area handbook series 

East Germany 

a country study 



i 

i 



East Germany 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Stephen R. Burant 
Research Completed 
July 1987 




On the cover: Looking across the Karl Marx Bridge to 
Marx-Engels Square in East Berlin 



Third Edition, First Printing, 1988. 

Copyright ®1988 United States Government as represented by 
the Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

East Germany : a country study. 

(DA pam ; 550-155) 
"Research completed July 1987." 
Bibliography: p. 381. 
Includes index. 

Supt. of Docs, no.: D 101.22:155/987 

1. Germany (East) I. Burant, Stephen R., 1954- 

II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. 

DD280.6.E22 1988 943.1087 87-600490 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-155 



Kor sale by [he Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, DC. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Carol Migdalovitz 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



111 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge their use and adaptation of 
substantial portions of the 1982 edition of East Germany: A Country 
Study, which was edited by Eugene K. Keefe. The authors of the 
1982 edition whose work was used in this edition were as follows: 
Rosalyn L. Unger, "Historical Setting"; Sallie M. Hicks, "The 
Society and Its Environment"; Arthur A. Stahnke, "The Econ- 
omy"; John M. Starrels, "Government and Politics"; William P. 
Baxter, "National Security"; and Carl H. McMillan, "The Coun- 
cil for Mutual Economic Assistance." The authors are also grate- 
ful to E. Wayne Merry of the Department of State, who provided 
information and insights on East German affairs. Robert E. 
McKeown and Scott McKnight furnished their expertise on the 
National People's Army. None of the individuals is responsible for 
the contents of this edition, however. 

In addition, the authors express their appreciation to members 
of the Federal Research Division staff who made significant con- 
tributions to the preparation of this study. The authors owe spe- 
cial thanks to Richard Nyrop, who supplied invaluable help and 
suggestions at all stages of the production process. Thanks go also 
to Marilyn L. Majeska, who edited the manuscript and oversaw 
its production, and to editorial assistants Barbara Edgerton and 
Izella Watson, who helped prepare the manuscript. Invaluable 
graphics support was provided by David P. Cabitto and his assis- 
tants, Sandra K. Cotugno and Kimberly A. Lord. Thanks are owed 
to Susan M. Lender, who reviewed the map drafts, and Harriett 
R. Blood, who prepared the final maps. Stanley M. Sciora fur- 
nished detailed information on the ranks and insignia of the East 
German armed forces, in addition to the forces of the other mem- 
bers of the Warsaw Pact. The index was prepared by Editorial 
Experts, and Andrea T. Merrill performed the final prepublica- 
tion review. Diann J. Johnson, of the Library of Congress Com- 
posing Unit, prepared the camera-ready copy under the supervision 
of Peggy Pixley. 

Finally, the authors wish to note the generosity of individuals 
and private agencies who provided photographs for use in this book. 
The authors are especially grateful for original work not previously 
published. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile xxi 

Introduction xxvii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting l 

James Gallagher 

EARLY HISTORY 4 

Ancient Period 4 

Medieval Germany 5 

The Reformation and the Thirty Years' War 9 

The End of the Holy Roman Empire and the Rise of 

Prussia 11 

GERMAN CONFEDERATION 14 

Age of Metternich 14 

Liberal Reform Movement 15 

Bismarck and Unification 16 

IMPERIAL GERMANY 18 

Political Consolidation 18 

Bismarck's Fall 19 

Industrial Expansion 20 

Wilhelmine Era 20 

World War I 22 

WEIMAR REPUBLIC 25 

Weimar Constitution 25 

Problems of Parliamentary Politics 27 

Stresemann Era 28 

Weimar Culture 29 

Hitler and the Rise of National Socialism 31 

THIRD REICH 34 

Consolidation of Power 34 

Mobilization for War 35 

Foreign Policy 36 

World War II 38 

Holocaust 40 

Internal Resistance 41 



vii 



GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 42 

Postwar Government 42 

Integration into the Soviet System 45 

Collectivization and Nationalization of Agriculture 

and Industry 47 

New Economic System 48 

Ulbricht Versus Detente 50 

Honecker and East-West Rapprochement 52 

Two Germanies 53 

Tenth Party Congress 55 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 57 

Stephen R. Burant 

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 61 

Boundaries 61 

Topography 63 

POPULATION 65 

Historical Trends 66 

Population Structure and Dynamics 67 

Settlement Patterns 68 

THE GERMAN PEOPLE 70 

Origins, Language, and Culture 71 

The German Question Today: One Nation 

or Two? 73 

Minority Groups 82 

SOCIAL STRUCTURE 83 

The Working Class 85 

The Political Elite 90 

The Creative Intelligentsia 92 

The Technical Intelligentsia 93 

INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANS OF SOCIETY 95 

The Family 95 

Mass Organizations 97 

The Educational System 103 

Religion and Religious Organizations 108 

DISSENT 112 

Chapter 3. The Economy 117 

Becky A. Gates 

RESOURCE BASE 120 

LABOR FORCE 120 

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND ITS CONTROL 

MECHANISMS 122 

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE 129 



vin 



ECONOMIC SECTORS . 136 

Mining, Energy, and Industry 136 

Agriculture 138 

Transportation and Communications 140 

BANKING, FINANCE, AND CURRENCY 144 

FOREIGN TRADE 147 

THE CONSUMER IN THE EAST GERMAN ECONOMY . . 154 

THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN, 1986-90 . 157 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 161 

Susan Larson 

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 164 

Constitution of 1949 164 

Constitution of 1968 166 

Amendments of 1974 166 

THE STATE APPARATUS 167 

Council of Ministers 168 

Council of State 170 

Legislature 171 

District and Local Government 174 

Judiciary < 175 

THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY 177 

Ideology and Politics 178 

Organization and Structure 181 

Politburo 182 

Secretariat 184 

Central Committee 185 

District and Local Party Levels 186 

Selection and Training Procedures 187 

Party Congresses 189 

Alliance Policy . . 193 

The Party and the Media . . 196 

Political Stability, Legitimation, and Succession 199 

FOREIGN POLICY 202 

Principles of Foreign Policy 203 

Relations with the Soviet Union 204 

Relations with West Germany 211 

Policy Toward the Third World 215 

Policy Toward the Industrial West 217 

Chapter 5. National Security 221 

Kathleen Luft 

THE SOVIET ZONE OF OCCUPATION 223 

The Soviet Military Administration 224 

Foundation of the People's Police 225 



ix 



THE REPUBLIC 227 

Ministry of the Interior and the Soviet Control 

Commission 227 

Creation of the National Defense Forces under the 

Ministry of the Interior 229 

Creation of the Ministry of State Security 229 

Uprising 230 

Establishment of the Ministry of Defense 231 

East Germany Joins the Warsaw Pact 232 

Crisis Control 233 

The National Security System and the Citizen 236 

The National People's Army and the Third World . . . 244 

ARMED FORCES 246 

Missions and Roles 249 

Ministry of Defense 250 

Ground Forces 251 

People's Navy 253 

Air Force/Air Defense Force 256 

Border Troops 258 

Uniforms, Decorations, and Insignia 262 

Military Traditions and Ceremonies 266 

Conditions of Service 267 

Reserves and Mobilization 269 

The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany 270 

PARAMILITARY FORCES 272 

Agencies of the Ministry of the Interior 272 

Agencies of the Ministry of State Security 273 

The Working-Class Combat Groups 275 

Civil Defense 275 

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 277 

Public Order and Mass Participation 277 

The Legal System 278 

The Court System 278 

Penal Institutions 280 

Penal Code 280 

Criminal Behavior 281 

Appendix A. Tables 283 

Appendix B. The Council for Mutual Economic 

Assistance 297 

Malinda K. Goodrich 

MEMBERSHIP, STRUCTURE, NATURE, AND SCOPE . . 298 

Membership 298 

Structure 301 



x 



Nature of Operation 305 

Comecon Versus the European Economic Community . 306 

EVOLUTION 308 

Early Years 308 

Rediscovery of Comecon after Stalin's Death 309 

Rapid Growth in Comecon Activity, 1956-63 309 

A Lull and Subsequent Revitalization in the Late 

1960s 310 

The Comprehensive Program for Socialist Economic 

Integration, 1971 311 

The 1980s 313 

COOPERATION UNDER THE 1971 COMPREHENSIVE 

PROGRAM 315 

Market Relations and Instruments 315 

Cooperation in Planning 318 

POWER CONFIGURATIONS WITHIN COMECON 323 

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 323 

Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam 324 

Support for Developing Countries 325 

TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 326 

Appendix C. The Warsaw Pact 331 

Karl Wheeler Soper 

THE SOVIET ALLIANCE SYSTEM, 1943-55 333 

The Organization of East European National Units, 

1943-45 333 

The Development of Socialist Armies in Eastern 

Europe, 1945-55 334 

THE WARSAW PACT, 1955-70 337 

East-West Diplomacy and the Formation of the 

Warsaw Pact 337 

Early Organizational Structure and Activities 339 

De-Stalinization and National Communism 340 

The Post-1956 Period 343 

THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE WARSAW 

PACT 351 

Political Organization 351 

Military Organization 351 

THE WARSAW PACT, 1970-87 359 

Detente 360 

The Role of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Countries 

in the Third World 361 

The Solidarity Crisis 363 

The End of Detente 365 



The Problem of Romania in the 1970s and 1980s 367 

The Renewal of the Alliance 368 

SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE WARSAW 

PACT 370 

Soviet Military Strategy 370 

The Role of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Countries in 

Soviet Military Strategy 372 

The Reliability of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact 

Armies 374 

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND THE WARSAW 

PACT 376 

The Weapons and Equipment of the Non-Soviet 

Warsaw Pact Armies 376 

Coordination of Arms Production 378 

Bibliography 381 

Glossary 413 

Index 415 

List of Figures 

1. German Democratic Republic, 1987 xxvi 

2. The Carolingian Empire Divided by the Treaty of Verdun, 

A.D. 843 6 

3. Germany at the Time of the Protestant Reformation .... 12 

4. The German Struggle for Unification, 1815-71 15 

5. The Weimar Republic, 1918-33 26 

6. Germany's Post-World War II Boundaries 43 

7. Topography and Drainage 64 

8. Transportation System, 1987 141 

9. Schematic Organization of the Socialist Unity Party of 

Germany 181 

10. Logos of the Alliance Parties 194 

11. National People's Army Oath of Allegiance, 1987 247 

12. Deployment of Major Ground Units as of 1981 248 

13. Organization of Ministry of Defense 252 

14. Representative Motorized Rifle and Tank Divisions, Early 

1980s 254 

15. Organization of Border Troops, 1987 259 

16. Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1987 264 

17. Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1987 265 

18. Organization of Ministry of the Interior, 1987 274 

19. Organization of Ministry of State Security, 1987 276 



xn 



Preface 



East Germany: A Country Study supersedes the edition published 
in 1982. The intervening five years have witnessed several signifi- 
cant changes in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). 
Until 1984 Western observers labeled East Germany as the Soviet 
Union's most loyal ally. That year East Germany entered into a 
dispute with the Soviet Union over General Secretary Erich 
Honecker's plan to visit the Federal Repubic of Germany (West 
Germany). This dispute led to open disagreements between the 
East Germans and the Soviets over whether small states should 
attempt to function as a bridge between East and West. Despite 
this disagreement, since 1982 East Germany has come to play an 
increasingly important role as the Soviet Union's "junior partner" 
in the Warsaw Pact and as a conduit for Soviet military and for- 
eign policy objectives in the Third World. East Germany also has 
become an increasingly important regional military power; offi- 
cially, the country's defense budget has risen over 30 percent since 
1980. During these same years, an organized dissident movement, 
in large measure sponsored by the Lutheran Church, has emerged 
in an attempt to stem the rising militarization of East German 
society. 

Although this study contains much material from the 1982 edi- 
tion, it is basically a new book. Like the previous volume, this study 
attempts to present the dominant social, economic, political, and 
national security aspects of East Germany. Sources of information 
included (books and scholarly journals, official reports of govern- 
ments and international organizations, foreign and domestic 
newspapers, and conference papers and proceedings. The authors 
have emphasized the use of foreign language sources to a greater 
extent than in the past. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end 
of the book, and a brief annotated bibliographic note on sources 
recommended for further reading appears at the end of each chap- 
ter. Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion 
table is provided to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with 
metric measurements (see table 1, Appendix A). A glossary is also 
included. 

German words that have become relatively common in English 
usage and are included in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, e.g., 
autobahn, blitzkrieg, have not been italicized and, if nouns, not 
capitalized. 



xin 



The origin of the word German is not known. Julius Caesar, 
Tacitus, and other Romans wrote about Germania (as the Romans 
called it) and peoples known as Germani, but the tribal peoples 
themselves to which the name was applied did not universally use 
the term. Sometime between the eighth and eleventh centuries 
A.D., the peoples referred to by others as Germani began refer- 
ring to themselves as diutisc, an early form of the word deutsche, which 
eventually became translated into English as the word German. 

The first article of the East German Constitution states: "The 
German Democratic Republic is a socialist state of workers and 
peasants." Because confusion often arises with respect to the use 
of the words socialist and communist, a note of caution is in order 
concerning their use in this book. Those countries that people in 
the West generally refer to as communist consistently describe them- 
selves as socialist, making the claim that they are working toward 
communism, which Karl Marx described as a more advanced 
historical stage than socialism. In this book, socialism and socialist 
are generally used in the East German sense as in the Socialist Unity 
Party of Germany, and that usage should not be confused or in 
any way equated with the democratic socialism of several West 
European and other countries. 



xiv 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Dau 



Event 



ANCIENT PERIOD 
ca. 500 B.C.-A.D. 100 



Germanic tribes settled in Germania. Roman 
army defeated by Sucvian tribe at Battle of 
the Teutoburg Forest in A.D. 9 and routed 
from central Germania. Romans subsequently 
reconquered Germania west of the Rhine and 
Danube rivers and constructed fortified 
frontiers. 



ca. A.D. 100-600 



Migration of Germanic peoples. Collapse of 
western Roman Empire: last Roman 
emperor, Romulus Augustus, deposed in 476 
by German armies led by Odovacar. Frankish 
tribes settled Gaul (France); Lombards set- 
tled northern Italy; Anglo-Saxons settled 
Britain. 



MEDIEVAL GERMANY (500-1517) 
Merovingian Dynasty (ca. 500-751) 



Carolingian Empire (752-91 1) 



Saxon Dynasty (919-1024) 



Merovingian kings ruled the Frankish tribes. 
Clovis, Frankish king 486-51 1, ruled over 
Gaul's mixed Germanic-Roman people. 
Pepin the Younger, Frankish king 741-68, 
founded Carolingian Empire in 752. 

Frankish rule reached from the Spanish marches 
into central Germany. The "Donation of 
Pepin" (754-56) established the Papal States. 
Charles the Great (Charlemagne), Frankish 
king 768-814, conquered Lombardy in 774. 
Carolingian Empire, known as First Reich, 
established 800; Charlemagne crowned Holy 
Roman Emperor (HRE) by pope. Louis I 
(Louis the Pious) HRE 814-40. Treaty of 
Verdun (843) divided Carolingian Empire 
among Charlemagne's three grandsons. Ger- 
many, France, and Middle Kingdom 
delineated and imperial title linked with Mid- 
dle Kingdom. Louis II (Louis the German) 
ruled east Frankish tribes 843-76. Charles III 
(Charles the Fat), German king 876-87 and 
HRE (881). Arnulf of Carinthia, German 
king 887-99 and HRE (896). Barbarian 
invasions weakened Carolingian rule; Ger- 
man duchies of Franconia, Saxony, Thurin- 
gia, Swabia, and Bavaria rose to power. Louis 
IV, German King 900-91 1 . Conrad I (Con- 
rad of Franconia) elected German king 
(91 1-18) following extinction of Carolingian 
Empire in the cast. 

Frankish and Saxon nobles elected Henry I 
(Henry the Fowler) German king (919-36). 
Subordination of duchies. Otto I (Otto the 
Great), German king 936-73, gained control 
of the Middle Kingdom, and the Holy Roman 



XV 



Table A. — Continued 



Empire of the German Nation began. Ger- 
man empire extended to the Elbe, and in the 
south to Vienna. Otto II, HRE 973-83. Otto 
HE HRE 983-1002. Henry II (Henry the 
Saint), HRE 1002-24. 

Salian Dynastv (1024-1125) Conrad II, Duke of Franconia. founded Salian 

Dynasty; elected HRE (1024-39). Henry III. 
HRE 1039-56. Henry IV. HRE 1056-1106. 
challenged Pope Gregory VII. Investiture 
Controversy and civil war. 1075-1 122: Ger- 
man empire weakened and German princes 
began rise to power. Henry V. HRE 1 106-25. 
The compromise Concordat of Worms ( 1 122) 
settled papal-imperial struggle. Eothar III. 
Saxon noble, elected HRE (1125-37). 

Hohenstaufen Dynasty (1138-1254) Hohenstaufen kings struggled to restore imperial 

authority. Conrad III elected German king 
(1138-52). Frederick I (Frederick Barba- 
rossa), HRE 1 152-90, proclaimed a general 
peace to restore order and stability. Beginning 
of Age of" Chivalry. Italian expeditions to 
regain imperial control of Middle Kingdom. 
Henry VI. HRE 1190-97. Civil war. 1198- 
1214. Frederick II, HRE 1212-50, restored 
imperial administration in Italy and Sicilv. but 
German princes gained concessions. Imperial 
statute of" 1232 established the secular and 
ecclesiastical princes as virtually independent 
rulers within their own territories (principali- 
ties). Great Interregnum, 1256-73; anarchy 
and civil war. German princes gained power 
and vied for imperial title; Habsburgs of" Aus- 
tria provided all German kings and emperors 
from mid-fifteenth century until dissolution 
of Holy Roman Empire in 1806. 

Rudolf of Habsburg elected German king (1273- 
91); acquired Austria and Styria in 1282 and 
made Habsburgs the strongest German dynasty. 
Adolf of Nassau elected German king (1292- 
98). Albert I (Habsburg) elected German king 
(1298-1308). Henry VII of Luxemburg. 
HRE 1308-13. founded dynasty that seriously 
rivaled Habsburgs from its power base in Bohe- 
mia. Louis IV (Louis the Bavarian) of House 
of Wittelsbach. HRE 1314-47. Charles IV of 
Luxemburg, HRE 1355-78. issued Golden 
Bull of 1356, which granted German princes 
power to elect emperor and provided basic 
constitution of Holy Roman Empire. VVcn- 
ccslas of" Bohemia, German king 1378-1400. 
Rupert of Palatinate, German king (1400-10): 



Early Habsburg Dynasty 
(1273-1519) 



XVI 



Table A. — Continued 



Date 



PROTESTANT REFORMATION 
AND RELIGIOUS WARS 
(1517-1648) 



RISE OF PRUSSIA (1648-1815) 



REACTION, REVOLUTION, AND 
GERMAN UNIFICATION 
(1815-71) 



Events 



Sigismund of Luxemburg, HRE 1400-37, last 
non-Habsburg emperor until 1742. Habs- 
burgs: Albert II, German king 1438-39; 
Frederick III, HRE 1440-93; Maximilian I, 
HRE 1493-1519. 

Martin Luther posted his ninety-five theses in 
Wittenberg in 1517 and challenged papal 
authority. Charles V, HRE 1519-56. Publi- 
cation in 1520 of Luther's three revolution- 
ary pamphlets. Luther banned by church and 
empire in 1521. Charles V's wars against 
France in 1521-26, 1526-29, 1536-38, and 
1542-44. Vienna threatened by Turks in 
1529. Diet of Augsburg, 1530; Protestant 
"Augsburg Confession" presented and Prot- 
estant League of Schmalkalden formed by 
German princes. War of Schmalkalden 
(1546-47) between Charles V and Protestant 
princes. Peace of Augsburg, 1555; Catholi- 
cism and Lutheranism formally recognized in 
Germany and each prince given right to 
decide religion to be practiced in his territory. 
Ferdinand I, HRE 1556-64. Maximilian II, 
HRE 1564-76. Rudolf II, HRE 1576-1612. 
Matthias, HRE 1612-19. Bohemian Revolt, 
1618; imperial armies defeated Bohemians at 
Battle of the White Mountain near Prague in 
1620. Thirty Years' War (1618-48); Peace of 
Prague signed in 1635; continuation of war 
by France; Peace of Westphalia, 1648. End 
of Holy Roman Empire as a European power. 

Frederick William, the Great Elector of 
Brandenburg-Prussia (1640-88), of Hohcn- 
zollern Dynasty, established absolute rule. 
Frederick III, elector of Brandenburg-Prussia 
(1688-1713), assumed title of king'in 1701. 
Frederick William I, Prussian king 1713-40, 
created Prussian civil and military bureau- 
cracy. Frederick II (Frederick the Great), 
Prussian king 1740-86; Seven Years' War 
(1756-63) against Austria demonstrated dis- 
cipline of Prussian armies. Frederick William 

II, Prussian king 1786-97. Frederick William 

III, Prussian king 1797-1840. Privileges of 
nobility within officer corps cast aside during 
War of Liberation against France. 

Congress of Vienna (1814-15) after Napoleon's 
defeat in the War of Liberation (1813-15) 
established German Confederation of thirty- 
nine monarchical states. Prince Klemens von 
Mcttcrnich, Austrian chancellor and foreign 



XVII 



Table A. — Continued 



minister (1809-48) headed confederation. 
Reversion to old order of social distinctions 
under Age of Mcttcrnich. Struggle between 
absolutism and liberalism during Vormarz 
(1815-48). Student unions agitated tor demo- 
cratic reform. Carlsbad Decrees (1819) out- 
lawed radical student organizations. Weimar. 
Bavaria, Baden, and Wiirttembcrg enacted 
c onstitutions, 1818-19. "July Revolution" in 
France, 1830, sparked revolutionary move- 
ments in Germany; Hesse and Saxony 
enacted constitutions. Brunswick, Hanover, 
and Oldenburg enacted constitutions in 1833. 
Zollverein (Customs Union) created in 1834. 
March 1848 revolution in Germany. 
Frankfurt Assembly (May 1848) planned con- 
stitutional German nation-state. Frederick 
William IV, Prussian king 1840-61, refused 
German crown in 1849; Frankfurt Assembly 
dissolved. German Confederation restored in 
1851. Prussia agreed to relinquish plans for 
a German union under its leadership in 
Treaty of Olmiitz. Wilhelm I, Prussian king 

1861- 88; Otto von Bismarck, chancellor 

1862- 90, united Germany. Constitutional 
struggle, 1862-66; Prussian king vied with 
German liberals in parliament on issue of 
budget for military expansion; Schlcswig- 
Holstein War, 1864. Seven Weeks' War 
(1866) between Austria and Prussia; German 
Confederation dissolved and Austria excluded 
from German politics. Austro-Hungarian 
Empire created in 1867. North German Con- 
federation (1867) headed by Prussia. Franco- 
Prussian War, 1870-71. Second Reich- 
Germany united as nation-state. 

IMPERIAL GERMANY Wilhelm I, German emperor 1871-88. Bis- 

(1871-1918) marck, chancellor 1871-90. Antisocialist law 

enacted 1878. Dual Alliance (1879): Ger- 
many, Austria-Hungary. Domestic alliance 
between aristocrats and industrialists. Com- 
prehensive social legislation program, 1881. 
Triple Alliance (1882): Germany, Austria- 
Hungary, and Italy. German colonies estab- 
lished 1884-85 in South-West Africa, Togo, 
the Camcroons, East Africa, and some Pacific 
islands. Frederick III, German emperor 
March 9-Junc 15, 1888. Wilhelm II, German 
emperor 1888-1918. Bismarck's fall, 1890. 
Leo von Caprivi, chancellor 1890-94. Prince 
Chlodwig zu Hohenlohc, chancellor 1894- 
1900. Naval Bill (1898) began naval race 
against Britain. Bcrnhard von Biilow, 



XV111 



WEIMAR REPUBLIC (1918-33) 



THIRD REICH (1933-45) 



chancellor 1900-1909. Moroccan crisis, 1905, 
in which Germany intervened in French and 
British sphere of influence. Theobald von 
Bethmann-Hollwcg, chancellor 1909-17. 
Moroccan crisis, 1911, in which Germany 
sent gunboat to port of Agadir. New Naval 
Bill, 1912. Balkan Wars, 1912-13, a nation- 
alist rebellion against Ottoman rule. Assas- 
sination of Austrian Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand (June 28, 1914) in Sarajevo, Bos- 
nia; Austria's declaration of war on Serbia. 
World War 1(1914-18); Germans defeated. 

November Revolution, 1918; Wilhelm II's abdi- 
cation. Social Democrats proclaimed republic. 
German armistice (November 11). Suppres- 
sion of revolt by Spartacus League in January 
1919. Treaty ' of Versailles, 1919. Social 
Democrat Friedrich Ebert elected president 
(1919-25). Right-wing Kapp Putsch at- 
tempted, 1920. Communist revolts in central 
Germany, Hamburg, and Ruhr district, 
1921. Occupation of Ruhr by French and Bel- 
gian troops, 1923. Hitler's beer hall putsch 
attempted in Munich. Gustav Stresemann, 
chancellor August-November 1923 and for- 
eign minister 1923-29, formulated policy of 
rapprochement with West. Dawes Plan on 
reparations, 1924. French-Belgian troops 
withdrawn from Ruhr, 1925. Paul von Hin- 
denburg, World War I army commander, 
elected president (1925-34). Locarno treaties, 

1925, and Treaty of Berlin with Soviet Union, 

1926. Germany joined League of Nations, 
1926. Young Plan on reparations, 1929; 
Allied troops withdrawn from Rhineland, 
1930. Depression Years (1929-33) and cabi- 
net crises. Heinrich Bruning, chancellor 
1930-32; government by presidential decree 
(Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution). 
Franz von Papen, chancellor May-December 
1932; Hitler's National Socialists won 230 
Reichstag seats in July 1932 elections and 
emerged as Germany's strongest political 
party. Kurt von Schleicher, chancellor 
December 1932-January 1933. President 
Hindenburg appointed Hitler to chancellor- 
ship on January 30, 1933. 

Reichstag fire, February 1933; Hitler demanded 
presidential emergency decree. Enabling Act 
(March 1933) accorded Hitler's cabinet dic- 
tatorial powers. Germany declared one-party 
National Socialist state, July 1933. Death of 



XIX 



Table A. — Continued 



Hindcnburg, August 1934; Hitler combined 
offices ol' president and chancellor. German 
rearmament, 1935. Rhineland remilitarized 
in 1936 and Berlin-Rome Axis formed. At 
secret conference (November 1937) Hitler 
announced intention to begin eastward expan- 
sion. Austrian Anschluss (annexation) in 
March 1938. Czechoslovak Sudetenland 
annexed, October 1938. Germany occupied 
Czech-populated provinces of Bohemia and 
Moravia, March 1939. Poland invaded in 
September 1939. World War II (1939-45). 

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC Yalta Conference (February 1945) determined 

REPUBLIC (1949- ) division of Germany into occupation zones. 

Soviet occupation zone came under political 
and economic domination of Soviet Union; 
Communist Party of Germany and Social 
Democrats merged to form Socialist Unity 
Party of Germany in April 1946. German 
Democratic Republic (East Germany) 
proclaimed October 7, 1949; German Com- 
munist, Walter Ulbricht, first secretary of the 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany (1949-71). 
Stalinization, 1949-55. East Germany joined 
Comecon in 1950. Workers' uprising, June 
1953. East Germany granted formal sover- 
eignty by Soviet Union, 1954. Joined War- 
saw Pact in 1956. Berlin Wall built August 
1961. New Economic System — economic 
reform program, 1963-67. Ulbricht dismissed 
May 1971; Honecker named new party 
leader, and detente negotiations begun. Ideo- 
logical Abgrenzung (demarcation) between East 
Germany and West Germany. Four Power 
Agreement on Berlin, 1971. Basic Treaty 
between East Germany and West Germany 
(1972) recognized two German states. Admis- 
sion to United Nations, 1973. Tenth Party 
Congress (1981) confirmed East Germany's 
commitment to Soviet Union. 



XX 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: German Democratic Republic. 
Short Form: East Germany or GDR 

Term for Citizens: Formally, Citizens of the GDR; informally, 
East Germans. 

Capital: East Berlin (Not recognized by United States, Britain, 
and France). 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 108,568 square kilometers, including East 
Berlin. 

Topography: Lies in northern European plain. Lowlands and low 



xxi 



hills cover coastal and central sections; mountains and hills found 
in south. Highest point, 1,213 meters. 

Climate: Maritime in north; gradually changes to continental in 
center and south. 

Society 

Population: Approximately 16,692,000, including East Berlin (July 

1986); average annual growth rate, percent. 

Ethnic Groups: Culturally and linguistically homogeneous; 
99.7 percent German; 0.3 percent Sorb (Slavic) and other minorities. 

Language: Modern German spoken by all people. Regional dialects 
used at home; Sorbs bilingual. 

Religion: Religious freedom constitutionally guaranteed but active 
participation very low. About 47 percent Protestant, 7 percent 
Roman Catholic, 46 percent unaffiliated or other; less than 5 per- 
cent of Protestants and 25 percent of Roman Catholics active par- 
ticipants. 

Education: School system highly centralized with standard cur- 
riculum, mandatory attendance through tenth grade, and strong 
emphasis on vocational training. Technology and science also 
stressed at secondary level and above. Indoctrination in Marxist- 
Leninist ideology included at all levels. 

Health and Welfare: Compulsory social insurance program 
includes free medical care, unemployment compensation, and 
retirement benefits. Health care good; steady decline in infant mor- 
tality rates and incidence of communicable diseases. Unusually high 
proportion of elderly; pensions low relative to wages. 

Economy 

Gross National Product: Estimated US$163.7 billion in 1984; 
US$9,800 GNP per capita, with 3 percent growth rate. Economy 
centrally planned and controlled by communist party. 

Energy and Mining: Country energy deficient; relies on imported 
crude oil and natural gas from Soviet Union and domestic lignite. 
Energy probable major problem for 1990s. Dependent on imports 
for iron and nonferrous ores. 

Industry: Manufacturing industries dominate. Machinery impor- 
tant; also chemicals, electronics, metallurgy, textiles, and food proc- 
essing. 



xxn 



Agriculture: System largely collectivized. Efficient but must import 
grain, vegetables, vegetable oil, and livestock. 

Foreign Trade: Major trade partners other communist countries. 
Major exports machinery, optics, and electronics. Major imports 
crude oil, agricultural products, metals and metal products, and 
consumer goods. Balance of trade positive in 1984: exports US$25.2 
billion; imports US$22.9 billion. 

Exchange Rate: About 205 GDR marks per US$1 in March 1987. 
Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Fiscal Policy: Central planning; state almost exclusive owner of 
means of production. 

Transportation and Communications 

Railroads: 14,226 kilometers total in 1985, of which 13,777 stan- 
dard gauge and 293 narrow gauge; 2,523 overhead electrified. In 
1984, 3,830 kilometers doubled-tracked. 

Roads: 120,433 kilometers total in 1983; 47,380 kilometers con- 
crete, asphalt, and stone block, of which 18,987 kilometers autobahn 
and limited-access roads; over 73,000 kilometers asphalt treated, 
gravel, crushed stone, and earth. 

Inland Waterways: 2,319 kilometers total in 1984. 

Pipelines: For oil, 1,301 kilometers; for refined products, 500 
kilometers; for natural gas, 1,700 kilometers. 

Ports: Wismar, Rostock, Stralsund, and Sassnitz on Baltic; East 
Berlin, Eisenhiittenstadt, Magdeburg, and Riesa on inland water- 
ways. 

Airports: East Berlin-Schonefeld, Dresden, Erfurt, Heringsdorf, 
and Leipzig. 

Telecommunications: In mid-1980s about 3.6 million telephones, 
or 21.8 for every 100 inhabitants. System not fully automated. 

Government and Politics 

Politics: Monopolized by Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozi- 
alistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands — SED), the communist party. 
General Secretary Erich Honecker also chairman of Council of 
State. Four other parties allowed to exist under SED domination; 
no opposition allowed. SED politics closely tied to Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union. 



xxin 



Government: Constitution of 1968, substantially amended in 1974. 
Legislature (People's Chamber) meets infrequently; Council of State 
and Council of Ministers principal government bodies. Important 
posts occupied by high-ranking SED members. 

Foreign Relations: Diplomatic relations with most countries. 
Closely allied with Soviet Union in international affairs. Relations 
with United States since 1974. 

International Agreements: Active participation in Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), Warsaw Pact, and United 
Nations. Signatory to Helsinki Accords and Mutual and Balanced 
Force Reduction Agreement. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: National People's Army in 1987 included ground 
forces (120,000 with 60 percent conscripts); People's Navy (16,300 
with 50 percent conscripts), and Air Force/Air Defense Force 
(39,000 with 38 percent conscripts), respectively. All forces orga- 
nized under Ministry of Defense. Group of Soviet Forces in Ger- 
many numbered about 380,000 men in 20 ground force divisions. 

Ground Forces: Two tank divisions, four motorized rifle regiments, 
two surface-to-surface missile brigades, two artillery regiments and 
one antiaircraft artillery regiment, eight air-defense regiments, one 
airborne battalion, two antitank divisions, and several support units. 
Frontier troops (50,000) organized and equipped as motorized rifle 
battalion. 

Navy: 1st Flotilla, headquartered in Peenemunde; 4th Flotilla, 
based in Rostock- Warnemunde; 6th Flotilla, located on Riigen 
Island; Coastal Border Brigade in Rostock; one communications 
regiment stationed on Riigen Island; and numerous support units. 

Air Force/ Air Defense Force: In air force, two regiments of fighter 
aircraft, one reconnaissance squadron, one transport regiment, and 
three helicopter regiments. In air defense force, six air regiments, 
seven surface-to-air missile regiments, and two radar regiments. 

Equipment: Primarily Soviet. 

Paramilitary: Includes People's Police (12,000), Transport Police 
(8,500), Feliks Dzierzynski Guard Regiment (7,000) of Ministry 
of State Security (secret police), Civil Defense officers and non- 
commissioned officers (3,000), and Working Class Combat Groups 
(500,000), all of whom receive some military training. 



xxiv 



Police: All police forces centralized under Ministry of the Interior. 
People's Police includes Alert Units, Municipal Police, Traffic 
Police, Criminal Police, and Passport Department. Transport Police 
and Fire Fighters separately organized. 

Foreign Military Treaties: Member of Warsaw Pact; also has 
bilateral defense treaty with the Soviet Union. 



xxv 




»'J SuM. 
Boundary 

"S. Suhl 

representation 
nof necessorffy 

I— 50 10 



Figure 1. German Democratic Republic, 1987 



xxvi 



Introduction 



THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (East Germany) 
came into existence on October 7, 1949, when the German Eco- 
nomic Commission formed a provisional government in the Soviet 
zone of occupied Germany. This move occurred in response to the 
action taken by the United States, Britain, and France, which in 
1948 had agreed to unite their respective occupation zones into a 
West German republic. The division of Germany and the found- 
ing of an East German state signified several historical reversals. 
First, the postwar partition of Germany represented a return to 
the country's previous existence as a divided nation. As of 1945, 
Germans had been united in a single sovereign state for only the 
last seventy-four years. Second, for at least 1,000 years Germans 
had expanded eastward, conquering territories previously controlled 
by Slavs and the Baltic peoples. As part of the settlement ending 
World War II, Germany lost territories to Poland and the Soviet 
Union that German rulers had controlled for centuries. Third, the 
lines of economic, cultural, military, and political influence had 
historically run from Germany to Eastern Europe and Russia. 
However, after World War II the Soviet Union imposed on East 
Germany a brand of Marxism-Leninism developed on Russian soil, 
the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Ein- 
heitspartei Deutschlands — SED), patterned itself after the Com- 
munist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and East Germany 
adopted a governmental system modeled in most respects on that 
of the Soviet Union. 

Historically, East Germany has been the Soviet Union's most 
pliant and loyal ally in Eastern Europe. Lack of international recog- 
nition made East Germany dependent on the Soviet Union. Until 
the Four Power Agreement on Berlin and the signing of the Basic 
Treaty by the two Germanies in the early 1970s, the noncommunist 
world treated the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) 
as the "real Germany" and East Germany as nothing more than 
an artificial state lacking international legitimacy. For a time, this 
sentiment seems to have been shared by the Soviet leadership as 
well. In 1954 Viacheslav Molotov, the Soviet representative at the 
Four Power Foreign Ministers Conference in Berlin, proposed 
simultaneous elections in both Germanies leading to the creation 
of a unified German state. If such elections had been held, the SED 
would have lost power. The presence of West Germany also made 
the SED regime more dependent on the Soviet Union. Before the 



xxvn 



construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, 2.5 million East German 
citizens had walked across the border to live in West Germany. 
A common language, family ties, and access to West German media 
left the East Germans much less isolated from West European cul- 
ture than were their counterparts in Eastern Europe. All these fac- 
tors tended to impede SED efforts to win popular legitimacy for 
the Marxist-Leninist regime in East Germany. Without legitimacy, 
both in the eyes of most of the world and in the eyes of its own 
people, the SED could turn only to the Soviet Union and its allies 
for support. To ensure Soviet loyalty to the cause of the SED 
regime, East Germany had to act as Moscow's model ally. 

East Germany is a one-party state. Although four other parties 
exist, they have been co-opted by the SED. These four parties — 
the Christian Democratic Union, the Liberal Democratic Party of 
Germany, the Democratic Peasants' Party of Germany, and the 
National Democratic Party of Germany — have the appearance of 
power without actually sharing it with the SED. In fact, these four 
parties act as "transmission belts" for SED decisions and policies 
to social strata such as the intelligentsia and the peasantry (see 
Alliance Policy, ch. 4). 

The operative principle of SED decision making is the Leninist 
precept of "democratic centralism." According to this principle, 
free discussion of policy alternatives by all SED members concerned 
with a given decision is followed by a vote; then the minority sub- 
mits to the position of the majority. In fact, the SED is a monolithic 
party in which the lines of decision making run from top to bot- 
tom. In East Germany, as in the Soviet Union and the other 
Marxist-Leninist regimes in Eastern Europe, the communist party 
is the real locus of power. In mid- 1987 Erich Honecker, who took 
over as first secretary of the SED from Walter Ulbricht in 1971 
( the title changed to general secretary in 1976), was the most power- 
ful political figure in East Germany by virtue of his party posi- 
tioi The top governmental position, that of the chairman of the 
Council of Ministers, had long been occupied by Willi Stoph, who 
held a position subordinate to that of Honecker in the SED Polit- 
buro. Other leading governmental figures — such as Horst Sinder- 
mann, the president of the People's Chamber, and Erich Mielke, 
the minister of state security — were also members of the Politburo. 
According to the operative rules of democratic centralism, at any 
given level government officials carry out decisions made by the 
party. Stated simply, the government implements and administers 
policies decided by the SED. 

Throughout its tenure, the Honecker regime has attempted to 
form a distinct East German political culture. This undertaking 



xxvm 



involves the inculcation of values, attitudes, and casts of mind that 
strengthen the citizenry's sense of the regime's legitimacy and 
authority. Since the early 1970s, for example, the Honecker regime 
has pursued a policy of Abgrenzung (demarcation — see Glossary) to 
stress differences in political values, history, and culture between 
the two Germanies (see The German Question Today: One Nation 
or Two?, ch. 2). Another important component of political cul- 
ture is tradition, which justifies the existence of a given polity and 
gives it a sense of rootedness. Hence, the SED has portrayed itself 
as the culmination of the German revolutionary tradition, as 
represented by theoreticians and activists such as Karl Marx, 
Friedrich Engels, and Karl Liebknecht. In an effort to locate its 
rule within the broader course of German history, the SED depicts 
itself as the heir to the positive achievements of historical figures 
such as Martin Luther, Carl von Clausewitz, and Otto von Bis- 
marck. These personages have no connection with Germany's 
revolutionary past (in fact, Bismarck made every effort to suppress 
the Social Democratic Party of Germany), and the regime had 
previously linked them to the discredited ideology of German 
nationalism. During Honecker' s tenure as SED party chief, offi- 
cial East German political culture has evolved to incorporate a sig- 
nificant element of the German national heritage. 

Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, East Germany has 
managed to make itself economically and politically indispensable 
to the Soviet Union in a variety of ways. Economically, East Ger- 
many has demonstrated to the world that a centralized, planned 
economy modeled on that of the Soviet Union can work (see Eco- 
nomic Policy and Performance, ch. 3). East Germany, for exam- 
ple, boasts the highest standard of living among the socialist 
countries of Eastern Europe. Its economy is highly developed, and 
chemicals and machinery constitute its most important products. 
It was the first among the socialist economies to move into the field 
of high technology and other intensive forms of production. East 
Germany is also important to the Soviet Union because it acts as 
a conduit between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon) and the European Economic Community (EEC). The 
origin of this role lies in West Germany's desire to facilitate an 
eventual German reunification. In the West German view, creat- 
ing a special economic relationship with East Germany has been 
one means of achieving this objective. This relationship has eased 
the transfer of EEC goods to East Germany. From East Germany, 
the merchandise can be exported to other Comecon countries (see 
Appendix B). Equally important, the special relationship between 
the two Germanies has also provided East Germany (and hence 



xxix 



Comecon as a whole) with a much-needed source of hard cur- 
rency. 

Throughout its existence, East Germany has proved to be a vital 
political ally of the Soviet Union. In 1956 the Ulbricht regime 
roundly condemned the Hungarian revolt. Twelve years later, East 
German troops, together with those of the Soviet Union, Hungary, 
Poland, and Bulgaria, marched into Czechoslovakia to quell the 
reform movement initiated during the Prague Spring. The East 
Germans also heavily criticized the Solidarity labor union move- 
ment in Poland as well as the Polish United Workers Party, which 
allowed the Solidarity reform movement to persist on Polish soil. 
The East Germans routinely call for tighter integration of the Soviet 
alliance system in Eastern Europe and for adoption of a unified 
position on political issues ranging from the United States Stra- 
tegic Defense Initiative to those of strategy and tactics in the Soviet- 
led world communist movement. Indeed, because East Germany 
has so often followed the Soviet political lead and has continually 
tried to persuade other Soviet allies to do so, Western observers 
describe East Germany as the Soviet Union's "junior partner" 
within the Warsaw Pact (see Appendix C). 

East Germany's role as the Soviet Union's junior partner also 
comes into play in the Third World. Here, East Germany has 
carved out a role for which it has no peer in the Soviet alliance. 
East Berlin provides many forms of military and economic assis- 
tance, police training, and technical education to selected Third 
World allies of the Soviet Union (see Policy Toward the Third 
World, ch. 4). To be sure, in extending this aid East Germany 
has gained political recognition from other countries as well as access 
to raw materials. However, in undertaking these activities East Ger- 
many acts for the Soviet-dominated socialist community. East Ger- 
man aid serves primarily as a means to extend Soviet influence 
throughout the world. 

For most of its existence, East Germany has been a model socialist 
state in the sense that it has experienced little public dissent. The 
spontaneous uprising in 1953 against communist rule in East Ger- 
many confined itself to the most important industrial centers and 
did not grip the country in the way that rebellions or reform move- 
ments in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Poland were able to do. 
From 1953 to the early 1980s, the SED used both rewards and 
punishments to keep the East German citizenry politically passive. 
Because food and rent were subsidized by the government, con- 
sumer prices remained low. Thus, East German workers had no 
economic impetus to follow their Polish counterparts and organize 
an independent labor union to press for economic reform. The party 



xxx 



also penetrates into most aspects of daily life in East Germany. With 
no areas of social life free of party domination, it has been difficult 
for East Germans interested in independent political action to join 
together, create a program, and attempt to further their common 
political ends. To repress manifestations of open dissent, forces of 
the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of State Security com- 
bine to form a powerful and pervasive police apparatus. The ulti- 
mate guarantors of SED rule in East Germany, however, are the 
National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee — NVA) and the 
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG). The NVA unites the 
border guards and ground, air, air defense, and naval forces into 
a total strength of 175,000. The NVA is a competent, well-trained 
force (see Armed Forces, ch. 5). The GSFG numbers over 380,000; 
it ensures the political quiescence of East German society as well 
as East Germany's continued membership in the Warsaw Pact. 

In the 1980s, an independent peace movement had succeeded 
in establishing itself in East Germany (see Dissent, ch. 2). Several 
factors explain the emergence and persistence of this form of political 
dissent. First, the movement revolves around peace and disarma- 
ment, issues to which the SED has publicly committed itself. The 
independent peace movement seeks to compel the East German 
regime to abide by its own rhetoric; it does not question the fun- 
damental political bases of the Marxist-Leninist regime, such as 
one-party rule, alliance with the Soviet Union, and a planned econ- 
omy. Second, from its inception the independent peace movement 
has been nonviolent. Third, the independent peace movement grew 
out of the Lutheran Church, an institution that is somewhat 
independent of the regime. The church offered peace activists 
throughout the country channels of communication insulated from 
regime control, an institutional setting in which activists could come 
together and formulate a program, and a forum in which to air 
the program for a nationwide constituency. Having gained in 
strength, the peace movement has proceeded to speak out against 
the militarization of East German society, environmental pollu- 
tion, and the development of nuclear power in East Germany. 

In the 1980s, other events have diminished East Germany's status 
as a model ally of the Soviet Union. East Germany derives many 
economic and political benefits from its relations with West Ger- 
many. As a result, East Germany's desire to maintain good rela- 
tions with West Germany has clashed with the Soviet interest in 
curtailing relations between Warsaw Pact countries and those of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Soviet policy 
changed because of a general cooling of superpower relations 
brought on by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the declaration 



xxxi 



of martial law in Poland, and NATO's decision to deploy Pershing 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in West Germany. 
In this public quarrel, Hungary backed the East German position, 
while Czechoslovakia, East Germany's hardline ally in alliance 
affairs, together with Poland, supported the Soviet position. The 
disagreement culminated in 1984 with Honecker's indefinite post- 
ponement of a planned trip to West Germany. 

The SED leadership has also differed with the Soviet Union on 
the need to emulate the economic and political reform program 
of CPSU general secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev. Soviet reforms 
under Gorbachev envisage the institutionalization of measures to 
encourage efficiency and innovation in the Soviet planned economy; 
the introduction of greater openness, reform of the party, and new 
electoral procedures in the political sphere; and the liberalization 
of the cultural sphere. The East German response has been gener- 
ally to maintain that reforms tailored to Soviet conditions are not 
necessarily applicable to East Germany. The Honecker regime has 
argued that for years East Germany has been introducing mea- 
sures to facilitate technological innovation and economic modern- 
ization and that East German economic successes prove the viability 
and vigor of its economic system. If changes are required, the 
Honecker regime contends that solutions must correspond to local 
conditions. Politically, the SED leadership has averred that prob- 
lems such as corruption and immobilisme, which the party reforms 
advocated by Gorbachev seek to eliminate, do not exist in East Ger- 
many. In the realm of culture, the Honecker regime offers the 
dubious claim that it has already introduced many measures to ease 
state control of the arts. 

East Germany's success as the Soviet Union's junior partner 
provided the foundation for its resistance to Soviet policies in for- 
eign and domestic policy. East German economic performance, 
partially due to the special relationship it enjoys with the Bonn 
government but primarily due to indigenous factors, increased East 
Germany's clout within the Soviet alliance. East Germany's sta- 
tus and power enabled it to pursue policies contrary to Soviet 
interests, if only to a limited degree. Hence, Soviet-East German 
friction demonstrates the emergence of East Germany's coming 
of age as an actor within the socialist interstate system. Like other 
small states of Eastern Europe, East Germany has achieved a suffi- 
cient amount of legitimacy, international recognition, and economic 



xxxn 



power to be able to express occasional public disagreement with 
the Soviet Union. 

* * * 

From September 7 to September 11, 1987, Honecker paid an 
unprecedented visit to West Germany. Several factors accounted 
for this trip, which had been scheduled for 1984 but indefinitely 
postponed since that time. The prospect of a Soviet- American agree- 
ment on IRBMs in Europe had increased the chance for better inter- 
German relations. West Germany had facilitated the prospect of 
an accord when Chancellor Helmut Kohl pledged to scrap his coun- 
try's seventy-two IRBMs, which carry American nuclear warheads. 
In addition, in 1987 the Soviet Union itself had been seeking bet- 
ter relations with West Germany. Honecker had to obtain Soviet 
permission for the trip, and Soviet approval may be seen as an effort 
to reward West Germany for its missile stance and as an attempt 
to improve relations with that country. From the East German per- 
spective, Honecker' s trip marked another effort to obtain West Ger- 
man recognition of East Germany's independent statehood. The 
practical significance of Honecker' s trip was rather limited. East 
Germany and West Germany signed agreements on scientific- 
technical cooperation, environmental protection and nuclear safety, 
and several measures to ease travel and communications between 
the two countries. Ultimately, the primary importance of Honecker's 
visit lay in its reaffirmation of the existence of two independent 
German states in the heart of Europe. 



September 15, 1987 Stephen R. Burant 



xxxm 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Medieval tower 



THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (East Germany) 
was proclaimed in October 1949 in the post-World War II Soviet 
occupation zone. The postwar division of Germany had enabled 
the German communist Walter Ulbricht and his Socialist Unity 
Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands — 
SED) to consolidate political power and establish a Soviet-style dic- 
tatorship. In 1961 the construction of the Berlin Wall effectively 
terminated the exodus of East Germans to the Federal Republic 
of Germany (West Germany), forcing citizens to reconcile them- 
selves to the communist regime. However, Erich Honecker, who 
succeeded Ulbricht in 1971, negotiated a detente that normalized 
trade and travel relations between the "two Germanies." This 
detente has resulted in strengthened ties and contacts between East 
German citizens and their West German neighbors. 

Germany had not been united as a nation-state until 1871, when 
authoritarian and militaristic Prussia subordinated the traditional 
German monarchical states and created an empire headed by the 
Prussian king. Imperial Germany was consolidated politically on 
the basis of an alliance between landed aristocracy and the finan- 
cial and industrial bourgeoisie. These groups launched the Ger- 
man pursuit of global politics, establishing overseas colonies and 
spheres of influence. They succeeded in stirring the nationalistic 
sentiment of the masses by promises of world power status and in 
diverting interest in domestic reform by emphasis on foreign policy. 
Throughout its existence, Imperial Germany competed against Brit- 
ain, France, and Russia to maintain its place within the European 
balance of power; this competition culminated in World War I. 

The Weimar Republic, established in 1918, was the first attempt 
to institute democratic government in Germany. The Social 
Democrats proclaimed the republic, and in the throes of military 
defeat the German people supported a democratic coalition cabi- 
net. The republic's strong presidency, however, reflected the Ger- 
man authoritarian tradition. The Social Democrats soon allied with 
elements of the old Imperial Army to suppress the radical left, and 
the party failed to implement social reform. Within two years, the 
Weimar coalition had lost its parliamentary majority, and in 
1925 the German public elected Paul von Hindenburg, the former 
World War I army commander, to the presidency. During the 
depression years (1929-33), Adolf Hitler's National Socialists 
(Nazis) acquired a mass following, emerging in July 1932 as 



3 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Germany's strongest political party. Hindenburg appointed Hitler 
to the German chancellorship in January 1933, thus enabling the 
fuhrer to accomplish the "legal revolution" that transformed Ger- 
many into a totalitarian dictatorship. The defeat of Hitler's Third 
Reich in World War II resulted in the division of Germany into 
the two states that continued to coexist in the late 1980s. 

The Basic Treaty between East Germany and West Germany, 
signed in 1972, politically recognized two German states. About 
the same time, the Honecker regime instituted a policy known as 
Abgrenzung (demarcation — see Glossary), which emphasized East 
Germany's distinctiveness as a nation and state. East German 
citizens continue to be attracted by the democratic politics and 
material wealth of West Germany, however, and the Honecker 
regime became increasingly involved in the repression of dissidents 
who called for political democratization and German reunification. 

Early History 

Ancient Period 

The Germanic tribes, which probably originated from a mix- 
ture of races in the coastal region of the Baltic Sea, inhabited the 
greater northern part of the European continent by about 500 B.C. 
By 100 B.C. they had advanced into the central and southern area 
of present-day Germany. At this time, there were three major 
groups: the eastern Germanic peoples living along the Oder and 
Vistula rivers; the northern Germanic peoples inhabiting the 
southern part of present-day Scandinavia; and the western Ger- 
manic peoples inhabiting the extreme south of Jutland and the area 
between the North Sea and the Elbe, Rhine, and Main rivers. The 
Rhine was the temporary boundary line between Germanic and 
Roman territory after the defeat of the Suevian tribe by Julius 
Caesar about 70 B.C. The threatening presence of the warlike tribes 
caused the Romans to pursue a campaign of expansion into Ger- 
manic territory. However, the defeat of the provincial governor 
Varus by Arminius in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest (A.D. 9) 
halted Roman colonial policy; Arminius had learned the enemy's 
strategies during his military training in the Roman armies. This 
battle brought about the liberation of the greater part of Germany 
from Roman domination. The Rhine River was once again the 
boundary line, until the Romans reoccupied territory on its eastern 
bank and built the limes, a 300-mile fortification, in the first cen- 
tury A.D. 

The migration of Germanic peoples ( Volkerwanderung) from the 
second through the sixth century A.D. was a violent period of 



4 



Historical Setting 



change and destruction in which eastern and western tribes left their 
native lands and settled in newly acquired territories. This period 
of Germanic history, which later supplied material for heroic epics, 
contributed to the downfall of the Roman Empire and resulted in 
a considerable expansion of habitable area for the Germanic peo- 
ples. However, with the exception of those established by the Franks 
and the Anglo-Saxons, the Germanic kingdoms founded during 
these centuries of migration were of relatively short duration because 
of their assimilation by the native Roman populations. The final 
conquest of Roman Gaul by the Frankish tribes in the sixth century 
became a milestone of European history; it was the Franks who 
were to become the founders of a civilized German state. 

Medieval Germany 

Merovingian Dynasty, ca. 500-751 

In Gaul there was a fusion of Roman and Germanic societies. 
Clovis, a Salian Frank of the family of Meroveus, became the 
absolute ruler of a Germanic kingdom of mixed Roman-Germanic 
population in 486. He consolidated his rule by victories over the 
Gallo-Romans and all the Frankish tribes, and his successors made 
other Germanic tribes tributaries of the Merovingian Dynasty. The 
remaining two and one-half centuries of the dynasty, however, were 
marked by internecine struggles and a state of decline. During the 
dynasty, the Franks, following the baptism of Clovis, which inau- 
gurated the alliance between the Frankish kingdom and the Roman 
Catholic Church, reluctantly began to adopt Christianity. 

Carolingian Empire, 752-911 

Charles the Great (Charlemagne) inherited the Frankish crown 
in 768. During his reign (768-814), he subdued Bavaria, conquered 
Lombardy and Saxony, and established his authority in central 
Italy. By the end of the eighth century, his kingdom, later to become 
known in German historiography as the First Reich, included the 
territories of present-day France, parts of Spain and Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, and the greater 
part of Italy. Charlemagne, the founder of an empire that was 
Roman, Christian, and Germanic, was crowned Holy Roman 
Emperor by the pope in the year 800. 

The Carolingian Empire was based on an alliance between the 
emperor, a temporal ruler supported by his military retinue, and 
the pope of the Roman Catholic Church, who granted spiritual 
sanction for the imperial mission. Charlemagne and his son, Louis I 



5 




Source: Based on information from Geoffrey Barraclough, The Origins of Modern Germany, 
Oxford, 1949, 12. 

Figure 2. The Carolingian Empire Divided by the Treaty of Verdun, 
A.D. 843 



(Louis the Pious, 814-40), established centralized authority, 
appointed imperial counts as administrators, and developed a 
hierarchical feudal structure headed by the emperor. However, the 
empire of Charlemagne, which, in contrast with the legalistic and 
abstract Roman concept of government, relied on personal leader- 
ship, lasted less than a century. 

A period of internecine warfare followed the death of Louis. 
The Treaty of Verdun (843) restored peace and divided the empire 
among his three sons, geographically and politically delineating the 
future territories of Germany, France, and the area between them, 
known as the Middle Kingdom (see fig. 2 ). The eastern Carolin- 
gian kings ruled in present-day Germany and Austria, the western 
Carolingian kings in the area of France. The imperial title, however, 
came to depend increasingly on rule over the Middle Kingdom 



6 



Historical Setting 



(primarily Italy). By this time, in addition to a geographical and 
political delineation, a cultural and linguistic split had occurred. 
The east Frankish tribes still spoke Germanic dialects; the language 
of the west Frankish tribes, under the influence of Gallo- Latin, had 
developed into Old French. Meanwhile, the eastern Carolingian 
kingship was being weakened by the rise of regional duchies, which 
acquired the trappings of petty kingdoms. This marked the begin- 
ning of particularism, in which territorial rulers promoted their 
own interests and autonomy without regard to the kingdom. These 
duchies were strengthened when the Carolingian line died out in 
911, leaving kings who had no direct line to the throne to assert 
their power against the territorial dukes. 

Saxon Dynasty, 919-1024 

The Saxon kings succeeded in establishing a monarchy, which 
subordinated the territorial dukes and reversed the particularist 
trend. They founded a new empire, established the principle of 
hereditary succession, and increased the crown lands, the founda- 
tion of monarchical power. The Saxon kings also encouraged east- 
ward expansion and colonization, thereby extending German rule 
to the Slavic territories of Poland and Bohemia and to Austria. In 
962, Otto I (Otto the Great), who had gained control of the Mid- 
dle Kingdom, was formally crowned Holy Roman Emperor, an 
event that marked the beginning of the Holy Roman Empire of 
the German Nation. 

Saltan Dynasty, 1024-1125 

After the death of Henry II in 1024, the crown passed to the 
Salians, a Frankish tribe. The German monarchy established itself 
as a major European power under the Salian emperors. The main 
Salian accomplishment was the development of a permanent admin- 
istrative system based on a class of public officials who served the 
crown. Salian rule was challenged in 1075 by the Investiture Con- 
troversy, a papal-imperial struggle in which Pope Gregory VII 
demanded that the Salian king Henry IV renounce his rights over 
the German church. The pope further attacked the concept of 
monarchy by divine right and gained the support of significant ele- 
ments of the German nobility interested in delimiting imperial 
absolutism. Henry was forced to journey to Canossa in northern 
Italy to do penance and receive absolution from the pope. He 
resumed the practice of lay investiture, however, and had an anti- 
pope elected. 

The papal-imperial struggle resulted in civil war, which ravaged 
the German lands from 1077 until the issue was resolved by the 



7 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Concordat of Worms in 1122. Control of Italy was lost, and the 
crown became dependent on the political support of competing 
aristocratic factions. Feudalism advanced rapidly as freemen sought 
protection by swearing allegiance to a lord. The princes, having 
thereby acquired extensive territories and large military retinues, 
took over administration within their territories and organized it 
around an increasing number of castles. Hence the foundations 
of the territorial particularism characteristic of subsequent German 
history were laid during the civil wars. The ultimate result was 
the monarchy's loss of pre-eminence. 

Hohenstaufen Dynasty, 1 138-1254 

During the Hohenstaufen Dynasty, which is generally associated 
with the Age of Chivalry, castles and courts replaced monasteries 
as centers of culture, and German medieval literature reached its 
prime. During this period, Frederick I (Frederick Barbarossa, 
1 152-90), the embodiment of chivalrous virtues and later a popu- 
lar figure in romantic literature, succeeded in partly restoring order 
and stability by proclaiming a general peace, forbidding private 
wars and feuds, and establishing a feudal social order. He and his 
son Henry VI (1190-97) restored and extended the empire. East- 
ward expansion, including conquest of the area that was to be 
Prussia, was continued during the dynasty, and towns gained in 
economic strength. After his father's death during the third crusade, 
Henry continued the Hohenstaufen policy; but he absorbed him- 
self in the continuing struggle between the empire and the papacy. 
His preoccupation provided opportunity for the German princes 
to extract far-reaching concessions, such as those put forth in an 
imperial statute of 1232, which established lay and ecclesiastical 
princes as virtually independent rulers within their territories. The 
Great Interregnum (1256-73), a period of anarchy in which the 
German princes vied for political control, followed the death of 
Henry's successor, Frederick II. 

Early Habsburg Dynasty 

The interregnum ended in 1273 with the election of Rudolf of 
Habsburg. In the post-interregnum period, German emperors had 
their power base in the dynastic principalities; the houses of Lux- 
emburg (Bohemia), Wittelsbach (Bavaria), and Habsburg (Aus- 
tria) alternated on the imperial throne, until the crown returned 
in the mid-fifteenth century to the Habsburgs, who retained it until 
the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. The post- 
interregnum period was an age of decline during which emperors 



8 



The Kramer Bridge in Erfurt, built in 1325 



and territorial lords sought primarily to increase their personal pos- 
sessions and prestige. The Golden Bull of 1356, promulgated by 
the Luxemburg emperor Charles IV (1355-78), provided the basic 
constitution of the Holy Roman Empire up to its dissolution. This 
edict, which established the principle of elective monarchy and con- 
firmed the right of seven prince-electors to choose the emperor, 
paved the way for the political consolidation of the principalities. 
By the close of the fifteenth century, Germany consisted of a col- 
lection of sovereign states under the control of the Habsburg 
Dynasty. 

The Reformation and the Thirty Years' War 

On the eve of All Saints' Day in 1517, Martin Luther, professor 
of theology at Wittenberg University in Saxony, posted on the castle 
church door ninety-five theses that primarily concerned the sale 
of indulgences — papal grants of mitigation of penalties, including 
release from purgatory. Luther challenged the secular orientation 
of the Roman Catholic Church and, more fundamentally, the 
authority of pope and church in matters of faith, affirming instead 
the authority of Holy Scripture and salvation by faith alone. Because 
of the invention of movable type, Luther's theses, posted to stimu- 
late debate among academics and clergy, spread rapidly through- 
out Germany. In 1520, in the midst of the crisis he had created, 
Luther published three pamphlets calling for religious reformation 



9 



East Germany: A Country Study 

and for the establishment of a German national church, indepen- 
dent of Rome. In 1521 both Rome and the empire banned Luther, 
who found sanctuary among the German princes. 

The oppressed German peasantry read into Luther's pamphlet 
"On the Freedom of a Christian Man" a promise of social reform 
and, stimulated by the successful struggle of Swiss peasants against 
the Habsburgs, revolted against the princes in the Great Peasant 
War of 1525. The war originated in the area of Lake Constance 
near the Swiss border and spread to central Germany, receiving 
support from dissatisfied city dwellers and rebellious knights. 
Luther, a social and political conservative who relied on the nobility 
for support in his religious revolution, allied himself with the princes 
in their bloody suppression of the peasant revolt. 

The Habsburg emperor Charles V (1519-56), who had inherited 
Spain, the Netherlands, southern Italy, Sicily, and the Austrian 
lands as patrimony, determined to restore the unity of the Ger- 
man empire, which was divided between Catholics and Protestants 
and threatened by foreign powers. In 1521 he became engaged in 
a struggle with Francis I of France, who had resolved to destroy 
the power of the Habsburgs. During a campaign against Francis 
I, German mercenary soldiers, most of them Lutheran, sacked 
Rome in 1527. The capture of Rome restored imperial control of 
the Middle Kingdom, which had been lost during the Great 
Interregnum. A staunch Catholic and a firm believer in the tradi- 
tion of the Holy Roman Empire, Charles assumed responsibility 
for protecting the Roman Catholic Church in the Lutheran revolt. 
However, many German princes, hoping to subordinate a Ger- 
man national church to the authority of the sovereign states and 
thus further consolidate their power, supported Luther's doctrines. 
They led a reform movement and in 1530 created the Protestant 
League of Schmalkalden to oppose the emperor. By 1545 all north- 
eastern and northwestern Germany and large parts of southern Ger- 
many were Protestant. In 1546 Charles, in an attempt to suppress 
the growing heresy, declared war on the Protestant princes. The 
war continued for a number of years until a compromise settle- 
ment was reached in the Peace of Augsburg of 1555. In the settle- 
ment, which represented a victory for the princes, Lutheranism 
and Catholicism were granted formal recognition in Germany, and 
each prince gained the right to decide the religion to be practiced 
within his state. 

Religious warfare resumed in the early seventeenth century with 
the Thirty Years' War (1618-48), a European- wide struggle that 
devastated Germany and reduced the size and power of the empire 
(see fig. 3). The Thirty Years' War resulted from a local rebellion. 



10 



Historical Setting 



In 1618 the Habsburg-ruled Bohemian kingdom, opposed to 
Emperor Matthias's designation of his cousin Ferdinand as future 
king of Bohemia, elected Frederick of the Palatinate, a German 
Calvinist, to the throne. In 1620, in an attempt to wrest back con- 
trol, imperial armies and the Catholic League under General 
Johann von Tilly defeated the Bohemians at the Battle of the White 
Mountain near Prague. Neighboring Protestant countries, alarmed 
by the resulting superior strength of the Catholic League and the 
possibility of Catholic supremacy in Europe, and France, opposed 
to the increasing power of the Habsburgs, supported the Protes- 
tant German princes, who seized the opportunity to renew their 
struggle against the emperor. However, by 1627 the imperial armies 
of Ferdinand II (1619-37) and the Catholic League, under the 
supreme command of General Aibrecht von Wallenstein, had 
defeated the Protestants and secured a foothold in northern Ger- 
many. Invading armies from Sweden, which, secretly supported 
by Catholic France, had come to the defense of the Protestant cause, 
were defeated in 1635, and the Peace of Prague was signed. In that 
same year, however, France had openly joined Sweden and declared 
war on Spain, a traditional ally of Habsburg Austria. The war con- 
tinued to rage, for the most part on German soil, until the Peace 
of Westphalia was signed in 1648. The settlement, which signaled 
the re-emergence of France as the main power on the continent, 
gave German territories to France and Sweden and extended tolera- 
tion to Calvinism. 

The End of the Holy Roman Empire and the Rise of Prussia 

The devastated and disjointed empire ceased to play a role in 
European politics after the Thirty Years' War. As a result of the 
Peace of Westphalia, German principalities became autonomous 
territorial units, and the power of the Holy Roman Emperor was 
reduced by German princes in league with France. During this 
period of disintegration, Prussia (officially so named in 1807) began 
to develop as a state. In 1618 the Brandenburg lineage of the 
Hohenzollern Dynasty had acquired possession of the Duchy of 
Prussia. Through a series of agreements, the Hohenzollerns 
increased their territory by acquiring a string of principalities in 
northern Germany. Frederick William the Great Elector (1640-88) 
established absolute monarchical rule within this territory by making 
an alliance with the Junkers, the landed aristocracy comprising the 
officer corps of the Prussian army, who in turn were guaranteed 
the perpetuation of an agrarian economy based on serfdom. Origi- 
nally a small and insignificant state, Prussia required a standing 
army for protection. In order to maintain the army and to ensure 



11 



East Germany: A Country Study 




Figure 3. Germany at the Time of the Protestant Reformation 



Historical Setting 




PRUSSIA 



Dundary of 
Holy Roman Empire 

Boundary of the States of the 

Holy Roman Empire 



Habsburg Territories 



Ecclesiastical Territories 



100 Miles 



100 Kilometers 



Source: Based on information from Geoffrey Barraclough, The Origins of Modern Germany, 
Oxford, 1949, opposite p. 358. 



13 



East Germany: A Country Study 

growth of the state, Prussian rulers introduced centralized taxa- 
tion and a bureaucratic system of civil officials. Toward the end 
of the seventeenth century, Prussia began to rise as a European 
military power. Prussian expansionism led to competition with 
Habsburg Austria, the other great power within the German 
empire. The competition culminated, fifty years later, in the Seven 
Years' War (1756-63). Fought by Prussia under Frederick II 
(Frederick the Great, 1740-86) against Austria, Russia, and France, 
the conflict demonstrated the superiority of the disciplined Prussian 
armies. 

The French Revolution of 1789, in addition to ending the ancien 
regime in France, aroused sentiment against absolutism in several 
European countries. After the revolutionary movement had spread, 
Prussia did not join in the campaigns aimed at stemming the tide 
of revolution. After the defeat of the Austro-Russian armies by 
Napoleon at Austerlitz in 1806, the principalities of southern Ger- 
many withdrew from the empire and formed the Confederation 
of the Rhine (Rheinbund) under the protectorship of France; 
Emperor Francis II abdicated, and the Holy Roman Empire came 
to an end. The German states in the confederation began to replace 
the old order of social distinctions and privileges. Prussia, which 
was finally forced into war by Napoleon, also met defeat at Jena 
and Auerstedt. After the defeat, the reform of the Prussian mili- 
tary was undertaken by Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who empha- 
sized the importance of moral incentives, personal courage, and 
individual responsibility. He also introduced the principle of com- 
petition and abandoned the privileges accorded to nobility within 
the officer corps. Prussian generals in the War of Liberation against 
Napoleon adopted the tactics of the revolutionary armies of France; 
the military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, in particular, developed 
new principles of military strategy in both theory and practice. 

German Confederation 

Age of Metternich 

The Congress of Vienna (1814-15), convened after Napoleon's 
defeat, established the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund) 
of thirty-nine monarchical states headed by Austria (see fig. 4). 
During his period of power (1815-48), Prince Klemens von Met- 
ternich, Austria's chancellor, pursued a reactionary policy, and 
the German states reverted to the old order of social distinctions 
and privileges. The personification of the European counter- 
revolution, Metternich advocated the principle of aristocratic 
legitimacy for the possession of titles and territories and represented 



14 



Historical Setting 




Source: Based on information from Geoffrey Barraclough (ed.) The Time Atlas of World 
History, London, 1978, 216. 

Figure 4. The German Struggle for Unification, 1815-71 

conservatism, order, and stability, which he opposed to social and 
political revolt. Metternich's police organization suppressed both 
nationalism and liberalism. The publicist Frederick von Gentz 
popularized Metternich's reactionary ideas and assisted him in 
developing a system of political censorship that held Austria and 
part of Germany in intellectual bondage until 1848. 

Liberal Reform Movement 

The movement for liberal reform (including constitutional, 
parliamentary government, economic freedom, and civil liberties) 
initiated during the Napoleonic era survived during the so-called 
Vormdrz (1815-48), a period of struggle between absolutism and 
rising liberalism. The July 1830 French revolution incited the Ger- 
man liberal intelligentsia — lower government officials, men of let- 
ters, professors, and lawyers — to organize local clubs and assume 



15 



East Germany: A Country Study 

leadership of the reform effort. The liberal intelligentsia, however, 
did not succeed in overthrowing absolutism in the "revolution of 
the intellectuals," which took place in March 1848 following the 
February revolution in France of the same year. Averse to revolu- 
tionary violence, the people did not oppose the Prussian troops that 
marched into Berlin to establish order. 

In May 1848, shortly after the revolutionary outbreak in Berlin, 
delegates from all of the German states convened at the Frankfurt 
Assembly to prepare for the formation of a united and constitu- 
tional German nation-state. Controversial issues that had divided 
Germany for centuries caused disputes among the delegates. To 
the religious and cultural antagonisms between north and south, 
Prussia and Austria, Catholics and Protestants, the question con- 
cerning the establishment of a "greater Germany," which would 
include Austria, or a "smaller Germany," which would be under 
Prussian leadership and exclude Austria, had recently been added. 
The compromise proposal adopted during the assembly, which 
provided that only the German provinces of the Habsburg mon- 
archy be included in the new nation-state, caused Austria to recall 
its delegates. The Frankfurt constitution established Germany as 
a federal union, which was to be headed by a monarch having an 
imperial title. The imperial crown was offered to Frederick William 
IV, King of Prussia, who refused it, stating that he could be elected 
only by the German princes. After the failure of the Frankfurt 
Assembly, a disagreement between moderate and radical liberals 
facilitated the restoration of monarchical conservatism, and the Ger- 
man Confederation was renewed in 1851 . In the Treaty of Olmiitz 
(1851), Prussia agreed to relinquish plans for a German union 
founded on liberalism under its leadership. 

Bismarck and Unification 

In 1862 King Wilhelm I of Prussia chose Otto von Bismarck 
as his chancellor. Of Junker ancestry, Bismarck championed the 
dominance of the aristocracy in matters of state more than he 
favored absolutism. He had been elected to the new Prussian parlia- 
ment in 1848, and from 1851 he served as Prussian delegate to 
the German Confederation's diet. As Prussian chancellor, Bis- 
marck's main task was to resolve the conflict on the issue of mili- 
tary reform, which had been announced by Wilhelm I in 1861. 
The reform, intended to expand and strengthen the Prussian army, 
had led to a bitter conflict between crown and parliament. From 
1862 until 1866, the liberal faction within the parliament's Cham- 
ber of Deputies, which consisted of representatives from the mid- 
dle class, voted against budget appropriations required for the 



16 



Historical Setting 



military reform. In order to break parliamentary opposition and 
reaffirm monarchical authority, Bismarck asserted his famous Lilck- 
entheorie (gap theory), which maintained that in cases of conflict 
between crown and parliament the will of the former must pre- 
vail. During the parliamentary struggle of the 1862-66 period, the 
Liickentheorie enabled the king to expend tax monies on the mili- 
tary without the approval of parliament. The enlarged Prussian 
army then made it possible for Bismarck to initiate a policy of 
militarism that was to establish Hohenzollern hegemony within a 
German nation-state. 

In June 1866, Bismarck defied Austria, protector of the 
sovereignty of the German monarchical states, by demanding the 
annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, then used Austria's rejection as 
a pretext for war. The Seven Weeks' War, which was won by Prus- 
sia, resulted in the dissolution of the German Confederation and 
the exclusion of Austria from German politics; in 1867 Hungary 
consequently became a semiautonomous kingdom, and the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire was created. In the same year, the constitu- 
tional North German Confederation, headed by the Prussian king, 
was established in Germany. The south German states — Baden, 
Wiirttemberg, and Bavaria — remained autonomous but promised 
military allegiance to Prussia in time of war. In an attempt to con- 
ciliate parliament, Wilhelm presented the Prussian parliament with 
the Indemnity Bill, which admitted past budgetary impropriety but 
requested ex post facto approval. Moderate liberals, impressed by 
Bismarck's victory over Austria, helped pass the bill, thus retro- 
actively approving the crown's illegal military expenditures of 1862 
to 1866. 

In 1870 Bismarck resumed his Machtpolitik (power politics) by 
provoking the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) as the means to 
incorporate the particularist south German states within a constitu- 
tional German nation-state. By releasing to the press the so-called 
Ems Dispatch — a telegram from Wilhelm in which the king refused 
to renounce future Hohenzollern claims to the Spanish throne — 
Bismarck succeeded in provoking the French and eliciting a decla- 
ration of war. Baden, Wiirttemberg, and Bavaria joined enthusiasti- 
cally in the war against Germany's traditional foe. The promised 
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, formerly part of the Holy Roman 
Empire, intensified German nationalist sentiment. Bismarck's 
major war aim, the voluntary acceptance of the Constitution of 
the North German Confederation by the southern states, was 
accomplished by Germany's victory over France. In January 1871, 
the Prussian king was proclaimed German emperor. 



17 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Imperial Germany 
Political Consolidation 

The constitution of 1871 established the Second Reich, a nation- 
state united on the basis of dualistic constitutionalism. The emperor 
controlled foreign policy and the combined military forces of the 
German states. Germany remained a federal union, however, and 
the aristocratic-monarchical order was preserved in the individual 
states. The Bundesrat (Federal Council) and the Reichstag (Imperial 
Parliament) exercised the power of legislation. State rulers were 
represented in the Bundesrat, whose members held office by princely 
appointment; the people were represented in the Reichstag, whose 
members were elected on the basis of universal male suffrage but 
whose powers were limited by the emperor and the Bundesrat. 

Six major political parties predominated: Conservative Party, 
Free Conservative Party, Center Party, National Liberal Party, 
Progressive Party, and Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozi- 
aldemokratische Partei Deutschlands — SPD). The Conservative 
Party represented Prussianism, aristocracy, and landed property. 
The pro-Bismarck Free Conservative Party represented nobles and 
industrialists. The Center Party, although conservative regarding 
monarchical authority, was progressive in matters of social reform; 
it represented Roman Catholic institutions in Germany. The pro- 
Bismarck National Liberal Party was composed of moderate liberals 
who advocated constitutionalism, a laissez-faire economic policy, 
secularization, and material progress. The antiauthoritarian and 
democratic Progressive Party championed the extension of parlia- 
mentary prerogatives. The Marxist SPD was founded in Gotha 
in 1875 from a fusion of Ferdinand Lassalle's General German 
Workers' Association (1863), which advocated state socialism, with 
the Social Democratic Labor Party (1869), headed by August Bebel 
and Wilhelm Liebknecht. 

Bismarck's early policies favored the National Liberal Party, 
which, in coalition with the Free Conservative Party and the 
Progressive Party, constituted a parliamentary majority in 1871. 
The federal chancellery published a new commercial code, estab- 
lished a uniform coinage system, and founded imperial banks. The 
French indemnity payment provided capital for military expan- 
sion, railroad construction, and building projects. The Kulturkampf 
(struggle for civilization) with the Roman Catholic Church resulted 
in the subordination of church to state and the secularization of 
the educational system. German financiers and industrialists, 
citizens of a potentially powerful nation-state who were finally 
provided with a unified internal market, took ample advantage of 



18 



Historical Setting 



investment opportunity. A speculative boom, characterized by 
large-scale formation of joint stock companies and unscrupulous 
investment practices, resulted. The Griinderzeit (era of promotion, 
1871-73) ended in the stock market crash of 1873. 

The crash of 1873 and the subsequent depression signaled the 
impending dissolution of Bismarck's alliance with the National 
Liberals. After 1873 the imperial government repudiated liberalism 
and abandoned free trade. Popular support for German liberal- 
ism also waned. Catholic opposition to the Kulturkampf strength- 
ened the Center Party, doubling its popular vote in the Reichstag 
elections of 1874. In the late 1870s, Bismarck began negotiations 
with the economically protectionist Conservative Party and Center 
Party toward the formation of a new government coalition. Con- 
servative electoral gains and National Liberal losses in 1879 brought 
the Conservative coalition (consisting of the Conservative Party, 
Center Party, and National Liberal Party) to power. The Reich- 
stag drafted a political program based on protectionism, and an 
alliance between the landed aristocracy and industrialists consoli- 
dated the domestic system. 

Bismarck's Fall 

After 1879 Bismarck struggled to defeat the aristocratic- 
monarchical order. The Military Cabinet and the General Staff, 
by Bismarck's authorization, were elevated to the status of indepen- 
dent agencies responsible only to the emperor. In the Reichstag, 
however, the Conservative coalition soon dissolved, and democratic 
opposition grew in strength. The dynamic industrialization of Ger- 
many after 1871 altered the political scene in the 1880s. German 
liberals abandoned authoritarianism; the Secessionists left the 
National Liberal Party and in 1884 united with the democratic 
Progressives, forming the German Free Thought Party. In addi- 
tion, the SPD emerged as a political force. 

Bismarck's attempt to regain German liberal support resulted 
in the revival of Machtpolitik, and soon German nationalistic senti- 
ment was stirred with promises of "world power" status. In the 
mid- 1880s, Germany joined the European powers in the scramble 
for overseas colonies, simultaneously maintaining its position within 
the European balance of power. The Bulgarian crisis of 1885-87, 
a clash between Austrian and Russian interests in the Balkans, 
provided an opportunity to install a progovernment majority in 
the Reichstag. When the Reichstag rejected the new armaments 
bill, Bismarck dissolved that body, called for new elections, and 
appealed to the German nation, claiming that Germany was threat- 
ened by both Austrian and Russian expansionism. 



19 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Bismarck's policies toward the SPD reflected the proverbial con- 
servative fear of the masses. The Social Democrats had only minor 
representation in parliament, but the party grew steadily. Bismarck 
endeavored simultaneously to pacify and eradicate the Social 
Democrats. As early as 1878, he had introduced antisocialist legis- 
lation outlawing all Social Democratic workers' clubs, organiza- 
tions, assemblies, and trade unions. The Social Democrats remained 
in parliament, however, and by means of the Sozialdemokrat, a party 
newspaper published in Switzerland, continued propaganda activi- 
ties in Germany. After 1881 Bismarck passed comprehensive social 
legislation; in 1889, however, he presented a new antisocialist law 
that included a provision for loss of property on suspicion of sub- 
versive activities. The new German emperor, Wilhelm II, and the 
Reichstag opposed the bill; Bismarck, however, remained adamant. 
In the February 1890 elections, the pro-Bismarck parties were deci- 
sively defeated, and Bismarck, prodded by the emperor, resigned. 

Industrial Expansion 

Imperial Germany industrialized rapidly, and by 1890 it was 
Europe's foremost industrial power. Employment in the industrial 
and mining sectors had surpassed employment in agriculture by 
the turn of the century. Industrial development followed upon a 
significant growth in population, which increased from 40.9 mil- 
lion in 1870 to 49.5 million in 1890 and 67.8 million in 1914. During 
this period, Germans migrated to the urban and industrial areas 
west of the Elbe River, swelling the population of the Rhineland, 
Westphalia, and Saxony. 

German industrialization was sparked by the railroad building 
of the 1840s and the subsequent development of coal mining. Coal 
mining created new industrial districts, most significantly in the 
Ruhr and the Saar. Iron ore extraction and iron and steel produc- 
tion accompanied the development of coal mining. Germany's 
acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, an area rich in iron ore, 
made possible the doubling of steel output between 1880 and 1900. 
Chemicals, however, occupied first place in German industry. Large 
salt and potassium deposits encouraged chemical manufacture, 
including, by the 1880s, pharmaceuticals, dyestuffs, fertilizers, and 
ammunition. Germany also developed its hydroelectric power and 
in the decade before World War I produced 50 percent of the 
world's electrical equipment. 

Wilhelmine Era 

The Wilhelmine Era (1890-1914), characterized by Wilhelm IPs 
predilection for military dress and posture, emphasized power. 



20 



Historical Setting 



Increased armaments production, the creation of an ocean fleet, 
and a vigorous global foreign policy were the means used to but- 
tress absolutism, encourage political unity, and secure social peace. 
Each of Bismarck's immediate successors — Leo von Caprivi 
(1890-94), Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe (1894-1900), Bernhard von 
Biilow (1900-1909), and Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1909- 
17) — pursued a policy of power. These policies, colliding with simi- 
lar designs in other European capitals, culminated in World War I. 

Weltpolitik (global politics), which included the establishment of 
overseas colonies and the development of economic spheres of 
interest abroad, was championed as the means to satisfy German 
liberals and to divert popular attention from the demand for social 
reform under the Hohenlohe ministry. Its supporters feared the 
Social Democrats in spite of the party's new revisionist policy 
advocating gradual socialization by parliamentary means. It was 
during Hohenlohe 's chancellorship that Alfred von Tirpitz gained 
prominence. Founder of the modern German navy, Tirpitz advo- 
cated a program of accelerated battleship construction to protect 
German interests abroad. Although German colonization had ended 
in the mid- 1880s, the extension of German commercial and indus- 
trial interests proceeded apace, and Anglo-German conflicts of 
interest in Africa and East Asia were frequent. Tirpitz identified 
Britain as the enemy of German economic progress. He converted 
the Naval Office into a propaganda center, won the support of Ger- 
man industrialists, and made his naval program the cornerstone 
of German foreign policy. In 1898 the Reichstag passed the first 
Naval Bill. As a result, Anglo-German relations deteriorated, and 
the German government ignored overtures from Britain for the 
peaceful settlement of colonial issues. 

Chancellor Biilow, a friend and associate of Tirpitz, fomented 
the formation of a new European alliance by pursuing Weltpolitik 
on a grand scale. The Supplementary Naval Act of 1900 further 
strained relations with Britain. Wilhelm II proposed a Baghdad 
railroad through the Ottoman Empire, a project that threatened 
British as well as Russian interests in the Balkans. Germany also 
precipitated the Moroccan crisis of 1905 in which Wilhelm II landed 
at Tangier and announced German support for Moroccan indepen- 
dence, thereby challenging French predominance in the area. Brit- 
ain supported the French claim to a sphere of influence in Morocco, 
however, and both powers forced Germany to back down. In 1907 
Britain joined France and Russia in the formal alliance known as 
the Triple Entente. 

Billow's chancellorship ended largely in consequence of the Daily 
Telegraph affair, a contest between emperor and chancellor that 



21 



East Germany: A Country Study 



raised the issue of imperial versus Reichstag authority. In November 
1908, the London Daily Telegraph published an interview with Wil- 
helm II quoting seriously offensive remarks made by the emperor 
regarding Britain and Russia. The German public reacted with 
alarm. Biilow confronted Wilhelm, extracting his promise to con- 
sult the Reichstag before issuing public statements. Wilhelm and 
the Conservative Party, however, subsequently withdrew their sup- 
port from Biilow, and his government collapsed. 

The militarization of Wilhelmine Germany peaked during the 
chancellorship of Bethmann-Hollweg from 1909 to 1917. Wilhelm 
II and Bethmann-Hollweg relied increasingly on the counsel of the 
German military chiefs; in the Reichstag the political weight shifted 
to the left as the Conservative Party lost influence. In 1913 the 
Reichstag passed the new Army Bill, which enlarged the military; 
the Social Democrats supported the bill, thus indicating the party's 
decision to support German nationalism and the pursuit of world 
power status. 

In 1911 a second Moroccan crisis had heightened tension between 
Germany and the Triple Entente powers, but the powers neverthe- 
less remained neutral during the Balkan Wars (1912-13), a nation- 
alist rebellion against Ottoman rule. The assassination of Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, however, 
proved to be fatal to peace in Europe. Germany encouraged its 
ally, Austria-Hungary, to declare war on Serbia. By early August, 
the European powers were engaged in a world war. 

World War I 

Declaration of war by Germany resulted largely as the conse- 
quence of the Schlieffen Plan — the German military strategy pre- 
pared by Alfred von Schlieffen, chief of staff (1892-1906). The plan 
was based on the idea that Franco-Russian rapprochement made 
a German two-front war inevitable. Schlieffen' s successor, Helmuth 
von Moltke the Younger (1906-14), firmly committed himself to 
the plan. Thus Germany's declaration of war on Russia (August 1 , 
1914), a response to Russian mobilization, was followed immedi- 
ately by its declaration of war on France (August 3). On August 4, 
Britain, the third member of the Triple Entente, declared war on 
Germany. In 1915 Italy, which had been allied with Germany and 
Austria-Hungary, switched allegiance and joined the Triple Entente 
powers. 

The strategy of the Schlieffen Plan conceived a swift victory in 
the west in which German troops entering France via neutral Bel- 
gium and the Netherlands would envelop the French armies, pin- 
ning them against the Swiss border. The bulk of the German army 



22 



Historical Setting 



would then be free for combat in the east. The plan failed, however, 
leaving German troops stalemated in trench warfare in France. As 
a result, Moltke, who had at first altered the Schlieffen Plan and 
later abandoned it, was relieved of his executive position in Sep- 
tember 1914 and was succeeded by Erich von Falkenhayn. Con- 
flict raged between Falkenhayn, who insisted on continued efforts 
in the west, and the eastern command of Paul von Hindenburg 
and Erich Ludendorff, who had achieved significant advances. 

Bethmann-Hollweg's September Program of 1914 set forth Ger- 
many's war aims, which included an expanded Germany (Mit- 
teleuropa) with Belgium and Poland as vassal states and German 
colonies in Africa. The program reflected a domestic political cli- 
mate in which the German nation had been virtually unanimous 
in supporting the decision to go to war; in August 1914, even the 
Social Democrats voted in favor of war credits in the Reichstag. 
During the first years of the war, the Reichstag was controlled by 
the Kriegszielmehrheit (war aims majority), a parliamentary bloc 
including delegates from the National Liberal Party, Center Party, 
and Conservative Party. The Kriegszielmehrheit had pressed for an 
annexationist war aims program; influential German interest 
groups, such as the Pan-German League, the army and navy, 
agrarian and industrial associations, and the intelligentsia approved. 
The SPD alone remained adamantly opposed to all annexationist 
claims. 

By the spring of 1915, the war of movement envisioned by the 
Schlieffen Plan had become a war of position, and political and 
social disagreements, temporarily forgotten during the upsurge of 
patriotic feeling, began to reappear. By late summer 1916, chances 
for a definitive German victory seemed remote, and consequently 
Bethmann-Hollweg considered peace negotiations. His peace note, 
however, was rejected by the Triple Entente powers. After the offer 
to negotiate was rejected, the Army High Command, headed by 
Chief of Staff Hindenburg and his adjutant general, Ludendorff, 
demanded passage of the Auxiliary Service Bill calling for the large- 
scale militarization of Germany; the Reichstag passed a consider- 
ably weakened version of the bill in early 1917. 

To cripple operations of the Triple Entente by destroying a suffi- 
cient amount of shipping, Germany began unrestricted submarine 
warfare in January 1917. In the meantime, although the Army High 
Command increasingly gained control of political decision mak- 
ing, pressure for a peace settlement mounted in the Reichstag. 
Bethmann-Hollweg attempted to pacify the opposition in the Reich- 
stag with a renewed pledge of democratic reform; and Wilhelm 
II, reacting to the first workers' strike in Germany, which had been 



23 



East Germany: A Country Study 

sparked by the Russian Revolution of February 1917, issued his 
famous Ostergeschenk (Easter present) confirming his chancellor's 
promise of reform. The Social Democrats nevertheless proceeded 
to issue a manifesto demanding peace without annexations. The 
Army High Command, however, remained committed to war and 
annexation. In April and May 1917, Hindenburg and Ludendorff 
met with Wilhelm II at Kreuznach and persuaded the emperor to 
draft the Kreuznach claims confirming the goals of the September 
Program. Bethmann-Hollweg and the Reichstag rejected the Kreuz- 
nach claims, however, and in July an interparty Reichstag com- 
mittee drafted a resolution demanding peace without annexations. 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff expressed their opposition by resigning 
their posts. Wilhelm, compelled to choose between Bethmann- 
Hollweg and the Army High Command, supported Hindenburg 
and Ludendorff and demanded the chancellor's resignation. Thus 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff gained de facto control of political 
decision making. 

After the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917, Russia and 
Germany began peace negotiations. In March 1918, the two coun- 
tries signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The defeat of Russia 
enabled Germany to transfer troops from the eastern to the western 
front. This advantage was by far outweighed, however, by the 
United States declaration of war against Germany in April 1917, 
provoked largely by Germany's continued unrestricted submarine 
warfare. In order to break the French and British lines before the 
arrival of the expeditionary force from the United States, Germany 
launched a large offensive in March 1918 and succeeded in reach- 
ing the Marne River. A second large offensive on July 15, aimed 
at definitively smashing the enemy, failed, and German troops were 
subsequently pressed back along their extended front. In the early 
fall of 1918, the Army High Command conceded and called for 
an armistice. The armistice, signed on November 11 after the Social 
Democrats had proclaimed a republic and formed a government, 
was later repudiated by the military, which, together with the 
extreme right, created the myth of the "stab in the back" that 
blamed defeat in World War I on left-wing elements. German mili- 
tary casualties in World War I amounted to 1 .6 million dead, more 
than 4 million wounded, and more than 200,000 missing in action. 

The Treaty of Versailles, which was signed in June 1919, called 
for German disarmament. As a result of the treaty, the Rhineland 
was demilitarized and occupied by the western Allied powers for 
fifteen years; Germany ceded Alsace-Lorraine, the Polish Corridor, 
northern Schleswig-Holstein, and all overseas colonies; and the 
Allied Reparations Commission was established and charged with 



24 



Historical Setting 



deciding the total war damage payments to be demanded of Ger- 
many. The Treaty of Versailles also included the "war guilt 
clause," which, by its implicit suggestion of German responsibility 
for World War I, evoked generalized German contempt for the 
treaty. Historians debate Germany's responsibility for World 
War I; some claim that Germany's entry into the war was accidental 
and defensive, others that the war was the result of German 
imperialism. It remains to be shown, in either case, that Wilhel- 
mine aspirations were indeed qualitatively different from the pre- 
World War I imperialist ambitions of Britain or France. 

Weimar Republic 
Weimar Constitution 

The Weimar Republic, proclaimed on November 9, 1918, was 
born in the throes of military defeat and social revolution (see fig. 5). 
On November 3, mutiny had broken out among naval squadrons 
stationed at Kiel. Workers had joined the revolt, which had quickly 
spread to other ports and to cities in northern, central, and southern 
Germany, finally reaching Berlin on November 9. Largely as a 
result of the November Revolution, Prince Max von Baden, the 
German chancellor, announced the abdication of the emperor. Fol- 
lowing the abdication, the Social Democrats in the Reichstag gained 
control of the government; they proclaimed the republic, formed 
a provisional cabinet, and organized the National Assembly. 
Another revolt instigated in Berlin by the Spartacus League, a group 
of left-wing extremists, was crushed by the army in January 1919. 
In February the National Assembly elected Social Democrat 
Friedrich Ebert to the presidency and drafted a constitution. 

The Weimar constitution of 1919 established a federal repub- 
lic consisting of nineteen states {Lander). The republic was headed 
by a president who was to be elected by popular direct ballot for 
a seven-year term and who could be re-elected. The president 
appointed the chancellor and, based on the chancellor's nomina- 
tions, also appointed the cabinet ministers. He retained authority 
to dismiss the cabinet, dissolve the Reichstag, and veto legislation. 
The legislative powers of the Reichstag were further weakened by 
the provision for presidential recourse to popular plebiscite. Arti- 
cle 48, the so-called emergency clause, accorded the president dic- 
tatorial rights to intervene in the territorial states for the purpose 
of enforcing constitutional and federal laws and/or to restore public 
order. 

The constitution provided for the Reichstag and the Reichsrat 
(council of German states' representatives). The Reichstag, elected 



25 



East Germany: A Country Study 




26 



Historical Setting 



by popular suffrage, voted on legislation introduced by the chan- 
cellor. By a vote of no confidence, it could call for the dismissal 
of both chancellor and cabinet ministers. The Reichsrat replaced 
the Bundesrat (see Political Consolidation, this ch.). Established 
to guarantee state government supervision of national legislation, 
it was nevertheless subordinated to national control in that mem- 
bers of the Reichstag cabinet convened and presided over Reichsrat 
sessions. The Reichstag was empowered to override Reichsrat 
opposition with a two-thirds majority vote. 

The powers accorded to the president reflected the nineteenth 
century's conservative and liberal predilection for monarchical rule. 
But democratization of suffrage strengthened the Reichstag, and 
in theory both the military and the bureaucracy were subordinated 
to cabinet control. Thus the constitution established a republic based 
on a combination of conservative and democratic elements. It 
guaranteed civil liberties, but provisions for social legislation, 
including land reform and limited nationalization, were never 
implemented. The constitution adopted the colors black, red, and 
gold — the colors of the Holy Roman Empire — to replace the black, 
white, and red of Imperial Germany. The colors adopted by the 
constitution symbolized the idea of a "greater Germany," which 
was to include Austria; but the incorporation of Austria into the 
republic was opposed by the Allies, and Austria remained a separate 
state. 

Problems of Parliamentary Politics 

The Weimar Republic represented a compromise: German con- 
servatives and industrialists had transferred power to the Social 
Democrats to avert a possible Bolshevik-style takeover; the Social 
Democrats, in turn, had allied with demobilized officers of the 
Imperial Army to suppress the revolution. The January 1919 
National Assembly elections produced the Weimar coalition, which 
included the SPD, the German Democratic Party (Deutsche 
Demokratische Partei — DDP), and the Center Party. The percen- 
tage of the vote gained by the coalition (76.2 percent; 38 percent 
for the SPD) suggested broad popular support for the republic. The 
antirepublican, conservative German National People's Party 
(Deutschnationale Volkspartei — DNVP) and the German People's 
Party (Deutsche Volkspartei — DVP) combined received 10.3 per- 
cent of the vote. The Independent Social Democratic Party of Ger- 
many, which had split from the SPD during the war, won 8 percent 
of the vote. But the lifespan of the Weimar coalition was brief, and 
the Weimar political system, which was achieving gains for both 
extreme left and extreme right, soon became radicalized. 



27 



East Germany: A Country Study 

The future of the Weimar Republic was shaped during the criti- 
cal year separating the National Assembly elections and the June 
1920 Reichstag elections. German public opinion was influenced 
by three major developments. First, the Treaty of Versailles shocked 
German nationalists and seriously damaged the republic's pres- 
tige. The treaty's provisions for Allied occupation of the Rhineland 
and reparations were considered unduly harsh. Second, German 
workers were disappointed by the failure to achieve social reform. 
Third, the Kapp Putsch of March 1920, an attempted coup staged 
by disaffected right-wing army officers, provided impetus for the 
political radicalization of rightist and leftist elements. In the June 
1920 elections, the Weimar coalition lost its majority. An increase 
in votes (28.9 percent) for the DNVP and the DVP reflected Ger- 
man middle-class disillusionment with democracy. SPD strength 
fell to 21.7 percent as the German working class defected to the 
extreme left. The Independent Social Democratic Party of Ger- 
many split as most members joined the Communist Party of Ger- 
many (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands — KPD), formed in 
December 1918, and the remainder reunited with the SPD. 

The Weimar coalition never regained its majority. After 1920 
the era of unpopular minority cabinets began. Postwar inflation 
and Allied demands for reparations contributed to political insta- 
bility. In January 1923, French and Belgian troops occupied the 
highly industrialized Ruhr district as a protest against German 
defaults in reparations payment. The Weimar government 
responded by calling upon the Ruhr population to stop all indus- 
trial activity. In the summer of 1923, President Ebert asked Gustav 
Stresemann, the DVP chairman, to form a new cabinet coalition 
to resolve the crisis. 

Stresemann Era 

Stresemann typified the Weimar Vernunftrepublikaner (common- 
sense republican); a former National Liberal and annexationist, 
he supported the republic for pragmatic reasons. During his brief 
chancellorship (August-November 1923), he headed the "great 
coalition," an alliance that included the SPD, Center Party, DDP, 
and DVP. After his chancellorship ended because of combined 
opposition from the right and left, Stresemann served as German 
foreign minister until his death in 1929. The Stresemann era 
(1923-29) was a period of rapprochement with the West during 
which passive resistance in the Ruhr was ended. As foreign minister, 
Stresemann pursued negotiation rather than confrontation with the 
Allies. His policy, however, was strongly opposed by members of 
both the DNVP and the KPD. 



28 



Historical Setting 



In 1924 the German government adopted a plan for German 
economic recovery prepared by the American financier Charles G. 
Dawes. The Dawes Plan attempted to coordinate German repara- 
tions payments with a program of economic recovery whereby Ger- 
many was required to make only limited payments until 1929. To 
assist with the recovery, the Reichsbank was founded, and foreign 
credit, mainly from the United States, was filtered into Germany. 
As a result, between 1924 and 1929 German industry and com- 
merce made unprecedented progress, and both the standard of living 
and real wages rose steadily. The Dawes Plan also provided for 
the withdrawal of French and Belgian troops from the Ruhr dis- 
trict. In 1925 President Ebert died, and the German people elected 
their national hero, Paul von Hindenburg, who supported the poli- 
cies inaugurated by Stresemann until 1929, the year of Stresemann's 
death. 

The Locarno treaties, signed in 1925 by Germany and the Allies, 
were part of Stresemann's attempt at rapprochement with the West. 
A prerequisite for Germany's admission to the League of Nations 
in 1926, the treaties accepted the demilitarization of the Rhineland 
and guaranteed the western frontier as defined by the Treaty of 
Versailles. Both Britain and Germany preferred to leave the ques- 
tion of the eastern frontier open. In 1925-26 the Allies withdrew 
their troops from the right bank of the Rhine. In 1926 the Ger- 
man and Soviet governments signed the Treaty of Berlin, which 
pledged Germany and the Soviet Union to neutrality in the event 
of an attack on either country by foreign powers. 

The Locarno treaties, the Treaty of Berlin, and Germany's mem- 
bership in the League of Nations were the successes that earned 
Stresemann world renown. The Young Plan of 1929, which was 
also introduced during the Stresemann era, formulated the final 
reparations settlement. Germany agreed to a 59-year schedule of 
payments averaging approximately 2 billion Deutsche marks 
annually. The Bank of International Settlement was established 
to facilitate transactions. The Allies, in turn, promised to complete 
the evacuation of the Rhineland. 

Weimar Culture 

The Weimar Republic was the first attempt to establish constitu- 
tional liberal democratic government in Germany. The republic's 
name symbolically evoked memories of the German writer Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe, who had spent a number of years at the 
court of Weimar, and of the nation's humanistic cultural tradi- 
tions. Goethe's Weimar was contrasted with the Prussian Ger- 
many of authoritarianism, military swagger, and imperialism. 



29 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Many Germans, however, remained attached to the old order and 
lacked a genuine commitment to republican ideals. Both the Social 
Democrats and those who harkened back to the Prussian past were 
opposed by the radical opposition, whose program included revolu- 
tionary tactics. German culture under the republic reflected the 
ideological diversity of a politically fragmented society. 

The Warburg Library, the Psychoanalytic Institute, the Ger- 
man Academy for Politics, and the Marxist Institute for Social 
Research, founded soon after World War I, were dedicated to the 
critical analysis of political and social values. These institutions 
reflected the desire of Weimar intellectuals to reconsider the Ger- 
man past. Eckart Kehr's Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik (Battle- 
ship Construction and Party Politics), published in 1930, pursued 
the same critical objective, revealing the domestic socioeconomic 
basis for Imperial Germany's naval policy. 

The cult of the hero survived in the poet Stefan George's liter- 
ary society, known as the George Circle, which, in addition to pub- 
lishing "elevated" poetry and translating the classics, displayed 
its aristocratic mentality in biographies about great historical figures. 
Ernst Kantorowicz's Emperor Frederick II, a biography of the 
thirteenth-century Hohenstaufen ruler, received widespread pub- 
lic acclaim. Kantorowicz, a former Prussian army officer, describes 
the Weimar Republic as the triumph of mediocrity, and in his 
preface he speaks of Germany's secret longing for its emperors and 
heroes. In his biography, he mythically portrays Frederick II as 
a superman who defies all authority and is voraciously eager to 
taste all of life. 

Many German artists during this period were part of the expres- 
sionist movement. Both literary and visual expressionism were 
primarily concerned with representing the immediate present. In 
contrast to the strict form in the writings of the George Circle, liter- 
ary expressionism consciously simplified, abbreviated, and distorted 
sentence structures to give expression to passionate inner feeling. 
A reaction to inhuman social conditions and the horrors of World 
War I, expressionist writing called for a new man and a new world 
that would be united in brotherly love. The outsider, as a victim 
of society, became the hero. Writers whose works represent this 
kind of reaction include Georg Heym and Fritz von Unruh. 
Although some writers, for example, Kurt Hiller and Heinrich 
Mann, became politically active extremists, expressionists were, 
for the most part, solely literary revolutionaries. Inner experience 
is also emphasized in the bold and symbolic colors and distorted 
forms found in the drawings and paintings of expressionist artists 
such as Franz Marc and Emil Nolde. In his grotesque figures and 



30 



Historical Setting 



suggestive juxtapositions, the postwar artist George Grosz satirized 
the materialistic pseudoculture of the bourgeoisie. 

The dilemma of the Weimar intellectual, who had to choose 
between the conservative past and the liberal present, can be 
approached through the novelist Thomas Mann. A monarchist 
before World War I, a commonsense republican after the war, 
Mann finally made a genuine commitment to the republic in the 
mid- 1920s. In 1924 he published Der Zauberberg (The Magic Moun- 
tain), a novel that describes Hans Castorp's education through life. 
While visiting a tubercular cousin in a Swiss sanatorium, the pro- 
tagonist contracts the disease himself and stays for seven years. The 
sanatorium is a cross section of European civilization in which 
Castorp is exposed to a variety of political ideologies, including 
enlightened liberalism. Significantly Castorp (and the conserva- 
tive Mann) cannot choose liberalism. Love, not reason, the novel 
concludes, will provide the basis for social reconciliation. 

After 1929 national socialism offered a different social and 
political solution. The Nazi party took full advantage of political 
instability and economic depression, launched a large-scale propa- 
ganda campaign, and won a mass following. Nazi ideology, authori- 
tarian but promising social revolution, appealed particularly to 
German youth, who longed for the restoration of order. 

Hitler and the Rise of National Socialism 

Adolf Hitler was born in the Austrian border town of Braunau 
am Inn in 1889. At the age of seventeen, Hitler was refused admis- 
sion to the Vienna Art Academy because of his lack of talent. He 
remained in Vienna, where he led a Bohemian existence, acquiring 
an ideology based on belief in the Germanic master race and a form 
of anti-Semitism that blamed social and political crises on Jewish 
subversive activities. Hitler remained in Vienna until 1913, when 
he moved to Munich to avoid the draft. After serving in the Ger- 
man army during World War I, he joined the right-wing Bavarian 
German Workers' Party in 1919. The following year, the party 
changed its name to the National Socialist German Workers' Party 
(National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei — NSDAP); the 
members were known as Nazis, a term derived from the German 
pronunciation of "National. " In 1921 Hitler assumed leadership 
of the NSDAP. 

As fuhrer (leader) of the NSDAP, Hitler reorganized the party 
on a monolithic basis and encouraged the assimilation of other radi- 
cal right-wing groups. He was assisted by Ernst Rohm, Dietrich 
Eckart, and Alfred Rosenberg. Rohm's Stormtroopers (Sturmabtei- 
lung — SA) constituted Hitler's private army. Eckart published the 



31 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Volkischer Beobachter, the official party newspaper. Rosenberg, the 
party ideologist, developed slogans and symbols and conceived the 
use of the swastika, the future emblem of the Third Reich. Under 
Hitler's leadership, the NSDAP denounced the republic and the 
"November criminals" who had signed the Treaty of Versailles. 
The postwar economic slump won the party a following among 
unemployed ex-soldiers, the lower middle class, and small farm- 
ers; in 1923 membership totaled 55,000. General Ludendorff sup- 
ported the former corporal in his beer hall putsch of November 
1923, an attempt to overthrow the Bavarian government. The 
putsch failed, and Hitler was imprisoned until December 1924. In 
prison he wrote Mein Kampf, the Nazi ideological tract. 

After the failure of the putsch, Hitler chose "legal revolution" 
as the road to power and then pursued a double goal. First, the 
NSDAP employed propaganda to create a national mass party capa- 
ble of seizing power through electoral successes. Second, the party 
developed a bureaucratic structure and prepared to assume the func- 
tions of state. Beginning in 1924, numerous Nazi cells sprang up 
in parts of northern Germany; the northern groups were consoli- 
dated with the Munich-Bavarian party core. The NSDAP bureau- 
cracy was established in 1926. The SA, which was subordinated 
to centralized political control, functioned primarily to train party 
members and to supervise the Hitler Youth (Hitlerjugend — HJ). 
Postwar youth and university students increasingly formed the core 
of the NSDAP membership. In 1927 the NSDAP organized the 
first Nuremberg party congress, a mass political rally. By 1928 party 
membership exceeded 100,000; the Nazis, however, polled only 
2.6 percent of the vote in the May Reichstag elections. 

The NSDAP, a mere splinter party in 1928, began its rise to 
power the following year. The original breakthrough was the July 
1929 alliance with the DNVP. Alfred Hugenberg, a DNVP leader, 
arranged the alliance for the purpose of launching a plebiscite 
against the Young Plan on the issue of reparations. Hugenberg, 
owner of a large chain of news media enterprises, considered the 
spellbinding Hitler to be a useful drummer who would attract the 
masses. The DNVP-NSDAP union brought the NSDAP within 
the framework of a socially influential coalition of the antirepubli- 
can right. As a result, Hitler's party acquired respectability and 
access to financial resources from a number of industrialists. 

Had it not been for the economic depression of 1929, however, 
Hitler might have faded out of Germany's history. The depres- 
sion greatly augmented political and social instability. By 1932 Ger- 
man unemployment figures had reached more than 6 million out 
of a population of 65 million. The situation caused the middle class, 



32 



Historical Setting 



which had not fully recovered from the inflation of 1923, to lose 
faith in the economic system and in its future. The NSDAP 
exploited the situation, making an intensified appeal to the unem- 
ployed middle-class urban and rural masses and blaming the Treaty 
of Versailles and reparations for the developing crisis. Nazi propa- 
ganda attacked the Weimar political "system," the "November 
criminals," Marxists, internationalists, and Jews. In addition to 
promising a solution to the economic crisis, the NSDAP offered 
the German people a sense of national pride, the acquisition of 
lebensraum (living space), and the restoration of order. The racist 
concept of the "superior" Aryan requiring defense against foreign 
intrusion, i.e., Jews, was also proclaimed. 

Frequent elections had to be held because no workable majority 
was possible in the Reichstag; the economic depression was caus- 
ing an increase in votes only for the extremist parties. The cabinet 
crises of the depression years led to increased experimentation with 
authoritarian methods of rule. The most important consequence 
of this experimentation was President Hindenburg's appointment 
of chancellors whose politics favored the right. In the spring of 1930, 
Hindenburg appointed Heinrich Briining as chancellor. The 
NSDAP won 18.3 percent of the vote that year and emerged as 
the second strongest Reichstag party (following the SPD, which 
had 38.2 percent). The KPD polled 13.1 percent of the vote. In 
1931 the DNVP, which was devastatingly defeated in the elections, 
joined with the NSDAP to form the Harzburg Front coalition 
against Briining' s government. Under orders from Moscow, the 
KPD cooperated with the NSDAP in an attempt to destroy the 
Weimar Republic. Under attack from both sides, the Briining 
government survived only until June 1932. 

In July 1932, the NSDAP more than doubled its 1930 Reich- 
stag representation and became the strongest German party. In 
the November 1932 election, however, NSDAP popularity declined 
as the economic depression began to abate. The KPD increased 
its representation in this election. In the same year, a group of con- 
servative and antirepublican aristocrats and industrialists, think- 
ing they could use to their advantage the wave of discontent that 
had contributed to Hitler's rise in popularity, supported the NSDAP 
with funds. Meanwhile, Briining's successor, Franz von Papen, 
a strong authoritarian who wished to establish a corporate state 
under aristocratic leadership and thus circumvent the problems of 
parliamentary politics, sought NSDAP-DNVP support in May 
1932. He, however, met with Hitler's refusal. After the electoral 
success of the NSDAP in the July 1932 elections, Hitler also refused 
Papen' s offer to join the cabinet as vice chancellor. 



33 



East Germany: A Country Study 



General Kurt von Schleicher, having forced Papen's resigna- 
tion, was appointed chancellor in December 1932. Unable to form 
a coalition in the Reichstag, Schleicher also offered Hitler the vice 
chancellorship, but the fuhrer was determined to hold out for the 
highest government post. When Schleicher was dismissed, he and 
Papen, intriguing separately, prevailed upon President Hinden- 
burg to appoint Hitler chancellor of a coalition government. On 
January 30, 1933, by entirely legal means, Adolf Hitler became 
chancellor of the republic. 

Third Reich 
Consolidation of Power 

Hitler proceeded to transform the Weimar Republic into a 
totalitarian dictatorship. The National Socialist "revolution" was 
accomplished in gradual steps by using legal and semilegal methods 
as well as terror. The NSDAP endeavored initially to establish 
National Socialist hegemony within the state. In this process, the 
old conservative-nationalist elite, while partially preserved, was 
subordinated to Nazi control. The state bureaucratic apparatus and 
the army, however, were retained, and the country's economic and 
social structure remained largely unchanged. 

Because the government did not have a parliamentary majority, 
Hindenburg called for the dissolution of the Reichstag and set 
March 5 as the date for new elections. A week before election day, 
the Reichstag building was destroyed by fire. The Nazis, who 
presumably had set fire to the building themselves, blamed the fire 
on the communists, and on February 28 the president, invoking 
Article 48 of the constitution, signed a decree that enabled the Nazis 
to quash the political opposition. Authorized by the decree, the 
SA arrested socialist and liberal leaders as well as a large number 
of communists. State governments lacking a National Socialist 
majority were dissolved and subordinated to control by the cen- 
tral government. In March Hitler presented the Enabling Act to 
the Reichstag. The Reichstag, purged and intimidated, passed the 
act by a vote of 441 to 84, thereby according Hitler's cabinet dic- 
tatorial powers for a period of 4 years. 

Hitler used the Enabling Act to implement Gleichschaltung (forced 
political coordination), the policy of subordinating all independent 
institutions and organizations to Nazi control. The state bureau- 
cracy and the judiciary were purged of "non- Aryans, ' ' and all mem- 
bers were obliged to swear an oath of personal loyalty to the fuhrer. 
The Secret State Police (Geheime Staatspolizei — Gestapo) was 
created, and the People's Tribunal was established to deal with 



34 



Historical Setting 



cases of treason. State governments were dismissed and replaced 
by Reich governors directly responsible to Hitler. Trade unions 
were dissolved, political parties other than NSDAP were disbanded, 
and the NSDAP was purged of its social-revolutionary wing. In 
July Germany was legally declared a National Socialist one-party 
state. 

After Hindenburg's death in August 1934, Hitler promulgated 
a law that combined the offices of the president and the chancel- 
lor. The law violated the Enabling Act, but it was subsequently 
sanctioned by national plebiscite. Thus, in the pseudolegal fashion 
characteristic of Nazi tactics, Hitler established himself as German 
fiihrer. The army swore an oath of allegiance pledging uncondi- 
tional obedience to him, and Heinrich Himmler's Guard Detach- 
ment (Schutzstaffel — SS) replaced the SA as Hitler's private army. 
Nazi leadership was drawn from the lower-middle class and, 
according to some estimates, came from non-Prussian regions such 
as Bavaria. 

Joseph Goebbels, the minister of propaganda, consolidated the 
National Socialist power and elite structure. Goebbels formulated 
the concept of "total propaganda" and established the Reich Cul- 
tural Chamber. The chamber extended Gleichschaltung to include 
the educational system, the media, and all cultural institutions. Ger- 
manic customs were revived, the worship of Germanic gods was 
encouraged, and ambiguous and exaggerated vocabulary was 
introduced into the language to promote Nazi ideology. Hitler's 
Mein Kampf and other racist-imperialist literature were also widely 
distributed. In its propaganda campaign, the NSDAP focused 
primarily on "gathering in" the German youth. 

Mobilization for War 

National socialism added to authoritarianism the politically 
charismatic idea of the "movement," i.e., the Third Reich's mobili- 
zation for war. To that end, Nazi economic policy emphasized 
accelerated rearmament and autarchy, and the German chemical 
industry developed artificial rubber, plastics, synthetic textiles, and 
other substitute products to make the Third Reich independent 
of imported raw materials. Because the NSDAP had won the sup- 
port of German industrialists, private ownership, although subor- 
dinated to party control, was left intact. The government also began 
an extensive public works program and expanded and improved 
the transportation system. 

The Four- Year Plan, adopted in 1936, resulted in a conflict 
between Hermann Goring' s nationalist approach, which aimed at 
removing Germany from the international economy through 



35 



East Germany: A Country Study 



industrial self-sufficiency, and the internationalist approach to 
industry advocated by Hjalmar Schacht, minister of economic 
affairs. Goring, at the time a minister without portfolio, prevailed 
with his "guns versus butter" slogan. 

The Four- Year Plan Office assumed responsibility for develop- 
ing production quotas and market guidelines. Major industrial 
enterprises, particularly war materiel producers such as Krupp (steel 
and armaments), I. G. Farben (chemicals), and Siemens (shipbuild- 
ing), were expanded. The enlarged war materiel industry signifi- 
cantly reduced unemployment. Owing to the preferential wage 
scales offered by war materiel producers, large numbers of Ger- 
mans abandoned agriculture to seek jobs in industry. During World 
War II, the Nazi regime instituted a labor draft and also used dis- 
enfranchised foreign and slave labor to supply the growing needs 
of the war economy. 

A most significant feature of the Third Reich was the formal 
institutionalization of a system of terror made possible by the SS. 
In the mid- 1930s, Himmler's SS assumed control over both the 
Gestapo and the Nazi concentration camp system, thereby solidify- 
ing Hitler's totalitarian control (see Holocaust, this ch.). Gestapo 
arrests, which had focused originally on communists and socialists, 
were extended to other social groups, most particularly to Jews. 
The concentration camps, which were filled with the Third Reich's 
undesirable elements during mobilization, were to supply forced 
labor for SS-run projects and industries during World War II. 
Meanwhile, the attention of the German masses, for whom there 
had been no real social revolution, was diverted ideologically toward 
the goal of lebensraum, which was to be achieved by coercion and 
military conquest. By the late 1930s, mesmerized Germans, roar- 
ing their approval in mass demonstrations, were ready to follow 
their fuhrer to war. 

Foreign Policy 

As fuhrer, Hitler directed foreign policy. In 1933 he withdrew 
Germany from the League of Nations, aiming to destroy the 
league's collective security system, and began German rearmament 
in preparation for eastward expansion. Hitler's demands, carefully 
timed and swiftly executed, brought about first diplomatic, then 
military, dominance of the Third Reich over Europe. The 
announcement of German rearmament in March 1935 was the 
Third Reich's first overt violation of the Treaty of Versailles. In 
this announcement, the fuhrer proclaimed general conscription, 
stated his intention to expand the army from its legal size of 100,000 
to 550,000 troops, and declared the creation of a German air force. 



36 



Historical Setting 



Britain, France, and Italy responded by sending representatives 
to a conference in Stresa, Italy, to discuss countermeasures. Hitler 
succeeded, however, in fomenting the rapid disintegration of the 
Stresa Front by drawing Britain into an Anglo-German naval agree- 
ment that would guarantee British naval superiority. The Anglo- 
German Naval Pact of June 1935, itself a violation of the Treaty 
of Versailles, implied tacit British acceptance of German rearma- 
ment. France and Italy subsequently abandoned their plans for 
punitive action against Germany. 

Hitler next endeavored to draw Italy away from the Western 
powers. After lending verbal support to Benito Mussolini's inva- 
sion of Ethiopia. Hitler marched German troops into the Rhineland 
in March 1936. The German military presence in the Rhineland, 
a violation of the Versailles and Locarno treaties, suggested the 
forthcoming alliance between Nazi Germany and fascist Italy and 
revealed the weakness of the Western democracies. Shortly there- 
after, Hitler and Mussolini joined to assist General Francisco Franco 
in overthrowing Spain's republican government during the Spanish 
Civil War (1936-39); in November 1936, Germany and Italy 
formed the Berlin-Rome Axis. In the same year, Germany, Italy, 
and Japan were diplomatically united in the Anti-Comintern Pact. 

The next phase in the fuhrer's tactics of encroachment was the 
execution of a plan aimed at eastward expansion. The plan for even- 
tual military aggression was originally discussed at a conference 
in November 1937 in which Hitler met in secret with German mili- 
tary and political advisers. His immediate aims — the annexation 
of Austria and the Czechoslovak Sudetenland — were to be accom- 
plished by pseudolegal means on the basis of a unilateral national- 
ethnic revision of the Treaty of Versailles that provided for the 
incorporation of territories with German populations into the Third 
Reich. In February 1938, Hitler announced his intention to annex 
Austria and called for the resignation of Chancellor Kurt von 
Schuschnigg. The chancellor attempted to avert annexation {Ansch- 
luss) by calling for a national plebiscite that would ratify Austria's 
independence. The attempt failed, and Schuschnigg stepped down. 
Arthur von Seyss-Inquart, the new Austrian chancellor and a Nazi 
puppet, invited German troops to enter Austria. On March 13, 
Austria was declared a province of the German Reich. 

Hitler next prepared to annex Czechoslovakia. In April 1938, 
he instructed the Sudeten Nazis to organize disruptive nation- 
alist agitation in the German-populated Sudetenland. Czechoslo- 
vakia, aware of Hitler's annexationist ambitions, appealed to Britain 
and France for assistance. British prime minister Neville Cham- 
berlain, however, refused to commit his country to defend 



37 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Czechoslovakia and instead organized the Munich Conference of 
September 1938, in which Britain and France agreed to German 
annexation of the Sudetenland. The territory was annexed on 
October 1. In March 1939, Germany occupied the Czech-populated 
western provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, and Slovakia was made 
a German puppet-state. 

When Germany occupied Bohemia and Moravia, Britain and 
France finally became convinced of Hitler's imperialist-expansionist 
objectives and announced their intention to defend the sovereignty 
of Poland, a country that was not German culturally, politically, 
or linguistically. In April 1939, Hitler raised claims to the Polish 
city of Danzig; anticipating war, the fiihrer instructed the military 
to prepare invasion plans. A month later, Germany and Italy signed 
the Pact of Steel, a formal military alliance. After negotiations to 
form an anti-Nazi alliance with the Western powers had repeatedly 
stalemated, the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with Ger- 
many, thus freeing Hitler to act against Poland. On September 1 , 
1939, German troops invaded Poland. Britain and France declared 
war on Germany two days later. 

World War II 

By the end of September, Hitler's armies had overrun western 
Poland; Soviet armies occupied eastern Poland two weeks after the 
German invasion. In April 1940, German forces conquered Nor- 
way and Denmark, and in May they struck at the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, and France. Skirting the northwestern end 
of the Maginot Line, German troops drove deep into northern 
France. British and French troops offered ineffective resistance 
against the lightning-like strikes (blitzkrieg) of German tanks and 
airplanes. A large part of the French armies surrendered, and more 
than 330,000 British and French soldiers were trapped in Dunkirk 
on the coast of northern France. However, because Hitler, for a 
combination of political and military reasons, had halted the 
advance of his armored divisions, the British were able to rescue 
the men in Dunkirk. When France fell in June 1940, Hitler, who 
had originally hoped that Britain would stay out of the war, 
approached Winston Churchill with the offer of a separate peace; 
but the new British prime minister was intransigent. The Third 
Reich experienced its first military defeat in the Battle of Britain, 
in which the Royal Air Force, during the summer and fall of 1940, 
prevented the German Luftwaffe from gaining the air superiority 
necessary for an invasion of Britain. As a result, Hitler postponed 
the planned invasion. 



38 



Historical Setting 



In the winter of 1940-41 , after Japan had joined the Axis powers, 
Hitler began to plan the invasion of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, 
Italy, which had made advances in North Africa and the Mediter- 
ranean region, was experiencing setbacks, and Hitler sent German 
troops to its assistance. As preparation for a campaign against 
Greece designed to protect Romanian oil fields from British air 
strikes, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia were taken into the 
Berlin-Rome Axis of 1936, and German troops were sent to Roma- 
nia in November 1940. Bulgaria joined the pact in March 1941. 
That year, in spite of resistance by the army and the civilian popu- 
lation, German troops also occupied Yugoslavia. 

As a result of the campaign in the Balkans, the German inva- 
sion of the Soviet Union was delayed until June 1941 . By late fall, 
Hitler's armies stood before Moscow. The fuhrer had anticipated 
victory in the Soviet Union within three months, but the early onset 
of winter stopped German advances. A counteroffensive, launched 
in the winter of 1941, drove the Germans back from Moscow. In 
the summer of 1942, Hitler shifted the attack to the south of the 
Soviet Union and began a large offensive directed at the Caucasian 
oil fields. By September 1942, the Axis controlled the area from 
Norway to North Africa and from France to Stalingrad. 

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, had 
brought the United States into the war, and the United States joined 
forces with Britain and the Soviet Union to defeat the Third Reich. 
The British began to bomb German civilian populations in 1942, 
and Soviet armies assumed the offensive after defeating German 
troops in the Battle of Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-43. The 
Allied road to victory had begun. By May 1943, Allied armies had 
driven the Axis forces out of Africa and had landed in Italy, and 
in 1943, also, the Americans, using precision daylight bombing, 
had begun a series of raids on the ball bearing factories at Schwein- 
furt and Regensburg. Area bombing, however, failed to bring about 
the submission of the German people, and the daylight raids, 
although temporarily seriously hindering the production of war 
materiel, proved to be extremely costly. As early as 1943, however, 
the American and British navies had succeeded in substantially 
reducing the German submarine threat to shipping, thereby clearing 
the way for the shipment of arms and troops to Britain in prepara- 
tion for the Normandy invasion. 

In June 1944, American, British, and Canadian forces invaded 
France, driving the Germans back and crossing the German frontier 
in September. The strategic bombing of oil dumps and oil plants 
after the Normandy landings crippled the German counteroffen- 
sive in the Ardennes, which took place in December. Soviet troops, 



39 



East Germany: A Country Study 

meanwhile, advanced from the east. Hitler, however, remained 
determined to fight on and called for the "total mobilization of 
all Germans" for the war effort. In March 1945, American forces 
reached the Rhine River; simultaneously Soviet armies overran 
most of Czechoslovakia and pressed on toward Berlin. Although 
faced with certain defeat, Hitler insisted that every German city, 
every village, and finally "every square meter" would have to be 
defended or left behind as "scorched earth." The western Allied 
and Soviet armies in Germany made their first contact in Saxony 
on April 27. Three days later, Hitler and his bride, Eva Braun, 
committed suicide in a Berlin bunker. Berlin fell to the Soviets on 
May 2; on May 7 the Third Reich surrendered unconditionally. 
German military casualties in World War II are estimated at 3.5 
million dead; more than 600,000 German civilians were killed in 
the bombing offensive. 

Holocaust 

After Hitler's seizure of power in 1933, the Nazis conducted a 
campaign to "purge" German society. Those who could not be 
integrated into the new state were removed; German concentra- 
tion camps became the repository for all "socially undesirable" 
elements, including communists, socialists, liberals, pacifists, 
homosexuals, the mentally retarded, and gypsies. Himmler's SS, 
to which the Gestapo was subordinated, became responsible for 
this process. Arrests were eventually extended to include Jews, a 
small minority, which had been made a scapegoat for Germany's 
problems. 

Anti-Semitism, which had been emphasized by Austrian and 
German conservative political parties since the late nineteenth cen- 
tury, assumed a radical form under the Third Reich. The Aryan 
Paragraph of 1933 decreed that Jews could not hold civil service 
positions. The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 legalized racist anti- 
Semitism, deprived Jews of the right to citizenship, and restricted 
relationships between "Aryans" and Jews. These laws did, 
however, initially reduce random acts of violence against Jews on 
the streets. By 1938 Jews were not permitted to change their names 
and were restricted in their freedom of movement. After the Kristall- 
nacht (Crystal Night) of November 9, 1938, during which acts of 
violence were perpetrated by Nazis against Jews in all parts of Ger- 
many, the persecution of Jews entered a new phase: random acts 
of violence were replaced by the systematic elimination of the Jewish 
population in Germany, numbering about 600,000 at that time. 

During World War II, the SS filled the concentration camps with 
foreign nationals, Russian prisoners of war, and non-German Jews. 



40 



Historical Setting 



After 1941 the number of camps and inmates increased more rapidly 
when the SS began to create extermination camps. Non-Jewish 
prisoners were assigned to forced labor and/or designated for liq- 
uidation; but the "final solution," the Nazi euphemism for geno- 
cide, called for the extermination of every Jew. Himmler's Special 
Duty Section (Sonderdienst — SD) took charge of the extermina- 
tion camps. The SS carried out extermination by working victims 
to death, physical torture, medical experimentation, mass shoot- 
ings, and gassing. The tempo of the mass murder of Jewish men, 
women, and children was accelerated toward the end of the war. 
Hitler's preoccupation with the "final solution" was so great that 
the transport of Jews was at times given preference over the trans- 
port of war materiel. Some authorities estimated that 6 million 
European Jews became victims of the Holocaust. A large number 
(4,565,000) of these victims came from Poland and the Soviet 
Union; about 125,000 German Jews were exterminated. 

Internal Resistance 

Because of the efficiency of the SS, resistance against the Nazi 
regime was extremely difficult. Moreover, the Germans lacked a 
strong tradition of resistance to authority. Resistance against the 
Third Reich, although not a unified movement, nevertheless existed 
from 1933 to 1945 and assumed many forms, including the refusal 
to say "Heil Hitler," bad workmanship, factory slowdowns and 
strikes, sabotage, subversive radio transmissions, distribution of 
leaflets, and planning of assassinations and coups. Many German 
professionals and artists turned to "inner emigration," a form of 
passive resistance in which they pursued their careers without adopt- 
ing the party line; those who publicly opposed the regime lost their 
livelihood and were imprisoned or executed. 

Resistance, limited in 1933 to members of the SPD and KPD, 
did not initially include the appeased middle class. Most of the leftist 
opposition was eliminated by 1934. The Red Band (Rote Kapelle), 
a designation given by the Gestapo to various resistance groups, 
continued to operate in Berlin up to 1942, when it was eliminated. 
Consisting of members with various political beliefs and from all 
social classes, the Red Band provided the Soviet Union with mili- 
tary information and maintained contact with prisoners of war and 
forced labor. 

After the enforcement of Gleichschaltung, some members of Ger- 
man churches, illegal political parties, middle-class youth, university 
organizations, the civil service, and the military continued to resist 
the Third Reich either actively or passively. There was, for exam- 
ple, a military-civilian plot to remove Hitler from office if, in the 



41 



East Germany: A Country Study 

event of a firm stand by France and Britain, war broke out over 
the issue of Czechoslovakia. The Grosse Organisation and the 
Kreisauer Circle coordinated military resistance within the Third 
Reich. Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg, who had ties with both 
of these organizations, attempted to assassinate Hitler and effect 
a coup on July 20, 1944. The coup was planned in cooperation 
with the civilian resistance and was supported by a large number 
of generals and field commanders. The news of Hitler's survival 
of the bomb blast spread, and the SS halted an attempt to secure 
key government offices. Approximately 5,000 conspirators, includ- 
ing 2,000 military officers, were subsequently executed. The 
celebrated national hero, General Erwin Rommel, whose partici- 
pation in the conspiracy was concealed from the public, was forced 
to take poison. 

German Democratic Republic 

Postwar Government 

At the Yalta Conference, held in February 1945 before the capitu- 
lation of the Third Reich, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet 
Union agreed on the division of Germany into occupation zones. 
Estimating the territory that the converging armies of the western 
Allies and the Soviet Union would overrun, the Yalta Conference 
determined the demarcation line for the respective areas of occupa- 
tion. Following Germany's surrender, the Allied Control Council, 
representing the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet 
Union, assumed governmental authority in postwar Germany. The 
Potsdam Conference of July- August 1945 officially recognized the 
zones and confirmed jurisdiction of the Soviet Military Administra- 
tion in Germany (Sowjetische Militaradministration in Deutsch- 
land — SMAD) from the Oder and Neisse rivers to the demarcation 
line (see fig. 6). The Soviet occupation zone included the former 
states of Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, Saxony, Saxony- Anhalt, and 
Thuringia. The city of Berlin was placed under the control of the 
four powers. 

Each occupation power assumed rule in its zone by June 1945. 
The powers originally pursued a common German policy, focused 
on denazification and demilitarization in preparation for the resto- 
ration of a democratic German nation-state. The Soviet occupa- 
tion zone, however, soon came under total political and economic 
domination by the Soviet Union. An SMAD decree of June 10 
granted permission for the formation of antifascist democratic 
political parties in the Soviet zone; elections to new state legisla- 
tures were scheduled for October 1946. A democratic-antifascist 



42 



Historical Setting 




Figure 6. Germany 's Post- World War II Boundaries 



coalition, which included the KPD, the SPD, the new Christian 
Democratic Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union— CDU), and 
the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (Liberal-Demokratische 
Partei Deutschlands — LDPD), was formed in July 1945. The KPD 



43 



East Germany: A Country Study 



(with 600,000 members) and the SPD (with 680,000 members), 
which was under strong pressure from the Communists, merged 
in April 1946 to form the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozi- 
alistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands— SED). In the October 1946 
elections, the SED polled approximately 50 percent of the vote in 
each state in the Soviet zone. In Berlin, which was still undivided, 
the SPD had resisted the party merger and, running on its own, 
had polled 48.7 percent of the vote, thus scoring a major electoral 
victory and decisively defeating the SED, which, with 19.8 per- 
cent, was third in the voting behind the SPD and the CDU. 

The SMAD introduced an economic reform program and simul- 
taneously arranged for German war reparations to the Soviet 
Union. Military industries and those owned by the state, by Nazi 
activists, and by war criminals were confiscated. These industries 
amounted to approximately 60 percent of total industrial produc- 
tion in the Soviet zone. Most heavy industry (constituting 20 per- 
cent of total production) was claimed by the Soviet Union as 
reparations, and Soviet joint stock companies (Sowjetische 
Aktiengesellschaften — SAGs) were formed (see Economic Policy 
and Performance, ch. 3). The remaining confiscated industrial 
property was nationalized, leaving 40 percent of total industrial 
production to private enterprise. The agrarian reform expropriated 
all land belonging to former Nazis and war criminals and generally 
limited ownership to 100 hectares. Some 500 Junker estates were 
converted into collective people's farms, and more than 3 million 
hectares were distributed among 500,000 peasant farmers, agricul- 
tural laborers, and refugees. 

Soviet and Western cooperation in Germany ended with the onset 
of the Cold War in late 1947. In March 1948, the United States, 
Britain, and France met in London and agreed to unite the Western 
zones and to establish a West German republic. The Soviet Union 
responded by leaving the Allied Control Council and prepared to 
create an East German state. In June 1948, the Soviet Union block- 
aded Berlin in an effort to incorporate the city into its zone. 

The Soviet Union envisaged an East German state controlled 
by the SED and organized on the Soviet model (see The Socialist 
Unity Party of Germany, ch. 4). Thus Joseph Stalin called for the 
transformation of the SED into a Soviet-style "party of the new 
type." To that end, Stalin named the Soviet-trained German com- 
munist Walter Ulbricht as first secretary of the SED, and the Polit- 
buro, Secretariat, and Central Committee were formed. According 
to the Leninist principle of democratic centralism, each party body 
was subordinated to the authority of the next higher party body. 
Ulbricht, as party chief, essentially acquired dictatorial powers. The 



44 



Historical Setting 



SED committed itself ideologically to Marxism-Leninism and the 
international class struggle as defined by the Soviet Union. Many 
former members of the SPD and some communist advocates of 
a democratic "road to socialism" were purged from the SED, In 
addition, the Soviet Union arranged to strengthen the influence 
of the SED in the antifascist bloc. The middle-class CDU and 
LDPD were weakened by the creation of two new parties, the 
National Democratic Party of Germany (National-Demokratische 
Partei Deutschlands — NDPD) and the Democratic Peasants' Party 
of Germany (Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands — DBD). 
The SED accorded political representation to mass organizations 
and, most significant, to the party-controlled Free German Trade 
Union Federation (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund — FDGB). 

In November 1948, the German Economic Commission 
(Deutsche Wirtschaftskomission — DWK), including antifascist bloc 
representation, assumed administrative authority. On October 7, 
1949, the DWK formed a provisional government and proclaimed 
establishment of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). 
Wilhelm Pieck, a party leader, was elected first president. 

Integration into the Soviet System 

The years 1949 to 1955 were a period of Stalinization, during 
which East Germany was politically consolidated as an authoritarian 
Soviet-style state under SED leadership. Ulbricht and the SED con- 
trolled the National Front coalition, a federation of all political par- 
ties and mass organizations that technically preserved political 
pluralism. The 1949 constitution formally established a democratic 
federal republic and created the States Chamber and the People's 
Chamber. The People's Chamber, according to the constitution 
the highest state body, was vested with legislative sovereignty. The 
SED controlled the Council of Ministers, however, and reduced 
the legislative function of the People's Chamber to that of accla- 
mation. Election to the People's Chamber and the state legisla- 
tures (later replaced by district legislatures) was based on a joint 
ballot prepared by the National Front; voters merely registered their 
approval or disapproval. The SED imposed conformity to Marxist- 
Leninist ideology on the educational system, the press, social 
organizations, and cultural institutions. In order to guarantee the 
party's dominance within the state, all members of the SED who 
were active in state organs were obliged to carry out party resolu- 
ions. The State Security Service (Staatssicherheitsdienst — SSD) and 
the Ministry of State Security monitored public life with a broad 
network of agents and contributed to eliminating opposition and 



45 



East Germany: A Country Study 



regimenting political and social affairs (see Creation of the Minis- 
try of State Security, ch. 5). 

The Third Party Congress of July 1950 emphasized industrial 
progress. The industrial sector, employing 40 percent of the working 
population, was subjected to further nationalization, which resulted 
in the formation of the Publicly Owned Enterprises ( Yolkseigene 
Betriebe — YEBs). These enterprises incorporated 75 percent of the 
industrial sector. The First Five-Year Plan | 1951-55) introduced 
centralized state planning: it stressed high production quotas for 
heavy industry and increased labor productivity. The pressures of 
the plan caused an exodus of East German citizens to West Ger- 
many. In 1951 monthly emigration figures fluctuated between 
11.500 and 17.000. By 1953 an average of 37.000 men. women, 
and children were leaving each month. 

Stalin died in March 1953. In June the SED. hoping to pacify 
workers with an improved standard of living, announced the Xew 
Course. The Xew Course in East Germany was based on the eco- 
nomic pohev initiated by Georgi Malenkov in the Soviet Union. 
Malenkov's policy, which aimed at improvement in the standard 
of living, stressed a shift m investment toward light industry and 
trade and a greater availability of consumer goods. The SED. in 
addition to shifting emphasis from heavy industry to consumer 
goods, initiated a program for alleviating economic hardships. This 
led to a reduction of delivery quotas and taxes, the availability of 
state loans to private business, and an increase in the allocation 
of production material. 

The Xew Course did not. however, alleviate the burden of the 
East German workers. High production quotas and spiraling work 
norms remained in effect, and the discontent of the workers resulted 
in an uprising on June 17. 1953. Strikes and demonstrations erupted 
spontaneously in major industrial centers. The workers demanded 
economic reforms and called for de-Stalimzation and an end to the 
Ulbricht regime. The East German People's Police and the Soviet 
Army suppressed the uprising;, in which approximately 500 par- 
ticipants were killed. 

In 1954 the Soviet Union granted East Germany formal sover- 
eignty, and the Soviet Control Commission in Berlin was 
disbanded. By this time, reparations payments had been completed, 
and the SAGs had been restored to East German ownership. The 
five states formerly constituting the Soviet occupation zone also 
had been dissolved and replaced by fifteen districts (Bezirke) in 1952: 
the United States. Britain, and France do not recognize the fifteenth 
district. East Berlin. East Germany began active participation in 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) in 1950 



46 



East Berliners throw stones at Soviet tanks 
during the uprising of June 17, 1953. 
Courtesy United Press International 

(see Appendix B). In 1956 the National People's Army (Nationale 
Volksarmee — NVA) was created, and East Germany became a 
member of the Warsaw Pact (see Appendix C). 

Collectivization and Nationalization of 
Agriculture and Industry 

In 1956, at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union, First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev repudiated 
Stalinism. Although Ulbricht remained committed to Stalinist 
methods, an academic intelligentsia within the SED leadership 
demanded reform. To this end, Wolfgang Harich, the main spokes- 
man for de-Stalinization, issued a platform advocating a democratic 
and parliamentary road to socialism. But Harich had misjudged 
the temper of the times and the power of Ulbricht; in late 1956, 
he and his associates were quickly purged from the SED ranks and 
imprisoned. 

An SED party plenum in July 1956 confirmed Ulbricht 's leader- 
ship and presented the Second Five-Year Plan (1956-60). The plan 
employed the slogan "modernization, mechanization, and auto- 
mation" to emphasize the new focus on technological progress. At 
the plenum, the regime announced its intention to develop nuclear 
energy, and the first nuclear reactor in East Germany was activated 



47 



East Germany: A Country Study 



in 1957. The government increased industrial production quotas 
by 55 percent and renewed emphasis on heavy industry. 

The Second Five-Year Plan committed East Germany to acceler- 
ated efforts toward agricultural collectivization and completion of 
the nationalization of the industrial sector. By 1958 the agricul- 
tural sector still consisted primarily of the 750,000 privately owned 
farms that comprised 70 percent of all arable land; only 6,000 
Agricultural Cooperatives (Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenos- 
senschaften — LPGs) had been formed. In 1958-59 the SED sub- 
jected private farmers to quota pressures and sent agitation teams 
to villages in an effort to encourage "voluntary" collectivization. 
The teams used threats, and in November and December 1959 
resisting farmers were arrested by the SSD. By mid- 1960 nearly 
85 percent of all arable land was incorporated in more than 19,000 
LPGs; state farms comprised another 6 percent. By 1961 the socialist 
sector produced 90 percent of East Germany's agricultural products 
(see Agriculture, ch. 3). An extensive economic management reform 
by the SED in February 1958 included the transfer of a large num- 
ber of industrial ministries to the State Planning Commission. In 
order to accelerate the nationalization of industry, the SED offered 
entrepreneurs 50-percent partnership incentives for transforming 
their firms into VEBs. At the close of 1960, private enterprise con- 
trolled only 9 percent of total industrial production. Production 
Cooperatives (Produktionsgenossenschaften — PGs) incorporated 
one-third of the artisan sector during 1960-61, a rise from 6 per- 
cent in 1958. 

The Second Five-Year Plan encountered difficulties, and the 
regime replaced it with the Seven- Year Plan (1959-65). The new 
plan aimed at achieving West Germany's per capita production 
by the end of 1961, set higher production quotas, and called for 
an 85 percent increase in labor productivity. Emigration again 
increased, totaling 143,000 in 1959 and 199,000 in 1960. The 
majority of the emigrants were workers, and 50 percent were under 
25 years of age. The labor drain, which had exceeded a total of 
2.5 million citizens between 1949 and 1961, resulted in the August 
1961 SED decision to build the Berlin Wall. 

New Economic System 

The annual industrial growth rate declined steadily after 1959. 
The Soviet Union therefore recommended that East Germany 
implement the reforms of Soviet economist Evsei Liberman, an 
advocate of the principle of profitability and other market princi- 
ples for communist economies. In 1963 Ulbricht adapted Liber- 
man's theories and introduced the New Economic System (NES), 



48 



Members of the People's Police reinforce 
the Berlin Wall with concrete slabs in 1965. 

Courtesy United Press International 

an economic reform program providing for some decentralization 
in decision making and the consideration of market and perfor- 
mance criteria (see Economic Policy and Performance, ch. 3). The 
NES aimed at creating an efficient economic system and transform- 
ing East Germany into a leading industrial nation. 

Under the NES, the task of establishing future economic develop- 
ment was assigned to central planning. Decentralization involved 
the partial transfer of decision-making authority from the central 
State Planning Commission and National Economic Council to the 
Associations of Publicly Owned Enterprises (Vereinigungen Volk- 
seigener Betriebe — VVBs), parent organizations intended to pro- 
mote specialization within the same areas of production. The central 
planning authorities set overall production goals, but each VVB 
determined its own internal financing, utilization of technology, 
and allocation of manpower and resources. As intermediary bod- 
ies, the VVBs also functioned to synthesize information and recom- 
mendations from the VEBs. The NES stipulated that production 
decisions be made on the basis of profitability, that salaries reflect 
performance, and that prices respond to supply and demand. 

The NES brought forth a new elite in politics as well as in 
management of the economy, and in 1963 Ulbricht announced a 
new policy regarding admission to the leading ranks of the SED. 



49 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Ulbricht opened the Politburo and the Central Committee to youn- 
ger members who had more education than their predecessors and 
who had acquired managerial and technical skills. As a consequence 
of the new policy, the SED elite became divided into political and 
economic factions, the latter composed of members of the new tech- 
nocratic elite. Because of the emphasis on professionalization in 
the SED cadre policy after 1963, the composition of the mass mem- 
bership changed: in 1967 about 250,000 members (14 percent) of 
the total 1.8 million SED membership had completed a course of 
study at a university, technical college, or trade school. 

The SED emphasis on managerial and technical competence also 
enabled members of the technocratic elite to enter the top eche- 
lons of the state bureaucracy, formerly reserved for political dog- 
matists. Managers of the VVBs were chosen on the basis of 
professional training rather than ideological conformity. Within 
the individual enterprises, the number of professional positions and 
jobs for the technically skilled increased. The SED stressed educa- 
tion in managerial and technical sciences as the route to social 
advancement and material rewards. In addition, it promised to raise 
the standard of living for all citizens. From 1964 until 1967, real 
wages increased, and the supply of consumer goods, including lux- 
ury items, improved. 

Ulbricht Versus Detente 

Ulbricht' s foreign policy from 1967 to 1971 responded to the 
beginning of the era of detente with the West. Although detente 
offered East Germany the opportunity to overcome its isolation in 
foreign policy and to gain Western recognition as a sovereign state, 
the SED leader was reluctant to pursue a policy of rapprochement 
with West Germany. Both Germanies had retained the goal of 
future unification; however, both remained committed to their own 
irreconcilable political systems. The 1968 East German Constitu- 
tion proclaimed the victory of socialism and restated the country's 
commitment to unification under communist leadership. However, 
the SED leadership, although successful in establishing socialism 
in East Germany, had limited success in winning popular support 
for the repressive social system. In spite of the epithet "the other 
German miracle," the democratic politics and higher material 
progress of West Germany continued to attract East German 
citizens. Ulbricht feared that hopes for a democratic government 
or a reunification with West Germany would cause unrest among 
East German citizens, who since 1961 appeared to have come to 
terms with social and living conditions. 



50 



Historical Setting 



In the late 1960s, Ulbricht made the Council of State the main 
governmental organ. The twenty-four-member, multiparty coun- 
cil, headed by Ulbricht and dominated by its fifteen SED represen- 
tatives, generated a new era of political conservatism. Foreign and 
domestic policies in the final years of the Ulbricht era reflected 
strong commitment to an aggressive strategy toward the West and 
toward Western ideology. Ulbricht 's foreign policy focused on 
strengthening ties with Warsaw Pact countries and on organizing 
opposition to detente. In 1967 he persuaded Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria to conclude bilateral mutual assis- 
tance treaties with East Germany. The Ulbricht Doctrine, subse- 
quently signed by these states, committed them to reject the 
normalization of relations with West Germany unless Bonn for- 
mally recognized East German sovereignty. Ulbricht also 
encouraged the abrogation of Soviet bloc relations with the indus- 
trialized West, and in 1968 he launched a spirited campaign to con- 
vince the Comecon states to intensify their economic development 
"by their own means." Considering claims for freedom and 
democracy within the Soviet bloc a danger to its domestic policies, 
the SED, from the beginning, attacked Prague's new political 
course, which resulted in intervention by the Soviet military and 
other Warsaw Pact contingents in 1968 (see Appendix C). 

Domestically the East German regime replaced the NES with 
the Economic System of Socialism (ESS), which focused on high- 
technology sectors in order to make self-sufficient growth possi- 
ble. Overall, centralized planning was reintroduced in the so-called 
structure-determining areas, which included electronics, chemicals, 
and plastics. Industrial combines were formed to integrate verti- 
cally industries involved in the manufacture of vital final products. 
Price subsidies were restored to accelerate growth in favored sec- 
tors. The annual plan for 1968 set production quotas in the 
structure-determining areas 2.6 percent higher than in the remain- 
ing sectors in order to achieve industrial growth in these areas. The 
state set the 1969-70 goals for high-technology sectors even higher. 
Failure to meet ESS goals resulted in the conclusive termination 
of the reform effort in 1970. 

In August 1970, the Soviet Union and West Germany signed 
the Moscow Treaty, in which the two countries pledged non- 
aggression in their relations and in matters concerning European 
and international security and confirmed the Oder-Neisse line. 
Moscow subsequently pressured East Germany to begin bilateral 
talks with West Germany. Ulbricht resisted, further weakening his 
leadership, which had been damaged by the failure of the ESS. 
In May 1971, the SED Central Committee chose Erich Honecker 



51 



East Germany: A Country Study 

to succeed Ulbricht as the party's first secretary. Although Ulbricht 
was allowed to retain the chairmanship of the Council of State until 
his death in 1973, the office had been reduced in importance. 

Honecker and East-West Rapprochement 

Honecker combined loyalty to the Soviet Union with flexibility 
toward detente. At the Eighth Party Congress in June 1971, he 
presented the political program of the new regime. In his reformula- 
tion of East German foreign policy, Honecker renounced the 
objective of a unified Germany and adopted the "defensive" posi- 
tion of ideological Abgrenzung. Under this program, the country 
defined itself as a distinct "socialist state" and emphasized its alle- 
giance to the Soviet Union. Abgrenzung, by defending East Ger- 
man sovereignty, in turn contributed to the success of detente 
negotiations that led to the Four Power Agreement on Berlin (Berlin 
Agreement) in 1971 and the Basic Treaty with West Germany in 
December 1972. 

The Berlin Agreement and the Basic Treaty normalized rela- 
tions between East Germany and West Germany. The Berlin 
Agreement (effective June 1972), signed by the United States, 
Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, protected trade and travel 
relations between West Berlin and West Germany and aimed at 
improving communications between East Berlin and West Berlin. 
The Soviet Union stipulated, however, that West Berlin would not 
be incorporated into West Germany. The Basic Treaty (effective 
June 1973) politically recognized two German states, and the two 
countries pledged to respect one another's sovereignty. Under the 
terms of the treaty, diplomatic missions were to be exchanged and 
commercial, tourist, cultural, and communications relations estab- 
lished. In September 1973, both countries joined the United 
Nations, and thus East Germany received its long-sought inter- 
national recognition. 

The Main Task, introduced by Honecker in 1971, formulated 
domestic policy for the 1970s. The program re-emphasized 
Marxism-Leninism and the international class struggle. During this 
period, the SED launched a massive propaganda campaign to win 
citizens to its Soviet-style socialism and to restore the "worker" 
to prominence. The Main Task restated the economic goal of 
industrial progress, but this goal was to be achieved within the con- 
text of centralized state planning. Consumer socialism — the new 
program featured in the Main Task — was an effort to magnify the 
appeal of socialism by offering special consideration for the material 
needs of the working class. The state extensively revamped wage 
policy and gave more attention to increasing the availability of 



52 



Historical Setting 



consumer goods. The regime also accelerated the construction of 
new housing and the renovation of existing apartments; 60 per- 
cent of new and renovated housing was allotted to working-class 
families. Rents, which were subsidized, remained extremely low. 
Because women constituted nearly 50 percent of the labor force, 
child-care facilities, including nurseries and kindergartens, were 
provided for the children of working mothers. Women in the labor 
force received salaried maternity leave which ranged from six 
months to one year. The state also increased retirement annuities 
(see Population Structure and Dynamics, ch. 2). 

Two Germanies 

From the mid-1970s, East Germany remained poised between 
East and West. The 1974 amendment to the Constitution deleted 
all references to the "German nation" and "German unity" and 
designated East Germany "a socialist nation-state of workers and 
peasants" and "an inseparable constituent part of the socialist com- 
munity of states." However, the SED leadership had little success 
in inculcating East Germans with a sense of ideological identifica- 
tion with the Soviet Union. Honecker, conceding to public opin- 
ion, devised the formula "citizenship, GDR; nationality, German." 
In so doing, the SED first secretary acknowledged the persisting 
psychological and emotional attachment of East German citizens 
to German traditions and culture and, by implication, to their Ger- 
man neighbors in West Germany. 

Although Abgrenzung constituted the foundation of Honecker' s 
policy, detente strengthened ties between the two Germanies. 
Between 5 and 7 million West Germans and West Berliners visited 
East Germany each year. Telephone and postal communications 
between the two countries were significantly improved. Personal 
ties between East German and West German families and friends 
were being restored, and East German citizens had more direct 
contact with West German politics and material affluence, particu- 
larly through radio and television. West Germany was East Ger- 
many's supplier of high-quality consumer goods, including luxury 
items, and the latter' s citizens frequented both the Intershops, which 
sold goods for Western currency, and the Exquisit and Delikat 
shops, which sold imported goods for East German currency. As 
part of the general detente between East and West, East Germany 
participated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe and in July 1975 signed the Helsinki Final Act, which was 
to guarantee the regime's recognition of human rights. The Final 
Act's provision for freedom of movement elicited approximately 



53 



East Germany: A Country Study 



120,000 East German applications for permission to emigrate, but 
the applications were rejected. 

Both Germanies have continued a search for national identity. 
From the beginning, the newly formed East German republic tried 
to establish its own separate identity. Because of Marx's abhor- 
rence of Prussia, the SED repudiated continuity between Prussia 
and East Germany. In an attempt to obliterate East Germany's 
Prussian heritage, the SED destroyed the Junker manor houses 
and the Berlin municipal castle and removed the equestrian statue 
of Frederick the Great from East Berlin. Instead the SED focused 
on the progressive heritage of German history, including Thomas 
Miintzer's role in the Great Peasant War and the role played by 
the heroes of the class struggle during Prussia's industrialization. 
Nevertheless, as early as 1956 East Germany's Prussian heritage 
asserted itself in the NVA. As a result of the Ninth Party Con- 
gress in May 1976, East Germany has since 1976-77 considered 
its own history as the essence of German history, in which West 
Germany is only an episode. It has laid claim to reformers such 
as Karl, Freiherr vom Stein, Karl August von Hardenberg, 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, and Gerhard von Scharnhorst. The statue 
of Frederick the Great has meanwhile been restored to prominence 
in East Berlin. Honecker's references to the former Prussian king 
in his speeches reflected East Germany's official policy of revisionism 
toward Prussia, which also included Bismarck and the resistance 
group Red Band. East Germany has also laid claim to the formerly 
maligned Martin Luther and to the organizers of the Spartacus 
League, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. 

In spite of detente, the Honecker regime remained committed 
to Soviet-style socialism and continued a strict policy toward dis- 
sidents. A critical Marxist intelligentsia within the SED neverthe- 
less renewed the plea for democratic reform. Among them was the 
poet-singer Wolf Biermann, who with Robert Havemann had led 
a circle of artists and writers advocating democratization; he was 
expelled from East Germany in November 1976 for dissident 
activities. Following Biermann's expulsion, the SED leadership dis- 
ciplined more than 100 dissident intellectuals. Despite the govern- 
ment's actions, East German writers began to publish political 
statements in the West German press and periodical literature. The 
most prominent example was Rudolf Bahro's Die Alternative, which 
was published in West Germany in August 1977. The publication 
led to the author's arrest, imprisonment, and deportation to West 
Germany. In late 1977, a manifesto of the "League of Democratic 
Communists of Germany" appeared in the West German maga- 
zine Der Spiegel. The league, consisting ostensibly of anonymous 



54 



Historical Setting 



middle- to high-ranking SED functionaries, demanded democratic 
reform in preparation for reunification. 

Even after an exodus of artists in protest against Biermann's 
expulsion, the SED continued its repressive policy against dissi- 
dents. The state subjected literature, one of the few vehicles of 
opposition and nonconformism in East Germany, to ideological 
attacks and censorship. This policy led to an exodus of prominent 
writers, which lasted until 1981 . The Lutheran Church also became 
openly critical of SED policies. Although in 1980-81 the SED 
intensified its censorship of church publications in response to the 
Polish Solidarity movement, it maintained, for the most part, a 
flexible attitude toward the church. The consecration of a church 
building in May 1981 in Eisenhiittenstadt, which according to the 
SED leadership was not permitted to build a church owing to its 
status as a "socialist city," demonstrated this flexibility (see Religion 
and Religious Organizations, ch. 2). 

Tenth Party Congress 

The Tenth Party Congress, which took place in April 1981, 
focused on improving the economy, stabilizing the socialist sys- 
tem, achieving success in foreign policy, and strengthening rela- 
tions with West Germany. Presenting the SED as the leading power 
in all areas of East German society, General Secretary (the title 
changed from first secretary in 1976) Honecker emphasized the 
importance of educating loyal cadres in order to secure the party's 
position. He announced that more than one-third of all party mem- 
bers and candidates and nearly two-thirds of the party secretaries 
had completed a course of study at a university, technical college, 
or trade school and that four-fifths of the party secretaries had 
received training in a party school for more than a year. Stating 
that a relaxation of "democratic centralism" was unacceptable, 
Honecker emphasized rigid centralism within the party. Outlin- 
ing the SED's general course, the congress confirmed the unity 
of East Germany's economic and social policy on the domestic front 
and its absolute commitment to the Soviet Union in foreign policy. 
In keeping with the latter pronouncement, the SED approved the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The East German stance dif- 
fered from that taken by the Yugoslav, Romanian, and Italian com- 
munists, who criticized the Soviet action. 

The SED's Central Committee, which during the 1960s had been 
an advisory body, was reduced to the function of an acclamation 
body during the Tenth Party Congress. The Politburo and the 
Secretariat remained for the most part unchanged. In addition to 
policy issues, the congress focused on the new Five-Year Plan 



55 



East Germany: A Country Study 

(1981-85), calling for higher productivity, more efficient use of 
material resources, and better quality products. Although the previ- 
ous five-year plan had not been fulfilled, the congress again set 
very high goals. Because it barely went beyond the repetition of 
previous aims and the continuation of domestic and foreign poli- 
cies, the Tenth Party Congress has been termed the party congress 
of continuity. 

* * * 

The reader may enjoy Carola Stern's Ulbricht: A Political Biogra- 
phy and Heinz Lippmann's Honecker and the New Politics of Europe. 
Jonathan Steel's Inside East Germany: The State That Came in from the 
Cold provides a journalist's account. Hartmut Zimmermann's essay 
"The GDR in the 1970s," in Problems of Communism, March- April 
1978, serves as an excellent introduction to the contemporary 
situation. 

For background, Geoffrey Barraclough's The Origins of Modern 
Germany is a classic study of the late-medieval German past. Ger- 
many: 1866-1945, by Gordon A. Craig, represents a recent synthesis 
of the history of the German nation-state. Fritz Fischer's controver- 
sial Germany's Aims in the First World War warrants brief perusal: 
the author collects a wealth of documentation revealing the politi- 
cal and social context of World War I. The German Dictatorship: The 
Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism by Karl Dietrich 
Bracher offers an excellent analysis of Hitler's road to power and 
the Third Reich. (For further information and complete citations, 
see Bibliography.) 



56 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




Clockwise from top: Handel, Schumann, and Bach 



THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (East Germany) 
lies in the heart of the northern plains of Europe and covers an 
area of approximately 108,568 square kilometers, including East 
Berlin (which is not recognized as part of East Germany by the 
United States, France, and Britain). It is bounded on the north 
by the Baltic Sea, on the east by Poland, on the southeast by 
Czechoslovakia, and on the west and southwest by the Federal 
Republic of Germany (West Germany). The terrain is gentle. 
Lowlands and rolling hills characterize about two-thirds of the coun- 
try; the southern third comprises uplands and mountains. The most 
fertile agricultural belt and the most densely settled area of the coun- 
try is the Borderland, where the central lowlands merge into the 
uplands. 

The population, which has declined steadily since World War 
II, was about 16.7 million in 1986. Low birthrates and the dynamics 
of the population combined with historical trends to produce an 
unbalanced age and sex structure; in the mid-1980s, a high propor- 
tion of the population was over sixty years of age. Most people 
lived in medium-sized towns of 5,000 to 50,000 residents. There 
were, however, some large cities, most of which were located in 
the southern section of the country. The largest city was East Ber- 
lin with a population of 1 .2 million. East Germany considered East 
Berlin its capital, although in the view of the Western Allies the 
entire city is still under the control of the former Allied powers, 
the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. 

East Germany is relatively homogeneous culturally and linguisti- 
cally. It does have, however, a small Slavic population known as 
Sorbs, who in 1984 numbered approximately 34,000 and resided 
primarily around the cities of Cottbus, Bautzen, and Hoyerswerda. 
A small Jewish community of a few hundred, all that remain of 
the prewar Jewish population, also continue to live in East 
Germany. 

In the 1970s, despite the country's cultural ties with West Ger- 
many, the East German government adopted a two-nation policy. 
Abandoning the goal of reunification, East Germany concentrated 
on building a national consciousness that was distinct from that 
of the West Germans. This effort, however, was not very success- 
ful, and East Germans continued to consider themselves part of 
a larger German community that included the populations of both 
German states. 



59 



East Germany: A Country Study 



The country calls itself a "socialist state of workers and peasants." 
Theoretically all power resides in the hands of the working class, 
but in reality the state exercises control of all resources and means 
of production. The communist party leadership forms the elite of 
society and is separated from the majority of the population by the 
privileges and power it enjoys. Members of the intelligentsia form 
an intermediate stratum. This segment of the population includes 
members from the prewar middle class as well as a group of newly 
trained and educated managers, planners, technicians, artists and 
others trained in the humanities, and scientists. In general the mem- 
bers of the intelligentsia are apolitical. The vast majority of the 
population is categorized as workers, a grouping that includes 
manual laborers and white-collar workers. Social programs imple- 
mented by the government are intended to restructure society and 
provide equal benefits for the working-class man and woman. 
Health, housing, and welfare programs are part of the scheme of 
restructuring society. The government has had mixed results in 
these areas. Since the 1970s, the government has catered to work- 
ers' demands for more and better consumer goods. Whether or 
not the government would be able to meet these demands in the 
future was uncertain because of the slowdown in economic growth. 

The family is the basic unit of society and is recognized as such 
by communist officials, who consider it the smallest collective unit. 
Parents are charged with educating their children in the socialist 
way of life. Family structure and relationships have been affected 
by the increased participation of women in the work force. 

In the mid-1980s, there were three major mass organizations — 
the Free German Trade Union Federation, the Free German 
Youth, and the Democratic Women's League of Germany. These 
organizations sought to produce a unity of interests among all seg- 
ments of the population and to mobilize support for government 
policies. 

The educational system, which is a source of pride for the East 
German government and people, is the primary agent of sociali- 
zation. In the mid-1980s, all children began the ten-grade general 
poly technical school at the age of six. The curriculum emphasized 
science and mathematics and contained a "practical experience" 
component designed to bridge the gap between learning and work. 
Upon completion of the ten-year program, most students began 
vocational training as apprentices in local factories. 

As of 1987, about 47 percent of the East German population 
was Protestant. Another 7 percent was Roman Catholic, and under 
1 percent adhered to other religious beliefs. The Lutheran Church, 
the main Protestant denomination, was organized into eight 



60 



The Society and Its Environment 



territorial churches that were, in turn, federated into two primary 
organizations. Both of these groups had separated from their West 
German counterparts in 1968. They cooperated with each other 
under a loose federal structure set up in 1969, but as of the mid- 
1980s there was talk of integrating the Lutheran churches into a 
single entity. The church characterized its relationship with the 
regime as one of critical solidarity, a phrase that implied a mix- 
ture of compromise and criticism. The regime considered the church 
an anomaly and generally discouraged the population from par- 
ticipating in religious activities. For its part, in the mid-1980s the 
church became a focus of dissent because it provided institutional 
and ideological foundations for the growth of an unofficial peace 
movement. 

In the early 1980s, an organized opposition emerged that revolved 
around the issues of peace and the demilitarization of East Ger- 
man society. Opposition also crystallized around small groups of 
the creative intelligentsia, who began openly to criticize the regime 
in their artistic and philosophical works. Most of the young intellec- 
tuals were committed Marxists who sought to reform the system. 
Since the mid-1970s, the regime has attempted to stifle dissent by 
exiling these critics to the West. Dissent was also evident in the 
number of East Germans who attempted to leave the country both 
legally and illegally. 

Physical Environment 
Boundaries 

East Germany is a state artificially and arbitrarily carved from 
the remnants of the Third Reich. At the end of World War II, 
Germany was partitioned into four occupation zones. The parti- 
tioning was to be a temporary measure, and the country was to 
be reunited after a short transitional period of one to three years. 
Political considerations and power rivalries, however, ultimately 
precluded speedy reunification. The British, French, and Ameri- 
can zones were merged in 1949 to become the Federal Republic 
of Germany. The Soviet zone became the German Democratic 
Republic, "an independent socialist state," later that same year. 

The country covers an area of 108,568 square kilometers (includ- 
ing East Berlin), somewhat less than one-third the area of West 
Germany. The Baltic Sea coastline, East Germany's northern 
boundary, measures about 320 kilometers. The coastline has many 
natural harbors and is favorable for navigation, but before the war 
it had no important ports. Czechoslovakia and East Germany share 
a border of about 427 kilometers to the southeast. The border 



61 



East Germany: A Country Study 

conforms to pre- 1938 boundaries. The Erzgebirge (mountain range) 
form a natural frontier, although the mountains are not an impass- 
able barrier. The Potsdam Protocol of 1945 defined eastward limits. 
Portions of Germany's prewar territories, most notably East Prus- 
sia, were placed under the administration of the Soviet Union and 
Poland pending conclusion of a final German peace treaty. The 
Allied powers agreed in principle that Poland should be given Ger- 
man territory to make up for land it had lost to the Soviet Union 
in 1939. At Potsdam the boundaries dividing Germany and Poland 
were drawn along the Oder and Neisse rivers located about 160 
kilometers to the west of the prewar boundary. Poland was also 
given a small section of land in the north, lying to the west of the 
Oder and containing the port of Stettin (Polish: Szczecin) and the 
Swine Channel, which opens to the sea. East Germany confirmed 
the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse line in the early 1950s. Until 
1970 West Germany refused to recognize the border and referred 
to the former German territories controlled by Poland and the Soviet 
Union as lands under foreign administration. However, the Mos- 
cow and Warsaw treaties, signed by West Germany in 1970, for- 
mally confirmed the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's easternmost 
boundary. The border extends for about 453 kilometers. 

The western boundary of the Soviet zone was outlined in a pro- 
tocol among the Allied powers in 1944, shortly before the end of 
the war. The western and southwestern frontier extends 1,381 
kilometers from Liibeck Bay on the Baltic Sea southward. Follow- 
ing the old prewar state boundaries, the frontier cuts across the 
northern plains, tracing the course of the Elbe River for a short 
distance before traversing southward through the Harz (mountain 
range) and then twisting eastward through Thuringer Wald (for- 
ested mountain range). The border dividing the two Germanies 
is among the most closely guarded and fortified in the world. The 
areas along the border have been cleared of trees and houses. Barbed 
wire fences, mine fields, and control towers mark the entire length; 
and the restricted zone, including the high security area, stretches 
over 780 meters in width. What began as a temporary demarca- 
tion of administrative zones between the Allied powers has been 
made into a virtually impenetrable border by East Germany. One 
year after the conclusion of the 1972 Basic Treaty, the Boundary 
Commission was established to settle boundary questions between 
the two states. Bilateral frontier agreements were also concluded 
in 1973 to provide for care of frontier waterways and to handle 
environmental problems. In 1978 the two Germanies signed a pro- 
tocol on the demarcation of about 90 percent of the inter-German 



62 



The Society and Its Environment 



border. Still disputed in early 1987 was a ninety-five kilometer sec- 
tion of the Elbe River in the north. 

Topography 

East Germany lies in the heart of the northern European plain. 
The terrain is gentle, and the landscape is marked by few sharp 
contrasts. Landform areas merge into one another; no significant 
natural boundaries bar communications or distinguish one section 
of the country from another. The country, however, can be roughly 
divided into geographic regions. The northern plain covers most 
of the country and contains the coastal area in the far north and 
the lowlands in the center. The uplands consist of mountains and 
rolling hills that cover the southern section (see fig. 7). 

The district of Rostock stretches along the entire length of the 
Baltic coast. The coastline is uneven but generally flat and sandy. 
The continuous action of wind and waves has created sand dunes 
and ridges along the coast, and sandbars have formed that con- 
nect the mainland with some of its offshore islands. The northern 
sections of the Schwerin and Neubrandenburg districts, which are 
also categorized as coastal, are dotted with marshes and numer- 
ous lakes. Much of East Germany contains soils of poor quality. 
The coastal section is no exception; soils are sandy, porous, and 
low in nutrients. Nonetheless, with the exception of the Border- 
land in the south, the coastal region contains some of the most 
intensively cultivated agricultural land in the country. About nine- 
tenths of the area is under cultivation; it produces mainly rye and 
potatoes. The region enjoys a maritime climate that is moderate 
and marked by few extremes in temperature. Average annual rain- 
fall is between sixty-one and sixty-four centimeters, close to the 
national average. 

Most of the country lies in an area of the northern plains known 
as the central lowlands. This includes the districts of Frankfurt, 
Potsdam, and Cottbus as well as portions of Schwerin, Neubrand- 
enburg, Magdeburg, Halle, Leipzig, and Dresden. This region 
(together with the coastal area) covers about 80 to 85 percent of 
the land and was formed by glaciation during the Quaternary 
period. The lowlands are dominated by rolling hills and low ridges 
that rarely reach elevations in excess of ninety-one meters above 
sea level. Numerous lakes, varying in size, shape, and depth, cover 
the landscape, particularly in western Neubrandenburg and around 
Berlin. In general these lakes are of little commercial value because 
of their shallow depth. Broad valleys, carved as glaciers receded, 
crosscut the plains, providing natural transportation routes. Soils 
of gravel and coarse sand predominate, and, as a result, much of 



63 



East Germany: A Country Study 




The Society and Its Environment 



the area, especially around Berlin, is forest and pastureland. The 
most fertile soils of clay and sand loam are found in the Elbe basin 
and along the rivers bordering Poland, but only slightly more than 
half the region is under cultivation. The climate exhibits greater 
extremes of temperature as the maritime climate of the coast gives 
way to a continental climate where the rivers freeze in winter. In 
general, however, the weather is moderate. Rainfall approximates 
the national average. 

The Borderland, a fertile belt of rolling countryside, forms a tran- 
sition zone from the central lowlands to the uplands in the south. 
The country's most valuable agricultural land is found here. Loess, 
a fine silt, provides a thick soil cover that is favorable for intensive 
cultivation of crops such as wheat, barley, and sugar beets. The 
Borderland forms an arc extending from the districts of Magdeburg 
and Halle southeast through parts of Leipzig and Dresden. Its 
broadest section lies along the Elbe and Saale rivers. Much of the 
country's mineral wealth, including sizable reserves of lignite and 
potash, is found in this area. The climate is continental but moder- 
ate, and the growing season is relatively long. 

The uplands cover about 20 percent of the southern section. The 
landscape consists of hills and high ridges. Included in this region 
are portions of the districts of Magdeburg, Halle, Leipzig, Dres- 
den, Erfurt, Suhl, Gera, and Karl-Marx-Stadt. The Harz forms 
the northwest section of the uplands; the highest peak, Brocken, 
reaches a height of 1,141 meters. In the southwest, extending some 
104 kilometers, is the Thiiringer Wald, a narrow ridge of thick 
woodland. To the southeast, forming the border with Czechoslo- 
vakia, are the Erzgebirge. Elevations in this range reach 1,213 
meters. Many major industrial centers are situated along the base 
of the Erzgebirge. Traditional passages into the region lie between 
the Harz and the Thiiringer Wald and between the Thiiringer Wald 
and the Erzgebirge. Good agricultural land is found at the base 
of the Thiiringer Wald surrounding Erfurt, but soils in the southern- 
most districts are poor and not favorable for cultivation. Tempera- 
tures depend on elevation and exposure, and they sometimes dip 
quite low in the higher mountain areas. Rainfall varies. In the Harz, 
for example, rainfall averages as high as 147 centimeters a year 
whereas at the base of the Thiiringer Wald, where the uplands 
merge with the Borderland, rainfall averages about fifty-one cen- 
timeters. 

Population 

In 1986 the estimated population was 16.7 million, or between 
one-fourth and one-third that of West Germany. In the years since 



65 



East Germany: A Country Study 



the war, population has declined steadily, posing a serious problem 
for East German planners interested in balanced economic growth 
and social development. The population reached a peak of 19.1 
million in 1948. This postwar increase resulted largely from the 
influx of Germans expelled from Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. After 1950, however, the population began to decline and, 
except for a small increase in the early 1960s (after the construc- 
tion of the Berlin Wall), the country continued to register a nega- 
tive growth rate. In 1950 the official census recorded a resident 
population of 18.3 million; by 1960 the number had dropped to 
17.2 million; and by 1970 it had decreased to 17.1 million. Popu- 
lation levelled off in the late 1970s at around 16.7 million, reflect- 
ing a zero rate of growth. 

Historical Trends 

The population pyramids of both East Germany and West Ger- 
many have reflected casualties suffered during two world wars, lower 
birthrates in the prewar and postwar periods, and the large-scale 
movement of population in the ten to fifteen years after World War 
II. East Germany, however, has felt these negative effects more 
severely than West Germany and has taken a longer time to recover 
from them. 

The number of German military and civilian deaths resulting 
from World War II is estimated at between 3.5 and 4.5 million. 
Most of the casualties were in the twenty-to-forty-four age group, 
and most of these were men in their thirties. The ratio of women 
to men was five to four in 1950. The surplus of females was espe- 
cially marked in the twenty-one-to-thirty-five age group, where 
women outnumbered men by more than two to one. The net result 
was a decline in marriage and birthrates, an increase in the death 
rate, and an increase in the proportion of the population over forty- 
five years of age. 

Compounding the problem was an influx of Germans from 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and an equally dramatic flow 
of refugees from East Germany to West Germany. An estimated 
11.7 million ethnic Germans were expelled from the Soviet Union, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and 
Romania between 1945 and 1960. Most were transferred in the 
first two years after the war, and most were channeled initially into 
the Soviet zone, although only an estimated 2.2 million finally set- 
tled there. In the late 1940s, the number of expellees offset the 
decline in the resident population because of war losses, and the 
total population increased by 14 percent. 



66 



The Society and Its Environment 



The inflow, however, was matched by a steady outflow of refu- 
gees from the Soviet occupation zone to the West. The movement 
of Germans from east to west consisted primarily of young people 
of working age, a fact that accentuated the prevailing negative 
demographic trends. By 1950 some 1.6 million had migrated to 
the western zones. Between 1950 and 1961, the refugee flow con- 
tinued at a rate of 100,000 to 200,000 annually. Workers were 
attracted by the economic opportunities open to them in West Ger- 
many, and in the early 1950s, they and their families formed the 
majority of emigrants. By the late 1950s, a growing proportion of 
those leaving were professional people and students whose skills 
were sorely needed for internal development. By 1961 approxi- 
mately 2.5 million had left. To stop the exodus, the communist 
authorities built the Berlin Wall in August 1961. 

The Wall effectively sealed off the best escape route open to dis- 
enchanted East Germans, thus halting the mass movement of people 
to the West. After its construction, the number of refugees enter- 
ing West Berlin and West Germany fell drastically. In addition 
controls and restrictions on those allowed to visit the West were 
tightened considerably. Although restrictions have been loosened 
since the conclusion of the Four Power Agreement on Berlin (Ber- 
lin Agreement) in 1971, pensioners have been the only group 
allowed relatively free access to the West. Until 1986, young peo- 
ple, professionals, and the technically skilled were denied oppor- 
tunities to visit the West except under the strictest of controls. 

Population Structure and Dynamics 

Population structure and dynamics in East Germany have been 
seriously affected by historical and political developments. The 
birthrate increased from 16.5 live births per 1,000 population in 
1950 to 17 in 1970 but thereafter declined steadily to 10.8 in 1975. 
After a slight upward trend in the late 1970s, this downward trend 
continued in the 1980s. In 1980 the birthrate was 14.6 per 1,000; 
by 1985 the birthrate had fallen to 13.7 per 1 ,000. In 1986 the East 
German regime took some measures to stimulate the birthrate. The 
state granted working mothers a paid "baby year": a paid leave 
of absence until the child was one year old immediately following 
a twenty-six-week leave for pregnancy and maternity. The state 
also granted all working mothers with two or more children a paid 
absence of up to six weeks per year so that they could take care 
of sick children. 

Marriage rates have fluctuated over the years but, like birthrates, 
generally declined after reaching a peak of 11.7 marriages per 1 ,000 
population in 1950. The number of marriages reflected changes 



67 



East Germany: A Country Study 

in the sex ratio and the small proportion of the population that fell 
in the marriageable age bracket. Since the 1970s, women have 
tended to marry at a younger age; the marriage rate in 1985 was 
7.9 per 1 ,000, slightly higher than in the 1960s. Divorce was com- 
mon. In 1985, with 3.1 divorces per 1,000 population, East Ger- 
many had one of the highest divorce rates in the world (see table 
2, Appendix A). 

The death rate in East Germany has been high for Europe, 
although the high rate has resulted primarily from an unfavorable 
age structure. In fact, infant mortality rates dropped dramatically, 
going from 48.9 deaths per 1 ,000 live births in 1955 to 10 in 1984. 
Similarly, the life span of the population increased in 1985 and 
stood at seventy-five years for women and sixty-nine years for men. 
Death rates increased from 11.9 deaths per 1,000 population in 
1950, to 13.6 in 1960, and to 14.1 in 1970. By 1985 the death rate 
had declined to 13.5 per 1,000 population. 

Historical trends and population dynamics have interacted to 
produce a lopsided sex and age structure. Since the war, the coun- 
try has had a large dependent population. In 1985 approximately 
18 percent of the population was of pensionable age (men sixty- 
five years and over and women sixty years and over). This num- 
ber was a marked increase from the 14 percent that fell into such 
a category in 1950. At the same time, the declining birthrate affected 
the proportion of the population under the age of fifteen. As a result 
of the slight increase in the birthrate in the late 1970s, the propor- 
tion of the population under the age of fifteen stood at 19 percent, 
which exceeded the proportion of the pensionable age-group by 
1 percent. The economically active population was about 63 percent. 

Settlement Patterns 

In 1985 East Germany had an average population density of 154 
persons per square kilometer. Densities ranged from 57 persons 
in the northern district of Neubrandenburg to 312 in the southern 
industrial city of Karl-Marx-Stadt (formerly Chemnitz). In the 
north, where soils are of generally poor quality and few towns of 
historical significance are found, the population was rather sparsely 
distributed. In the south, where rich loessial soils provide attractive 
farmland and major mineral deposits are found, the population 
was denser and was concentrated in and around urban-industrial 
centers. 

Major transportation routes bypass the northern third of the coun- 
try. There are few large industrial centers outside of newly devel- 
oped coastal ports, and the quality of the land is such as to favor 
forests, pastureland, and mixed extensive-intensive agriculture. 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



By far the most important port city is Rostock, whose 1985 popu- 
lation was 244,444. Rostock was developed into a major center after 
the war in order to compensate for the loss of strategically located 
ports. Stralsund and Wismar were also developed into port cities 
and in 1985 were sizable municipalities of 75,480 and 57,465, 
respectively. 

In the central third of the country, East Berlin overshadows all 
other cities in terms of its size and its political and economic sig- 
nificance. It had a 1985 population of 1.2 million and an average 
density of 3,016 persons per square kilometer. Over the years it 
has acted as a magnet, attracting persons from all over East Ger- 
many. It has a higher proportion of the economically active popu- 
lation than any of the other districts but a relatively low proportion 
of the young. Other important urban centers in the central sec- 
tion of the country include Potsdam, Brandenburg, Frankfurt am 
Oder, and Magdeburg. Potsdam (139,467) lies to the southwest 
of Berlin and is a center for light industry. Brandenburg is located 
west of Berlin and had a 1985 population of 94,862. Frankfurt am 
Oder lies near the Polish-German border. Although after the war 
it suffered some loss of inhabitants because of its location, the city's 
population in 1985 stood at 85,593. With the exception of East Ber- 
lin, Magdeburg (population 288,965) is the largest city in the cen- 
tral part of the country. It is located near the inter-German border 
in a fertile agricultural region and is one of the oldest cities in the 
country. 

The southern third is the most densely populated and the most 
industrialized section of the country. It also contains the most fer- 
tile agricultural land. The loessial soils of the Borderland make the 
region attractive for farming. Intensive agriculture predominates, 
and the farm population lives in nucleated village settlements. Most 
of East Germany's mineral resources are also found in the south, 
and large cities developed around the deposits. In 1985 the two 
largest cities were Leipzig (553,660) and Dresden (519,769). Leipzig 
has lost population since the 1970s but in 1985 was still the second 
largest city in East Germany. Surrounded by rich agricultural land 
and easily accessible, it is well known as a publishing and printing 
center but more particularly as the site of the semiannual Leipzig 
Fair. Dresden, in the southeast, is a historic city noted for its 
impressive art collections. In 1985 eight other cities in the south 
each had populations in excess of 100,000. Cottbus (124,752) spe- 
cializes in light industries. Dessau (103,569) is the center of an 
important local food processing industry. Halle (235,169) supports 
a variety of industrial activities. Farther south lie Karl-Marx- 
Stadt and Zwickau, having populations of 315,452 and 120,206, 



69 



East Germany: A Country Study 



respectively. Several large cities are located in the southwest. Erfurt, 
the largest, had 216,046 residents; also sizable were Gera (131,843) 
and Jena (107,401). 

The urban population, i.e., those living in cities or towns of 2,000 
or more, constituted about 77 percent of the total populace in 1985. 
Only 26 percent of the population lived in cities or towns of 100,000 
inhabitants. Instead about 30 percent of the population made their 
homes in small and medium-sized towns of 5,000 to 50,000. World 
War II greatly affected the rate and direction of urbanization. Many 
of the more industrialized towns suffered heavy damage during the 
war and were only slowly rebuilt. In the immediate postwar period, 
there was also some internal migration away from towns located 
along border areas. An exception was the city of Eisenhiittenstadt, 
near the German-Polish border. Constructed in 1950 as a model 
socialist city, it attracted a sizable population for employment in 
its iron and steel industries. 

In keeping with the socialist pattern of urban planning, the state 
has attempted to develop urban centers throughout the country, 
to encourage uniform regional development, and to reduce dispari- 
ties between rural and urban areas. The government has encour- 
aged the development of some industry in the northern and central 
districts and fostered a diversification of industry in the south in 
order to revitalize centers with diminished resources and to redirect 
industrial activity toward priority sectors. In reality, planners have 
not been successful in controlling and balancing growth between 
rural and urban areas or among districts. 

There have been no official restrictions on the internal move- 
ment of the population. However, a shortage of housing and difficul- 
ties related to switching jobs have prevented large-scale internal 
migration. Movement has taken place primarily within district 
boundaries, and residents have gone from rural areas and small 
urban centers to medium- and large-sized municipalities. In 1985, 
for example, about 16 persons per 1,000 inhabitants moved across 
district boundaries. 

The German People 

East Germany contains no minority groups of any significant 
size. Most citizens identify themselves as Germans, culturally and 
linguistically. The government, particularly since the early 1970s, 
has encouraged the development among its citizens of an East Ger- 
man national consciousness distinct from that of West Germans. 
It has adopted a "two-nation" policy and has pointed to diver- 
gences in culture, language, and socioeconomic development as 
proof that a single German nation no longer exists. Most East 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



Germans, however, believe that they share with their West Ger- 
man counterparts a German nationality that is based on a com- 
mon ethnic heritage and shared historical experiences. 

Origins, Language, and Culture 

The Germans are the descendants of the Germanic peoples who 
settled in the north-central plains of Europe sometime around the 
end of the sixth century B.C. (see Early History, ch. 1). The 
Romans, who first encountered the Germanic tribes in their con- 
quest of Gaul, called the people of the area the Germani, after cer- 
tain tribes in Belgium and the Rhineland. Although the Germanic 
people comprised many tribal groups, the name German has come 
to describe the people who remained in central Europe. 

The Germanic people were originally organized into numerous 
small tribes that gradually united into larger groups in order to 
increase their political and military power as they spread across 
and conquered much of Europe. Many of these peoples were the 
forefathers of present-day European populations. The Franks and 
Burgundians were the ancestors of the French; the Lombards con- 
quered northern Italy; and the Angles, Saxons, and Danes moved 
into England and Denmark. Other members of the Saxon tribe, 
in addition to Bavarians and Thuringians, settled in the northern 
plains and began to extend eastward along the Elbe and Oder rivers. 
These early tribal designations survived, and their names desig- 
nate the territories inhabited by the German people. In a very rough 
sense, these ancient tribal groupings correspond to modern-day 
regional groupings, whose distinctive identities are manifested in 
differing customs, dress, food, and dialects. The Germans, par- 
ticularly the pre- World War II generation, are extremely proud 
of their regions of birth and their unique dialects. Regional dis- 
tinctions have been blurred in East Germany since the end of the 
war as a result of an influx of those expelled from Eastern Europe, 
universal and standardized education, urbanization, and greater 
mobility in general. Generally, regional differences are less 
pronounced than those between East Germany and West Germany. 
East Germans are commonly characterized as typifying the Prus- 
sian traits of orderliness, cleanliness, and obstinacy (an adherence 
to rigid Prussian principles), whereas West Germans are more often 
seen as self-assertive, lively, and fun loving. Of course these are 
caricatures of reality, but significantly the government has used 
what regional differences do exist in an effort to create psychologi- 
cal and social boundaries between the two German states. 

Regional loyalties, however, have not obscured the overarch- 
ing feeling among Germans that they share a common nationality 



71 



East Germany: A Country Study 



and are bound together ethnically, linguistically, and culturally. 
National consciousness is especially strong among the Germans, 
and in the past their strong national spirit has been exploited by 
ruthless leaders to muster support for expansionist policies. 

Language is perhaps the most significant expression of a com- 
mon German nationality. The German language is spoken by mil- 
lions of people of Europe, including peoples living in the two 
German states, Austria, Switzerland, and various regions of East 
European countries. In addition the language has a significance 
beyond its everyday use. German-speaking people have made 
important contributions to science, literature, and philosophy. 
Modern German, which belongs to the family of Indo-European 
languages, evolved from proto-Germanic or Common Germanic, 
the collection of languages spoken by the tribes that inhabited the 
area. Although there are many regional dialects, the language is 
usually divided into three major subvarieties: low German, spoken 
in the north; middle German, spoken across the central lowlands; 
and high German, spoken in the uplands of the south. 

A standard form of written and spoken German developed very 
slowly. A move toward standardizing the written language began 
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The invention of printing 
made impractical the continued use of innumerable local dialects 
that varied in spelling, style, and grammar. The translation of the 
Bible into German by Martin Luther usually is considered the mile- 
stone in the development of a standardized written language. 
Luther's translation, based on the Saxon dialect, was accepted by 
the educated classes as a model. The new written German was 
championed by literary societies and improved upon by grammari- 
ans and stylists in the seventeenth century and eventually adopted, 
in a refined form, by some of the great German writers of the eigh- 
teenth and nineteenth centuries, such as Gotthold Lessing, Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe, and Johann von Schiller. 

The spoken language, however, continued to reflect the prolifera- 
tion of local dialects until the end of the nineteenth century. These 
dialects were the individual's way of expressing identity and 
independence and therefore were carefully preserved. As commerce, 
travel, and communication in general increased among the vari- 
ous towns and regions of Germany, the numerous dialects became 
increasingly restrictive, and a standard spoken language began to 
evolve. The schools and the media were especially instrumental 
in pressing for a standard form of German. The standard spoken 
language is today based on the pronunciation of educated north- 
ern Germans. Most Germans write and speak the standard form 
of German with little difficulty, although dialects continue to be 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 



used among family and friends and on informal occasions. (Differ- 
ences in dialect are based on divergences in pronunciation, use of 
expressions, intonation, syntax, and the meaning given to specific 
words.) 

Like all living languages, German is constantly influenced and 
modified through interaction with regional dialects and foreign lan- 
guages. The influence of French, English, and various Slavic lan- 
guages is apparent in the adoption of loanwords and idiomatic 
expressions. The Germans have initiated purification programs at 
various periods in modern history aimed at eliminating all traces 
of foreign influence from the language. 

In addition to a common ethnic heritage and language, the Ger- 
man people share certain social values. The German world view 
and value system are products of Teutonic pagan cosmology, Judeo- 
Christian tradition, and modern eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
philosophies. The pre-Christian conception of the world pitted the 
bravery and stoicism of man against the harsh and oppressive forces 
at work in the world. A thread of tragedy ran through life, but 
it was blended with romanticism and mystical idealism. Lutheran 
Christianity, the religious tradition that most profoundly influenced 
German thinking, emphasized individual morality and conceived 
of man as essentially frail and full of guilt. Man could cleanse himself 
only through penance and devotion to the Almighty. The ratio- 
nalist systems of Immanuel Kant and Georg Hegel represented the 
culmination of Enlightenment philosophies. Materialism and athe- 
ism lay at the basis of Karl Marx's philosophy and economic views. 
Friedrich Nietzsche was a forerunner of twentieth-century existen- 
tialist thought. 

These different and, in many cases, contradictory religious and 
philosophical currents have produced a German who is stereotypi- 
cally characterized as inward looking, vulnerable, sorrowful, and 
full of self-doubt. He combines the sober qualities of industry, 
intelligence, honesty, obstinacy and cleanliness with a certain senti- 
mentality and gaiety. He is extremely disciplined and exhibits a 
penchant for order and authority. He admires courage and physi- 
cal and moral strength. There is a certain validity in this charac- 
ter description insofar as it is based on a common set of experiences 
and traditions. As with all stereotypical descriptions, however, it 
constitutes a distortion of reality when applied to the individual. 

The German Question Today: One Nation or Two? 

Until the 1970s, the governments of both East Germany and West 
Germany went to great lengths to preserve the concept of a united 
Germany. Both cast themselves in the role of national protector; 



73 



East Germany: A Country Study 

both claimed to embody all that was good in the German culture 
and heritage and to speak for all German people; and both pur- 
ported to be working toward the reunification of divided Germany. 
At the same time, officials in the two Germanies initiated policies 
aimed at developing a base of popular loyalty to their separate 
governments. This necessarily meant implementing certain poli- 
cies that were contradictory to the goal of unification. Nationhood, 
national identity, and nationalism became concepts defined by offi- 
cial policy and manipulated to affirm the legitimacy of the state. 
The balance struck by each of the governments between an appar- 
ent desire for unity and the development of a separate "state con- 
sciousness" is at the heart of the "German question." 

Official Policy 

The evolution of official policy on the German, or national, ques- 
tion (as the policy toward reunification came to be known) can be 
roughly divided into three periods. During the first period, from 
1949 to 1961 , East Germany was strongly committed to reunifica- 
tion and sought rapprochement with West Germany on the basis 
of perceived "national commonalities." However, Walter Ulbricht, 
first secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands — SED), also sought to keep East Ger- 
many internationally isolated as a means to force East Germans 
to turn inward and begin a program of internal socialist develop- 
ment. Unification (a subtle change in terminology to reflect grow- 
ing divergences) was still the ultimate goal, but, according to 
prevailing policy, the adoption of different socioeconomic systems 
had resulted in the creation of two German states, and reconcilia- 
tion would be more difficult to achieve. The second period of East 
German policy ran roughly from the building of the Berlin Wall 
in 1961 to the replacement of Ulbricht by Erich Honecker as party 
chief in 1971. The signing of the Berlin Agreement in 1971 and 
of the Basic Treaty in 1972 marked the beginning of a third shift 
in policy (see Honecker and East-West Rapprochement, ch. 1). 
The broad outlines of this policy were expressed in the term 
Abgrenzung (demarcation — see Glossary). East German leaders con- 
tended that the two diametrically opposed socioeconomic systems 
had led to changes in culture, language, and worldview and that 
it was no longer possible to speak of one German nation. Unifica- 
tion as a policy goal was abandoned altogether. 

The evolution of policy toward West Germany can be summa- 
rized as changing from togetherness and cooperation in the 1950s, 
to coexistence in the 1960s, and to separation in the 1970s and 
1980s. (Ironically this shift paralleled a reverse trend in West 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



German relations vis-a-vis East Germany and more generally in 
superpower relations.) East German thinking on the "German 
question" likewise changed from affirmation of one indivisible 
nation, to the idea of two states within one nation, and finally to 
the declaration of two separate nations. 

The 1949 constitution of East Germany referred to Germany 
as "an indivisible democratic republic" and noted that there was 
"only one German citizenship." Throughout the 1950s, East Ger- 
many and the Soviet Union kept open the door of reunification 
and even made political overtures for closer cooperation with the 
West. In 1952 the Soviets were prepared to support a united but 
neutral Germany in order to deter West Germany from rearming 
and entering the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
East Germany and the Soviet Union continued efforts to draw West 
Germany into some sort of "national compromise" even after the 
latter joined NATO in 1955. East German proposals were never 
seriously considered; Western policy dictated the international iso- 
lation and nonrecognition of East Germany. 

During the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, the East Ger- 
man regime began to focus on internal socialist development as 
a prerequisite for unification. The success of the socialist system 
became the test "of every real German patriot." Socialist develop- 
ment meant the collectivization of agriculture, the nationalization 
of industry, and the implementation of a highly centralized plan- 
ning system modeled after the Soviet system. The Berlin Wall was 
erected in 1961 to stop the outflow of talented and skilled labor, 
and the New Economic System was launched in 1963. The coun- 
try consequently began to enjoy a period of relative prosperity. 

The new self-confidence of the regime was reflected in the chang- 
ing official attitudes toward and pronouncements on the German 
question. Confederation was still advanced as an option in the early 
1960s, but later in the decade officials began to speak of the exist- 
ence of two separate states within one German nation. East Ger- 
man citizenship was established in 1967. The state secretariat for 
all German affairs became the state secretariat for West German 
affairs. Finally, a new constitution was promulgated in 1968, 
institutionalizing the change in policy. East Germany became "a 
socialist state of the German nation" (Article 1), "faithful to the 
interests of the German people and the international obligations 
of all Germans" (Article 6). It sought equality in recognition and 
international status and supported "the step-by-step rapproche- 
ment of the two German states until the time of their unification 
on the basis of democracy and socialism" (Article 8). 



75 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Detente between the superpowers and the initiation of West Ger- 
many' s policy of Ostpolitik (see Glossary) sought to bridge the grow- 
ing gap between the Germanies through the promotion of contacts 
at the people-to-people level. East German officials reacted with 
caution and suspicion. The sense of confidence inspired by the eco- 
nomic successes in the 1960s had not quieted the basic insecurity 
of the regime. Consequently, despite Soviet commitment to detente 
with the West (which included closer cooperation between the two 
Germanies), Ulbricht resisted entering into any cooperation agree- 
ments with West Germany. He was removed from power and 
replaced in 1971 by Honecker as party chief. Shortly thereafter 
East Germany and West Germany signed the 1972 Basic Treaty, 
paving the way for the normalization of relations. The agreement 
was a compromise to the sensitivities of both governments. West 
Germany succeeded in promoting contacts between Germans in 
the two states without officially recognizing East Germany. (Rela- 
tions between the two were still characterized as inner-German from 
the West German perspective.) In September 1973, East Germany 
gained de facto international status and was admitted to the United 
Nations, along with West Germany. 

To compensate for the drawing together of the two states, 
however, East German officials implemented a domestic policy of 
Abgrenzung. On a practical level, this took the form of internal 
vigilance against influences from and exposure to the West. On 
a more abstract level, it meant increased efforts toward the develop- 
ment of a distinct state or national identity. In the mid-1970s, the 
official East German view was that one German nation no longer 
existed. The Abgrenzung policy — and the two-nation concept derived 
from it — culminated in 1974 in several important amendments to 
the 1968 Constitution (see Constitution of 1968, ch. 4). All refer- 
ences to the "German nation" were eliminated, references to unifi- 
cation were deleted, and the country's commitment to socialist 
internationalism and its "irrevocable" ties to the Soviet Union were 
forcefully and directly asserted. In the mid-1980s, this policy of 
Abgrenzung continued to characterize relations with the West. In 
addition officials have attempted to reinforce the two-nation con- 
cept among the population by the manipulation of cultural and 
ethnic symbols. 

Development of an East German National Identity 

The Honecker regime recognized the importance of national feel- 
ings and the strength of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural ties among 
the German people. Likewise, the regime was aware that legisla- 
tive and policy changes do not necessarily lead to changes in 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



public attitudes, behavior, and values. Part of the program of 
mobilizing popular support and constructing a socialist society, 
therefore, aimed at developing a new "national consciousness." 
The regime targeted primarily three areas for change. First, it 
attempted to alter the basis for shared historical experiences through 
the selective interpretation of German history. Second, it encour- 
aged the development of linguistic differences in the standard 
language. Third, it attempted to mold a new "socialist person- 
ality" — and hence shape a new value system — through intensive 
socialization. 

According to the official view, East Germany embodies all that 
is positive and progressive in the German past, while West Ger- 
many is a continuation of a reactionary past. The Weimar Republic 
is seen as the logical predecessor of the East German state, and 
historical figures from Germany's socialist past (Marx, Friedrich 
Engels, Rosa Luxemburg, and Karl Liebknecht) are honored as 
the principal national heroes (see Weimar Republic, ch. 1). In 
addition selected military, literary, and musical figures are accorded 
a prominent place in East German history because of their "progres- 
sive" ideas. These include famous Prussian generals and military 
theoreticians such as Gerhard von Scharnhorst, Gebhard von 
Blucher, Carl von Clausewitz, and August Gneisenau, as well as 
reformers such as Karl, Freiherr vom Stein, and Karl August von 
Hardenberg. (The Order of Scharnhorst is the highest East Ger- 
man military decoration.) Also included are cultural figures such 
as Goethe, Schiller, and Johann Sebastian Bach. 

In 1976 at the Ninth Party Congress of the SED, leaders urged 
historians to help develop an East German national identity and 
socialist consciousness by broadening the definition of the "progres- 
sive past" and by making greater use of national history. As a result, 
a critical re-examination of certain periods of history once consid- 
ered reactionary has taken place. Prussian history, for example, 
had been condemned for its militaristic tradition, but in recent years 
it has been the object of closer study. Historical figures either 
ignored or considered unacceptable have been rehabilitated. In the 
1970s and 1980s, Luther and Otto von Bismarck, whom the regime 
had previously criticized, have been re-evaluated. Luther has been 
incorporated into the "socialist heritage" of East Germany. Since 
1980 the regime has regarded Luther as a progressive who 
challenged the power of the Roman Catholic Church with theology, 
the only weapon available to him. Since the mid-1980s, Bismarck 
has also received more favorable treatment, both because he 
advocated good relations with Russia and because he is seen as 
having ended the fragmentation of Germany and paved the way 



77 



' 'Lutherhaus in Eisenach. Damaged by bombing in 1944, 
the structure needed full restoration after the war. 

Courtesy V. Jeffrey Gedmin 

for the blossoming of German economic development. Richard 
Wagner, once disparaged in official circles because of his popular- 
ity among the Nazi leadership, has been rediscovered. Albert Ein- 
stein, earlier ignored by the leadership, was honored in 1979 on 
the hundredth anniversary of his birth. Finally, the study of history 
has been encouraged among the population through the organiza- 
tion of local historical societies, the opening of museums, the build- 
ing of statues, and the preservation and restoration of historical 
landmarks and monuments. The emphasis on certain elements in 
the German past is meant to convey to East Germans the feeling 
that they share not only common historical roots but also a com- 
mon destiny. 

Officials have also encouraged the development of a standard 
language that can be distinguished from the standard German 
spoken in West Germany. They have pointed to the already exist- 
ing divergences in the language to substantiate their claim that two 
separate nations have developed. Indeed, a number of changes are 
apparent in the German language as a result of the long separa- 
tion of East Germany and West Germany. They are not as far 
reaching or as deeply implanted, however, as most Western schol- 
ars originally thought. Changes have resulted primarily from the 
introduction of political and technical jargon into the language and 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



the heavy reliance on abbreviations and acronyms. Certain terms 
have assumed special political and emotional significance, and others 
have become politicized because of their use as slogans. Economic 
and technical terms, many of which presume an extensive knowl- 
edge of science and economics, are used frequently in official pub- 
lications and documents. (Officials point to these changes as proof 
of social progress.) Acronyms are used widely to describe economic 
enterprises and political organizations, and their use, in turn, has 
necessitated the periodic publication of directories to guide people 
through the maze of terms. The impact of these changes on every- 
day speech is difficult to determine, but there is little to suggest 
that official jargon has influenced general public usage. Language 
is slow to change. Communications between East Germans and 
West Germans have continued despite the separation of the two 
states and in the 1980s have grown as a result of the easing of travel 
restrictions. The Western broadcasting media are also widely 
listened to and viewed by the East German public. 

The shaping of a socialist personality is the single most impor- 
tant objective of socialization in the country. The educational sys- 
tem, mass organizations, communist party, media, and production 
committees and worker groups of the enterprises all aim to develop 
within the individual the qualities associated with a socialist per- 
sonality. According to SED leaders, that personality blends creativ- 
ity, intelligence, and industry with a sense of responsibility, 
collective spirit, and commitment to the goals of socialism. There 
are many aspects to the socialist personality, the most fundamen- 
tal of which are the socialist consciousness and socialist morality. 
Consciousness in this case implies a knowledge of Marxism- 
Leninism as interpreted by the regime and involvement in the 
political life of the state. The individual who displays a socialist 
consciousness is one who studies official ideology and party doc- 
trine, understands the basis of productive relations, and actively 
takes part in the construction of a socialist society by working to 
fulfill production quotas and joining in political activities. Morality, 
in this instance, implies a personal sense of obligation and respon- 
sibility toward one's fellow workers, a collective spirit, integrity, 
and trustworthiness. An individual's willingness to use his or her 
full range of talents for the good of society and a commitment to 
realize the fullest potential are also aspects of the socialist personality. 

With the exception of its ideological component, the concept of 
a socialist personality embraces many of the character traits and 
values traditionally admired by Germans. Thus authorities have 
been able to tap traditional respect for authority, discipline, hard 
work, and efficiency as part of the development of a socialist 



79 



East Germany: A Country Study 



personality. The more the socialist values have been compatible 
with traditional values, the more the regime has been successful 
in enforcing its value system and standards of behavior. 

Public Attitudes on National Identity 

The extent to which East German citizens have developed a 
separate national identity is difficult to determine. Generally proof 
for and against an emerging East German national consciousness 
is based on the impressions of journalists or scholars who have 
traveled to East Germany and on a handful of opinion polls and 
survey samples of questionable reliability. 

Those who believe that a new national consciousness has devel- 
oped or is developing argue that the building of the Berlin Wall 
forced East Germans to come to terms with political realities and 
either passively accept the regime or actively seek a place within 
the system. Meanwhile the economic success of the 1960s and early 
1970s gave the people a sense of pride in certain socialist accom- 
plishments. These included an educational system considered to 
be one of the finest in the world, a package of social services and 
programs that was relatively impressive, job security, and a stan- 
dard of living that topped that of other East European countries. 
Given the acute shortage of labor, many opportunities were avail- 
able for the person with the "proper" socialist credentials, and those 
who proved their political loyalty were amply rewarded. Most 
important, a new generation of East Germans had gradually 
replaced the older generation. Close to half the population in the 
mid-1980s had been born since 1945 and close to a quarter since 
1960. These young East Germans have been exposed only to com- 
munist rule. They have not been allowed to interact extensively 
with their counterparts in West Germany. And they have been the 
object of an intensive socialization campaign beginning in the 
schools and youth groups and continuing through the work organi- 
zations. 

Opinion polls and surveys to some extent have supported the 
impressionistic accounts of an emerging national consciousness. 
Many of the polls from the 1960s revealed that the population 
showed growing support or loyalty to the regime. Many people 
felt that they were materially better off since the construction of 
the Wall. Those under forty years of age were most likely to con- 
sider East Germany an independent state and to favor recognition 
by West Germany. 

An equally compelling case can be built, however, against the 
emergence of a distinctive national consciousness among the East 
Germans. Proponents of this view refer to the fragility of a loyalty 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



based solely on material well-being. Any worsening of the economic 
outlook is likely to have a negative impact on popular attitudes 
toward the regime. Despite official encouragement to measure its 
own well-being against that of other socialist bloc countries, the 
population continues to compare its standard of living with that 
of the people of West Germany, where the quality of life continues 
to be noticeably higher. 

In addition, East Germans have no freedom to choose the politi- 
cal system under which they must live, a fact that undoubtedly colors 
many citizens' view of the regime. Every year hundreds of per- 
sons risk their lives in attempts to escape to the West. The presence 
of Soviet troops is a constant reminder of dependence on the Soviet 
Union. Although travel restrictions eased in the 1970s, East Ger- 
man students and the economically active were until the mid-1980s, 
for all intents and purposes, denied travel to the West except under 
the strictest of controls, and internal restrictions were placed on 
citizen contacts with visitors from the West. 

In the mid-1980s, common influences on national consciousness 
continued to exist. East Germans have easy access to Western 
media, particularly West German television, and the influx of 
Western visitors since the early 1970s has ensured that at least some 
sense of a common German identity would be preserved. 

Public opinion polls and surveys can be cited to support the 
arguments of those who believe that as of the mid-1980s a distinct 
East German national consciousness has not yet been achieved. 
A study from the late 1970s, for example, found that about 80 per- 
cent of the citizens considered themselves part of an all-German 
nation. Another poll found that over one-half supported eventual 
unification and that such support was strongest among the young. 
A poll from 1975 refuted earlier surveys from the 1960s that claimed 
East Germans were beginning to evince a growing loyalty toward 
the regime. Like the earlier polls, the 1975 study found that just 
over 60 percent considered themselves loyal citizens; moreover, 
only a quarter of the sample claimed to be strongly loyal, while 
just over a third claimed they had merely accommodated prevail- 
ing conditions. The remainder were either opposed or indifferent 
to the regime. Another poll revealed that some three-fourths of the 
population supported closer contacts between East Germany and 
West Germany. 

In the mid-1980s, the debate over the deployment of inter- 
mediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe led to the reinforcement 
of an all-German sentiment in East Germany. This debate led 
citizens of East Germany and West Germany to feel that they had 
a special role to play in preventing the outbreak of war. However, 



81 



East Germany: A Country Study 

this feeling of pan-German sentiment was essentially reactive in 
nature, that is, it was bound up with the specific circumstances 
of the missile deployment. In general the evidence suggested that 
East Germans recognized that they were citizens of a separate state 
but also considered themselves part of a larger German community 
that included those living in both Germanies. 

Minority Groups 

In the mid-1980s, minority groups constituted less than 1 per- 
cent of the population of East Germany. At various periods through 
history, minorities living in Germany have been persecuted. The 
most systematic and gruesome attempt to eliminate racial and ethnic 
minorities occurred under Adolf Hitler in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Since World War II, the governments of both Germanies have 
introduced special measures designed to protect the minorities liv- 
ing under their administrations. The East German Constitution, 
for example, provides for the protection of minority cultures and 
languages and guarantees freedom to profess a religious creed. 

The Sorbs, a Slavic people who have a culture dating back to 
the sixth century, are the largest surviving minority in East Ger- 
many. In 1984 the Sorbs numbered about 34,000 people. They 
speak a Slavic language known variously as Sorb, Wendish, or 
Lusatian, and they share a culture rich in folk traditions, songs, 
and dances. Most live in and around the cities of Cottbus, Bautzen, 
and Hoyerswerda, which are located southeast of Berlin near the 
Polish and Czechoslovak borders. 

In the postwar period, the Sorb minority received special (some- 
times preferential) treatment from the communist regime. In the 
early 1950s, the East German government, with Soviet encourage- 
ment, contemplated setting up an autonomous Sorb state. The 
plans, however, gained little support from either the German or 
the Sorb population and never materialized. The Office of Sorbic 
Culture was established to introduce Germans to the Sorb cultural 
heritage and to preserve and foster the development of the Sorb 
language. In the mid-1980s, schools in areas with a Sorb popula- 
tion had a specially designed curriculum that emphasized aspects 
of the Sorb culture. Instruction was offered in the Sorb language, 
and German was taught as a second language. By and large, 
however, the population is equally fluent in both languages, and 
the Sorbs are well integrated into the general population. 

In the mid-1980s, the only other minority group was the small 
Jewish community. In 1986 its numerical strength was estimated 
at several hundred, with approximately 400 Jews professing their 
faith. About 80 percent of those Jews who remained in East Germany 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



were over sixty-five years old. East Berlin had the largest Jewish 
community. The Jews who remained in Germany were primarily 
survivors of the Holocaust. They were free to practice their reli- 
gious and cultural traditions, and they had their own organization, 
known as the Union of Jewish Communities in the GDR (Verband 
der Jiidischen Gemeinden in der DDR). 

Social Structure 

East Germany, according to its Constitution, is a "socialist state 
of workers and peasants" in which "all political power is exercised 
by the working people." Theoretically, the people exercise their 
power through socialist ownership of the means of production. In 
other words, the workers, through the SED and government organs, 
control and coordinate the use of social and economic resources 
and wealth for the public good. According to the ideology, in the 
perfect communist society there would be no exploitation of one 
person by another, and class distinctions based on ownership of 
property and material goods would not exist. 

The communist leaders who assumed control of the government 
after World War II took upon themselves the task of transforming 
society from a capitalist system based on private ownership to a 
socialist (and eventually communist) system based on collective 
ownership. They inherited a prewar social system stratified into 
three relatively distinct social classes. Power, wealth, and prestige 
resided in a small upper class of large landowners (the remnants 
of the Prussian nobility of an earlier period), wealthy industrialists 
and entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and top government officials and 
military officers. The middle class was composed of businessmen, 
public officials, academicians, professionals, merchants, artisans, 
and medium-sized landowners. It, in turn, was divided into an 
upper middle and lower middle class, depending on income, edu- 
cation, and occupational status. The largest social grouping was 
the lower class, which consisted of urban workers, farmers, and 
agricultural laborers. Social structure was fairly rigid; birth was 
the primary criterion for membership in the upper class. It was 
possible, however, to rise in the social hierarchy through marriage, 
education, or achievement in such areas as politics or the arts. 

In order to carry out the restructuring of society, immediately 
after the war East German officials implemented programs aimed 
at "de-Nazification" of society and socialization of the means of 
production. Officials in government and elsewhere who had cooper- 
ated with Nazi authorities were removed from their positions and 
replaced by loyal communists. The estates and businesses of wealthy 
landowners and industrialists who were accused of supporting the 



83 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Nazi regime were confiscated. Industries and private enterprises 
were nationalized and/or brought under the umbrella of state con- 
trol, and agricultural lands were initially redistributed among rural 
workers and later consolidated into collectives. By the early 1960s, 
these programs were largely completed. During this time, many 
members of the former upper and upper-middle classes fled to the 
West, while those who remained made the adjustment to the new 
communist regime. 

East German officials consider theirs to be a transitional society 
that still contains elements of the past social order. The primary 
function of party and government leaders is to reconcile those differ- 
ences that still exist and eventually to mold the various social group- 
ings into a collective whole. The Constitution, in fact, notes that 
"the inviolable foundations of socialist society are provided by the 
firm alliance of the working class with the class of cooperative farm- 
ers, the intelligentsia, and other sections of the population." 

As of 1987, it was difficult to describe the stratification of society 
in other than general terms. Official data from 1986 broke down 
the socioeconomic structure of the labor force as follows: workers 
and salaried employees, 89 percent; members of cooperatives (includ- 
ing farm, craft, and lawyer cooperatives), 9 percent; owners of semi- 
state enterprises and commission dealers, 0.3 percent; private farmers 
and gardeners, 0.1 percent; and other privately employed persons 
(including craftsmen, merchants, and professionals), 1.7 percent. 
These figures showed that the percentage of workers, salaried 
employees, and members of cooperatives had substantially increased, 
while the percentage of private farmers, craftsmen, merchants, and 
self-employed professionals had decreased. Other official data indi- 
cated that of the workers and salaried employees, 836,374 were 
agricultural workers. This figure is a substantial decrease from 1965, 
when 1,041,960 individuals worked in agriculture. 

Ignoring the official structural breakdown of the population, 
however, it was possible to speak in the broadest terms of four social 
strata. These included the workers (the so-called backbone of the 
socialist society), the political elite (those who gained their power 
and influence through loyalty to the SED), the intelligentsia (those 
who achieved a relatively comfortable position in society as a result 
of their specialized knowledge or creative abilities), and privately 
employed persons (those who were generally part of the prewar 
middle class and who continued to practice their trades and profes- 
sions under the communist regime). Stratification, particularly at 
the elite level, was based primarily on technical/intellectual com- 
petence and political power. Education and loyalty to the SED were 
the main means of upward mobility. 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



The Working Class 

In 1985 workers constituted 89 percent of the labor force, or about 
7.9 million people. Consistent with communist ideology, however, 
official figures make no distinction between mental and manual 
labor. Instead all "workers" — laborers, clerks, technical and scien- 
tific personnel, and professionals — are considered part of a non- 
antagonistic social class. 

East German workers have not always supported the reforms 
carried out in their name. In the postwar period, the widespread 
and rapid nationalization of industry and collectivization of agricul- 
ture caused some severe dislocations and hardships and were not 
popular among the people. The workers' revolt of 1953 began as 
a protest against the high cost of living and the imposition of higher 
work norms and blossomed into a political protest that was crushed 
only with the aid of Soviet troops. Until the erection of the Berlin 
Wall in 1961, industrial workers and farmers constituted, in abso- 
lute numbers, the majority of refugees fleeing to the West. While 
their motives for leaving may have been related more to economic 
conditions than to ideology, their departure in such large num- 
bers was a testament to the repressive policies of the regime. 

Over the years, and particularly since the 1960s, the East Ger- 
man leadership has concentrated on gaining the support and loyalty 
of the working population and on restructuring society through the 
implementation of comprehensive social programs in the areas of 
housing, health, welfare, and education (see The Educational Sys- 
tem, this ch.). In addition, officials have focused on raising the 
standard of living and satisfying the demands of workers for more 
and better consumer goods. The Constitution guarantees the citizen 
health protection, improved living conditions, care in old age, and 
dwelling space for his or her family. The record of the government 
in these areas has been mixed. 

Housing 

The quality and quantity of housing have been serious problems 
for many years. Most housing was owned by the state, and rents 
were controlled. In the mid-1980s, new apartments rented for about 
one GDR mark (for value of the GDR mark — see Glossary) per 
square meter; older units rented for even less. East Germany, how- 
ever, has suffered from a shortage of housing. Construction was 
accorded low priority in the 1950s and early 1960s; hence older 
housing was allowed to fall into disrepair, and few attempts were 
made to modernize apartments. Even as late as the early 1970s, 
close to 80 percent of dwelling units were of prewar vintage. More 
than half had no indoor plumbing. 



85 



East Germany: A Country Study 

During the 1960s, authorities began to recognize the need for 
housing construction, but little attention was given to design or 
comfort; the government was primarily interested in cutting con- 
struction time and costs. Housing was given top priority at the 
eighth and ninth party congresses, and since the early 1970s the 
construction of new housing and the renovation of older dwellings 
have formed the main thrust of East Germany's social policy. The 
shift in emphasis is apparent in the number of new dwellings con- 
structed annually. In 1950 only 31,000 new units were built; in 
1960 the number had risen to 80,000. Since 1971, however, over 
100,000 new or improved units have been constructed each year. 
From 1980 to 1984, close to 946,000 new homes were constructed, 
and over 333,000 units were modernized. The 1986-90 Five-Year 
Plan called for construction and modernization of 1,064,000 units 
and committed the country to solving the housing problem by 1990. 

Beginning in the 1970s, an attempt was also made to build more 
attractive and spacious housing. Prefabricated dwellings, popular- 
ized in the 1960s because of low cost and quick construction time, 
still formed the majority of new housing, but more attention was 
given to design and aesthetic qualities. All dwellings built after 1970 
had indoor baths and showers, and most had hot water and cen- 
tral heating. 

Despite the housing boom of the preceding decade, many problems 
remained as of the mid-1980s. The persistence of a housing short- 
age meant that allocation of housing created a measure of discon- 
tent. Housing, particularly in the large urban areas, was difficult 
to obtain, and young couples looking for their first home were often 
forced to wait two or three years before a unit became available. 
Housing was assigned on the local level by housing commissions. 
Priority was generally accorded first to families with children, then 
to married couples, and finally to single persons. Because of the hous- 
ing problems, moving from one city to another could be a frustrat- 
ing experience. Available housing was advertised in newspapers and 
listed with local authorities. A family then attempted to match its 
requirements with those of a family in another city and exchange 
units. Housing, however, has been used to entice workers into cer- 
tain jobs or sectors of the economy and to reward loyal service to 
the state; therefore, highly skilled workers and members of the tech- 
nical intelligentsia and political elite have been given preference in 
assignments and receive the choicest housing. 

Health and Welfare 

In the areas of health and welfare, the country also has shown 
mixed results. As of 1987, workers were covered under a compulsory 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



social insurance program administered by the FDGB. (Self-employed 
persons and members of farm and craft cooperatives had a slightly 
different program administered by the state.) The program included 
free medical treatment, coverage for accidents and disabilities, 
unemployment compensation, and retirement benefits. The worker 
contributed 10 percent of his or her monthly income, up to 60 GDR 
marks, toward financing the program. The amount was matched 
by a contribution from the employing enterprise. In the past, funds 
have been inadequate, and the state has had to finance the program. 

In the mid-1980s, health care was free for citizens covered under 
the program, that is, for the majority of the population. The 
improvement of health care over the years has been evidenced by 
the dramatic decline in infant mortality rates, which went from 
38.8 per 1,000 live births in 1960 to 10 per 1,000 in 1984. The 
incidence of major diseases has also decreased. For example, 
diphtheria went from 10.5 cases per 10,000 in 1950 to complete 
elimination in 1985. Typhus decreased from 3 cases per 10,000 
in 1950 to a total of 27 cases in 1985. However, using the inci- 
dence of reported tumors as an indicator, it appears that the cancer 
rate in East Germany has been increasing. In 1955 there were 22.4 
reported tumors per 10,000. By 1983 that figure had risen to 31.9 
per 10,000. 

During the 1950s, the country suffered a serious shortage of doc- 
tors and other trained medical personnel. Roughly one-fourth of 
the country's physicians emigrated to the West before the build- 
ing of the Berlin Wall. During the 1960s and 1970s, however, a 
new generation of doctors, nurses, and dentists was trained. In 1985 
there were 22.8 doctors per 10,000 population, or about 37,000 
total, which was a considerable increase over the 14,500 doctors 
practicing in 1960. Most physicians worked for the state in health 
centers, outpatient clinics, and individual medical practices. Only 
a small number — an estimated 1,000 to 2,000 — were still allowed 
to practice privately, although some state doctors unofficially 
accepted private patients for special treatment. 

In 1985 health policy centered on preventive medicine and health 
education. The health-care network included 590 polyclinics, 998 
outpatient facilities, and 1,602 state-sponsored medical practices. 
The 3,000 physicians and dentists working directly in state enter- 
prises provided medical treatment to some two-thirds of the work 
force. Although health care in general has steadily improved, the 
provision for and care of the elderly remain a problem. As of the 
mid-1980s, pensions were very low, and retirees were at the bot- 
tom of the income scale. The average monthly income for a retired 
person in 1970 was 199 GDR marks; as of 1984 it was 448 GDR 



87 



A district polyclinic in Parchim 
Courtesy Frank Kurt Cylke 

marks. Although the pension paid to retirees was considerably less 
than the average monthly income of the working population, the 
difference between the two was lessened by the fact that the pen- 
sioner did not pay social security or other taxes, which, in the early 
1980s, could cost the average wage earner 200 GDR marks per 
month. 

Wages and Prices 

Wage policy is an important part of East German social policy. 
Minimum wages are set by the government and have been allowed 
to rise gradually over the years. The minimum was raised to 400 
GDR marks in 1976; about one-seventh of the work force earned 
the minimum. The average monthly income of a worker rose from 
558 GDR marks in 1960 to 1,140 GDR marks in 1985. Income 
differentials existed, however, depending on the sector of the econ- 
omy in which the worker was employed. In the mid-1980s, the 
income of workers in retail trade averaged approximately 26 per- 
cent lower than the pay of workers in energy, fuel, and metals. 
Differences in income also reflected levels of training, education, 
and responsibility; the differences were likely to remain as long as 
it was necessary to attract workers into priority industries. Material 
incentives, in the form of cash bonuses and extended holiday time, 
were used to encourage increased productivity. 

Pricing policies are meant to achieve the same effect as wage 
policies. During the 1970s, the government committed itself to 
maintaining stable prices on staple goods and providing luxury items 
to meet consumer demand. As of the early 1980s, food prices had 
remained frozen for more than a decade, and rents were set at 
extremely low levels. Since prices have not been allowed to reflect 
actual economic conditions (in particular the slowdown in economic 



88 



Automobiles line up at a gas station in Weimar 
Courtesy V. Jeffrey Gedmin 

growth), the government has had to subsidize certain products to 
keep prices low and stable. In the mid-1980s, subsidies for food, 
rent, and commuter fares amounted to one-third of total state 
expenditures. In 1983 the government spent over 12 million GDR 
marks to support food prices. From 1980 through 1983, rent sub- 
sidies averaged 8.3 million GDR marks a year. These subsidies 
strained the state's budget, which in turn led to a lower rate of 
increase. For example, between 1979 and 1980 subsidies for com- 
muter fares rose by 7 percent. By contrast the rate of increase from 
1982 to 1983 was 3.2 percent. 

Because of the price-support policies of the government, the stan- 
dard of living rose in the early 1980s. Per capita consumption of 
meats and meat products and fresh vegetables and fruits increased 
while consumption of potatoes and cereals decreased (see table 3, 
Appendix A.) Many luxury goods were made available to the con- 
sumer, and consumers proved to be anxious to purchase them despite 
exorbitant costs and lengthy delivery times. A television set, for 
example, cost about twice the monthly income of a worker, yet the 
percentage of households owning a television rose from 49 percent 
in 1965 to 93.4 percent in 1985. In 1965 only one-quarter of house- 
holds had refrigerators and washing machines; by 1985 there were 
91.8 washing machines per 100 households and 99 refrigerators per 
100 households. In 1985 a car cost eight or nine times a worker's 



89 



East Germany: A Country Study 

average monthly income, and delivery took up to six years. Only 
8 percent of households owned an automobile in 1965, but almost 
46 percent of households had acquired one by 1985. 

In comparison with their East European neighbors, East Ger- 
man workers enjoyed a comfortable standard of living in the 
mid-1980s, although it was not as high as that of West German 
workers. The government, however, was expected to have difficulty 
maintaining the standard of living. As more goods become availa- 
ble, consumer demands and expectations are likely to multiply. 
Ultimately the economic situation will affect the pricing and rate 
of production of consumer goods. 

The Political Elite 

About 1 percent of the population belongs to what may be termed 
the political elite. This group includes party leaders at the national, 
district, and county levels; key persons in the state government and 
in industry, media, and education; and the heads of mass organi- 
zations. In their hands rests the bulk of political power and 
influence. They form the vanguard of society and purport to rule 
in the name of the working class. 

The communist party in East Germany, the SED, is not, tech- 
nically speaking, a mass political party. Yet the SED has a mem- 
bership considerably larger than its counterparts in other East 
European communist countries. In 1986 SED membership (includ- 
ing candidates) was 2,304, 121 , or 13.2 percent of the adult popu- 
lation. One out of every eight citizens over the age of eighteen 
belonged to the party. SED leaders have long boasted of their suc- 
cess in bringing workers into the party and in promoting to leader- 
ship positions those whose social origin is the working class. 
According to the SED's own statistics, the proportion of workers 
in the party has grown steadily and in 1984 reached 58.1 percent. 
The proportion of intelligentsia and cooperative farmers within 
party ranks has consequently declined, and in 1984 these two groups 
constituted 22.4 percent and 4.8 percent of the membership, respec- 
tively. Despite many differences in age, education, and social back- 
ground, party members form a special social group, to some extent, 
in that they share a consciousness of belonging to a privileged sec- 
tion of the population. Career advancement is tied closely to party 
membership, and most top positions in government, industry, 
media, and education are held by party members (see The Socialist 
Unity Party of Germany, ch. 4). 

The rank-and-file membership in reality wields little political 
power and has almost no voice in decision making and policy for- 
mulation. Out of the over 2 million party members, approximately 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



500,000 belong to the Nomenklatur (see Glossary), who are appointed 
to leading positions in the party, state, and economy. Members 
of the Nomenklatur make sure the system works, i.e., that policy 
directives are carried out, that production quotas are filled, that 
the educational system produces students equipped to fill priority 
positions, that the proper "socialist outlook" is reflected in the 
media, and so forth. 

Membership in the political elite is based on a combination of 
party loyalty, training and on-the-job performance, and personal 
friendships. Party loyalty is by far the most important criterion. 
It involves a blend of devotion to Marxist-Leninist principles, loyalty 
to the state, commitment to socialist internationalism, and strict 
adherence to party discipline. An individual's record of political 
activity and length of service in the party and related mass organi- 
zations in large measure determine the likelihood of rising to a top 
leadership role within the party hierarchy. In the late 1940s and 
1950s, party loyalty tended to displace all other considerations in 
selection of candidates for leading positions. Longtime party 
activists, most of whom had been active in the Communist Party 
of Germany before World War II and many of whom had received 
their training in the Soviet Union, were placed in control of the 
government after the war. Loyalists with little or no practical 
administrative or technical experience took charge of major indus- 
tries. These members of the "old guard" tended to be party dog- 
matists. 

Since the 1960s, a growing emphasis has been placed on 
performance-related criteria. It is no longer enough to be a loyal 
party activist; the aspiring candidate must also possess a certain 
amount of talent and skill, oftentimes based on intensive scientific 
and technical education. The professionalization of the party leader- 
ship is apparent in the educational profile of the Politburo. In 1984, 
of twenty-five full and candidate members of the Politburo, fifteen 
had an elementary school education, five had completed high school 
or technical school, and 20 had a university degree. In 1946, by 
comparison, thirteen of the fourteen Politburo members had only 
an elementary school education. In early 1987, almost three- 
quarters of the Central Committee members (including candidates) 
were graduates of a university or technical school. 

Elite membership is linked to the web of personal friendships 
and political alignments that party activists weave as they rise in 
the hierarchy. There is an "old-boy" network that operates within 
the SED, particularly at the highest levels of party leadership. Thus, 
for example, Ulbricht, first secretary of the SED from the time of 
its establishment to his retirement (removal) in 1971, surrounded 



91 



East Germany: A Country Study 

himself with trusted friends who had spent the war years with him 
in the Soviet Union. Honecker, his successor, has selected his friends 
and associates from the Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche 
Jugend — FDJ) apparatus to fill key political positions. 

The members of the political elite display many of the charac- 
teristics of a new class, a class that has replaced the old landed 
aristocracy and upper class of the prewar era. Members of the 
political elite share a conscious social identity and a commitment 
to communist ideology. While tensions sometimes surface between 
the older, more dogmatic party leaders and the younger, more prag- 
matic members, both have a prevailing commitment to the sys- 
tem and a vested interest in maintaining it. Differences relate 
primarily to style and not ideology. Individual commitment is gener- 
ally strengthened as cadres rise in the political hierarchy. Mem- 
bers of the political elite also share a common life-style and receive 
certain benefits by virtue of their position. They are materially better 
off than the population at large; they have access to comfortable 
housing; and their children are assured a place at a university. In 
addition they are permitted freer travel abroad. The political elite 
is a relatively stable group. Unless serious doubt is cast upon a mem- 
ber's party loyalty or unless the member's job performance is very 
poor, his or her position remains fairly secure. 

At the same time, membership in the elite is not closed. Virtu- 
ally anyone can advance in the party hierarchy by displaying a 
balanced blend of political loyalty and talent. As time passes, 
however, the political elite may become a self-perpetuating social 
class as members attempt to secure for their children the same 
privileges they themselves have enjoyed. 

The Creative Intelligentsia 

The creative intelligentsia is broadly defined as those involved 
in artistic creativity, artistic expression, or teaching and research 
in the humanities. Since its inception, the East German regime 
has attempted to form an intelligentsia imbued with socialist values 
and responsive to regime needs. In return for service to the state, 
the regime has granted members of the creative intelligentsia many 
privileges, including the right to travel to the West and access to 
excellent housing facilities. As a result of these privileges, the crea- 
tive intelligentsia has become increasingly isolated from the rest 
of the population. 

The East German government does not publish data on the crea- 
tive intelligentsia. However, it is possible to gauge the growth of 
this stratum by using statistics that depict increases in the kinds 
of institutions where these individuals work. For example, in 1951 



92 



A student theater group at an open-air stage outside Weimar 

Courtesy V. Jeffrey Gedmin 

there were twenty-one universities in East Germany; in 1984 there 
were fifty-four. In 1951 there were 77 theaters in the country; by 
1984 that figure had risen to 188. The number of music teachers 
increased from 1,427 in 1966 to 2,153 in 1984. Museums devoted 
to art, literature, the theater, and music rose from 34 in 1965 to 
122 in the mid-1980s. These figures suggest that the regime has 
devoted significant resources to the expansion of the kind of forums 
where the new "socialist" culture may be seen, heard, or taught. 
Of necessity the regime has had to staff these new institutions with 
individuals it has attempted to inculcate with socialist values. 

The Technical Intelligentsia 

The technical intelligentsia is a broadly formed social group com- 
prising those who, in the words of one observer, "directly or 
indirectly do the brain work" of managing the country. Thomas 
A. Baylis, a social scientist who has studied the East German tech- 
nical intelligentsia, estimated the numerical strength of this group 
at about 3 percent of the total population in the early 1970s (7 to 
8 percent of the work force). He included in this group "the chief 
governmental planners and economists; bureaucrats with impor- 
tant economic, technical, or scientific responsibilities; industrial 
managers; physical scientists and mathematicians; engineers; and 
educators and journalists in scientific, technical, and economic 



93 



East Germany: A Country Study 



fields." The political elite has recognized the utility, indeed the 
necessity, of the technical intelligentsia in helping to develop and 
run the economy and society. The Constitution calls upon the 
intelligentsia to ally itself with the working class and other sections 
of the population for "the planning and management of social 
development in accordance with the most advanced scientific 
knowledge." 

Two subgroups constitute the technical intelligentsia: the old 
intelligentsia, which is made up of members of the prewar upper 
middle class, and the new intelligentsia, which includes a genera- 
tion of technocrats trained under the watchful eye and guidance 
of the political elite. During the 1940s and 1950s, party leaders 
replaced many of the old intelligentsia who held positions in edu- 
cation, government, and the legal professions. In these areas, stan- 
dards of performance were relaxed so that politically reliable and 
tested individuals could assume key positions. Scientists, techni- 
cians, managers, engineers, and planners could not be replaced 
as easily. Authorities, therefore, sought to co-opt these more tech- 
nically minded individuals. Initially an effort was made to re-educate 
them politically, that is, to inspire in them a loyalty to the govern- 
ment and to Marxist-Leninist ideals. Ultimately the aid of the 
intelligentsia was purchased by offering members of the group 
attractive material rewards and high social status. For example, 
in the mid-1970s special individual contracts were concluded with 
those whose skills were most sorely needed. Base salaries ranged 
from 4,000 to 15,000 GDR marks per month. (This was five to 
twenty times the average monthly income of an industrial worker 
at that time.) In addition an attractive package of benefits was tailor- 
made for the technical intelligentsia. They received priority in hous- 
ing; their children were admitted to the universities; bonuses and 
extra paid holidays were stipulated in their contracts; and they were 
provided with pension plans guaranteeing incomes of up to 90 per- 
cent of their preretirement incomes. Private shops and clubs were 
established to cater to their needs. To satisfy a personal need for 
recognition, honorary titles, e.g., Honorary Chief Engineer, 
Honored Inventor, Distinguished Scientist of the People, and 
medals were awarded for a job well done. These perquisites set 
the old technical intelligentsia apart from the general population. 
The wooing of the old intelligentsia also created a certain amount 
of tension and frustration within the party ranks. The older dog- 
matists distrusted the intelligentsia because of their lack of politi- 
cal commitment; the younger cadres resented the inequitable 
distribution of benefits. East German leaders consider the new tech- 
nical intelligentsia to be a stratum rather than a social class, that 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



is, members of a nonantagonistic group drawn from and committed 
to the working class and separated from it only insofar as their work 
involves intellectual labor. The long-term approach of the politi- 
cal leadership has been to create and train a new generation of 
managers, scientists, and technicians who were politically "relia- 
ble" as well as technically competent. This new intelligentsia was 
to embody the true "socialist personality," reflecting the interests 
of the working class and living in a spirit of collective unity. Bonuses 
and benefits were similar to those extended to the old intelligen- 
tsia. The state also awarded the new intelligentsia various kinds 
of honorary titles similar to those given to the old intelligentsia. 

Institutions and Organs of Society 
The Family 

The traditional German family was patriarchally organized. The 
father was the head of the household and the ultimate authority 
on all family matters. The mother centered her life around the three 
Ks — Kirche, Kinder, und Kilche (church, children, and kitchen). Chil- 
dren were expected to submit to the will of their parents and ideally 
to reflect the qualities of obedience, responsibility, and respect. The 
typical family unit was the nuclear household, but ties with the 
extended family were maintained, and a close relationship existed 
with relatives. War, industrialization, and urbanization had impor- 
tant implications for family organization and patterns of relation- 
ships. In the postwar period, the communist regime has treated 
the family as the smallest collective unit of society and emphasized 
its role in the political socialization and education of children. 

The family is protected and its relationship outlined in the Family 
Code of 1965 and in the Constitution. The Family Code is consid- 
ered a fairly progressive document. It delineates the relationships 
between husband and wife and between parents and children, recog- 
nizes the equality and mutual respect of the sexes, and stipulates 
the joint responsibility of the parents with regard to the education 
of their children. The Constitution places "marriage, family, and 
motherhood . . . under the special protection of the state." 

Women are given complete equality with their husbands under 
the law. Either the wife's or the husband's name may be chosen 
as the family name. Husbands are expected to support and 
encourage their wives in pursuing an education and/or employ- 
ment opportunities. Both spouses jointly own property earned after 
the marriage, although each retains the rights to any possessions 
acquired before marriage. 



95 



East Germany: A Country Study 



The legal age of marriage is eighteen for both men and women. 
Marriage ages have declined over the years, and by the early 1980s 
the average marriage age for both partners was in the mid-twenties. 
Marriage must be performed by an authorized official of the state 
and be properly registered. In the mid-1980s, divorce rates were 
relatively high; divorce occurred primarily in marriages that were 
in their second to seventh years. Women initiated an increasing 
number of divorce suits. Common causes of divorce were infidelity, 
incompatibility, and drinking. A divorce was not difficult to obtain 
if neither spouse objected. The couple simply filed an application 
and paid a fee determined on the basis of the couple's income. In 
90 percent of divorces, the mother retained custody of any chil- 
dren involved in the suit. 

Most young couples have preferred a small family of one or two 
children. A liberal abortion law, promulgated in 1972 amid pro- 
test from religious circles, permits abortion upon the request of the 
mother. Before the enactment of the law, over 100,000 illegal abor- 
tions were estimated to have been performed annually. As of the 
mid-1980s, information on contraceptive methods was available 
to the public, and women could obtain birth control pills at no cost. 

At the same time, motherhood is encouraged and accorded an 
honored role in society. The state is concerned about declining birth- 
rates and has implemented a program of benefits and services 
designed to make motherhood more attractive (see Population 
Structure and Dynamics, this ch.). An elaborate network of day- 
care centers provides care for the child while the mother is at work. 
In 1984 there were 6,605 year-round day nurseries with room for 
296,653 children. These nurseries provided care for 63 percent of 
eligible children. 

The working woman/mother is highly regarded by society. Work 
is considered a social responsibility as well as a right. A woman's 
right to work is, in the first instance, an ideological commitment 
on the part of the state and the communist rulers, but it is also 
a necessity given the shortage of manpower. Yet for all the rela- 
tive equality in the workplace, in the mid-1980s the majority of 
household chores still fell to women. Surveys have indicated that 
women assumed most of the burden for cooking, cleaning, wash- 
ing, and shopping and that they performed these tasks in addition 
to their regular employment outside the home. 

One of the major social responsibilities of parents is the educa- 
tion of their children. The Constitution notes that "it is the right 
and the noblest duty of parents to raise their children to become 
healthy, joyous, competent, universally educated, and state- 
conscious citizens." Parents teach their children by providing role 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



models and by actively participating in their formal education. In 
the mid-1980s, parents' councils operated within the schools to 
review and discuss curriculum, instruction, and educational stan- 
dards. Official propaganda continually emphasized the need for 
conformity in values between the home and collective institutions 
in society. Parents were admonished not to confuse the child by 
allowing conflicting standards of behavior within the family. 

The family continues to influence strongly the life of the aver- 
age citizen. Despite the social, economic, and political changes that 
have occurred, family ties remain solid and close; some observers 
suggest that ties within the extended family are even stronger in 
East Germany than in West Germany. Observers also have noted 
a tendency for East Germans to turn inward toward the family as 
one of the few areas of "private" life left open to the individual. 

Mass Organizations 

The so-called mass organizations are an integral part of society. 
They serve to integrate the individual into the social and political 
life of the country and are designed to produce the unity of interests 
that communist rulers claim is at the base of a Marxist-Leninist 
system of government. The mass organizations, however, are very 
much the stepchildren of the communist party. They have been 
created from above to control, supervise, and mobilize the public 
and to provide channels through which party policies can effec- 
tively be implemented. In their function as mouthpieces for party 
members, the mass organizations, however, must refrain from 
producing significant conflict or deviating from the basic outlines 
of party policy. 

Workers and the Free German Trade Union Federation 

The largest and most significant of the mass organizations is the 
Free German Trade Union Federation (Freier Deutscher Gewerk- 
schaftsbund — FDGB). In the mid-1980s, approximately 96 percent 
of all workers (including manual laborers, white-collar workers, 
and members of the intelligentsia) belonged to the FDGB. As of 
1985, membership was about 9.4 million, and the union had 61 
deputies in the People's Chamber (the national legislature). The 
FDGB is affiliated with trade unions in other countries through 
its membership in the World Federation of Trade Unions. 

All trade unions are united under the FDGB, the only federa- 
tion of unions allowed to operate in the country. The FDGB is 
organized on a territorial basis, much the same as the SED. Work- 
ers in enterprises employing twenty or more individuals are 
organized in so-called free trade unions. Members at the local levels 



97 



East Germany: A Country Study 



elect union officials, who in turn elect representatives at the next 
higher levels. The FDGB has a congress, a coordinating executive 
committee, and a presidium to formulate policies. Theoretically 
the FDGB operates on the principle of democratic centralism; but 
in reality, as is true in the SED, power is structured hierarchically, 
and decision making and policy formulation are the preserve of 
those at the top. Changes in policy are only infrequently initiated 
from the bottom up; more often than not, party and union offi- 
cials carry out the policy directives handed down from above. 

Just as the SED has its committed corps of cadres, the FDGB 
has a component of about 2 million union activists who ensure that 
policies are implemented. Union posts at the local levels are filled 
by volunteers, and nonparty members perform about 75 percent 
of union tasks. Leadership positions, however, are held by mem- 
bers of the SED Nomenklatur. 

The organization and ideology of the FDGB are predicated on 
the basis of an overall unity of interests between workers and the 
state. The Constitution states that "trade unions are independent" 
and that "no one may limit or obstruct their activities." In fact 
the FDGB's close association with the party does not allow it to 
play a real bargaining role or to strike for specific demands. Because 
a commonality of interests does not always exist in reality, the 
FDGB on occasion finds itself in an anomalous position. On the 
one hand, it is supposed to represent the interests of the workers, 
which may include fighting for better working conditions, higher 
wages, and more realistic production norms. On the other hand, 
it is very much an auxiliary of the SED, and as such it is used to 
control the work force, enforce higher production quotas, and 
increase worker productivity. 

Nonetheless the union is an important part of the worker's life. 
The work place is the center of the average citizen's existence much 
more so in East Germany than in Western countries. The local 
union and the enterprise form a collectivity and offer the worker 
a variety of educational, cultural, and social activities. In addition, 
the FDGB administers the social insurance program and provides 
vacation centers and packaged holidays for workers. In 1984 there 
were 1,163 "holiday homes" with a capacity of 135,889 beds. Hous- 
ing, libraries, discount shops, clubs, and recreational facilities are 
provided through the worker's enterprises. Through their activi- 
ties, the union and the enterprise permeate every aspect of the 
individual's life. 

Like other mass organizations, the FDGB has a socialization func- 
tion to perform. In the mid-1980s, it cooperated with schools and 
enterprises to instill in the worker an appreciation of the social value 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



of work and an awareness of the social duties incumbent upon a 
purported owner of the means of production. Contacts between 
factory workers and children were encouraged through special visits 
of children to factories and through practical work experiences. In 
factories employing more than fifty people, dispute commissions 
(social courts) handled discipline problems, settled conflicts, and 
generally enforced norms of behavior. Commissions were composed 
of workers approved by the FDGB; the commissions were a fairly 
effective form of social control because workers were responsible 
forjudging their fellow workers. Worker productivity was encour- 
aged through the example of showcase production units and model 
employees who were dubbed "Hero of the Work." The regime 
used these showcase units to rationalize increases in production 
quotas. 

After the mid-1970s, the government appeared to allow the 
union a greater voice in decision making and policy formulation. 
In other words, there appeared to be some official support permit- 
ting the union to function more as a representative of worker 
interests than as a conduit for party policies. The bounds of per- 
missible criticism and discussion, however, were likely to remain 
extremely narrow and not to obscure the overriding authority of 
the SED leadership. 

Young People and the Free German Youth 

East Germany considers its young people its most important 
asset. As a result, the party and government have expended a great 
amount of attention and resources on socialization of youth through 
schools and youth groups. Since the inception of the regime, youth 
activities have been strictly controlled and monitored by SED party 
officials. Youth organizations outside of those officially sanctioned 
by the regime have not been permitted. By far the most important 
youth organization has been the FDJ, founded in 1946 and subse- 
quently brought under the control of the SED. As of 1984, the FDJ 
had a membership of approximately 2.3 million, or 83 percent of 
all youth in the eligible age group (fourteen through twenty-five). 
Membership was voluntary, but for anyone who wanted to advance 
politically or professionally, membership was a practical necessity. 
Strong pressures were exerted on young people through the schools 
and peer groups to join the FDJ, and the organization's near total 
control over recreational facilities, resort areas, and entertainment 
ensured a high membership. Perhaps more important, the FDJ han- 
dled university entrance examinations and scholarship programs. 
The most active members, therefore, were found among students 
and soldiers; nearly 80 percent of each group belonged to the FDJ. 



99 



Young Pioneers camp near Erfurt 
Courtesy V. Jeffrey Gedmin 

Participation of young industrial workers and farm youth was con- 
siderably lower. In the case of the industrial workers, the trade 
unions provided an alternative to FDJ membership. 

The organization of the FDJ is patterned after that of the SED. 
The Youth Parliament is convened periodically, and the Central 
Council is elected to coordinate activities between parliament ses- 
sions. As in the SED, the real center of power lies in the FDJ bureau 
and secretariat. Most often the leadership positions are held by loyal 
SED members who might be considerably older than the rank-and- 
file membership. In 1985 the FDJ held thirty-seven seats in the 
People's Chamber and was well represented at the local and dis- 
trict government levels. The FDJ is an important ground for the 
recruitment of SED party cadres, and many key party officials have 
received their initial training in the FDJ. The FDJ is a member 
of the World Federation of Democratic Youth and cooperates with 
its counterparts in other communist countries through youth con- 
gresses and youth friendship projects. Such cooperation is an 
important way of developing an international socialist outlook. 

The Ernst Thalmann Pioneers Organization, known as the 
Young Pioneers (Junge Pioniere — JP), is an auxiliary of the FDJ. 
In the mid-1980s, membership in the JP began with entry into 
school at around age six and continued through age fourteen. In 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 

1985 the JP has approximately 1.3 million members. This figure 
represented roughly 85 percent of all eligible children. 

The regime has used the JP to reinforce the political values and 
social behavior taught in the schools. The SED considers the JP 
to be especially instrumental in developing the collective spirit that 
is considered such an important part of the "socialist personality." 
The groups are headed by teachers and JP leaders (normally FDJ 
recruits), who teach the children to work toward and identify with 
collective goals. Ultimately the JP provides an effective, but con- 
trolled, source of peer pressure. Norms, values, and standards of 
behavior are shaped and guided by group leaders. The JP also pro- 
vides educational, cultural, and sports programs for the young. 

Two other youth-oriented organizations deserve mention. The 
Society for Sport and Technology (Gesellschaft fur Sport und 
Technik— GST) was established in 1952. In the mid-1980s, the 
GST provided paramilitary training through sports activities such 
as parachuting, marksmanship, and other skill-oriented programs. 
The GST also held military sports games (Wehrspartakiade). In the 
1985 games, over 8,000 contestants competed in 280 "premilitary" 
and "military sporting" events, which included stripping machine 
guns, hand grenade target practice, and sharpshooting. A second 
group, the German Gymnastics and Sports Federation (Deutscher 
Turn-und Sportbund der DDR), has trained athletes for sporting 
competition and has been the organization responsible for producing 
Olympic competitors. In 1985 this organization claimed over 3.5 
million members. A total of 10,249 sports clubs catered to the 
group's members. 

Despite the near total integration of youth into the political and 
party organizational network, a sizable minority of young people, 
particularly those in their teens and early twenties, have elected 
not to join official youth organizations. Many resent the system 
of controls and monitoring of youth activities that are evident in 
the schools and elsewhere. FDJ members, for example, are selected 
to monitor classes and youth activities. In addition, young people 
in East Germany, regardless of their involvement in youth groups, 
have been affected by some of the same pressures as youths in other 
industrialized countries. Thus reports of juvenile delinquency and 
alcohol abuse in the larger urban areas have grown more common, 
and there has been some indication that crime has increased in the 
1980s (see Crime and Punishment, ch. 5). 

Officials have complained that the current generation of youths 
tends to be spoiled. Because they did not live through the troubled 
years of the war and the postwar period, they allegedly do not under- 
stand what serious hardship really means. Party leaders, on occasion, 



101 



East Germany: A Country Study 

have chided young people for lack of political enthusiasm and their 
growing preoccupation with the acquisition of material goods. For 
their part, young people have frequently complained about the 
restrictions placed on travel abroad and the artificiality and lack 
of creativity in society. The New Sorrows of Young W } a play produced 
in 1973 based on Goethe's famous novel The Sorrows of Young 
Werther, was an enormous success among the young. It tells the 
story of a young dropout who experiences a sense of alienation and 
despair that eventually leads to his suicide. Seemingly, young people 
want the opportunity to use the skills they have learned in school 
and to be challenged in their work. 

In general, Western observers have noted that youths in the 1970s 
and 1980s tended to be more critical and willing to question govern- 
ment policies within limits than had young people in preceding 
decades. Some evidence suggests that party leaders had allowed 
those limits to expand. The FDJ, which had always been an 
instrument of party control, was also allegedly becoming a forum 
for the discussion of youth problems and concerns. The limits of 
permissible criticism, however, seemed likely to remain narrow. 

Women and the Democratic Women's League of Germany 

The Constitution guarantees equality of the sexes. Women are 
afforded equal rights before the law and "in all spheres of social, 
state and personal life." The East German record in the area of 
women's rights has been good. Women have been well represented 
in the work force, comprising about half of the economically active 
population. As of 1984, roughly 80 percent of women of working 
age (between eighteen and sixty) were employed. The state has 
encouraged women to seek work and pursue careers and has pro- 
vided aid to working mothers in the form of day-care centers and 
generous maternity benefits (see The Family, this ch.). The state 
also has made a concerted effort to provide educational opportu- 
nities for women. The number of women having a university or 
technical school education has increased over the years. Of the stu- 
dents enrolled in universities and colleges in 1985, about 50 per- 
cent were women, and most of these were involved in direct study 
(as opposed to extension and evening study). This figure represented 
an increase from 25 percent in 1960 and 35 percent in 1970. Female 
enrollments in technical schools also rose. In 1960 women accounted 
for 29 percent of the student body, by 1970 their proportion had 
grown to 49 percent, and in 1985 they represented about 73 per- 
cent of all enrollees. Special courses were designed for women who 
already held jobs but wished to increase their level of skills, and 
state enterprises offered programs that provided women leave time 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



and paid up to 80 percent of their wages so they might pursue fur- 
ther education. In the mid-1980s, women were less well represented 
in positions of political power. In 1984 about one-third of the 
deputies to the People's Chamber were women. However, in 
December 1984, only 19 of the 153 SED Central Committee mem- 
bers were women. In early 1987, there were only two women among 
the twenty-seven full and candidate members of the Politburo. 

The Democratic Women's League of Germany (Demokratischer 
Frauenbund Deutschlands — DFD) is the official mass organization 
for women. Established in 1947, it originally spearheaded the cam- 
paign for equal rights for women. The SED has used the DFD to 
politicize women, to make them aware of their rights and respon- 
sibilities in the construction of a socialist society, and to encourage 
them to participate in the productive life of the country. The DFD 
had 1.5 million members as of 1985 and operated through 17,904 
local organizations. Membership was ostensibly open to all women 
regardless of their social background or political orientation. As 
with other mass organizations, however, leadership positions were 
filled by SED loyalists, and DFD activities fell under the strict con- 
trol and supervision of the party. The DFD had thirty-four seats 
in the People's Chamber. 

After the late 1960s and 1970s, the influence of the DFD among 
women declined. As women became integrated into the work force, 
they began participating in the trade unions instead of the DFD. 
In this sense the DFD succeeded in its original goals and hence 
became outmoded. Consequently the thrust of the organization 
changed by the 1980s, and its main concern became the part-time 
woman worker and the nonworking woman. Critics contend that 
the shift in goal orientation turned the DFD into a social organi- 
zation for housewives. 

The Educational System 

In the mid-1980s, the education system comprised preschool edu- 
cation (kindergarten) for children from three to six years of age; 
a compulsory ten-year polytechnical education for all children of 
ages six through sixteen; postpoly technical education, which con- 
sisted of either vocational training leading to entry in the work force 
or extended general education leading to the university; and higher 
education at a special technical institute or university. 

Attendance at kindergarten was not mandatory, but the majority 
of children from ages three to six attended. The state considered 
kindergartens an important element of the overall educational pro- 
gram. The schools focused on health and physical fitness, develop- 
ment of socialist values, and the teaching of rudimentary skills. 



103 



East Germany: A Country Study 



The regime has experimented with combined schools of childcare 
centers and kindergartens, which introduce the child gradually into 
a more regimented program of activities and ease the pains of 
adjustment. In 1985 there were 13,148 preschools providing care 
for 788,095 children (about 91 percent of children eligible to attend). 

Compulsory education began at the age of six, when every child 
entered the ten-grade, coeducational general polytechnical school. 
The program was divided into three sections. The primary stage 
included grades one through three, where children were taught the 
basic skills of reading, writing, and mathematics. The primary stage 
also introduced children to the fundamentals of good citizenship 
and, in accordance with the 1965 education law, provided them 
with their "first knowledge and understanding of nature, work, 
and socialist society." Instruction emphasized German language, 
literature, and art as a means of developing the child's expressive 
and linguistic skills; about 60 percent of classroom time was devoted 
to this component. Mathematics instruction accounted for about 
24 percent of the curriculum and included an introduction to fun- 
damental mathematical laws and relations. Another 8 percent was 
devoted to physical education, which comprised exercises, games, 
and activities designed to develop coordination and physical skill. 
Polytechnical instruction was also begun at the primary level and 
consisted of gardening and crafts that gave the child a basic 
appreciation of technology, the economy, and the worker; about 
8 percent of classroom time was allotted to such instruction. 

An intermediate stage in the child's education began in grade 
four and continued through grade six. The study of the Russian 
language was introduced at this stage and consumed about 12 per- 
cent of classroom time. Natural and social sciences also became 
part of the curriculum and together with mathematics formed about 
26 percent of instruction time. Another 44 percent of instruction 
was taken up with German literature, language, art, history, and 
geography. The remainder was divided between sports and poly- 
technical instruction. During this stage of the young person's edu- 
cation, the political-ideological content of the curriculum becomes 
increasingly important. The curriculum emphasized the connec- 
tion between education and work, and it acquainted pupils in a 
more detailed way with the life of society and with work, science, 
technology, and culture. The development of a socialist personality, 
especially a socialist attitude toward work, was a major objective. 

The final stage of polytechnical schooling comprised grades seven 
through ten. Polytechnical instruction included courses in techni- 
cal drawing, socialist production, and productive work. The pupil 
spent one day per week in practical training, working alongside 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



regular employees at a nearby factory or agricultural cooperative. 
About 14 percent of the curriculum was devoted to polytechnical 
instruction during this stage. Science education formed about 
22 percent of instruction time, and courses covered biology, chemis- 
try, physics, and astronomy. Mathematics consumed roughly 15 
percent of the classroom period; the Russian language, 9 percent; 
and German art, literature, language, and history, about 34 per- 
cent. A second foreign language, generally English, was introduced 
at the upper grade levels. 

The polytechnical curriculum gradually accorded a prominent 
role to science and technology, reflecting the regime's need for 
technically trained individuals. Throughout the entire educational 
program, the regime emphasized instruction in "socialist values." 
The curriculum balanced scientific knowledge with ideological 
instruction to produce "a scientific view of life" according to 
Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Theory was related to practice 
through polytechnical training, and the child was expected to grasp 
a basic understanding of productive relationships. 

The educational system's major goal was producing technically 
qualified personnel to fill the manpower needs of the economy. The 
government guaranteed employment to those who completed the 
mandatory ten-year program. Ostensibly the student was free to 
choose his or her occupation, but career choices were often guided 
by government plans and policies. 

In 1985 there were 5,864 general polytechnical schools with a 
total student population of 2.1 million. The average class size was 
twenty students. Educators and specialists developed the curricu- 
lum, textbooks, and teacher manuals, which, however, were closely 
controlled and had to be approved by the appropriate authorities. 
The Politburo of the SED made most policy decisions regarding 
the educational system. The main task of the Ministry of Educa- 
tion, which oversees the kindergartens and polytechnical schools, 
was making certain that SED policies were implemented and that 
instructional materials reflected the proper philosophical orientation. 

Upon completion of the compulsory ten-year education, the stu- 
dent had essentially three options. The most frequently chosen 
option was to begin a two-year period of vocational training. In 
1985 about 86 percent of those who had completed their ten-year 
course of study began some kind of vocational training. During 
vocational training, the student became an apprentice, usually at 
a local or state enterprise. Students received eighteen months of 
training in selected vocations and specialized in the final six months. 
In 1985 approximately 6 percent of those who had completed their 
polytechnical education entered a three-year program of vocational 



105 



East Germany: A Country Study 

training. This program led to the Abitur, or end-of-school exami- 
nation. Passing the Abitur enabled the student to apply to a techni- 
cal institute or university, although this route to higher education 
was considered very difficult. In 1985 East Germany had a total 
of 963 vocational schools; 719 were connected with industries, and 
another 244 were municipal vocational schools. Vocational schools 
served 377,567 students. 

A final option was the extended poly technical education, which 
prepared only a minority of students for higher education. In 1984 
approximately 8.3 percent of those completing their general school- 
ing continued in extended poly technical programs. In the past, chil- 
dren were selected for extended schooling after the eighth grade, 
but as of the early 1980s the selection was generally made after 
the tenth grade. In effect the extended schooling was a college 
preparatory program. The curriculum continued the general edu- 
cation provided at the lower grades, but instruction was more 
intensive and geared specifically to university entry. The extended 
schools had instruction through grade twelve. A thirteenth year 
was spent in practical training. This year was meant to instill in 
the student an appreciation of labor and to prevent an elitist atti- 
tude from emerging among those who went on for higher education. 

After passing the Abitur examination and completing a year of 
practical training, the student could apply to either a university 
or a technical institute. Applicants were judged primarily on their 
scholastic achievements and political attitudes. In the past, appli- 
cants from working-class backgrounds were given priority for 
positions at the university and institutes. A Workers' and Peasants' 
Faculty was established at each university to help prepare the 
prospective student for entry into universities. During the 1950s, 
the proportion of students of working-class origin steadily increased 
and was over 50 percent around 1960. The proportion declined, 
however, during the 1960s, and by the end of the decade working- 
class students constituted roughly 38 percent of the university popu- 
lation. The special faculties were closed in the late 1960s. Under 
Honecker, there was a renewed effort to attract working-class stu- 
dents to the universities, but no figures were available on the propor- 
tion of such students at institutions of higher learning in the 
mid-1980s. 

In 1985 East Germany had 54 universities and colleges, with 
a total enrollment of 129,628 students. Women made up about 
50 percent of the student population. Courses in engineering and 
technology headed the list of popular subjects. Medicine, economics, 
and education were also popular choices. There were 239 techni- 
cal institutions, with a total student population of 162,221. About 



106 



Karl Marx University in Leipzig; in the background 
the "Hochhaus" of the university with its 
thirty -four floors, built in 1973 
Courtesy V. Jeffrey Gedmin 



107 



East Germany: A Country Study 

61 percent of the students studied full time, while the remainder 
enrolled in correspondence study or took evening classes. The three 
most popular fields of study at the institutes were medicine and 
health, engineering and technology, and economics. Courses at the 
university and technical institutes consisted primarily of lectures 
and examinations. Completion of the program led to a diploma 
or license, depending on the field of study. 

As of the mid-1980s, higher education was very inexpensive, and 
many of the textbooks were provided free of charge. Full or par- 
tial financial assistance in the form of scholarships was available 
for most students, and living expenses were generally minimal 
because most students continued to live at home during their course 
of study. Germans have a high regard for education, and the regime 
has generally supported young people who have wanted to upgrade 
their level of skills through further training or education. Ironically 
education has become one way in which young people seek to 
achieve social recognition. Higher education has also produced a 
generation that is oftentimes overqualified for available jobs. The 
government began restricting the number of positions available at 
the universities and technical institutes during the late 1960s, mak- 
ing competition for entry extremely stiff. 

Religion and Religious Organizations 

Official statistics on the religious affiliation of the population have 
not been available since the 1960s. Most East Germans, however, 
are Protestant. In the mid-1980s, the number of Protestants was 
estimated to be 7.7 million, or just under half the population. About 
7 percent, or 1.2 million people, were Roman Catholics. Other 
religions accounted for less than 1 percent of the population. 
According to the Constitution, freedom of religion and worship 
is the right of every citizen. In reality the regime discourages par- 
ticipation in religious activities, and in the mid-1980s young Chris- 
tians were often denied access to the best jobs and educational 
opportunities. 

Most Protestants in the country are affiliated with the Lutheran 
churches. In the mid-1980s, there were eight territorial Lutheran 
churches; three were united in the United Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in the German Democratic Republic (Vereinigte Evange- 
lisch — Lutherische Kirche in der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik-VELK) and five in the Evangelical Church of the Union 
(Evangelische Kirche der Union — EKU). Until 1969 the Lutheran 
churches in East Germany were loosely federated with those in West 
Germany. The VELK and the EKU, however, split with their West 
German counterparts in 1968 and the following year established 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



their own Federation of Evangelical Churches in the German 
Democratic Republic (Bund der Evangelischen Kirchen in der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik — BEK). The East German 
regime had been pressing for a separation of East German and West 
German churches for some time as part of its program of develop- 
ing an East German consciousness and had made the maintenance 
of relations with West German churches very difficult. 

Traditionally the Lutheran churches have retained a great deal 
of autonomy and administrative independence from one another. 
After the Reformation, the churches were organized on a territorial 
basis and were marked by differences in theology and ecclesiasti- 
cal administration. These characteristics have continued into the 
present. Each of the territorial churches elects its own bishop and 
has its own synod. Elections and administrative matters are wholly 
independent from state control. In 1984 the eight territorial churches 
comprised nearly 7,000 parishes, which were served by approxi- 
mately 4,000 pastors. There were fifty church-run hospitals, eighty- 
nine institutions for the physically handicapped, and many similar 
institutions. In the early 1980s, the largest of the Lutheran churches 
was the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Saxony (a member of the 
EKU). This church had approximately 1,200 parishes, 1,000 pas- 
tors, and a reported membership of 2.3 million. In the late 1970s, 
the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Thuringia, a member of the 
VELK, had 1,587 parishes, 750 pastors, and a membership of about 
1 million. 

The recognition of a common set of problems that needed solu- 
tions culminated in a movement toward the unification of the 
Lutheran churches. Since its inception in 1969, the BEK has pro- 
vided a federal structure for discussing problems and setting general 
guidelines, but it has exercised no real control over the member 
churches and has had little impact on their policy decisions. 
Moreover the creation of the BEK resulted in organizational redun- 
dancy; there were, in effect, three federations or unions: the VELK, 
the EKU, and the BEK. Each had separate offices, governing 
boards, and synods. In 1979 the churches decided to merge into 
one integrated union by 1981 . Such a union would exercise greater 
control on matters of common interest and present a united front 
in dealing with the government. Several obstacles, however, com- 
bined to forestall unification. First, the churches involved followed 
different teachings, and no resolution had been effected on the 
emphasis to be given to various interpretations of the faith. Sec- 
ond, the degree of linkage to churches in West Germany and West 
Berlin remained open. Both the VELK and the EKU had sepa- 
rated from their sister churches in the West, but the EKU had 



109 



East Germany: A Country Study 

maintained structural similarities and closer ties with the West. 
Finally, there was general disagreement about whether a united 
front was the best approach to dealing with the government. 

The Protestant churches are financed through offerings and a 
voluntary income tax on membership. In the mid-1980s, the 
churches also owned about 202,400 hectares of land, which the 
government had not expropriated, and operated 50 agricultural 
enterprises. A substantial proportion of church financing — about 
40 percent — was contributed by churches in West Germany and 
was used primarily for the renovation of old buildings or the con- 
struction of new churches. The government offered support for 
charitable institutions such as hospitals, homes for the aged, and 
day-care centers. These institutions provided a welcome supple- 
ment to the network of state institutions. 

In the mid-1980s, the Roman Catholic Church numbered 1.2 
million; most of the church membership was located in the south. 
Many Catholics had originally come from Eastern Europe as part 
of the population expelled in the postwar period. The church was 
divided into seven administrative districts that comprised about 
830 parishes, which were administered by 1,400 priests. By East 
European standards, the East German regime has treated the 
Roman Catholic Church relatively well. The regime has neither 
subjected the church to extreme repression nor co-opted it. Unlike 
the Protestant churches, the Roman Catholic Church has main- 
tained its structural ties to the West because most of the church's 
administrative districts were part of larger dioceses that extended 
into West Germany and Poland. In the mid-1980s, the church oper- 
ated 34 hospitals, 118 nursing homes and homes for the aged, 14 
homes for the mentally handicapped, 30 children's homes, and 137 
parish social service offices. 

In the mid-1980s, less than 1 percent of the population professed 
a faith other than that of the two mainstream religions. There were 
about 150,000 members of other Protestant denominations, or "free 
churches. " In addition there was a small Jewish community of about 
400 and a small community of Orthodox Christians. 

Relations between church and state have vacillated over the years. 
In general the state does not tolerate organizations outside of those 
officially sanctioned by the SED. All organizations within the 
socialist structure of society are designed to work together in devel- 
oping a new socialist personality and in restructuring society. The 
regime, moreover, is committed to an atheistic philosophy that views 
organized religion as an "opium of the masses" and, consequently, 
a tool of capitalist societies. 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



During the 1950s, the state implemented a series of measures 
aimed at diminishing the influence of the church. The state grad- 
ually assumed control of many of the functions traditionally under 
the purview of the church. Church youth groups were prohibited, 
and substitute youth groups under the supervision of the SED were 
formed, e.g., the JP and the FDJ. Religious instruction was for- 
bidden in the schools and was replaced by the teaching of "socialist 
morality." Secular and socialist rituals were initiated to rival reli- 
gious rituals and sacraments. A socialist name-giving ceremony 
replaced the traditional christening of infants, and a socialist mar- 
riage ceremony and funeral service were given official sanction. 

The most significant of the new rituals, however, was the Jugend- 
weihe (youth dedication). The Jugendweihe is an old ritual first per- 
formed in Germany in the mid- 1800s. It was reintroduced by 
communist officials in 1954 as the official ceremony marking the 
entry of the youth into adulthood. Normally the Jugendweihe takes 
place near a child's fourteenth birthday. It is a rite of passage that 
corresponds to the Christian confirmation or the Jewish bar 
mitzvah. The child receives political ideological instruction before 
his or her formal initiation, which includes a vow of loyalty to the 
socialist state. The churches unsuccessfully resisted the Jugendweihe, 
at first threatening to deny confirmation to youths who had par- 
ticipated in the socialist ceremony. The church, however, was fight- 
ing a rearguard action in this instance. By the late 1970s, over 95 
percent of all eligible East German youths had participated in the 
Jugendweihe. Participation was a virtual necessity for any young per- 
son who wished to secure a higher education or a good job. 

Despite the restrictive measures adopted by the regime in the 
1950s however, the churches were not the object of brutal repres- 
sion. Church leaders had fought Nazi fascism during the war, and 
many had been imprisoned along with communist leaders. A cer- 
tain amount of mutual respect, therefore, had developed between 
the two groups. Although some clergy and local lay officials were 
incarcerated when the communists came to power, no top church 
officials were jailed, and the regime later released those who had 
been imprisoned. 

In the 1960s, Ulbricht made overtures toward rapprochement 
with the Lutheran Church. The humanistic aspects of Christianity 
and its commitment to peace were seen as compatible with socialist 
philosophy. By easing restrictions, the regime hoped to enlist the 
support of the churches in developing a collective consciousness. 
In addition, certain church activities, in particular the operation 
of charitable institutions, were seen as socially useful and deserv- 
ing of support. The main bone of contention throughout this period 



111 



East Germany: A Country Study 



was the continuation of organizational unity between the churches 
in East Germany and West Germany. 

In the 1970s, the Lutheran churches adopted a policy of "criti- 
cal solidarity" with the regime. In essence this policy translated 
into accommodation on many issues, but at the same time the 
churches reserved for themselves the right to speak out on issues 
that were of vital concern. (The Roman Catholic Church is less 
vocal than the Lutheran Church.) The government has not always 
accepted the churches' view of critical solidarity. Rather, it has 
attempted to draw the Lutheran Church into closer collaboration 
while at the same time refraining from muzzling church leaders. 
Relations with the state relaxed considerably after a March 1978 
meeting between Honecker and BEK leaders wherein the state made 
several concessions to the churches. The role of the church as an 
independent entity was affirmed; building permits were granted 
for the construction of churches in new towns; promises were made 
to eliminate discrimination against young Christians; and media 
time was allotted for religious broadcasts. 

In the mid-1980s, the peace issue became a wedge between the 
church and the regime. Because of clerical and lay pressure, the 
Lutheran Church provided an organizational and spiritual impe- 
tus for the independent peace movement in East Germany. Inspired 
by the Biblical injunction to "beat swords into plowshares," in 
1982 the Conference of Governing Bodies of the Evangelical 
Churches in the GDR advocated disarmament. The church also 
sought a "social service for peace" instead of military service for 
conscientious objectors. 

In the 1980s, the Lutheran Church began to broaden its criti- 
cisms of the East German regime to encompass other issues as well. 
Church spokesmen attempted to link the peace issue with the 
attainment of justice and regime recognition of human rights. The 
Lutheran Church began to raise the issue of environmental pro- 
tection, and in 1986 the church used the nuclear accident at 
Chernobyl in the Soviet Union to condemn the development of 
nuclear power in East Germany. These efforts led to a resurgence 
of interest in organized religion. In the 1980s, popular demand 
for Bibles soared and far exceeded the output of 44,000 copies a 
year. Since the early 1980s, young people, especially, have been 
attending church meetings and concerts with increasing regularity. 

Dissent 

Dissent has taken several forms in East Germany. Each year a 
number of East German dissenters attempt to leave the country, 
through either emigration or escape. Beginning in the 1980s, there 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



also emerged an organized opposition. Under the auspices of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church, one area of group dissent revolved 
around the issues of peace and the demilitarization of East Ger- 
man society. A second category of dissent involved members of 
the intelligentsia who were independent Marxists. 

From 1945 to 1961, a relatively large number of East Germans 
left the country through emigration or escape. Since the construc- 
tion of the Berlin Wall, however, the numbers departing have been 
smaller. According to official statistics, approximately 320,000 per- 
sons have left since 1961 ; the unofficial estimates are much higher. 
According to some West German estimates, another 400,000 to 
500,000 East Germans have applied to emigrate and await exit per- 
mits. In 1984 the East German regime allowed over 30,000 peo- 
ple to emigrate, and in 1986 the figure was about 20,000. Successful 
escapes were few in number. The Wall and the heavy fortifications 
along the entire length of the east-west border ensured that risks 
were great for those trying to escape. Nevertheless escape attempts 
continued. 

Many of those who escaped enlisted the aid of middlemen or 
organizations (known as Fluchthilfer) that have made a profession 
of arranging escapes. The help of these organizations is expensive, 
and many of those who took advantage of such services were neces- 
sarily relatively prosperous by East German standards. This group 
of refugees has included members of the intelligentsia and profes- 
sionals. Escape was generally effected by way of third countries 
where border security was not as tight as in East Berlin. 

An organized opposition within East Germany emerged only in 
the 1980s. There are several reasons why organized dissent had 
failed to appear before this time. Paradoxically the existence of West 
Germany hindered the persistence of active dissent. In the past, 
the East German regime had simply exiled activists to West Ger- 
many and thereby isolated them from the country. Most notable 
among those expelled were the singer Wolf Biermann and the 
independent Marxist thinker Rudolf Bahro. The regime had also 
used repression to curb dissent. In 1986, according to West Ger- 
man sources, there were 2,000 political prisoners in East Germany. 
Finally, the regime had been able to co-opt the vast majority of 
the country's intelligentsia through a combination of privileges and 
rewards (see The Creative Intelligentsia; The Technical Intelli- 
gentsia, this ch.). 

The roots of the organized opposition involving the independent 
peace movement go back to the early 1960s, when considerable 
resistance emerged to East Germany's remilitarization, especially 
in Protestant circles. In the late 1970s and 1980s, Protestant 



113 



East Germany: A Country Study 

activists objected to the introduction, in the summer of 1978, of 
compulsory pre-military training for fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds. 
Soldiers, who had fulfilled their military obligation through work 
in special military construction units, pressured Lutheran Church 
leaders to support nonviolence and disarmament. In February 1982, 
the term peace movement began to be used in connection with peace 
initiatives that originated outside official party or government cir- 
cles. The initiatives stemmed from a forum organized by the 
Lutheran Church that challenged the official government view that 
peace can be maintained only through armed strength. In the 
mid-1980s, the independent peace movement has sought the for- 
mation of a civilian peace service as an alternate to military ser- 
vice and the demilitarization of East German society. 

In the 1980s, work for peace began to be decentralized and 
extended to areas outside East Germany's major urban centers. For 
example, by the mid-1980s the Protestant student community in 
Rostock had organized a monthly Peace Worship Service. Every 
six months a "Retreat and Meditation Day" on the theme of peace 
took place in the Land-church of Mecklenburg. Standing workshops 
for peace were formed in numerous student communities, and peace 
seminars, often attended by hundreds of people, were held in Karl- 
Marx-Stadt, Meissen, Waldheim, Zittau, Kessin, and elsewhere. 

Independent Marxist opposition among the intelligentsia was also 
present in the 1980s and had attained an importance in East Ger- 
many that far exceeded its influence elsewhere in Eastern Europe. 
Although the independent Marxist group was very small, the regime 
nevertheless considered such dissent to be very dangerous. This 
opposition had been inspired by the late Robert Havemann, whose 
thought, as expressed in Fragen, Antworten, Fragen {Questions, Answers, 
Questions) and Dialektik ohne Dogma {Dialectics Without Dogma), cen- 
tered on the gap between the theory and practice of socialism. 
Havemann advocated a pluralistic socialism inspired by a return 
to the humanism developed in Marx's early writings. Bahro's Die 
Alternative, which attacked party and government bureaucracy and 
called for an organized communist opposition in the socialist coun- 
tries, had also influenced East Germany's independent Marxists. 
In the 1980s, these ideas were gaining support among East Ger- 
many's young adults, who had been trained in Marxist-Leninist 
ideology throughout their years in the country's educational system. 

* * * 

In the 1980s, scholars have devoted significant attention to the 
study of East German society. G.E. Edwards's GDR Society and Social 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



Institutions deals extensively with the family, women, youth, and 
the elderly. Jonathan Steele's Inside East Germany: The State That 
Came in from the Cold treats living conditions, social programs, daily 
life, and education. Henry Krisch's The German Democratic Repub- 
lic: The Search for Identity contains useful information on society, as 
does C. Bradley Scharf's Politics and Change in East Germany. Roy 

E. H. Mellor's The Two Germanies: A Modern Geography and Nor- 
man J.G. Pounds 's Eastern Europe are two valuable works on 
geography and demography. Gebhard Schweigler's National Con- 
sciousness in a Divided Germany is an important contribution to the 
study of an emerging East German national consciousness, although 
a number of more recent studies disagree with his conclusion that 
East Germans are developing a separate identity. Information on 
the social structure is contained in the works of Peter Christian 
Ludz, Thomas A. Baylis, and John M. Starrels and Anita Mal- 
linckrodt. The family, mass organizations, and educational sys- 
tem are dealt with in the works of Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr. , Arthur 
Hearndon, Margrete Siebert Klein, and Harry G. Schaffer. Robert 

F. Goeckel's "The Luther Anniversary in East Germany" covers 
the politics surrounding that celebration. B.V. Flow, Matthew 
Boyse, and Ronald D. Asmus have written fine articles on religion 
in East Germany. Dissent in East Germany has been covered by 
Pedro Ramet, Michael J. Sodaro, Klaus Ehring, and Roger Woods. 
Ramet's "Disaffection and Dissent in East Germany" is an espe- 
cially penetrating article. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



115 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



Lubbenau power station 



THE ECONOMY of the German Democratic Republic (East Ger- 
many) has developed impressively since its founding in 1949. By 
almost any indicator, it stands at the top of the socialist world in 
economic development and performance. The country has the 
highest per capita income, the greatest number of automobiles ancl 
hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants, the highest labor productivity, 
and the highest yield in the agricultural sector per agricultural 
worker. It uses the most electricity and has the greatest number 
of television sets and radios among member states of the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), all on a per capita 
basis. East Germany is a major supplier of advanced technology 
to the other members. In short, it is the most modern and indus- 
trialized socialist state. 

The condition of the economy is all the more remarkable when 
one considers the circumstances under which it has developed. The 
country was devastated during World War II. Subsequently Soviet 
occupation of East German territory placed heavy burdens on the 
population and resources. In addition, the partitioning of the Ger- 
man lands after the war seriously disrupted the economy. East Ger- 
many's heavy industry capacity was very low, and its raw material 
supplies, except for lignite (low-grade) coal and potash, were almost 
nonexistent. The fact that the country for many years lacked 
international recognition as a sovereign state certainly did not con- 
tribute to economic growth, and its population loss before construc- 
tion of the Berlin Wall was a significant drain on labor resources. 

Explaining the relatively successful economic record achieved 
by East Germany after these early troubled years is not as easy 
as many assert. It is clear, however, that the previous level of Ger- 
man industrialization and the existence of a trained and diligent 
labor force have been important factors in the success story. To 
this East German leaders themselves would add two other expla- 
nations: the socialist character of their system and the help they 
received from the Soviet Union, particularly after 1953, the year 
of Joseph Stalin's death. 

The differing statistical concepts and procedures used by com- 
munist and noncommunist economists, both of which have draw- 
backs, result in differing images of East Germany and the 
functioning of its economic system. Data calculated on the basis 
of noncommunist concepts will be identified by the use of such 
Western terms as gross national product; East German statistics will 



119 



East Germany: A Country Study 

be called official data or identified by such terms as gross social product 
or national income. 

Resource Base 

East Germany is a resource-poor and relatively small politico- 
economic entity. It must import most of the raw materials it needs, 
aside from lignite, copper, and potash. Iron ore deposits are widely 
scattered in areas unfavorable to mining and have thin seams with 
an iron content of only 20 to 35 percent. Most of the iron ore, high- 
grade coal, and oil needed by the country and all of its bauxite, 
chromium, manganese, and phosphate must be imported. Most 
cotton and lumber also come from abroad. According to West Ger- 
man calculations, in the early 1980s East Germany was exporting 
25 to 30 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary) to pay for these basic materials. Even the country's water 
supply has been barely sufficient for its needs. However, East Ger- 
many is self-sufficient in a number of other minerals: rock salt, 
fluorspar, heavy spar, stone and earth for building, tin, and raw 
materials for glass and ceramics manufacture. 

East Germany's agricultural base is not as large as that of other 
East European countries; the country has an agricultural area of 
only 0.4 hectare per citizen. However, its climate and soil fertility 
are adequate for large-scale production of a wide range of crops 
and livestock. By the mid-1980s, East Germany's heavy reliance 
on lignite, the only fuel source it possessed in great quantity, was 
exacting a heavy price from the country's natural environment, 
resulting in a high level of atmospheric pollution, particularly from 
sulfur dioxide. In the 1980s, increasing use of nitrate fertilizers and 
pesticides was also creating problems. The country has become one 
of the most polluted regions of Europe. In an effort to combat the 
growing pollution, the East German government, having long 
affirmed the importance of environmental protection, was a party 
to a number of international agreements concerning progressive 
reduction of harmful emissions. Additional government policies to 
protect the environment and the country's resources included recy- 
cling of materials, energy conservation, and enforcement of already 
existing regulations. 

Labor Force 

The population, and therefore the labor force, of East Germany, 
has always been comparatively small. Prior to the 1960s, when 
birthrates were relatively high, over 2.5 million people left East 
Germany for the West. Perhaps half of these individuals were 
twenty-five years of age or younger. Subsequently the birthrate 



120 



The Economy 



fell, and during the 1970s East Germany, alone among European 
countries, witnessed a continuing population decline. By the late 
1970s, the situation prompted government efforts to promote large 
families (see Population, ch. 2). According to official East German 
figures, after World War II the total population fell from around 
18.5 million in 1946 to 16.7 million in 1986. The decline occurred 
despite the fact that in the postwar years some Germans had had 
to be resettled from the territories in Eastern Europe that had been 
part of the Third Reich but that subsequently had fallen within 
the boundaries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. 

Beginning in the late 1940s, the East German leadership moved 
to expand the labor force. First, the government initiated a pro- 
gram to socialize agriculture, reducing the number of people 
employed in the agricultural sector from 2.2 million in 1949 to less 
than 1 million in 1970 and to only 874,000 in 1977. In subsequent 
years, the number of agricultural workers increased slightly, reach- 
ing 922,000 in 1985. As a result of the government's policy, well 
over 1 million persons became available for employment in other 
sectors of the economy. 

Second, and more important, the state effectively mobilized 
women and brought them into the ranks of the gainfully employed. 
Whereas in 1949 women had constituted about 40 percent of the 
labor force, by 1985 that proportion had risen to 49 percent, giv- 
ing East Germany one of the highest rates of female employment 
in the world. 

As a result of this mobilization, by 1985 the East German labor 
force was a comparatively large segment of the country's total popu- 
lation, standing at about 51 percent. (According to official figures, 
64.8 percent of the population was of working age; about 79 per- 
cent of these individuals were employed.) In 1975 the proportion 
of the retirement-age population was 19.8 percent. According to 
East German statistics, in 1985 this proportion of the population 
had dropped to 16.6 percent. Nevertheless, in the mid-1980s the 
country continued to suffer from a labor shortage. The govern- 
ment was attempting to solve the problem through a more efficient 
use of labor and through the replacement of workers by robots. 
In the early 1980s, increasing labor productivity was a major pri- 
ority in economic planning. 

In 1985 the socialist sector employed 98 percent of the work force. 
Industry accounted for more than one-third of the total work force, 
the "nonproductive" sector (such as service industries and the state 
bureaucracy) employed one-fifth of the work force, and agricul- 
ture and trade accounted for one-tenth each. The East German 
Constitution guarantees to all citizens the right to work, and 



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East Germany: A Country Study 



officially there was no unemployment in East Germany. The coun- 
try's leaders acknowledged, however, that temporary unemploy- 
ment could occur as a result of rationalization and restructuring. 

Although the government was intent upon mobilizing the avail- 
able labor reserves, it was not insensitive to popular sentiments 
favoring a shorter workweek. The standard workweek for all 
workers was reduced to forty-three and three-quarter hours in 1967. 
In 1977, it was further reduced to forty hours for women and forty 
to forty-two hours for those working shifts. In conjunction with 
the government's efforts to raise the birthrate, women received sub- 
stantial opportunities to work part time and increasingly liberal 
maternal benefits, including extended leave with pay and further 
reduction in the workweek (see Population Structure and Dynam- 
ics, ch. 2). 

Economic Structure and its Control Mechanisms 

Like other East European communist states, East Germany has 
a centrally planned economy (CPE), imposed on it by the Soviet 
Union in the late 1940s, in contrast to the more familiar market 
economies or mixed economies of most Western states. The state 
establishes production targets and prices and allocates resources, 
codifying these decisions in a comprehensive plan or set of plans. 
The means of production are almost entirely state owned. In 1985, 
for example, state-owned enterprises or collectives earned 96.7 per- 
cent of total net national income. 

Advocates of CPEs consider this organizational form to have 
important advantages. First, the government can harness the econ- 
omy to serve the political and economic objectives of the leader- 
ship. Consumer demand, for example, can be restrained in favor 
of greater investment in basic industry or channeled into desired 
patterns, such as reliance on public transportation rather than on 
private automobiles. Second, CPEs can maximize the continuous 
utilization of all available resources. Under CPEs, neither unem- 
ployment nor idle plants should exist beyond minimal levels, and 
the economy should develop in a stable manner, unimpeded by 
inflation or recession. Third, CPEs can serve social rather than 
individual ends; under such a system, the leadership can distrib- 
ute rewards, whether wages or perquisites, according to the social 
value of the service performed, not according to the vagaries of 
supply and demand on an open market. 

Critics of CPEs identify several characteristic problems. First, 
given the complexities of economic processes, the plan must be a 
simplification of reality. Individuals and producing units can be 
given directives or targets, but in carrying out the plan they may 



122 



The Economy 



select courses of action that conflict with the overall interests of 
society as determined by the planners. Such courses of action might 
include, for example, ignoring quality standards, producing an 
improper product mix, or using resources wastefully. Second, critics 
contend that CPEs have built-in obstacles to innovation and effi- 
ciency in production; managers of producing units, frequently 
having limited discretionary authority, see as their first priority 
a strict fulfillment of the plan targets rather than, for example, 
development of new techniques or diversification of products. Third, 
the system of allocating goods and services in CPEs is thought to 
be inefficient. Most of the total mix of products is distributed 
according to the plan, with the aid of a rationing mechanism known 
as the System of Material Balances. But since no one can predict 
perfectly the actual needs of each producing unit, some units receive 
too many goods and others too few. The managers with surpluses 
are hesitant to admit they have them, for CPEs are typically "taut," 
that is, they carry low inventories and reserves. Managers prefer 
to hoard whatever they have and then to make informal trades when 
they are in need and can find someone else whose requirements 
complement their own. Finally, detractors argue that in CPEs prices 
do not reflect the value of available resources, goods, or services. 
In market economies, prices, which are based on cost and utility 
considerations, permit the determination of value, even if imper- 
fectly. In CPEs, prices are determined administratively, and the 
criteria the state uses to establish them are sometimes unrelated 
to costs. Prices often vary significantly from the actual social or 
economic value of the products for which they have been set and 
are not a valid basis for comparing the relative value of two or more 
products to society. 

East German economists and planners are well aware of the 
alleged strengths and weaknesses of their system of planned econ- 
omy. They contend that Western critics overstate the disadvan- 
tages and that in any case these problems are not inherent in the 
system itself. They direct their efforts toward preserving the fun- 
damental framework of the system while introducing modifications 
that can address the problems just noted. 

The ultimate directing force in the economy, as in every aspect 
of the society, is the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands — SED), particularly its top leadership 
(see The Socialist Unity Party of Germany, ch. 4). The party 
exercises its leadership role formally during the party congress, when 
its accepts the report of the general secretary (Erich Honecker since 
1971; the title of the party chief changed from first secretary to 
general secretary in 1976) and when it adopts the draft plan for 



123 



East Germany: A Country Study 

the upcoming five-year period. More important is the supervision 
of the SED's Politburo, which monitors and directs ongoing eco- 
nomic processes. That key group, however, can concern itself with 
no more than the general, fundamental, or extremely serious eco- 
nomic questions, for it also has the full range of other matters on 
its agenda. 

At the head of the government organs responsible for formally 
adopting and carrying out policies elaborated by the party con- 
gress and Politburo is the Council of Ministers, which has more 
than forty members and is in turn headed by a Presidium of six- 
teen. The Council of Ministers supervises and coordinates the 
activities of all other central bodies responsible for the economy, 
and it may play a direct and specific role in important cases. 

The State Planning Commission (sometimes called the Economic 
General Staff of the Council of Ministers) advises the Council of 
Ministers on possible alternative economic strategies and their 
implications, translates the general targets set by the council into 
planning directives and more specific plan targets for each of the 
ministries beneath it, coordinates short-, medium-, and long-range 
planning, and mediates interministerial disagreements. 

The individual ministries have major responsibility for the 
detailed direction of the several sectors of the economy. The minis- 
tries are responsible within their separate spheres for detailed 
planning, resource allocation, development, implementation of 
innovations, and generally for the efficient achievement of their 
respective plans. 

Directly below the ministries are the centrally directed trusts, 
or Kombinate. Intended to be replacements for the Associations of 
Publicly Owned Enterprises — the largely administrative organiza- 
tions that previously served as a link between the ministries and 
the individual enterprises — the Kombinate resulted from the merg- 
ing of various industrial enterprises into large-scale entities in the 
late 1970s, based on interrelationships between their production 
activities. The Kombinate include research enterprises, which the 
state incorporated into their structures to provide better focus for 
research efforts and speedier application of research results to 
production. A single, united management directs the entire produc- 
tion process in each Kombinat, from research to production and sales. 
The reform also attempted to foster closer ties between the activi- 
ties of the Kombinate and the foreign trade enterprises by subor- 
dinating the latter to both the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the 
Kombinate (see Foreign Trade, this ch.). The goal of the Kombinat 
reform measure was to achieve greater efficiency and rationality 
by concentrating authority in the hands of midlevel leadership. The 



124 



The Economy 



Kombinat management also provides significant input for the cen- 
tral planning process. 

By the early 1980s, establishment oi Kombinate for both centrally 
managed and district-managed enterprises was essentially complete. 
Particularly from 1982 to 1984, the government established vari- 
ous regulations and laws to define more precisely the parameters 
of these entities. These provisions tended to reinforce the primacy 
of central planning and to limit the autonomy of the Kombinate, 
apparently to a greater extent than originally planned. As of early 
1986, there were 132 centrally managed Kombinate, with an aver- 
age of 25,000 employees per Kombinat. District-managed Kombinate 
numbered 93, with an average of about 2,000 employees each. 

At the base of the entire economic structure are the producing 
units. Although these vary in size and responsibility, the govern- 
ment is gradually reducing their number and increasing their size. 
The number of industrial enterprises in 1985 was only slightly more 
than one-fifth that of 1960. Their independence decreased signifi- 
cantly as the Kombinate became fully functional. 

In addition to the basic structure of the industrial sector, a sup- 
plementary hierarchy of government organs reaches down from 
the Council of Ministers and the State Planning Commission to 
territorial rather than functional subunits. Regional and local plan- 
ning commissions and economic councils, subordinate to the State 
Planning Commission and the Council of Ministers, respectively, 
extend down to the local level. They consider such matters as the 
proper or optimal placement of industry, environmental protec- 
tion, and housing. 

The agricultural sector of the economy has a somewhat differ- 
ent place in the system, although it too is thoroughly integrated. 
It is almost entirely collectivized except for private plots (see Eco- 
nomic Sectors, this ch.). The collective farms are formally self- 
governing. They are, however, subordinate to the Council of 
Ministers through the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Food- 
stuffs. A complex set of relationships also connects them with other 
cooperatives and related industries, such as food processing. 

The fact that East Germany has a planned economy does not 
mean that a single, comprehensive plan is the basis of all economic 
activity. An interlocking web of plans having varying degrees of 
specificity, comprehensiveness, and duration is in operation at all 
times; any or all of these may be modified during the continuous 
process of performance monitoring or as a result of new and 
unforeseen circumstances. The resultant system of plans is 
extremely complex, and maintaining internal consistency between 
the various plans is a considerable task. 



125 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Operationally, short-term planning is the most important for 
production and resource allocation. It covers one calendar year and 
encompasses the entire economy. The key targets set at the cen- 
tral level are overall rate of growth of the economy, volume and 
structure of the domestic product and its uses, utilization of raw 
materials and labor and their distribution by sector and region, 
and volume and structure of exports and imports. Beginning with 
the 1981 plan, the state added assessment of the ratio of raw material 
use against value and quantity of output to promote more efficient 
use of scarce resources. 

Medium-range (five-year) planning uses the same indicators, 
although with less specificity. Although the five-year plan is duly 
enacted into law, it is more properly seen as a series of guidelines 
rather than as a set of direct orders. It is typically published several 
months after the start of the five-year period it covers, after the 
first one-year plan has been enacted into law. More general than 
a one-year plan, the five-year plan is nevertheless specific enough 
to integrate the yearly plans into a longer time frame. Thus it pro- 
vides continuity and direction. 

In the early 1970s, long-term, comprehensive planning began. 
It too provides general guidance, but over a longer period (fifteen 
or twenty years), long enough to link the five-year plans in a 
coherent manner. 

In the first phase of planning, the centrally determined objec- 
tives are divided and assigned to appropriate subordinate units. 
After internal consideration and discussion have occurred at each 
level and suppliers and buyers have completed negotiations, the 
separate parts are reaggregated into draft plans. In the final stage, 
which follows the acceptance of the total package by the State Plan- 
ning Commission and the Council of Ministers, the finished plan 
is redivided among the ministries, and the relevant responsibili- 
ties are distributed once more to the producing units. 

The production plan is supplemented by other mechanisms that 
control supplies and establish monetary accountability. One such 
mechanism is the System of Material Balances, which allocates 
materials, equipment, and consumer goods. It acts as a rationing 
system, ensuring each element of the economy access to the basic 
goods it needs to fulfill its obligations. Since most of the goods 
produced by the economy are covered by this control mechanism, 
producing units have difficulty obtaining needed items over and 
above their allocated levels. 

Another control mechanism is the assignment of prices for all 
goods and services. These prices serve as a basis for calculating 
expenses and receipts. Enterprises have every incentive to use these 



126 



The Economy 



prices as guidelines in decision making. Doing so makes plan ful- 
fillment possible and earns bonus funds of various sorts for the 
enterprise. These bonuses are not allocated indiscriminately for 
gross output but are awarded for such accomplishments as the 
introduction of innovations or reduction of labor costs. 

The system functions smoothly only when its component parts 
are staffed with individuals whose values coincide with those of the 
regime or at least complement regime values. Such a sharing takes 
place in part through the integrative force of the party organs whose 
members occupy leading positions in the economic structure. Efforts 
are also made to promote a common sense of purpose through mass 
participation of almost all workers and farmers in organized dis- 
cussion of economic planning, tasks, and performance. An East 
German journal reported, for example, that during preliminary 
discussion concerning the 1986 annual plan, 2.2 million employees 
in various enterprises and work brigades of the country at large 
contributed 735,377 suggestions and comments. Ultimate decision 
making, however, comes from above. 

The private sector of the economy is small but not entirely 
insignificant. In 1985 about 2.8 percent of the net national product 
came from private enterprises. The private sector includes private 
farmers and gardeners; independent craftsmen, wholesalers, and 
retailers; and individuals employed in so-called free-lance activi- 
ties (artists, writers, and others). Although self-employed, such 
individuals are strictly regulated. In 1985, for the first time in many 
years, the number of individuals working in the private sector 
increased slightly. According to East German statistics, in 1985 
there were about 176,800 private entrepreneurs, an increase of 
about 500 over 1984. Certain private-sector activities are quite 
important to the system. The SED leadership, for example, has 
been encouraging private initiative as part of the effort to upgrade 
consumer services (see The Consumer in the East German Econ- 
omy, this ch.). 

In addition to those East Germans who are self-employed full time, 
there are others who engage in private economic activity on the side. 
The best known and most important examples are families on col- 
lective farms who also cultivate private plots (which can be as large 
as one-half hectare). Their contribution is significant; according to 
official sources, in 1985 the farmers privately owned about 8.2 per- 
cent of the hogs, 14.7 percent of the sheep, 32.8 percent of the horses, 
and 30 percent of the laying hens in the country. Professionals such 
as commercial artists and doctors also worked privately in their free 
time, subject to separate tax and other regulations. Their impact 
on the economic system, however, was negligible. 



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East Germany: A Country Study 



More difficult to assess, because of its covert and informal nature, 
is the significance of that part of the private sector called the ' ' second 
economy." As used here, the term includes all economic arrange- 
ments or activities that, owing to their informality or their illegality, 
take place beyond state control or surveillance. The subject has 
received considerable attention from Western economists, most of 
whom are convinced that it is important in CPEs. In the mid-1980s, 
however, evidence was difficult to obtain and tended to be anec- 
dotal in nature. 

One kind of informal economic activity includes private arrange- 
ments to provide goods or services in return for payment. An elderly 
woman might hire a neighbor boy to haul coal up to her apart- 
ment, or an employed woman might pay a neighbor to do her wash- 
ing. Closely related would be instances of hiring an acquaintance 
to repair a clock, tune up an automobile, or repair a toilet. Such 
arrangements take place in any society, and given the serious defi- 
ciencies in the East German service sector, they may be more neces- 
sary than in the West. They are doubtless common, and because 
they are considered harmless, they are not the subject of any sig- 
nificant governmental concern. 

There is another kind of private economic activity, however, that 
does concern the government: the stealing and selling of goods for 
profit by individuals who have ready access to them. For exam- 
ple, an individual might siphon gasoline from a public vehicle and 
sell it to a friend. No statistics are available on such practices. 
Surface impressions, however, suggest that they are not very com- 
mon or significant, certainly not as significant as may be the 
case in other socialist states where they are reportedly quasi- 
institutionalized . 

Another common activity that is troublesome if not disruptive 
is the practice of offering a sum of money beyond the selling price 
to individuals selling desirable goods, or giving something special 
as partial payment for products in short supply. Such ventures may 
be no more than offering someone Trinkgeld (a tip), but they may 
also involve Schmierge Id (money used to "grease" a transaction) or 
Beziehungen (special relationships). Opinions in East Germany vary 
as to how significant these practices are. But given the abundance 
of money in circulation and frequent shortages in luxury items and 
durable consumer goods, most people are perhaps occasionally 
tempted to provide a "sweetener," particularly for such things as 
automobile parts or furniture. 

These irregularities do not appear to constitute a major economic 
problem. However, the East German press does occasionally report 
prosecutions of particularly egregious cases of illegal "second 



128 



The Economy 



economy" activity, involving what are called "crimes against 
socialist property" and other activities that are in "conflict and 
contradiction with the interests and demands of society" (as one 
report described the situation). 

Economic Policy and Performance 

During the interwar years, the territory that is now East Ger- 
many was profoundly dependent on external economic ties. In the 
mid- 1930s, it shipped almost half of its total production to the other 
parts of Germany. In return it obtained a slightly larger percen- 
tage share of its total economic needs from the same territories. 
This domestic trade featured sales of agricultural products; tex- 
tiles; products of light industry, such as cameras, typewriters, and 
optical equipment; and purchases of industrial goods and equip- 
ment. In addition, a substantial share of the production from the 
area was shipped abroad in those years, and additional goods were 
received in return. 

Such a pattern of interdependence and specialization had its 
advantages, particularly in ensuring the population a standard of 
living comparable with that of western Germany. Conversely chaos 
could result if the intricate system of interactions broke down. Major 
dislocations occurred after World War II, when Germany was 
divided into two sections, one part dominated by the Soviet Union 
and the other by the Western Allies. 

Because it could no longer rely on its former system of internal 
and external trading, the Soviet Zone of Occupation had to be 
restructured and made more self-sufficient through the construc- 
tion of basic industry. Such an economic strategy was also dictated 
by the Stalinist pronouncement that the newly established people's 
democracies in Eastern Europe were to replicate the Soviet eco- 
nomic strategy, which emphasized heavy industry and a trade denial 
policy bordering on autarky. For East Germany, this meant build- 
ing iron and steel plants and increasing the country's capacity to 
produce chemicals and heavy machinery regardless of the cost such 
a strategy imposed on living standards. 

The reorientation and restructuring of the East German economy 
would have been difficult in any case. The substantial reparations 
costs that the Soviet Union imposed on its occupation zone, and 
later on East Germany, made the process even more difficult. Pay- 
ments continued into the early 1950s, ending only with the death 
of Stalin. According to Western estimates, these payments amounted 
to about 25 percent of total East German production through 1953. 

Reconstruction was complicated by the massive effort to introduce 
socialism that began almost immediately after the war. In October 



129 



East Germany: A Country Study 



1945, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany ordered the 
confiscation of all properties belonging to former Nazis and their 
sympathizers. The measure affected properties of the great Ger- 
man banking concerns and about 10,000 other enterprises. In 1946 
the first phase of agrarian reform began; it involved redistribution 
of all landholdings over 100 hectares, as well as lands owned by 
former Nazi activists, and affected about one-third of all land in 
agricultural production. Agricultural laborers, poor farmers, and 
Germans recently resettled from the "lost territories" in Eastern 
Europe received about two-thirds of this confiscated land, and the 
remainder was converted into state farms. 

The public reaction to reparations and land reform, though 
muted, was mixed. Reparations costs could hardly have been well 
received by the impoverished population, whatever their political 
views. Dispossession of the ex-Nazis and large landowners may have 
been popular with many, including those who received parcels of 
land; but many individuals who were dispossessed fled to the West 
with their much needed expertise, if not their movable resources. 
In addition, dividing the land into small units (the plots averaged 
about eight hectares) was unlikely to lead to the institution of effi- 
cient farming methods, although initially the level of mechaniza- 
tion in agriculture was sc low that the matter was of little 
significance. 

The postwar years and the early 1950s were very difficult ones 
for the East Germans. About 2 million more people lived in East 
Germany during the immediate postwar years than in the 1930s, 
straining the country's limited resources. Nevertheless, official statis- 
tics suggest that by 1950 the extent of economic recovery was already 
impressive (see table 4, Appendix A). 

By 1950 the results of the state's cautious steps toward the 
socializing of both industry and agriculture were already discerni- 
ble. Near the end of 1950, about 66 percent of all industry, 40 per- 
cent of the construction enterprises, and 30 percent of the domestic 
trades were already state owned. In 1952, six years after the land 
had been distributed to the poorer agricultural population, collec- 
tivization of agriculture began in earnest. By 1960 about 85 per- 
cent of the land had been collectivized. 

During the 1950s, East Germany made significant economic 
progress, at least as indicated by the gross figures. By 1960 invest- 
ment had grown by a factor of about 4.5, while gross industrial 
production had increased by a factor of 2.9. Within that broad 
category of industrial production, the basic sectors, such as 
machinery and transport equipment, grew especially rapidly, while 
the consumer sectors such as textiles lagged behind. 



130 



The Economy 



In the 1950s, the size, composition, and distribution of the labor 
force also underwent significant change. Although during that 
decade the population declined by 1.2 million, the number 
employed actually increased by about 500,000, a development 
caused by an increase of over 650,000 in the number of working 
women. In the same period, the percentage of the total labor force 
employed in industry increased by about 7 percent (to 36 percent 
of the total), while agricultural labor dropped from 28 to 22 per- 
cent of the labor force. The only other significant shift was in the 
services area, which increased its share of the labor force from 12.5 
to 15 percent. 

Consumption grew significantly in the first years, although from 
a very low base, and showed respectable growth rates over the entire 
decade (see table 5, Appendix A). Fluctuations were considerable 
from year to year, however. High rates for the years 1954, 1955, 
and 1958 reflected consumption-oriented policies proclaimed in 1953 
(the New Course) and 1958 (the year that witnessed the inaugura- 
tion of the Seven-Year Plan for 1959-65). In 1955 and again in 1960, 
downturns were recorded, in the latter year partly because of popular 
resistance to further steps toward the full collectivization of agricul- 
ture. Disruptions in agriculture and the migration of East Germans 
to the West, which reached a high point at the beginning of 1961, 
helped to produce a general crisis in the economy, as reflected in 
almost all the economic data for the early 1960s. 

As the 1950s ended, pessimism about the future seemed rather 
appropriate. Surprisingly, however, after construction of the Ber- 
lin Wall and several years of consolidation and realignment, East 
Germany entered a period of impressive economic growth that 
produced clear benefits for the people. For the years 1966-70, GDP 
and national income grew at average annual rates of 6.3 and 5.2 
percent, respectively (see table 6, Appendix A). Simultaneously, 
investment grew at an average annual rate of 10.7 percent, retail 
trade at 4.6 percent, and real per capita income at 4.2 percent (see 
table 7, Appendix A). 

During the 1960s, collectivization of agriculture continued. The 
number of people employed grew steadily, although marginally, 
by about 80,000, despite a net population decrease of more than 
100,000 and an increase in the percentage of the population either 
too old or too young to be part of the labor force. By the end of 
the 1960s, the percentage of women in the work force had reached 
48.3 percent. The most significant shift in the sectoral composi- 
tion of the labor force was the continued drop in the relative size 
of the agricultural labor component, which went from 17 percent 
of the total in 1960 to about 12 percent a decade later. 



131 



East Germany: A Country Study 

As of 1970, growth rates in the various sectors of the economy 
did not differ greatly from those of a decade earlier. Production 
increases continued to be highest in the basic industry areas, while 
light industry — textile and food-processing branches — still lagged. 
Production reached about 1 40 to 1 50 percent of the levels of a decade 
earlier. Agricultural growth was not reported in comparable terms, 
but it is possible to compare total production of certain key items 
for the years 1966-70 against those for 1956-60 and thus obtain 
a rough measure of increase, while minimizing the impact of a pos- 
sible single poor harvest (see table 8, Appendix A). The growth 
rates in production resulted in substantial increases in personal con- 
sumption (see table 3, Appendix A). 

This same period also saw the establishment and subsequent dis- 
mantling of significant economic reforms. The SED leadership 
instituted the New Economic System (NES), as the reforms came 
to be known, at its Sixth Party Congress held in 1963. The theo- 
retical basis of the NES drew upon the ideas of the reform-minded 
Soviet economist Evsei Liberman. Specifically, East Germans who 
advocated reform argued that existing procedures placed too much 
emphasis on numbers (the "tonnage" ideology) at the expense of 
efficiency, that the distorted pricing system caused excessive waste 
and improper decision making, and that innovation was being sti- 
fled because enterprises had neither the incentive nor the autonomy 
necessary to introduce progressive changes. The NES substantially 
decentralized authority, giving a degree of power to production 
units; central controls were effected essentially through fiscal and 
monetary instruments. Prices were altered and made more flexi- 
ble and thus more rational, while enterprises were given much 
greater control over their investment and other funds. 

The reform did not fail in terms of production figures. Yet by 
the end of the 1960s, its most important features had been rescinded. 
Apparently the crucial factors prompting its abandonment were 
both economic and political. Economically, decentralization had 
led to unacceptably high investment levels and decisions that were 
inconsistent with central priorities. Politically, the leadership may 
have simply been uncomfortable with the trend toward decentrali- 
zation. The reform also suffered from its affinity with the liberal 
economic program of the Alexander Dubcek era in Czechoslovakia. 

Most of the reforms of the 1960s having been abandoned, the 
decade of the 1970s began with a "return to normalcy" in terms 
of economic organization. By this time, East German leaders could 
face the future with a greater measure of confidence than ever 
before, for both political and economic reasons. The political iso- 
lation was ending, as demonstrated by East Germany's conclusion 



132 



The Economy 



of the Basic Treaty with West Germany in 1972 and its subsequent 
admission into the United Nations in September 1973. And on the 
economic side, East Germany's performance was noteworthy. 

In the 1970s, with two decades of economic expansion and 
development behind them, the East German leaders faced a num- 
ber of new problems. Concern now centered on how East Germany 
should proceed under conditions of "mature socialism." In the 
1970s, in East Germany and in the other member states of Come- 
con, attention focused on the proper way to respond to the trend 
toward ever expanding varieties of products needed in an advanced 
society, many of which were becoming more complex and expen- 
sive to produce. Since this trend meant increasing costs for each 
increment in total product output, prospects for sustained economic 
growth at previous rates were uncertain. 

The Comecon member states agreed that the organization would 
move toward greater integration, specialization, and cooperation 
of the several economies in what became known as the Compre- 
hensive Program of 1971 (see Appendix B). The member states 
would pool their resources for the development of costly and 
sophisticated projects of organizationwide importance. Members 
would also specialize in certain areas of production to minimize 
duplication of effort. For example, no longer would every mem- 
ber manufacture ships or buses; only one or two countries would 
produce such items, which they would then trade for goods produced 
elsewhere. All countries would presumably benefit from the greater 
efficiency of mass production. 

This focus inevitably had significant implications for the East 
German economy, i.e., how it should be structured, what it should 
produce, and so on. In general, East Germany gradually consoli- 
dated production units into larger and larger entities, culminating 
in the introduction of the Kombinate of the late 1970s (see Economic 
Structure and Its Control Mechanisms, this ch.). Consolidation 
also occurred in agriculture; by 1980 there were only one-third as 
many collective farms as there had been in 1960. 

In the 1970s, unforeseen international developments forced East 
German leaders to modify their strategy in some areas. First came 
the 1973 price explosion for petroleum, accompanied by a more 
general inflationary spiral on the world market. A slowdown in 
the rate of growth in Soviet petroleum export capabilities clouded 
the future, as did the fact that prices for raw materials rose much 
more steeply on the world market than did prices for the kinds of 
products East Germany exported. In the late 1970s, a worldwide 
recession also had a negative impact on the performance of the East 
German economy. Because much of its trade was with the Soviet 



133 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Union and the other European members of Comecon, the East Ger- 
man economy was somewhat insulated from the immediate effects 
of changes on the world market. Nevertheless, over the long run 
these interrelated developments affected East Germany, and in each 
case the impact was decidedly negative. As early as 1970, East Ger- 
many began to show a deficit in trade with the West and after 1975 
with the Soviet Union. 

Despite these problems, throughout the 1970s the East German 
economy as a whole enjoyed relatively strong and stable growth. 
In 1971, First Secretary Honecker declared the "raising of the 
material and cultural living standard" of the population to be a 
"principal task" of the economy; and private consumption grew 
at an average annual rate of 4.8 percent from 1971 to 1975 and 
4 percent from 1976 to 1980. The economy's sturdy performance 
was not a result of a growing labor input — the size of the work 
force scarcely increased — but rather of a high level of investment 
in fixed assets and an increase in materials consumption that actually 
exceeded the growth of net output. The 1976-80 Five- Year Plan 
achieved an average annual growth rate of 4.1 per cent. 

By the end of the 1970s, the country's growing indebtedness both 
to the West and to the Soviet Union was becoming a serious 
problem. A major priority of the East German economic strategy 
for the 1980s, therefore, was holding down imports and accelerat- 
ing the growth of exports. The new economic strategy called for 
speeding up scientific-technological advances; reducing specific 
production consumption (primary materials consumed per unit of 
national income), particularly with regard to energy use; making 
limited, carefully targeted investments geared toward moderniza- 
tion rather than new projects; and improving labor productivity 
(especially important because little expansion of the labor force could 
be expected). The stated goals were an overall "intensification" 
of economic processes and elimination of "reserves," or excess 
capacity in the system. 

The 1981-85 Five Year Plan called for maintenance of previous 
growth rates, both in the basic producing spheres and in the con- 
sumer sector, while at the same time mandating a reduction of 
6.1 percent per annum in specific consumption of "nationally 
important" energy supplies, raw materials, and other materials. 
To reduce dependence on imported fuels, East Germany sought 
to develop the capability of mining 285 to 290 million tons of lig- 
nite annually by 1985, a substantial increase over the 1980 produc- 
tion level of just under 260 million tons. On the consumer side, 
the government sought to hold prices for the basic necessities at 
existing levels, necessitating increasing subsidies from the state over 



134 



The Economy 



time. The plan projected an expansion in supplies of consumer 
goods retail trade by 20 to 23 percent and net personal income by 
about the same amount. Housing construction was to continue to 
receive special attention, and more than 900,000 units were to be 
completed by 1985. 

While the traditional planned system remained fundamentally 
unchanged, a number of significant innovations did occur during 
drafting and implementation of the 1981-85 Five- Year Plan. One 
change in the direct control mechanisms of the planning process 
was the elevation of efficiency measures, including cost/profit con- 
siderations, to a level of primary importance as plan indices. As 
of 1983, efficiency measures displaced industrial goods — or gross — 
production as the primary consideration (gross production remained 
an important consideration in planning, however). This change 
implied a cautious upgrading of the profit motive. To serve as 
indirect controls on the functioning of the economy, the plan 
introduced a series of price increases in the producing sector, first 
for raw materials (actually beginning as early as 1976) and subse- 
quently for semifinished and finished goods as well. Beginning in 
1984, a payroll tax, in the form of employer contributions to social 
funds, was levied in the industrial sector to encourage efficient use 
of labor. Examination of loan applications submitted by enterprises 
became more rigorous, involving a more direct assessment of the 
proposed investment project's potential contribution to the "intensi- 
fication" effort. 

The 1981-85 plan period proved to be a difficult time for the 
East German economy. The first serious problem was the deci- 
sion by Western banks in 1981 and 1982 to clamp down on credit 
for East Germany and the concurrent decision of the Soviet Union 
to reduce oil deliveries by 10 percent (see Foreign Trade, this ch.). 
The immediate East German response — retrenchment on Western 
imports and stepped up exports — resulted in domestic bottlenecks 
and a growth rate of less than 3 percent. However, by the end of 
the period the economy had chalked up a respectable overall per- 
formance, with an annual average growth rate of 4.5 percent (the 
plan target had been 5.1 percent). 

Industrial production proved especially disappointing; affected 
as it was by scarcity of resources, it grew at an annual rate of about 
4 percent instead of the targeted 5.1 percent (see table 9, Appen- 
dix A). In the limited investment program, which amounted to 
roughly the same amount as in the previous plan period (264 bil- 
lion GDR marks at 1980 prices; for value of the GDR mark — see 
Glossary), metallurgy, the chemical industry, and microelectronics 
received high priority, necessarily at the expense of other areas. 



135 



East Germany: A Country Study 

During the 1981-85 period, however, specific energy consump- 
tion (primary energy consumption per unit of national income) was 
reduced by 3.5 percent per year, an impressive record. The sav- 
ings were largely in the production sector; household consump- 
tion increased markedly (energy prices for consumers remained 
stable, and acquisition of energy-using consumer durables continued 
apace). Oil consumption dropped sufficiently to more than com- 
pensate for the cutback in Soviet oil exports that occurred in 
1982-83; by the end of the plan period, East Germany was able 
to make available for export (as crude oil and various oil products) 
about 40 percent of its oil imports from the Soviet Union. At 
312 million tons, lignite production exceeded plan targets in 1985 
by 22 to 27 million tons. In the 1984-85 period, the agricultural 
sector registered a particularly good performance, and record har- 
vests were reported. During the plan period, the state raised crop 
and livestock prices, and it eliminated subsidies to the input sector 
(for example, fuels, feedstuffs, and construction materials) to pro- 
mote greater efficiency. The situation of the individual consumer 
deteriorated somewhat during the early years of the plan because 
of shortages and supply bottlenecks. In 1984 the growth rates in 
private consumption customary in earlier years resumed. 

During the 1981-85 plan period, East Germany also managed 
to reduce substantially its debt both to the West and to the Soviet 
Union. Lower oil prices were helpful in some respects, and East 
Germany would benefit increasingly as the Comecon price was 
adjusted to the new world prices during the 1986-90 Five-Year Plan 
period. It was true that lower prices also made East Germany's 
re-export of oil products to the West less profitable. In general, 
however, by 1985 East Germany was again considered to be a 
"good debtor," so that the foreign trade balance was a less sensi- 
tive issue, at least for the time being. 

Economic Sectors 

Mining, Energy, and Industry 

Industry is the dominant sector in the East German economy 
and is the principal basis for the relatively high standard of living 
(see table 10, Appendix A). East Germany ranks among the world's 
top industrial nations, and in Comecon it is second in total indus- 
trial output only to the Soviet Union. 

East Germany has an abundance of lignite, of which it is the 
world's largest producer. Reserves of lignite that can be mined with 
up-to-date technology are estimated at 24 billion tons, of which 
92 percent is suitable for open-pit mining. The major portion of 



136 



The Economy 



the workable reserves is located in Cottbus and Dresden districts 
adjoining the Polish frontier. Other important deposits are located 
in the Halle and Leipzig districts. In 1985 production of raw lig- 
nite was 312 million tons, up substantially from 267 million tons 
at the beginning of the five-year plan in 1981. 

Lignite is used primarily as a fuel for thermal-electric power sta- 
tions, for the production of coal gas, and as a raw material for the 
chemical industry. In 1985 approximately 72 percent of domestic 
energy demand was met by this source. It is inferior to hard coal, 
crude oil, and natural gas and is less economical to use than those 
products. Because of lignite's high moisture and low caloric con- 
tent, it is also costly to transport. The bulk of the output is there- 
fore consumed close to the mining centers. A portion of the lignite 
output is converted into briquettes to improve its heating qualities 
and to reduce the cost of transportation. 

Reserves of hard coal have always been relatively insignificant. 
After having declined steadily during the previous 20 years, min- 
ing of East Germany's very small reserves of hard coal had virtu- 
ally ceased by 1978; reserves were becoming depleted, and in 1979 
only 50,000 tons were mined. As a result, East Germany imported 
the bulk of its yearly requirements for hard coal, primarily from 
the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. 

As of 1985, East Germany possessed only one functioning nuclear 
reactor for production of electricity — in Lubmin near Greifswald — 
despite earlier more ambitious plans. Nuclear energy played a rela- 
tively modest role in the country's energy supply situation. In 1985 
only about 10.5 percent of East Germany's electricity needs were 
met by nuclear energy, which represented a decline from 12 per- 
cent in 1980. 

East German iron ore deposits are widely scattered, and the seams 
are expensive to mine because of their relatively low ore content. 
In the 1980s, annual output of iron ore fell far short of the coun- 
try's industrial needs; thus East Germany imported large amounts 
of this material. The country also imported virtually all its require- 
ments for manganese, chrome, and other ferroalloys. Nonferrous 
metals, including copper, lead, zinc, and tin, were mined in small 
quantities. To supplement the limited domestic production, East 
Germany imported substantial quantities of nonferrous metals from 
the Soviet Union. 

Before World War II, the area that later became East Germany 
was not well developed industrially. Because this area lacked raw 
materials, heavy industry was generally located in other parts of 
the German state. Compounding the problems for the newly created 
East German state in 1949 was the massive destruction during 



137 



East Germany: A Country Study 

World War II of the industrial plant that had existed there and 
the subsequent Soviet dismantling and removal of factories and 
equipment that had survived the war. After Soviet demands for 
reparations ended, construction of an industrial base for the country 
began in the early 1950s. However, East Germany's industrial 
"economic miracle" did not begin until after the flood of emigra- 
tion had been halted in 1961. Given a base of 100 in 1980, the 
official index of gross industrial production increased from 10 in 
1950 to 32 in 1960, 58 in 1970, and 122 in 1985. Obviously the 
country's industry had come a long way from its shaky beginning 
four decades earlier. 

According to official sources, as of 1985 chemical products and 
machinery were the most important groups in industrial produc- 
tion in East Germany, providing 19.7 and 18.9 percent of the value 
of total industrial output, respectively. They were followed by the 
agricultural and food-processing industry at 13.5 percent, the energy 
and fuel industry at 12.2 percent, light industry (excluding tex- 
tiles) at 9.5 percent, metallurgy at 9.4 percent, and electrotechni- 
cal and electronic equipment at 8.5 percent. Other significant 
groups were the textile industry (5.8 percent), the construction 
materials industry (2.0 percent), and the water supply/conserva- 
tion industry (0.6 percent). 

As of 1985, about 3.2 million, or 37.9 percent of the approxi- 
mately 8.5 million persons in the labor force, were employed in 
the industrial sector, according to official statistics. Their efforts 
produced 70.3 percent of the country's net product. 

Agriculture 

According to official East German sources, in 1985 agriculture 
and forestry employed 10.8 percent of the labor force, received 7.4 
percent of gross capital investments, and contributed 8.1 percent 
to the country's net product. Agricultural output did not meet 
domestic demand. According to Western sources, in 1983 it satis- 
fied about 90 percent of the country's needs, the shortfall being 
imported. Excellent harvests in 1984 and 1985, however, greatly 
reduced East Germany's dependence on imports. 

The Soviet model, introduced after World War II, was the basis 
for the system of collective and state farms. Collectivization was 
not forced on East German agriculture, which previously had been 
dominated by family farming operations, until the late 1950s. By 
1960, however, about 85 percent of the farmland was either col- 
lectivized or state owned. State farms, on which everyone is an 
employee of the central government, remained much less impor- 
tant in East Germany than in the Soviet Union. Collective farms, 



138 



Mechanized agriculture 
Courtesy Panorama DDR 




that is, agricultural producer cooperatives, constituted the dominant 
form of agricultural organization. In 1984 they occupied about 
85.8 percent of the total agricultural land, while state farms held 
only about 7 percent. Other land in the socialist agricultural sec- 
tor, which made up 95 percent of total land in 1984, was held by 
horticultural cooperatives and various other specialized units. 

Three kinds of collective farms — types I, II, and III — have existed 
since the early days of collectivization. Types I and II are generally 
considered to be transitional to type III, the most advanced form. 
On type I farms, only the plowland must be collectively used. All 
other land and productive resources are left for the members' 
individual use. On type II collective farms, all farmland is coopera- 
tively used except small private plots retained by each member 
family. In addition, members surrender all machinery and equip- 
ment needed for the operation of the collective sector. Type III 
farms are completely collectivized. All productive resources 
(including plowland, forests, meadows, bodies of water, machinery, 
and buildings) except for small private plots and a few head of 
livestock are used collectively. To become a member of a type III 
collective, a farmer must contribute property — buildings, livestock, 
and machinery — of a specified value, which becomes the property 
of the organization. Members whose assets are not adequate to meet 
this requirement may discharge their obligation out of earned 
income over a period of time. Work on the private plots must take 



139 



East Germany: A Country Study 

place during noncommunal work hours. Owners of private plots 
can sell and bequeath them. 

On all collective farms, distribution of the income remaining after 
compulsory contribution to several specialized funds is based on 
the amount of land surrendered by each member and the amount 
of work performed for the collective. The second of these factors 
is more heavily weighted than the first. The retention of landowner- 
ship does have a basis in law; in the past, individual members have 
received compensation for their land when it has been removed 
from the control of the collective for conversion to industrial use. 
Each collective farmer must contribute at least the minimum annual 
amount of work prescribed by the collective assembly (general meet- 
ing of all members). Members who do not perform the specified 
minimum work are penalized by deductions from their incomes. 
In line with SED policy, minimum annual work norms help ensure 
that members devote their energies primarily to the collective sec- 
tor rather than to their own private plots. By 1980 there were only 
about 10,000 farmers operating types I and II collective farms, thus 
bringing the vast majority of collective farmers into the type III 
farm favored by the party. 

During the 1970s and early 1980s, the trend in East German 
agriculture was toward larger units; some crop-producing collec- 
tives and state farms combined to form cooperatives holding 4,000 
to 5,000 hectares. These agribusinesses, known as Cooperative 
Departments of Crop Production (Kooperative Abteilungen der 
Pflanzenproduktion — KAP), which included food-processing estab- 
lishments, became the dominant form of agricultural enterprise in 
crop production. In the early 1980s, specialization also took place 
in livestock production. 

In 1982 the East German government announced a reform pro- 
gram for agriculture. General goals were an improvement in rural 
life and an increase in autonomy for the agricultural producer 
cooperatives. The program called for closer cooperation between 
arable and livestock farming to facilitate planning, especially with 
regard to feedstuffs. It also provided greater incentives for coopera- 
tive farms and modest encouragement of the small private sector. 

During the early 1980s, agricultural performance was lackluster, 
lagging behind industrial growth. However, in 1984 and 1985 
excellent harvests occurred. Although favorable weather played a 
part, both Western and official sources ascribed additional credit 
to the agricultural reforms. 

Transportation and Communications 

The transportation system inherited by East Germany included 



140 



The Economy 




a good railroad network, a satisfactory system of roads, and an 
excellent inland waterway system, all damaged to some extent by 



141 



East Germany: A Country Study 



the war (see fig. 8). During the occupation period, the Soviet Union 
confiscated from the railroads a substantial amount of rolling stock 
and track as reparations. In addition, factories that had produced 
locomotives were dismantled and taken to the Soviet Union as com- 
plete railroad maintenance shops. After reparations payments ended, 
the railroad system was slowly rebuilt, and highways and canals were 
repaired. The political situation in West Berlin and the closing of 
the east-west border imposed restrictions on all forms of inter-German 
transportation. Lack of sufficient investment in the 1960s and 1970s 
hampered maintenance and the acquisition of spare parts for roll- 
ing stock and highway vehicles. In 1985 the system as a whole con- 
sisted of 14,054 kilometers of railroad tracks, 47,214 kilometers of 
roads, and 2,319 kilometers of inland waterways. 

There were 13,777 kilometers of standard- gauge railroad line 
in 1985; 2,523 kilometers were electrified. As of 1984, about 3,830 
kilometers were double tracked. At 13.1 kilometers of track per 
100 square kilometers, the network's density approximately equaled 
that of West Germany. A major goal in railroad improvement dur- 
ing the 1970s and early 1980s was the replacement of steam locomo- 
tives by diesel and electric engines. By 1986 electric engines were 
supplying 38 percent of the locomotive capacity in the country, 
and plans called for an increase to 60 percent by 1990. Additional 
focal points in the 1980s were the introduction of microelectronic 
technology and robots to improve the efficiency of railroad opera- 
tions. In 1985 freight carried by rail amounted to 347.9 million 
tons for a total of 58.7 billion ton-kilometers. Passengers carried 
numbered 623 million, or about 22.5 billion passenger-kilometers. 

The best known roads in both Germanies are the autobahns, 
many of them built during the 1930s and World War II primarily 
for military purposes. These limited-access highways also became 
important for private and commercial users and remained so after 
Germany was partitioned. However, the East German part of the 
system was sometimes underutilized because of its orientation 
toward the country's borders. During the 1960s and 1970s, as the 
economy produced more trucks and buses, the highway system 
increased in importance. New sections of autobahn completed dur- 
ing the 1970s — Dresden-Leipzig, East Berlin-Rostock, and the 
western part of the Berlin Ring — added to the overall importance 
of the highway system and contributed to the growing volume of 
freight carried by road. In 1982 construction of the autobahn con- 
nection on East German territory between Berlin and Hamburg 
was completed. With West German financial assistance, major 
projects were also carried out on the major transit artery from Berlin 
to Helmstedt and additional portions of the Berlin Ring. 



142 



The Economy 



By the late 1970s, however, increasing fuel costs forced authori- 
ties to give more thought to saving gasoline and diesel fuel, and 
the government encouraged diversion of freight from the highways 
to trains and barges. In 1985 freight carried on the highways 
amounted to 555 million tons. This figure, although well over 1.5 
times the amount carried by rail, represented a considerable propor- 
tional decline compared with rates in the 1970s. In 1985 the 15.1 
billion ton-kilometers for motor vehicle freight was only about a 
quarter of the 58.7 billion ton-kilometers posted by rail freight. 

The inland waterway system inherited by East Germany was 
well developed before World War II. In the mid-1980s, it remained 
important to the overall transportation network. The Elbe River, 
navigable from Hamburg through East Germany to Prague, pro- 
vides the north-south axis of the waterway system; and the series 
of canals from the Polish border near Eisenhiittenstadt to the inter- 
German border and beyond provides the east-west axis. Magde- 
burg, where the two axes meet, is a hub of inland waterway traffic. 
In the mid-1980s, other major inland waterway ports included 
Frankfurt am Oder, Dresden, East Berlin, Potsdam, and Halle. 
The 17.7 million tons of cargo carried in 1985 (2.4 billion ton- 
kilometers) was a small amount compared with the amounts car- 
ried by road and rail. Nevertheless, the waterways remained 
important, particularly for bulk cargoes. The approximately 1,170 
river and canal craft plying the waterways in 1985 had a total 
capacity of about 608,800 tons. 

Until the mid-1950s, East Germany had a negligible shipbuild- 
ing capacity, practically no oceangoing vessels, and no seaport 
facilities worthy of the name (the Baltic ports, which had never 
been of major importance, were destroyed in the war). After 1957, 
however, shipbuilding and harbor construction mushroomed as the 
government invested heavily in those industries, in part because 
of large and continuing Soviet purchases of seagoing vessels. Recon- 
struction of the ports of Rostock, Stralsund, and Wismar moved 
forward. By the 1970s, Rostock, which had received the highest 
funding priority, ranked fourth among Baltic ports. Further 
improvements to facilities at Rostock during the 1976-80 Five-Year 
Plan period, completion of the East Berlin-Rostock autobahn, and 
electrification of the Berlin-Rostock railroad line increased Rostock's 
importance to the country's economy. The less important port of 
Wismar specialized in potash and grain; Stralsund specialized in 
lumber and bulk goods. In 1985 flag vessels in the East German 
oceangoing merchant fleet numbered 171, for a total of 1 . 7 mil- 
lion deadweight tons. Freight turnover in the three Baltic ports in 



143 



East Germany: A Country Study 

1985 amounted to about 953,000 tons in Stralsund, 4.5 million 
tons in Wismar, and 19.7 million tons in Rostock. 

The Oder River port of Schwedt is the East German terminus 
of the Friendship pipeline, which carries crude oil from the Soviet 
Union. About 1,301 kilometers of pipeline carry the crude oil from 
Schwedt to Rostock for transshipment and from Schwedt to the 
refinery city of Leuna, located about 25 kilometers west of Leip- 
zig. There are also 500 kilometers of pipeline for refined products 
and 1,500 kilometers for natural gas. 

Beginning in 1980, all domestic air traffic (excluding agricul- 
tural and industrial operations) in East Germany was suspended 
in an effort to economize on fuel; Interflug, the state airline, pro- 
vided only international service on a regular basis. In 1985 the gross 
amount of cargo carried by civil aviation was 29,700 tons, account- 
ing for 71.6 million ton-kilometers. In 1984 Interflug carried more 
than 1.5 million passengers (2.5 billion passenger-kilometers). East 
Berlin-Schonefeld was the country's principal airport; Dresden, 
Erfurt, Heringsdorf, and Leipzig also handled substantial amounts 
of traffic. 

In the mid-1980s, East Germany possessed a comparatively well- 
developed communications system. There were about 3.6 million 
telephones in use, or about 21.8 for every 100 inhabitants, and 
16,476 telex stations. In 1976 East Germany began operating a 
ground radio station at Fiirstenwalde for relaying and receiving 
communications from Soviet satellites as a participant in the 
international telecommunications organization Intersputnik. 

In 1985 there were 6,646,500 licensed radios in the country, or 
39.9 for every 100 persons, and 6,078,500 licensed televisions, or 
36.5 for every 100 persons. The mass media, including newspapers, 
radio, and television, were closely supervised by the state. However, 
East Germans could also receive West German television except 
in the area around Dresden (in 1983 the East German government 
began installing a cable television system for the Dresden area that 
would include West German transmissions, possibly in an effort 
to overcome the reluctance of East Germans to live there). 

Banking, Finance, and Currency 

Investment activity in the East German economy in its broad 
outlines is fundamentally a function of planning on the national 
level. Funding for investment activities may be allocated by direct 
provisions in the national budget, by disbursements made from 
the resources of economic units, or by credits. General investment 
goals for the various sectors of the economy are defined in the five- 
year and one-year plans. 



144 




The East German banking system is highly centralized. The State 
Bank (with regional and industrial branches), which is an organ of 
the Council of Ministers and serves as the bank of issue, is respon- 
sible for overall execution of currency and credit policies. Integrated 
within the centralized system are banks for the various sectors of 
the economy: institutions to handle foreign trade, investment, 
agriculture, and small enterprises. There are also savings banks, 
functioning directly under oversight of the Ministry of Finance. Vari- 
ous economic units and, less frequently, individuals may apply for 
credit, which the banks grant in accordance with guidelines devised 
by the State Bank and the Ministry of Finance and approved by 
the Council of Ministers. Banks play an active role in the planned 
economy of East Germany, exercising supervisory functions, promot- 
ing the goals of the economic plans, and generally helping to shape 
economic behavior in ways considered desirable by the government. 

In East Germany, prices have always been centrally controlled; 
pricing policy is used as a tool to promote economic, political, and 
social objectives. In production, alteration of prices on selected input 
goods has been one method by which central planners encourage 
greater efficiency. Prices for basic consumer goods, by contrast, 
have by and large been held constant, although some increases are 
masked by the introduction of "new" or "improved" products. 

The currency of East Germany is the East German mark, or 
GDR mark, officially a nonconvertible, domestic currency. 



145 



East Germany: A Country Study 

International financial relationships are assessed on the basis of the 
valuta mark (see Glossary), over which the Council of Ministers 
has oversight. In East- West trade, Western currency is used, and 
in Comecon trade the Soviet foreign-exchange ruble is used (see 
Foreign Trade, this ch.). For noncommercial transactions such as 
tourist trade, the State Bank establishes the rates of exchange for 
the GDR mark. 

Beginning in 1973, it became legal for East Germans to possess 
foreign currency. The state tapped this supply of hard currency 
through the establishment of a chain of Intershops, which sold lux- 
ury and Western goods to tourists and to East Germans with hard 
currency; exchanging East German marks privately for hard cur- 
rency remained illegal. In the late 1970s, the government introduced 
regulations that required East Germans to make their Intershop 
purchases in certificates obtained by exchanging their foreign cur- 
rencies at a bank (foreign tourists could still use Western curren- 
cies in the Intershops), making it possible to monitor the circulation 
of foreign currencies more closely. 

In terms of magnitude, East Germany has a currency problem 
unique among the countries of Eastern Europe. Each year the coun- 
try is visited by millions of West German tourists and relatives of 
East German citizens, who bring West German marks, or Deutsche 
marks (also known as D-marks — see Glossary) with them. As a 
result, some portions of the population have access to hard cur- 
rency and the goods it can buy, while others do not. One by-product 
of this state of affairs is a black market in currency, in which one 
D-mark costs four or five GDR marks. This situation causes several 
problems for the regime. First and most obviously, the local cur- 
rency is discredited because its de facto value against any Western 
counterpart is markedly lower than the official exchange rate. 
Second, the fact that hard currencies are unevenly and inequita- 
bly distributed among the people on a random basis threatens to 
create a distinction between "haves" and "have nots." Third, the 
circulation of such monies can introduce uncertainties in economic 
activity that can at least marginally distort the balance intended 
in the plan. 

From the leadership's point of view, the influx of Western cur- 
rency is far from ideal. However, it may be that the advantages 
obtained from the acquisition of hard currencies through the 
Intershops, the general popularity of such stores with the people, 
and their utility in satisfying consumer demand in some degree 
outweigh the disadvantages or problems that accompany the exis- 
tence of a second currency in the economy. 



146 



The Economy 



Foreign Trade 

East Germany has always been fundamentally dependent upon 
foreign trade for its economic well-being, and that dependence has 
increased with the passage of time. Although trade has brought 
the country enormous advantages, it has also introduced uncer- 
tainties into the economy because worldwide conditions have been 
so volatile during the 1970s and early 1980s. 

The East German regime has at least avoided the worst possible 
situation for a centrally planned economy — rapidly changing prices 
(in an adverse direction) for its basic exports and imports — because 
its economy is largely insulated from short-term fluctuations on 
the world market. This insulation results from the fact that two- 
thirds of its trade has been with other communist countries and 
has been conducted on a medium- or long-term, planned basis. 
Over time, however, intra-Comecon trade has also been affected 
by world market conditions. It is also true that East German trade 
with the West has been possible only when the Western partner 
has found it profitable to buy or sell. Thus East German depen- 
dence on foreign suppliers and buyers carries with it many of the 
normal risks as well as advantages of international commerce. 

The foreign trade sector of the economy is particularly difficult 
to analyze and to relate to the other domestic branches. One 
difficulty stems from the fact that East Germany separates its 
external economic activity from its domestic system, placing each 
in a relatively distinct compartment. Producers of goods for export 
operate under the same price and other constraints as those mak- 
ing products for domestic use; their sales to foreign trade organs 
are measured in GDR marks. But when the foreign trade organ 
sells on the international market, the prices it charges are deter- 
mined by market conditions or negotiated agreement, and they need 
not have a relationship to the internal price. In fact, the transac- 
tions are carried out in foreign currencies or value units. This 
process is reversed for imports. Foreign trade organs purchase 
imports with United States dollars, D-marks, or Soviet foreign- 
exchange rubles under conditions imposed by the world market 
and then "resell" them internally to the end users for GDR marks. 

When the East Germans have published statistics on foreign 
trade, they have used valuta marks rather than GDR marks. How 
those reported figures were calculated, however, is not known. The 
value of the valuta mark against the domestic currency is also not 
known. East German economists generally consider the two kinds 
of marks to be of equal value. In the mid-1980s, Western calcula- 
tions suggested that official East German estimates overstated some- 
what the value of the flow of foreign trade. 



147 



East Germany: A Country Study 

The unavailability of important statistics poses another problem 
for the Western analyst attempting to assess East German trade. 
The East German statistical yearbook does not break down trade 
totals into exports and imports but instead shows only the total turn- 
over. As a result, it is not possible to determine whether East Ger- 
many's trade is balanced, either overall or with individual countries. 
Some export and import totals are reported on a country-by-country 
basis, but they are selective rather than exhaustive, and they are 
given in value terms that cannot be aggregated, i.e., in some 
instances by weight or unit and in others by value. Those who would 
examine East German trade performance are therefore forced to 
rely heavily on the data of its partners, a cumbersome and not 
altogether satisfactory process. 

According to East German sources, trade turnover has grown 
impressively. In 1985 it amounted to 180,191.3 million valuta 
marks, about 77 percent of produced national income if the valuta 
mark is assumed to be equal to the GDR mark, or somewhat less 
according to Western calculations. According to official sources, 
as of 1985 the flow pattern of East German trade, in gross terms, 
was about 65 percent with other communist states, 30 percent with 
"capitalist industrial countries," and 5 percent with the develop- 
ing world. During the 1970s, a slight reduction in the trade share 
of the communist countries took place, accompanied by a com- 
pensatory increase in commercial relations with other countries. 
This situation reflected the fact that in the 1970s Western credits 
were made available to and were used by East Germany for the 
purchase of increasing amounts of Western goods; in the early 
1980s, a general leveling off occurred as restrictions on credit tight- 
ened. East Germany has also actively sought to build ties with the 
developing world. In general, the extent of fluctuations has been 
modest, and the orientation of East German trade has been clear. 

According to official statistics, of total East German exports in 
1985, 46.6 percent consisted of machinery, equipment, and trans- 
port products. This group of products had declined in importance 
since the early 1970s (down from 51.7 percent in 1970). By con- 
trast, in 1985 exports of fuels, minerals, and metals had tended 
to increase, from 10.1 percent in 1970 to 20 percent in 1985. Other 
major groups were industrial consumer goods, at 14.1 percent 
(down from 20.2 percent in 1970); chemicals, fertilizers, building 
materials, and other goods at 11.6 percent (10.6 percent in 1970); 
and various raw materials, unfinished goods for industrial use, and 
food products, at 7.7 percent (up from 7.4 percent in 1970). On 
the import side, in 1985 by far the largest group was fuels and other 
raw materials, at 42.5 percent (up from 27.6 percent in 1970). Next 



148 




in importance were machinery and transport equipment at 
26.8 percent (down from 34.2 percent). Various other raw materials 
and unfinished goods for industrial use, as well as various food 
products, followed, at 16.1 percent (down from 28.1 percent in 
1970). In 1985 chemical products and industrial consumer goods 
were also important, standing at 8.4 and 6.2 percent, respectively 
(both of these had increased in significance since 1970, from 5.6 and 
4.5 percent, respectively). 

In 1985 about 65 percent of East Germany's total trade turnover 
was with five countries (see table 1 1 , Appendix A). The dominant 
partner was the Soviet Union, having a trade share of almost 
39 percent of total East German trade. Next in importance was 
West Germany, including West Berlin (8.3 percent). Three fel- 
low Comecon members followed: Czechoslovakia (7.2 percent), 
Poland (5.4 percent), and Hungary (4.9 percent). 

In trade with the Soviet Union, major items on the East Ger- 
man export side in 1985 were machinery and transport equipment 
(by some counts, as much as 80 percent). Chemicals, textiles and 
clothing, and domestic appliances also played a minor role. Major 
groups of imports from the Soviet Union included petroleum and 
petroleum products (about 42 percent), machinery and transport 
equipment (about 1 1 percent), and ferrous products (10.5 percent). 
There were also significant imports of wood and paper products 
(4 percent) and coal and coke (about 3 percent). 



149 



East Germany: A Country Study 

An important factor in East German-Soviet trade was the long- 
term dependence of East Germany, along with other Comecon 
countries, on the Soviet Union for imports of fuel, primarily oil 
but also natural gas and coal. Prior to the oil price explosion of 
1973 and for some time after, Comecon prices were fairly stable. 
The subsequent drastic changes in oil prices had an inevitable, 
though somewhat delayed, impact on East Germany. In 1975 at 
Soviet insistence, a new pricing system was implemented for Come- 
con trade, which called for new calculations every year based on 
average world market prices for the previous five years. As a result, 
for a number of years prices increased considerably, but in predict- 
able steps (thus making planning possible) and at a relatively favor- 
able pace. According to Honecker, the 1980 prices paid for Soviet 
oil were only 50 percent of the world market level. Even that price 
was a burden the East German economy could not easily bear. 

In 1982 the Soviet Union reduced oil deliveries to East Germany 
by 10 percent from planned levels; the new reduced level remained 
in effect until 1985. An additional problem was the Comecon oil 
pricing system, which had benefited East Germany during the early 
1980s. By 1983 and 1984, world market prices for oil were falling. 
But Soviet (intra-Comecon) prices continued to rise because of the 
five-year formula. After 1984 the East German leadership also faced 
the termination of a 1966 agreement with the Soviet Union on deliv- 
ery of supplementary crude oil at particularly favorable prices. 
Declining oil prices did make East Germany's purchases of oil on 
the open market less expensive. However, Soviet oil amounted to 
17 million tons of the 23 to 24 million tons of total imported oil. 
Because the Soviet, or Comecon, oil price was tied only retroactively 
to the world price, East Germany actually began paying prices 
higher than world market levels. Furthermore, East Germany's 
re-exports of oil products (13 million tons in 1984), mainly in the 
form of diesel fuel, from which the country derived a sizable por- 
tion of its hard currency, were affected immediately by the lower 
prices. Only in subsequent years would East Germany benefit sub- 
stantially from the price drop. 

In late 1985, East Germany and the Soviet Union signed an 
agreement on trade plans for the 1986-90 five-year period. Trade 
turnover was to increase by 28 percent over the previous five-year 
period, and the East Germans were to export machinery for open- 
cut mining, ore mills, and chemical works, as well as expertise and 
plant for Soviet consumer goods and food industries; consumer 
goods were also to increase by 40 percent. The Soviet Union agreed 
to supply quantities of crude oil, natural gas, hard coal, iron ore, 
rolled steel, timber, and cotton. At a Comecon meeting in late 1986, 



150 



The Economy 



the Soviet Union announced that it would once again increase its 
export of oil to East Germany and the other Comecon states. 
Admittedly, the increase in supplies was only sufficient to match 
what these countries had been receiving in the late 1970s. It was 
clear in any case that the Soviet Union would retain its position 
as East Germany's primary trade partner. By the mid-1980s, a 
broad pattern of economic cooperation had emerged that involved 
coordination of economic plans, research projects, and joint invest- 
ment projects. 

With regard to East Germany's major Comecon partners, offi- 
cial statistics list the major exports as tractors and agricultural 
machinery; transportation equipment, including rolling stock (to 
Czechoslovakia) and highway vehicles (to Hungary and Bulgaria); 
electronic equipment; data-processing equipment; and machine 
tools. In turn, East Germany also imported various kinds of 
machinery, including agricultural machinery from Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary and equipment for the food and construction indus- 
tries from Poland. Other significant imported items were electronic 
equipment from Poland and electronic and pharmaceutical products 
from Hungary. Since the late 1970s, the role of East Germany's 
major non-Soviet Comecon trade partners — Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania — had declined some- 
what, from 29.8 percent of total East German trade turnover to 
23.2 percent in 1985. 

West Germany plays a relatively dominant role in East German 
trade, a fact that can be explained in part by West Germany's 
geographic proximity and traditional intra-German ties. Further- 
more, West Germany's advanced industrial level and product qual- 
ity plus its aggressive foreign trade-oriented business community 
also help to explain the country's prominent position as a trading 
partner. 

There is another reason, however, which is as complex as it is 
important. Since World War II, West German leaders have con- 
sistently treated trade with the Soviet Zone of Occupation, and later 
East Germany, as a special case — as domestic (intra-German) com- 
merce, but with a difference. The grounds for this special treat- 
ment have been political; since the late 1940s, Bonn governments 
have sought to keep alive the idea of German reunification, to 
increase the contacts between Germans on both sides of the border, 
and to maintain the stability and well-being of West Berlin. One 
of the important means of achieving these ends has been the pro- 
vision of an attractive economic package to the East Germans. For 
its part, the East German government has been willing to accept 
the advantages offered by West Germany, but not to the point of 



151 



East Germany: A Country Study 



acknowledging the linkages Bonn asserts. The European Economic 
Community (ECC), of which West Germany is a member, has also 
sanctioned the special relationship and excluded East Germany from 
ECC competence. This means that ECC quotas and tariffs, as well 
as its other regulations, do not apply to "intra-German" trade (on 
the West German principle that East Germany is not a foreign coun- 
try). Furthermore, because trade between East Germany and West 
Germany is conducted in a clearing unit of account, East Germany 
can import some Western products by way of West Germany 
without spending hard currency. 

Among the special economic advantages East Germany obtains 
from West Germany are permanent, interest-free credit, referred 
to as "the swing," which in 1985 was set at 850 million D-marks; 
free entry of East German agricultural products into the West Ger- 
man market, where prices are maintained (under ECC agreement) 
at above world market levels; free entry (no tariffs) for East Ger- 
man nonagricultural finished products that are sold to West Ger- 
man buyers; substantial cash payments in hard currency for such 
things as construction and improvement of railroad lines and high- 
ways to and from West Berlin and transit visas for those West Ger- 
mans using them; and exemption of goods sold to East German 
buyers from normal regulations concerning the value-added tax. 

The East German capacity to export industrial goods, so 
important in its Comecon trade, has played a much reduced role 
in its trade with West Germany, accounting for only about 10 per- 
cent of East German exports in the mid-1980s. Instead, raw materi- 
als and producer goods such as chemicals have been dominant, 
accounting for approximately 50 percent of total value. Other 
important East German deliveries were consumer goods (textiles 
and clothing, at 25 percent, being particularly important) and 
agricultural products (about 6 percent). On the East German import 
side, about 18 percent of the total consisted of investment goods 
and equipment, about 45 percent consisted of raw materials and 
producer goods, and an additional 25 percent was evenly divided 
between consumer goods and agricultural products. 

According to official sources, in 1985 East German exports to 
other market economies, most notably Austria, Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein, Britain, and France, included chemical products, 
machinery and machine tools, and products of ferrous metallurgy. 
In turn, East Germany imported products of ferrous metallurgy, 
textiles and clothing, chemical products, and machinery for chemical 
engineering, among other items. 

Historically, the United States had demonstrated minimal interest 
in developing a trade relationship with East Germany. By 1985 



152 



The Economy 



the United States, which in 1980 was East Germany's twelfth larg- 
est trade partner, had dropped to twenty-eighth place. As of 1985, 
principal East German exports to the United States included iron 
and steel (26.6 percent), machinery (20.3 percent), and rubber 
manufactures (15.4 percent). In turn, East Germany imported 
primarily foodstuffs (grain and soybeans); such goods comprised 
76.4 percent of all imports from the United States. Generally, in 
the mid-1980s East Germany was particularly eager to trade with 
countries that could offer high technology (especially robots and 
electronics) and equipment for improving East Germany's energy 
and fodder supply situation. For this reason, East Germany's trade 
with Western countries had considerable importance for the econ- 
omy, although its quantity was relatively modest by comparison 
with trade conducted with Comecon countries. 

In the mid-1980s, there were signs that East Germany hoped 
to foster its trade relations with countries in Southeast Asia and 
East Asia, particularly with China. In July 1985, following mutual 
visits of delegations, East German and Chinese representatives 
signed a long-term agreement that called for a substantial increase 
in trade from 1986 to 1990. Primary East German exports to China 
in the mid-1980s were agricultural products, textiles, and mineral 
and chemical raw materials. Two agreements reached during 1986 
called for deliveries of railroad refrigerator cars and passenger 
coaches to China. 

East German trade with the developing world has not been sig- 
nificant in percentage terms, although its relative importance has 
increased slightly since the late 1970s. In specific cases, however, 
East Germany has placed some emphasis on trade with the coun- 
tries in the Third World. Sometimes a political consideration has 
been dominant. East Germany has provided considerable support 
for national liberation movements and various governments in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America (see The National People's Army 
and the Third World, ch. 5). The East Germans have supplied 
to governments such as those of Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia 
machinery and equipment on favorable credit terms. In other cases, 
economic factors have been dominant, as when East Germany 
evinced interest in oil imports from countries such as Mexico, Iran, 
and Iraq beginning in the late 1970s. During the previous Five- 
Year Plan (1981-85), East Germany chalked up large trade 
surpluses with developing countries. These surpluses were particu- 
larly helpful because some of the trade took place in freely con- 
vertible currencies. 

As a whole, at the end of the 1981-85 period the status of East 
German foreign trade was relatively favorable, particularly when 



153 



East Germany: A Country Study 

viewed against the background of the seemingly intractable 
problems of the previous decade. As noted previously, during the 
late 1970s and into the early 1980s, East Germany had run dan- 
gerously high trade deficits. In 1980 East German indebtedness 
to the West amounted to approximately US$9 to US$10 billion, 
or more than the value of all the goods it sold on Western markets 
that year. In the late 1970s, the country was also running substan- 
tial deficits in its trade with the Soviet Union. Western banks, cit- 
ing the growing East German international debt, began to restrict 
the availability of loans. In early 1982, the East Germans responded 
by cutting imports drastically and by expanding exports as much 
as possible. During the 1981-85 period, East Germany's exports 
rose by 64 percent while imports rose by only 37 percent. In early 
1987, East Germany was again considered a prime customer for 
credit; as a result of their strategy, East German economic plan- 
ners were well positioned to draw on Western credit if they chose 
to do so. 

The Consumer in the East German Economy 

The East German standard of living has improved greatly since 
1949. Most observers, in both East and West, agree that in the 
1980s East Germans enjoyed the highest standard of living in 
Eastern Europe. Major improvements occurred, especially after 
1971, when the Honecker regime announced its commitment to 
fulfilling the "principal task" of the economy, which was defined 
as the enhancement of the material and cultural well-being of all 
citizens. Problems remained, however. In the mid-1980s, light 
industry and consumer goods industries were not performing as 
well as the economy as a whole, although according to official statis- 
tics the net monetary income of the population and retail trade turn- 
over were growing at around 4 percent. 

Since the inception of the regime, the monthly earned income 
of the average East German has increased steadily in terms of 
effective purchasing power. According to the 1986 East German 
statistical yearbook, the average monthly income for workers in 
the socialized sector of the economy increased from 311 GDR marks 
in 1950 to 555 GDR marks a decade later, 755 GDR marks in 
1970, and 1,130 GDR marks in 1985. Because most consumer 
prices had been stable during this time, the 1985 figure represented 
a better than threefold increase over the past thirty-five years. 

These figures do not mean very much by themselves, but they 
demonstrate that the upward trend has been consistent and posi- 
tive. In 1986 at official exchange rates, 1 ,000 GDR marks amounted 
to just over US$500, only enough for a very modest subsistence 



154 



The Economy 



in the United States. But in East Germany, the GDR mark can 
purchase a great number of basic necessities because the state sub- 
sidizes their production and distribution to the people. Thus hous- 
ing, which consumes a considerable portion of the earnings of an 
average family in the West, constituted less than 3 percent of the 
expenditures of a typical worker family in 1984. Milk, potatoes, 
bread, and public transportation were also relatively cheap. Many 
services, such as medical care and education, continued to be avail- 
able without cost to all but a very few. Even restaurant meals, con- 
certs, and postage stamps were inexpensive by Western standards. 
In the early and mid-1980s, however, the government began to 
signal an intention to reduce somewhat the number of items sub- 
sidized by the state, which suggested that some price increases were 
in store for East German consumers. 

If one sought "luxury" items, such as stereos, automobiles, color 
televisions, and freezers, or even coffee and brandy, 1,000 GDR 
marks would not go very far, however. In the mid-1980s, prices 
for clothing (except for the most basic) and linens were relatively 
high. Products with a special claim to quality or stylishness, sold 
primarily in so-called Exquisit or Delikat shops, were also very 
expensive. 

In the mid-1980s, East Germans had no difficulty obtaining meat, 
butter, potatoes, bread, clothing, and most other essentials. Con- 
sumers, admittedly, did have to spend considerable time shopping 
for these items. Fruits and vegetables were more difficult to obtain 
than basic foodstuffs, particularly in the off-season, and their quality 
was often inferior to accepted standards in the West. 

With regard to housing, another necessity of life, the East Ger- 
man government did not take serious action to provide modern 
facilities until the late- 1960s. The devastation of World War II had 
created tremendous housing problems in the Soviet occupation 
zone, particularly in the cities. Beginning in the late 1960s, the 
government initiated a major campaign to provide modern hous- 
ing facilities; it sought to eliminate the longstanding housing short- 
age and modernize fully the existing stock by 1990. By the early 
1980s, the program had provided nearly 2 million new or reno- 
vated units, and 2 million more were to be added by 1990. As of 
1985, progress in this area appeared to be satisfactory, and plan 
targets were being met or exceeded. Most government-built hous- 
ing consists of high-rise apartments, often neither spacious, diverse, 
nor pleasing to the eye. Nevertheless, such apartments are func- 
tional, and they usually provide easy access to schools, transpor- 
tation, restaurants, playgrounds, post offices, and supermarkets. 
In addition to this kind of housing, individuals can build their own 



155 



East Germany: A Country Study 

homes (outside of East Berlin). About 15 percent of the units con- 
structed up to 1981 were privately built and owned. 

In the mid-1980s, the availability of durable consumer goods and 
luxuries remained less satisfactory, though it was improving. 
Demand for automobiles as well as for such items as washing 
machines and refrigerators was greater than the supply available; 
however, improvement over the years had been steady. In 1985 
about 99 percent of the households owned refrigerators, compared 
with only about 26 percent in 1965. For washing machines, the 
numbers for the same years had increased from 28 percent to 
92 percent; for television sets the numbers had increased from 
49 percent to 93 percent. Automobiles were more difficult to obtain, 
and delivery could come after as many as ten years of waiting. In 
1985 about 46 percent of the households owned an automobile, 
and demand had not been satisfied. The quality of the most com- 
mon automobile, the domestically produced Trabant, was not up 
to world market standards. 

Services are another important area of consumer welfare in any 
industrialized society. The term is used here in a broad sense to 
include retail trade, public transportation, and communications, 
as well as barbers, plumbers, and automobile service stations. In 
the mid-1980s, East German consumers continued to complain of 
both a shortage of workers in the service sector and deficient qual- 
ity. Automobile repair facilities were inadequate, for example, as 
were supplies of spare parts. Although again improvements had 
been made — the number of supermarkets and other stores, restau- 
rants, and service centers had risen significantly by the mid- 
1980s — it seemed clear that meeting the needs of an increasingly 
prosperous society would remain a problem in East Germany for 
the foreseeable future. In the 1980s, the government acknowledged 
the existence of the problem and encouraged specialized private 
craftsmen and traders to help fill the void. 

East Germans compare their own overall situation as consumers 
with that of other East Europeans and are aware of their favored 
economic position in the Soviet bloc. However, they also compare 
themselves with the West Germans. A comparison between an East 
German and West German household's normal purchasing capacity 
has limited value, unfortunately, because the selection of goods 
available is vastly greater in West Germany and the material inputs 
and technical characteristics of West German products are usually 
of higher quality. In 1983, however, the Institute for Economic 
Research in West Berlin undertook one of its periodic studies in 
which the purchasing power of the GDR mark was measured 
against that of the West German D-mark (officially they are 



156 



The Economy 



exchanged at 1 GDR mark per 1 D-mark). Typical "market 
baskets" of goods purchased in the two countries were the basis 
of comparison. When the consumption patterns of the East Ger- 
mans served as the basis for deciding what should go into the mar- 
ket basket, the GDR mark purchased more than the D-mark. That 
is, were West Germans to purchase exactly the same things in the 
same proportions as their East German counterparts, the West Ger- 
mans would have to pay more (24 percent more for an average 
worker's household with four members). If, however, West Ger- 
man consumption patterns were used as the basis for the compari- 
son, the results would be reversed (the GDR mark then would 
purchase only 87 percent as much). The institute concluded that 
as a whole, the GDR mark could be considered to have 106 per- 
cent the value of the D-mark in purchasing power, an impressive 
gain over the 76 percent estimated for 1960, 86 percent for 1969, 
and 100 percent for 1977. Although in many ways the West Ger- 
man consumer had a more favorable position, with regard to both 
consumer options and income, the analysis clearly invalidated the 
view commonly held in the West that the GDR mark had very lit- 
tle purchasing power. 

The East German leadership acknowledged, as of 1985, that the 
quantity, range, and quality of many goods and services offered 
to the East German consumer needed improvement and that the 
public's desires needed to receive more attention. It should also 
be noted, however, that East German press, television, and radio 
reports frequently stressed the insecurity of life in the consumer 
society of West Germany. West German television broadcasts them- 
selves did not convey an idyllic picture of consumer well-being, 
containing as they did substantial amounts of self-criticism and dis- 
cussions of West German weaknesses. 

The Five-Year Plan, 1986-90 

The East German economic leadership published its directive 
on the 1986-90 Five-Year Plan during the Eleventh Party Con- 
gress of the SED in April 1986. The basic components of the 
"economic strategy for the 1980s," with the general goal of "inten- 
sification," remained in effect. 

Specific targets for the plan were relatively modest. National 
income was to grow at 4.4 to 4.7 percent annually (the average 
rate for 1981-85 was 4.4). Industrial goods production was to 
increase by 3.7 to 4.1 percent annually; the fastest growth was 
planned for the electrical engineering and electronics sectors. In 
general, the process of concentration in industry was to continue, 
with additional production stages integrated into the Kombinate. With 



157 



East Germany: A Country Study 

regard to energy, the increasing use of domestic lignite was to con- 
tinue. By 1990 lignite was to meet about 78 to 80 percent of primary 
energy needs. Nuclear energy would provide 15 percent of elec- 
tric power by 1990. Apparently the 1986 nuclear reactor accident 
at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union and the worldwide decline in 
oil prices had not brought about a change in East Germany's energy 
policies, although public statements by East German leaders sug- 
gested that some reappraisal was occurring. Primary energy con- 
sumption as a whole was to grow by only 1 percent per year. In 
agriculture, crop and livestock production was to be stabilized at 
the 1985 level — actually an ambitious target since 1985 was a record 
year. 

The 1986-90 plan called for special efforts in what was called 
"key technology," which included microelectronics, modern com- 
puter and automation technology, industrial robots, and biotech- 
nology. Inputs from these areas were expected to boost productivity 
in numerous ways. The plan expected the major impetus for eco- 
nomic growth to come from research and development, which was 
expected to improve production efficiency, increase the quality of 
existing production, and introduce new high-quality products. The 
government hoped in particular that in the coming five years the 
Kombinate would be able to generate from their own resources both 
a larger proportion of the investment funds they needed and new 
efficiency measures, technologies, and products. This objective 
entailed a modest degree of controlled decentralization, compara- 
ble in some respects with reforms that were being proposed in the 
Soviet Union. Western observers anticipated no radical procedural 
changes, however, given the caution customarily displayed by the 
East German leaders and their public praise for "tried-and-tested 
policy" and "the proven course." 

The 1986-90 plan targets suggested that after the strenuous efforts 
made in the early 1980s to increase exports — and the domestic bot- 
tlenecks these efforts produced, especially for consumers — there 
would be some effort to promote both investment and private con- 
sumption, although exports were still to have a high priority. 
Investment efforts would continue to focus on modernization and 
improved utilization of existing resources, but the government had 
relaxed somewhat the restrictive investment policies of the previ- 
ous plan period. For consumers, the projected growth of retail trade 
turnover in manufactured goods (a measure of consumption) was 
5.3 percent, compared with 4.2 percent during the previous period. 
Prices for basic consumer goods were to remain constant until 1990. 
The plan called for an increase in the supply of consumer electronics, 
technical goods, sports and leisure goods, furniture, building 



158 



The Economy 



materials, and quality clothing in particular. Finally, the housing 
program, long a high priority, would continue and would be vir- 
tually completed by 1990. 

Some Western observers suggested that, with regard to ineffi- 
ciencies within the East German economic system, many of the 
most obvious and least disruptive measures to improve produc- 
tivity had already been taken. In the mid-1980s, commitment to 
central planning remained strong and continued to limit the reform 
options available to the planners. Consequently, it was possible 
that the East German leadership would seek to expand the coun- 
try's productive capacity through extensive and potentially expen- 
sive investment and technological upgrading. East Germany's 
improved credit status in the mid-1980s made this approach a via- 
ble option. 

* * * 

Current English-language sources of information on the East Ger- 
man economy are few in number. The East German government's 
Central Statistical Office publishes reports concerning fulfillment 
of annual and five-year plans in the English-language series enti- 
tled "Documents on the Policy of the German Democratic Repub- 
lic." For a retrospective view of aspects of the economy's 
development, Economic Reform in East German Industry (translated 
from the German) by Gert Leptin and Manfred Melzer is helpful. 
An interesting study of consumer conditions in East Germany is 
The Consumer under Socialist Planning: The East German Case by Phillip 
J. Bryson. 

In German, two major sources of information are the East Ger- 
man Handbuch Deutsche Demokratische Republik (1984) and the two- 
volume West German DDR Handbuch (third edition, 1985), edited 
by Hartmut Zimmermann et al. The ongoing publications of the 
Institute for Economic Research in West Berlin, particularly its 
DIW Wochenbericht, are excellent sources of information. The East 
German Statistisches Jahrbuch, with its yearly report of official statis- 
tics, is indispensable. The party newspaper Neues Deutschland and 
the monthly journal Wirtschaftswissenschaft provide ongoing accounts 
of economic developments. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



159 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




State emblem 



THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (East Germany) 
is organized along the lines of the other East European communist 
systems that were created at the end of World War II in imitation 
of the Soviet model. The East German "socialist state" therefore 
embodies the principles of Marxism-Leninism as applied to specific 
national conditions. In theory, the principle of democratic cen- 
tralism serves as the basis for "the realization of the sovereignty 
of the working people" and as the guiding principle for the 
construction of the socialist state. As in other Marxist-Leninist 
systems, the ruling communist party, in this case the Socialist Unity 
Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands — 
SED), determines the goals, policies, and actions of the govern- 
ment. 

The formal structure of government, as established by the 
Constitution of 1968 and the amendments of 1974, remained 
essentially unchanged in 1987. Constitutionally, the highest organ 
of state power is the People's Chamber, a unicameral legislature 
that theoretically controls the executive organs of government. In 
practice, however, political power is monopolized by the SED. 
Within the party, power is concentrated in the hands of the 
Politburo and the Secretariat, the party's two highest organs. As 
in the Soviet system, the general secretary is first among equals 
in these two bodies. Erich Honecker has held the top party post 
since 1971 (replacing Walter Ulbricht as first secretary; the title 
changed in 1976 to general secretary) and in 1976 also assumed 
the top state post, chairman of the Council of State, which he 
continued to hold in 1987. Having received a strong political 
endorsement from Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Honecker 
was re-elected head of the SED at its Eleventh Party Congress in 
April 1986. 

In the view of the party leadership, the government exists as the 
instrument through which the party administers the country and 
implements communist policies and programs. Although four other 
political parties have been allowed to exist under the "Alliance 
Policy" (Biindnispolitik), they have been tightly controlled by and 
subservient to the ruling communists. The existence of other par- 
ties and mass organizations has given the appearance of a pluralist 
system, but as of mid- 1987 there had been no institutionalized 
political opposition. 



163 



East Germany: A Country Study 
Constitutional Framework 

The constitution of 1949, promulgated on October 7 of that year 
to coincide with the founding of the republic, was based on a 
parliamentary-democratic model. In fact, however, the various 
parliamentary-democratic provisions of the 1949 constitution did 
not hinder the emergence of a centralized and authoritarian politi- 
cal order under the hegemony of the SED. The original intentions 
of the constitution, framed under the specific historical conditions 
of the "antifascist democratic order" of 1945-49 (as SED histori- 
ans refer to it), were simply altered over the years to incorporate 
changing realities. Thus, while many of the rights and guarantees 
of the original document were retained, a number of subsequent 
legal additions were made at the initiative of the SED with the con- 
currence of the People's Chamber. 

Constitution of 1949 

East Germany's present Constitution is very different from the 
one adopted in October 1949 when the state was founded. The first 
constitution, based largely on an SED draft of September 1946 and 
intended for a united Germany, originated before the Soviet Union 
had decided to establish a socialist republic in its zone of occupa- 
tion. The constitution both resembled and differed from Western 
parliamentary-democratic systems in various respects. With regard 
to state organization, the 1949 constitution resembled, at least 
superficially, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic 
of Germany (West Germany). As in other parliamentary- 
democratic systems, provision was also made for two legislative 
assemblies, the States Chamber (Landerkammer) and the People's 
Chamber (Volkskammer), and the election of a president (Minister- 
president) by the party with the largest mandate in the People's 
Chamber. The president of East Germany, like the president of 
West Germany, had a very limited vote and was removable by a 
joint two-thirds majority vote in both houses. Lawmaking was 
essentially the job of the People's Chamber rather than the States 
Chamber, but the latter could propose draft laws to the former. 
The legislative process also exhibited important differences from 
the West German model; the East German States Chamber, for 
example, which represented the interests of the individual states, 
occupied a much weaker position than its West German counter- 
part. Article 51 stated that the members of the People's Chamber 
were to be elected in universal, equal, and secret elections based 
on the relative majority principle. Another important difference 
concerned the role of political parties in the government. According 



164 



Government and Politics 



to Article 92, parties with at least 40 seats in the People's Cham- 
ber, which then had a total of 400 members, had the right to 
representation in the government. This policy was consistent with 
the SED's Marxist Alliance Policy, which stipulated that in order 
to achieve its aims, the party of the working class must initially 
work with and through other parties. It also ensured that if the 
SED were ever demoted to a minority position, its continued influ- 
ence in the government would be safeguarded by the provision that 
any parliamentary party that commanded at least 10 percent of 
the total number of votes had a guaranteed share in the govern- 
ment. A set of basic human rights, including the right to strike 
(Article 14) and to emigrate (Article 10) retained features of a liberal 
Rechtstaat and formally guaranteed that sovereignty would remain 
vested in the people. 

The 1949 constitution was a compromise; it could have served 
either as a basis for building socialism or as the basis for a democratic 
all-German republic. Critics have pointed out that the absence of 
a genuinely independent constitutional judiciary rendered the docu- 
ment virtually meaningless, however. And, in fact, as time pro- 
gressed, the authorities ignored most of its formal provisions and 
permitted the emergence of a centralized political order under the 
control of the SED. 

Several important amendments were made at the initiative of 
the SED in the eighteen years in which the constitution was in force. 
An amendment of August 1950 eliminated state parliaments and 
called for the election of parliamentary deputies through the crea- 
tion of a joint platform and lists organized by the National Front, 
the umbrella organization of all political parties and mass organi- 
zations. A 1952 decision replaced the five states [Lander) with fifteen 
administrative districts (Bezirke) that were tied more directly to the 
central government. (The United States, Britain, and France do 
not recognize East Berlin as an administrative district.) This step 
created the necessary legal precedent for eliminating the States 
Chamber, which eventually was dissolved by a constitutional 
amendment in December 1985. A series of amendments known 
as the Law Toward the Completion of the Constitution were passed 
by the People's Chamber in March 1954, when the country was 
formally granted sovereignty by the Soviet Union. These amend- 
ments delineated the features of the country's new sovereignty and 
a formal military structure, which prepared the ground for the 
obligatory military service clause of 1955. And finally, upon the 
death of Wilhelm Pieck, a constitutional amendment of 1960 
replaced the office of president with the Council of State, whose 
chairman became Ulbricht, first secretary of the SED. 



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East Germany: A Country Study 

Constitution of 1968 

At the Seventh Party Congress of the SED in April 1967, Ulbricht 
called for a new constitution and declared that the existing consti- 
tution no longer accorded "with the relations of socialist society 
and the present level of historical development." A new constitu- 
tion was needed to conform with the Marxist-Leninist belief in the 
progression of history and the role of the working class led by the 
SED. The new constitution was also to reflect the role of the state 
as the party's main instrument in achieving the goal of a socialist 
and eventually communist society. A commission in the People's 
Chamber was tasked in December 1967 to draft a new constitu- 
tion. Two months later, the commission produced a document, 
which, after "public debate," was submitted to a plebiscite on 
April 6, 1968. Approved by a 94.5 percent margin, the new Con- 
stitution went into effect three days later. The new Constitution 
integrated all the constitutional changes that had taken place since 
1949 into a new "socialist" framework, but it reduced certain rights 
provided in the earlier version. The new document unequivocally 
declared that "the leadership of the state is to be exercised through 
the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party," the SED. The 
1949 constitution had declared Germany to be a "democratic repub- 
lic," whereas the new one described East Germany as a "socialist 
state of the German nation." Under the old constitution, power 
was derived from "the people," while Article 2 of the new Consti- 
tution stated that power emanated from the "working people," 
who were implementing socialism under the leadership of the 
Marxist-Leninist party. 

Significant changes introduced into the 1968 document included 
Article 6, which committed the state to adhere to the "principles 
of socialist internationalism" and to devote special attention to its 
"fraternal ties" with the Soviet Union; Article 9, which based the 
national economy on the "socialist ownership of the means of 
production"; Article 20, which under pressure from the churches 
granted freedom of conscience and belief; Article 21 , which main- 
tained that the "basic rights" of citizenship were inseparably linked 
with "corresponding obligations"; and Article 47, which declared 
that the principle of "democratic centralism" is the authoritative 
maxim for the construction of the socialist state. 

Amendments of 1974 

In September 1974, Honecker declared in a statement to the Peo- 
ple's Chamber that "it has become necessary to amend the present 
constitution." Several important amendments that were passed on 



166 



Government and Politics 



that day represented a fundamental revision of the 1968 Constitu- 
tion. The 1974 amendments did not change the basic socialist order 
but encompassed important developments that had occurred after 
Honecker had replaced Ulbricht as first secretary of the SED in 
May 1971. First, the 1974 amendments eliminated all references 
to the German nation to reflect the Honecker regime's new policy 
of demarcation (Abgrenzung — see Glossary), which in 1972 replaced 
the policy of rapprochement (Annaherung) and emphasized the ideo- 
logical differences between the two Germanies. Instead of describing 
East Germany as a socialist state of the German nation, Article 1 
was rewritten to proclaim that East Germany is a "socialist state 
of workers and peasants" and to abrogate the earlier commitment 
to the reunification of the two German states on the basis of 
democracy and socialism. 

The amendments also strengthened East Germany's ties to the 
Soviet Union. References to the German nation were eliminated 
from the Constitution, and Article 6, Section 2 proclaimed that 
the country is "forever and irrevocably connected to the Socialist 
Soviet Republic." The 1968 version had emphasized only com- 
prehensive cooperation and friendship with the other socialist states. 
Articles 76 through 80 also significantly increased the role of the 
Council of Ministers (Ministerrat) and its chairman relative to that 
of the Council of State (Staatsrat). Honecker further put his stamp 
on the 1974 amendments by incorporating in Article 2 a goal first 
announced at the Eighth Party Congress in 1971 : raising the stan- 
dard of living, in material and cultural terms, was identified as 
the primary goal of the "advanced socialist society." 

The State Apparatus 

Honecker has defined the socialist state as the chief instrument 
for executing the public policy of the "toiling masses under the 
leadership of the working class." At the Tenth Party Congress in 
1981, Honecker declared the "all-around strengthening of the 
socialist state an important task of the 1980s." An editorial in a 
subsequent issue of Neues Deutschland reiterated that the "all-around 
strengthening of the socialist state is and remains for our party a 
basic issue of the revolution. . . . Without a strong and well- 
functioning socialist state there can be no socialist achievements 
for the people." 

Although it is not the main center of political power, the state 
has an important political function insofar as it serves as the chief 
instrument through which the party seeks to implement its pro- 
grams and achieve special social, economic, and political goals. Such 
a cooperative effort requires a well-elaborated system of coordination 



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East Germany: A Country Study 

between the two entities. The party determines the boundaries 
within which the state is required to act. The need to coordinate 
the activities and functions of the party and state apparatuses has 
resulted in a significant degree of overlap in the policy area as well 
as in the personnel of both organizations (see table 12, Appendix A). 
Both apparatuses are responsible for a variety of similar activities; 
however, while the party is responsible for setting up the general 
guidelines and ideological content of specific policies and programs, 
the state is given the legal authority to execute them and to moni- 
tor their implementation on all levels of the hierarchy. 

The division of authority between party and state often results 
in conflict. Such conflict is based less on differences in ideology 
between members of the two apparatuses than on the issue of con- 
trol and the most effective way of achieving the goals toward which 
the party's programs and policies are directed. However, the over- 
lapping of membership between the party and state apparatuses — 
especially between their respective executive organs such as the SED 
Central Committee and the Council of Ministers — makes such a 
conflict manageable. Moreover, conflict between the two organi- 
zations is often the consequence of disagreement within the vari- 
ous branches of the party and state. 

Council of Ministers 

The Council of Ministers is the government of East Germany 
and the highest organ of the state apparatus. Its position in the 
system of government and its functions and tasks are specified in 
the Constitution as amended in 1974 as well as in the Law on the 
Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic of 
October 1972. Whereas earlier the Council of Ministers had been 
described as the "executive organ of the People's Chamber," the 
1972 statute defined the council as the "government." According 
to the new law, the Council of Ministers was to "carry out the 
decisions of the party of the working class on the basis of the laws 
and decisions of the People's Chamber." The Constitution as 
amended in 1974 significantly expanded the functions of the Council 
of Ministers at the expense of the Council of State. 

In 1987 the Council of Ministers consisted of a chairman, two 
first deputy chairmen, and nine deputy chairmen, all of whom con- 
stituted an inner circle called the Presidium of the Council of 
Ministers. The chairman of the Council of Ministers, Willi Stoph, 
was head of the government (prime minister). Stoph, a represen- 
tative of the old guard and a Politburo member since 1953, was 
again appointed council chairman in 1986. Unlike the nine deputy 
chairmen, the two first deputy chairmen, Politburo members 



168 



Government and Politics 



Werner Krolikowski and Alfred Neumann, generally had not been 
responsible for specific ministerial portfolios. 

In 1987 four of the nine deputy chairmen represented the four 
non-SED political parties allowed to operate in East Germany: the 
Christian Democratic Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union — 
CDU); the Democratic Peasants' Party of Germany (Demokratische 
Bauernpartei Deutschlands-DBD); the Liberal Democratic Party 
of Germany (Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands — LDPD); 
and the National Democratic Party of Germany (National- 
Demokratische Partei Deutschlands — NDPD). The four non-SED 
deputy chairmen were the minister of post and telecommunications, 
Rudolf Schulze of the CDU; the minister of environmental pro- 
tection and water management, Hans Reichelt of the DBD; the 
minister of justice, Hans-Joachim Heusinger of the LDPD; and 
the chairman of the State Contract Court, Manfred Flegel of the 
NDPD. The other five positions held by deputy chairman on the 
Presidium of the Council of Ministers were occupied by members 
of the Central Committee of the SED. Two of the appointees, Giin- 
ther Kleiber and Gerhard Schiirer (a candidate member) were also 
Politburo members. Of the thirty-three regular members on the 
council, including both ministers and nonministers, nineteen were 
concurrently members of the Central Committee of the SED, and 
two were also Politburo members. The latter were Erich Mielke, 
minister of state security, and Hans-Joachim Bohme, minister of 
university and technical affairs. 

According to the Constitution, all members of the Council of 
Ministers are formally selected to their posts by the People's Cham- 
ber for a five-year term. In fact these decisions probably emanate 
from the Politburo and the Central Committee of the SED. The 
Council of Ministers is required to work closely with the People's 
Chamber, and according to its administrative guidelines the council 
must have all its legal drafts and decisions approved by the Peo- 
ple's Chamber before they become law. In practice, the converse 
is true; the People's Chamber is obliged to approve those actions 
that are undertaken by the council and then routinely submitted 
to the legislature. Similarly, the People's Chamber is given the for- 
mal responsibility of selecting the membership of the council; in 
practice such personnel decisions are made by the Politburo of the 
SED. The legislature is then expected to approve the selections. 

As the de jure government, the Council of Ministers is respon- 
sible for providing the People's Chamber with the major legal drafts 
and decisions that subsequently are to be published in the name 
of the state. The work style of the Council of Ministers is a collec- 
tive one. It normally meets on a weekly basis to discuss problems 



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East Germany: A Country Study 

and plans put forward by individual ministers. It also confirms 
decisions that already have been made by the Presidium. The 
Presidium is of special importance because of its responsibility for 
handling the affairs of the council when the full body is not in 
session. 

Specific functional responsibilities of the Council of Ministers 
include directing and planning the national economy; solving 
problems growing out of membership in the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (Comecon-see Appendix B); coordinating and 
implementing social policy decisions that have been agreed upon 
with the support and concurrence of the Free German Trade Union 
Federation (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund — FDGB); instructing 
and controlling subordinate levels of government, that is, the coun- 
cils at district, county, and community levels that implement the 
laws and decisions of the central government; improving the func- 
tioning of the system of "democratic centralism" within the state 
apparatus; and carrying out the basic foreign policy principles of 
the socialist state. 

Council of State 

Designated as an organ of the People's Chamber, the Council 
of State was largely a creation of Ulbricht's during his tenure as 
first secretary of the SED. After Ulbricht was forced to relinquish 
that position in 1971 , the prestige and authority of the council cor- 
respondingly began to decline. However, although it was no longer 
the de facto supreme executive organ, Honecker's assumption of 
the chairmanship of the Council of State in October 1976 repre- 
sented a renewal of its importance. A similar move was made in 
the Soviet Union when Leonid Brezhnev became head of state. 
It is reasonable to assume that given East Germany's close adher- 
ence to Soviet practices, the increased invisibility of the Council 
of State since the late 1970s can be traced at least in part to parallel 
developments in the Soviet Union. Not unrelated to the takeover 
of the council's chairmanship by Honecker is the fact that after 
1977 the number of individuals who were simultaneously mem- 
bers of the council and of the SED's Central Committee Secretariat 
increased. 

In referring to the Council of State, the Constitution declares 
that it will consist of the chairman, deputy chairmen, members, 
and secretary; it does not specify the number of deputy chairmen 
and members. In 1987, under the chairmanship of Honecker, there 
were eight deputy chairmen and seventeen members. In addition 
to Honecker, two of the deputy chairmen, Horst Sindermann and 
Willi Stoph, were members of the Politburo of the SED; Stoph was 



170 



Government and Politics 



also chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Sindermann was 
president of the People's Chamber. Four of the deputy chairmen 
of the Council of State represented the other four political parties, 
as did four of its seventeen members. The day-to-day functions 
of the council are carried on by a small bureaucratic staff consist- 
ing in 1987 of twenty offices and departments, all of which were 
headed by SED members. Despite the presence of non-SED mem- 
bers as deputy chairmen and members of the leadership group, 
SED control was guaranteed by the presence of Honecker, Stoph, 
Sindermann, and Egon Krenz, probably the four most powerful 
individuals in the country. 

In the mid-1980s, the functions performed by the Council of State 
included representing the country abroad and ratifying and ter- 
minating international treaties; supporting local assemblies in the 
implementation of their economic and budgetary plans; administer- 
ing electoral laws that govern the selection of local assemblies on 
the community, city, county, and district levels; discharging respon- 
sibilities for the maintenance of the country's defense with the 
assistance of the National Defense Council; and administering the 
activities of the Supreme Court and the Office of the General 
Prosecuting Attorney to ensure that their actions are congruent with 
the Constitution and the civil law. In this area, the Council of State 
possesses additional responsibility for proclaiming amnesties and 
pardons. 

Legislature 

The unicameral People's Chamber is described in the Consti- 
tution as "the supreme organ of state power in the German 
Democratic Republic." According to the Constitution, the "prin- 
ciple of the sovereignty of the people" defines the role and func- 
tion of the chamber. Before 1963 the People's Chamber consisted 
of 466 members; since then it has consisted of 500 deputies, elected 
for a 5-year term. Men outnumber women deputies by more than 
a factor of two. Although the deputies of the People's Chamber 
are nominally responsible to their constituencies, they are constitu- 
tionally directed to "fulfill their responsible tasks in the interest 
of and for the benefit of the entire population." 

Article 55 of the Constitution directs the People's Chamber to 
elect a "Presidium for the duration of the legislative term." In 1987 
the Presidium consisted of the president of the People's Chamber, 
a deputy president, three SED members, two LDPD members, 
a representative from each of the other three small parties, and 
two representatives from mass organizations. Sindermann was 
re-elected in 1986 to his third five-year term as Presidium president. 



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East Germany: A Country Study 

The membership of the chamber as a whole consists of represen- 
tatives of the five political parties and members of four mass 
organizations: the FDGB; the Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche 
Jugend — FDJ); the Democratic Women's League of Germany 
(Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands — DFD); and the East Ger- 
man Cultural League {Kulturbund der DDR). Because National Front 
policy has dispensed with competitive elections, a formal agree- 
ment assigns a fixed number of the 500 seats in the People's Cham- 
ber to each National Front organization according to a formula 
that has not varied since 1963. 

As the dominant party, the SED is alloted 127 seats, which con- 
stitute the largest bloc in the People's Chamber. The FDGB with 
sixty-eight seats ranks second. Each of the other political parties 
is allotted fifty-two seats, the FDJ forty, the DFD thirty-five, and 
the East German Cultural League twenty- two. Since many deputies 
of the four mass organizations are also party members, the SED's 
share of the chamber seats in effect exceeds 50 percent. 

Under the Constitution, the People's Chamber is responsible 
for determining "the basic principles of government policy and 
implementing those policies." It is theoretically empowered to elect, 
supervise, and recall all members of the principal executive organs 
of the government: the Council of State, Council of Ministers, chair- 
man of the National Defense Council, attorney general, and 
Supreme Court justices. In practice, however, these positions are 
filled by party organs outside the chamber's control. The cham- 
ber is also constitutionally empowered to determine administra- 
tive principles, supervise government activities, and approve or 
renounce state treaties. In the 1980s, the chamber generally has 
met only three or four times a year for one-day sessions and has 
rarely cast a vote that is not unanimous. In earlier years, the cham- 
ber met more frequently. 

The Presidium of the People's Chamber is primarily a coordinat- 
ing agent for chamber business. The fact that the chairmen of the 
parties and mass organizations do not occupy Presidium posts 
indicates its relatively insignificant function. The People's Cham- 
ber thus has comparatively less stature than the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. 

The People's Chamber also has standing committees — fifteen 
as of the ninth electoral period in 1986 — with jurisdictions cor- 
responding to major areas of public policy, such as national defense, 
foreign affairs, industry, labor, social policy, and culture. Although 
the size of each committee is not fixed, chamber deputies generally 
constitute the majority of each committee's membership. Additional 
members, however, may be drawn from outside the chamber. Each 



172 



Government and Politics 



committee meets at least once a year to receive reports from SED 
officials, nominally satisfying the constitutional requirement that 
the government be accountable to the people. 

In practice, the People's Chamber has been relegated to a sub- 
servient role, and its function in the legislative field has been largely 
pro forma, approving measures authorized by the supreme organs 
of the SED. The deputies are constitutionally required to hold regu- 
lar consultations with their constituents, providing them with reports 
on legislative activities; to explain the policy of the socialist state 
to the citizens; and to listen to the latter' s criticism and sugges- 
tions. Even though such sessions are rare in practice, the People's 
Chamber is a vital government institution because the function of 
mobilizing public support for the goals of the party and state is 
deemed important by the party. 

Despite superficial similarities between the formal responsibili- 
ties of the chamber and those exercised by its parliamentary coun- 
terparts in Western Europe, the People's Chamber does not 
function as an independent entity. Unlike the West German 
Bundestag, for example, the People's Chamber does not permit 
the articulation and legislation of opposing views. The SED, 
however, does ensure that the political parties and mass organiza- 
tions that play important roles in mobilizing public opinion are 
given representation in the chamber. The basic rule is that oppor- 
tunities to participate in the Marxist-Leninist system issue from 
constitutional guarantees as well as from the ideology of the party 
itself, which emphasizes mass participation in an effort to legitimize 
its policies. In the People's Chamber, however, the "right and 
obligation" to participate is based on the SED's conception of how 
much representation each political party and mass organization 
deserves. The party specifies what share of workers, bureaucrats, 
and members of the intelligentsia should serve in the People's 
Chamber as well as the ratio of men to women. At election time, 
the National Front presents a voting list to the electorate that is 
designed to conform with SED guidelines. 

The responsibilities of the chamber representatives can conven- 
tionally be divided into two distinct, though related, activities, both 
of which highlight the mobilization function of the People's Cham- 
ber. First, the deputies are expected to keep the population informed 
about major policy initiatives that have been presented by the SED 
to the People's Chamber for legislative action. This process, 
beginning with the decision of the party to put forward a legisla- 
tive initiative and continuing through the actual publication and 
explanation of the law to the citizenry, theoretically requires con- 
tinuous interaction between the deputies and the population. It is 



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East Germany: A Country Study 

uncertain whether the flow of information and discussion is two- 
way, or whether in fact the People's Chamber is simply required 
to propagandize on behalf of party policies with little concern for 
the various public interests and demands as specific pieces of legis- 
lation are processed through the various phases of drafting and 
modification during the five-year legislative cycle. Second, the 
chamber's fifteen standing committees give deputies the chance to 
inform themselves about the activities of the various ministries 
within the Council of Ministers. In fact, there are limited oppor- 
tunities for committee members to specialize in one or more sub- 
stantive policy areas. Committees also have the right to require 
the presence of ministers as well as heads of other state organs at 
their deliberations. Obviously such contacts should increase the 
members' knowledge and political insight and enable them to con- 
vey a more realistic image of the legislative world and the impact 
of policy to the constituency. 

The actual degree of effectiveness of the People's Chamber is 
questionable. First, direct control over the operation of the Peo- 
ple's Chamber by the SED is exercised through the network of over- 
lapping memberships, which align the mass organizations to the 
party. For example, in 1985 the share of SED members among 
the mass organization deputies was as follows: sixty-one of the sixty- 
eight deputies of the FDGB were also members of the SED, as were 
thirty-six of the forty FDJ deputies, thirty-one of the thirty-five 
DFD deputies, and sixteen of the twenty-two deputies from the 
East German Cultural League. Although it was highly unlikely, 
deputies holding dual memberships theoretically could support 
positions of their organizations opposed to SED policy. Second, 
there is little evidence to suggest that genuine debate on legisla- 
tion takes place within the chamber, although it could be assumed 
that the differing opinions represented in the legislature would 
engender occasional conflict between different legislative groups. 
The scant evidence to date suggests that the national legislature 
affirms but does not debate policy. Third, the amount of time 
actually spent in session is not published by the legislature. Over- 
all, these factors suggest that the People's Chamber performs largely 
ceremonial and opinion-mobilizing functions, which, albeit impor- 
tant, do not make the chamber a key policymaking institution. 

District and Local Government 

East Germany has three territorial levels below the national level: 
15 districts (Bezirke), 219 counties (Kreise), and some 90,000 towns 
and communities (Gemeinde). Each organ has an elected assembly 
(whose composition is controlled by local National Front committees) 



174 



Government and Politics 



and a council, which acts as the executive. Each assembly in turn 
features a structure of committees, composed of deputies and non- 
deputies, and organized around local policy issues such as local 
trade, supply, finances, construction, housing, traffic, transporta- 
tion, health, socialist education, culture, youth, and sports. Over 
400,000 citizens serve on assembly committees at some level, and 
206,652 are deputies. 

The district assembly is the highest government organ in the dis- 
trict; it is elected every five years by the district electorate; the num- 
ber of deputies in the assembly ranges from 190 to 210, depending 
on the size of the district electorate. The district council usually 
consists of some eighteen to twenty members; as a rule, SED mem- 
bers outnumber representatives of other political parties. Coun- 
ties, as subdivisions of districts, replicate the district government 
structure on a smaller scale. In 1985 there were 191 urban coun- 
ties (Stadtkreise) and 28 rural counties (Landkreise) . The smallest unit 
of local government with an assembly and a council is the com- 
munity, of which there were 7,567 in 1985. East German officials 
are quick to point out that citizen participation in local govern- 
ment exceeds that of Western democracies. However, the power 
of local government executives, who are selected by higher officials, 
and the narrow parameters of action set by the central government 
strictly circumscribe the effectiveness of citizen participation. Local 
governments have little independence in initiating policies; as a 
rule, local policy is derived from authorizing legislation or a 
ministerial order at the national level. 

On September 1, 1985, the Community Constitution (Gemein- 
deverfassung) was passed. This document strengthened democratic 
centralism on the local level. However, the central control of the 
state apparatus, described as a "unified state power," was not 
relaxed, and the power of the districts increased somewhat at the 
expense of the role of communities and towns. 

Judiciary 

Like all other aspects of the government administration of East 
Germany, the party is the ultimate decision maker in the opera- 
tion of the legal system. The Constitution, however, provides for 
the right of citizens to a voice in the judicial process and the selec- 
tion of judges, directly or through their elected representatives. It 
further provides for citizen participation in the administration of 
justice in an effort to deter crime. Basic guarantees for justice are 
said to derive from the "socialist society, the political power of the 
working people, and their state and legal system." 



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East Germany: A Country Study 

In fact, separation of powers does not exist in the East German 
government. Although the Constitution asserts the independence 
of the courts, it also subordinates the judiciary to the political 
authorities and their political goals. Judgeships are restricted to 
communists of proven loyalty. The regime officially considers law 
and justice the tools for building a communist society and declares 
it the duty of all judicial and legal officers to serve this end. In effect, 
legal and judicial organs serve as agencies for promoting official 
doctrine, and the careers of personnel in the system are dependent 
on their political ratings as determined by higher state and party 
officials. 

At the top of East Germany's legal system are the Ministry of 
Justice, the Supreme Court, and the Office of the General Prosecut- 
ing Attorney (public prosecutor). In 1987 the heads of these offices 
were, respectively, Hans-Joachim Heusinger (LDPD), Heinrich 
Toeplitz (CDU), and Josef Streit (SED). The public prosecutor 
appoints prosecutors throughout East Germany, including those 
active in military courts; he can dismiss them, and they are "respon- 
sible to him and bound by his instructions." The Office of the 
General Prosecuting Attorney is also responsible for supervising 
"strict adherence to socialist legality and protecting citizens from 
violations of the law." The role of the Ministry of Justice, which 
is not mentioned in the Constitution, appears to be largely formal 
and propagandistic. 

The organs of justice are the Supreme Court, regional courts, 
district courts, and social courts. Military jurisdiction is exercised 
by the Supreme Court and military tribunals and courts. The 
specific areas of responsibility for each level of the court system 
are defined by law. Professional and lay judges of the courts are 
elected for five years by corresponding representative bodies, except 
district court judges, who are elected directly by the citizenry. They 
are subject to dismissal for malfeasance and for violations of law 
and the Constitution in the performance of their duties. 

Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court, as the highest organ 
of the legal system, directs the jurisdiction of all lower courts and 
is charged with ensuring the uniform application of the law on all 
levels. The highest court not only has the right of extraordinary 
appeal as a measure of control over the lower courts but on occa- 
sion serves as a link in the chain of command by issuing general 
legal directives. According to Article 93 of the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court "directs the jurisdiction of the courts on the basis 
of the Constitution, the laws, and their statutory regulations. ... It 
ensures a uniform application of the law by all courts." The direc- 
tive function of the Supreme Court goes far beyond that of supreme 



176 



Government and Politics 



courts in Western systems, which as a rule do not give legally bind- 
ing instructions to the lower courts concerning specific questions 
of law. The Supreme Court is responsible to the People's Cham- 
ber and, between the latter' s sessions, to the Council of State. 
Internally, the organization of the high court consists of an assem- 
bly, a presidium, and three functional administrative divisions 
known as collegiums for criminal justice, military justice, and civil, 
family, and labor law. The assembly, which is directed in its ple- 
nary sessions by the Supreme Court Presidium, consists of fifteen 
directors of the district courts, the chairmen of the higher military 
courts, and all professional judges. 

Each district court is presided over by a professional judge and 
two jurors in cases of original jurisdiction and by three professional 
judges in cases of appellate jurisdiction. The district courts have 
appellate jurisdiction in civil cases and original jurisdiction in major 
criminal cases such as economic crimes, murder, and crimes against 
the state. 

The county court is the lowest level of the judiciary system, and 
each of the country's counties has at least one such court, which 
is presided over by a professional judge and two lay assessors. The 
majority of all criminal and civil cases are tried at this level; county 
courts have jurisdiction over cases not assigned elsewhere and civil 
cases involving only small amounts of property. 

In addition to the regular law courts, East Germany has also 
developed an extensive system of community and social courts 
(Gesellschaftliche Gerichte), known as either conflict or arbitration com- 
missions (Konflikt und Schiedskommissioneri). The first are formed in 
state-owned and private enterprises, health and educational insti- 
tutions, offices, and social organizations. The second are estab- 
lished in residential areas, collective farms, and cooperatives of 
manual laborers, fishermen, and gardeners. Created to relieve the 
regular courts of their minor civil or criminal case loads, the juris- 
diction of the courts applies to labor disputes, minor breaches of 
the peace, misdemeanors, infringements of the law, truancy, and 
conflicts in civil law. These courts are composed of lay jurors who 
are elected by their respective constituencies. Party officials at the 
community level generally influence the nomination of jurors to 
the community courts and exercise considerable influence on the 
outcome of cases heard at this level. 

The Socialist Unity Party of Germany 

The most important political institution in East Germany is the 
ruling communist party, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands — SED). The SED was 



177 



East Germany: A Country Study 

founded on April 19, 1946, in the Soviet zone of occupation through 
a merger of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Com- 
munist Party of Germany, the two major left-wing political organi- 
zations in the eastern part of Germany. The two parties had played 
significant roles in the Weimar Republic but had been suppressed 
after 1933 when the Nazis took power. Since its inception, the SED, 
in which the Communists achieved early dominance over the Social 
Democrats, has undergone a number of organizational as well as 
ideological changes. According to the late Peter Christian Ludz, 
a recognized analyst of East German politics, perhaps the most 
important change was the SED's shift from a totalitarian party to 
one that exhibited more "consultative-authoritarian" tendencies. 

Significant developments have occurred since the early 1980s. 
In the 1970s, the SED became known as a leading exponent of 
Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism. East Germany was then a staunch 
defender of the Soviet ideological view in Eastern Europe and a 
critic of the more liberal Eurocommunism in Western Europe. 
However, the 1980s have signaled an important change in East 
German attitudes toward the Soviet Union and its role as a model 
to be emulated by other socialist countries. Although Moscow is 
still considered the ultimate guarantor of communist rule in East 
Germany, the leader of the socialist community, and East Ger- 
many's primary economic partner, since the early 1980s, East Ger- 
many has no longer viewed the Soviet Union as a model of socialist 
development worthy of emulation in all respects. The Soviet 
Union's leadership of the socialist community remains unques- 
tioned, but the days of blind devotion appear to be over. East Ger- 
man officials argue that their country is at a different stage of 
development and that they must seek solutions that correspond to 
local conditions, a theme increasingly heard elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe since the early 1980s. Although attempts to carve out a 
separate identity as a socialist state have occurred before, particu- 
larly under Ulbricht in the 1960s and the early 1970s, the SED 
generally has been seen as an orthodox ally of Moscow and a 
staunch defender of Warsaw Pact unity. However, during the 
mid-1980s, a trend toward greater autonomy has been evident in 
East German ideological pronouncements and domestic policy 
initiatives. 

Ideology and Politics 

The SED's most important connective tissue remains Marxist- 
Leninist ideology. Ideology has retained an overriding significance 
even in the Honecker era, where it has played the role of an 
integrating and mobilizing force in society. Ideology determines 



178 



Government and Politics 



the norms of conduct, guides social and political action, and inte- 
grates the leadership elite. In the SED's proclamations on the "unity 
of ideology, party, and economy," ideology appears first. Since 
the Ninth Party Congress in 1976, these factors have been linked 
and defined as "characteristic of the nature of party work." Even 
at the Tenth Party Congress in 1981 when Honecker reversed the 
order and spoke of the "unity of politics, economy, and ideology," 
he still emphasized the significance and the "superiority of Marxist- 
Leninist ideology." 

The SED considers itself fraternally linked to the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); it considers the attitude toward 
the CPSU and the Soviet Union to be "a criterion of loyalty toward 
Marxism-Leninism." An "uncompromising struggle" against all 
appearances of "anti-Sovietism" is mandatory for all party mem- 
bers. 

One of the foremost concerns of both the Ulbricht and the 
Honecker regimes has been the stabilization and legitimation of 
SED rule in East Germany. Upon its formation in 1949, the East 
German regime was a provisional political entity that lacked 
legitimacy in the eyes of most of its citizenry. Unlike the communist 
parties in Eastern Europe, the SED generally has been able to avoid 
major internal conflict since the last massive party purge initiated 
by Ulbricht in 1957. The erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the 
promulgation of the New Economic System at the Sixth Party Con- 
gress in January 1963, and the emergence of a generation of politi- 
cal leaders that had matured in East Germany since the war were 
all factors that helped stabilize SED rule in the country. 

The first major event of the 1970s occurred when Ulbricht, who 
had been party leader during the two previous decades, was forced 
to relinquish his control over the SED in May 1971 ; he was allowed, 
however, to retain his chairmanship of the Council of State and 
full membership in the Politburo until his death in August 1973. 
Ulbricht' s replacement, Erich Honecker, brought about a series 
of changes in party policy. Among the more important was the 
SED's declaration that East Germany had abandoned its goal of 
national reunification with West Germany, which Ulbricht had con- 
sistently stressed and codified in an article of the 1968 Constitu- 
tion. Honecker also emphasized East Germany's special relationship 
with the Soviet Union. Under Ulbricht the SED had proclaimed 
that its brand of socialism was equal to that of the Soviet Union, 
and Ulbricht had clashed with Moscow over a number of issues, 
including the question of relations with West Germany and the 
Soviet Union's relations with other East European states. When 
Honecker assumed leadership of the SED in the spring of 1971, 



179 



East Germany: A Country Study 

this conflict came to an abrupt end. On April 15, 1971, the SED 
Politburo declared that the directives of the Twenty-fourth Congress 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow in 1971 
were of "general theoretical and political importance" and were bind- 
ing on the SED in its search for solutions to the "basic question 
of the creation of a developed socialist society in the GDR." This 
policy ended the long-standing divergence between the SED's and 
the CPSU's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. Concepts that had 
originated under Ulbricht, such as the understanding of socialism 
as a "relatively independent socioeconomic system developing on 
its own base," the "developed social system of socialism," and the 
"socialist human community" were cast aside. Instead, the Honecker 
regime spoke of a "developed socialist society" and in 1973 
introduced the expression "real existing socialism," which eventu- 
ally became the hallmark of the Honecker era. 

At the Ninth Party Congress in May 1976, the notion of a har- 
monious "socialist human community" in which class differences 
were almost obliterated was superseded by the idea of a "class 
society of a special type." Honecker resurrected the class nature 
of society by emphasizing the leading role of the working class and, 
by extension, its vanguard, the party. Late in the Ulbricht era, 
the regime magnified the significance of the Council of Ministers 
and the Council of State as regulators of economic and social life 
and downgraded the party's function to a supervisory role. By con- 
trast, Honecker once again reversed the relationship between the 
party and the state. 

Honecker spoke of a new "social phase" beginning under his 
leadership, and he made it clear that the role of the SED would 
increase. The SED's "chief task" was to ensure all-around growth 
in social and economic well-being. These improvements would 
result from "increasing efficiency, scientific-technical progress, and 
higher labor productivity." The scientific-technical revolution of 
the 1960s was to become scientific-technical progress in the 1970s. 
The leadership considered it necessary to close the ever increasing 
gap in living standards between those with technical skills and those 
without. Thus, in the mid- and late 1970s, the party brought science 
and technology increasingly under its wing. Numerous scientific 
councils were created and attached to the East German Academy 
of Sciences, the Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Com- 
mittee of the SED, and other party organizations. Because the 
establishment of these scientific councils allowed the SED to plan, 
coordinate, and supervise research topics and outcomes much more 
comprehensively, in the 1970s the party became the main integra- 
tive force in the domain of science and technology. 



180 



Government and Politics 



GENERAL 
SECRETARY 



CENTRAL PARTY 
CONTROL 
COMMISSION 



CENTRAL COMMITTEE 



SECRETARIAT 






1 






DEPARTMENTS 



OTHER 
COMMISSIONS 



PARTY CONGRESS 



DISTRICT PARTY CONGRESS 



COUNTY PARTY CONFERENCE 



BASIC PARTY ORGANIZATION 


LOCAL 
GROUPS 


INDUSTRY 
GROUPS 


FARM 
GROUPS 


ACADEMIC 
GROUPS 


OTHER 
GROUPS 



Figure 9. Schematic Organization of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany 



The Honecker era also has seen a steady increase in the use of 
the instruments of coercion — the civil and political police and the 
military — and in the 1980s these sectors consumed an ever growing 
proportion of the national budget. The trend indicates that greater 
influence by the security and defense organs has paralleled the 
increase of the party's power. 

Organization and Structure 

The SED is hierarchically organized in the manner of the CPSU 
(see fig. 9). Party organizations are organized territorially into local, 
district (Bezirk), regional (Kreis), and national bodies. Like the 
CPSU, the SED operates on the Leninist principles of democratic 
centralism, party-mindedness, and criticism, all of which are bind- 
ing on the membership of the party. In principle, democratic cen- 
tralism requires full discussion of party programs by lower units 
and the adherence of lower party bodies to decisions taken by higher 
party bodies. Party-mindedness denotes the concepts of "party 
spirit" and "party consciousness," which demand the loyal 



181 



East Germany: A Country Study 

commitment of every party member to the party program. Criti- 
cism and self-criticism require members to recognize their own 
shortcomings and to remain willing to discuss ways to overcome 
their faults in open party meetings. 

The SED is a mass political organization. In 1986 the SED had 
approximately 2.3 million members and candidates (nonvoting 
members); in other words, one of every six citizens over the age 
of eighteen belonged to the party. Furthermore, the social compo- 
sition of the party reflected the leadership's efforts to ensure that 
the proportional representation of various social groups roughly 
corresponded to the social structure of the society as a whole. In 
1986 that breakdown was as follows: 58. 1 percent of the members 
were workers; 4.8 percent were farmers and peasants; 22.4 per- 
cent were members of the intelligentsia; and 14.8 percent were other 
workers. Males constituted some 66 percent of the SED's mem- 
bership (see The Political Elite, ch. 2). 

The educational level of the SED has risen considerably since 
1949. By the late 1970s, every third graduate of a university or 
technical college was a member of the party. Within the SED, 
slightly fewer than one-third of its members possessed a degree from 
a university or a technical college. Furthermore, every secretary 
of the district or county leadership had a degree from one of the 
higher educational institutions. In May 1984, the Politburo stated 
that 72.6 percent of the leading cadres had graduated from high 
school, and 52.4 percent had a diploma from a university or a tech- 
nical college. Entrance to a university or a technical college, 
however, is made considerably easier by membership in the SED. 
Conversely, professional mobility within the party apparatus, as 
well as within the state apparatus, is still increasingly dependent 
on the ability of members to acquire advanced degrees. 

Politburo 

The Politburo is the party's highest decision-making body. It 
addresses the fundamental political problems of the party, state, 
economy, and culture, and it is responsible for formulating domes- 
tic, foreign, military, and security policies. The Politburo normally 
meets once a week, and although its meetings are conducted in 
secret, other members of the Central Committee, the Secretariat, 
and members of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers are 
admitted to the proceedings. Meetings are chaired by General Secre- 
tary Honecker, and decisions are arrived at by a consensus vote, 
although certain individuals within the Politburo, particularly long- 
standing members, play a major or even dominant role in deter- 
mining the positions and decisions of the executive body. The 



182 



Government and Politics 



Politburo is required to inform the Central Committee about the 
various personnel and policy issues and problems discussed dur- 
ing its weekly sessions. At the regular plenums of the Central Com- 
mittee, held at least once every six months, one or more members 
of the Politburo report on issues discussed in Politburo sessions. 
These reports are subsequently discussed by the Central Commit- 
tee membership and are then published in an abbreviated form 
in the SED official daily, Neues Deutschland. 

The Politburo is composed of the highest officials of the party, 
the state, the security organs, the largest mass organizations and, 
unlike the Politburo of the CPSU, all ten members of the Secre- 
tariat, which directs the party apparatus through the Central Com- 
mittee departments. Between 1976 and early 1984, the only 
additions to the ranks of the Politburo were Giinter Schabowski, 
then the chief editor of Neues Deutschland, who became a candidate 
member at the Tenth Party Congress in 1981; and Egon Krenz, 
who was appointed in 1983 and made a Central Committee secre- 
tary at the same time. Krenz, as the youngest member of the Polit- 
buro, replaced Paul Verner as the unofficial number two man in 
the party leadership. After his induction into the two top party 
organs, Krenz became increasingly visible at Honecker's side, fuel- 
ing speculation that the SED chief had already designated him as 
the heir apparent. In May 1984, four high-ranking officials, three 
of whom were already candidates, were made full members of the 
Politburo: Werner J arowinsky, deputy minister of trade and sup- 
ply; Gunther Kleiber, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers 
and an expert on agriculture and an occasional emissary to the Mid- 
dle East; Schabowski, editor-in-chief of Neues Deutschland; and 
Herbert Haber, the SED's expert on relations with West Germany. 
In contrast to J arowinsky, who had served as a candidate for twenty- 
one years, Haber became a full member directly, bypassing can- 
didate status. The promotion of Jarowinsky and Kleiber raised the 
level of economic expertise in the Politburo. Also named to the 
Secretariat was Konrad Naumann, a full member of the Politburo 
and then head of the SED's East Berlin party organization. It was 
announced that Verner, veteran member of both the Politburo and 
the Secretariat, was relinquishing his post because of illness. Three 
weeks later, Krenz and Giinter Mittag were made deputy chair- 
men of the Council of State, East Germany's "collective presi- 
dency," chaired by Honecker. 

These new appointments significantly strengthened Honecker's 
position as undisputed leader of the party and appeared intended 
to strengthen his commitment to detente with West Germany. 
However, at the Eleventh SED Central Committee Plenum on 



183 



East Germany: A Country Study 



November 22-23, 1985, it was announced that Naumann and Haber 
had been dropped from the Politburo and the Secretariat "for rea- 
sons of health. " Although Haber departed largely because of health 
problems, Naumann 's removal was probably politically motivated. 
Known for his opposition to Honecker in several key areas of domes- 
tic and foreign policy, Naumann enjoyed backing from Moscow and 
possessed a long record as a hardliner in his approach to relations 
with West Germany and his opposition to the SED's policies on cul- 
ture and religion. Naumann 's political demise continued when three 
days later he was replaced by Schabowski as East Berlin's party chief. 
Naumann's removal eliminated Honecker's chief rival and further 
strengthened the East German leader's position. In November 1986, 
the Politburo consisted of twenty-two full and five candidate mem- 
bers. The Politburo also included the head (Erich Miickenberger) 
of the Central Party Control Commission, an appeals board for issues 
related to SED membership rights. The mass organizations have 
been represented in the Politburo by the head of the labor unions 
and the head of the youth organization, both having considerable 
experience as party officials. 

At the Eleventh Party Congress in April 1986, there were few 
surprises among those elected to join the ranks of the Politburo. 
The decisive changes had already been made at the party's Eleventh 
Central Committee plenum in November 1985, when Naumann 
and Haber were dropped from the Politburo and Secretariat. 
Although there were no further dismissals at the congress, four new 
full members were added: Heinz Kessler, minister of defense and 
a Honecker confidant, and three regional secretaries, Werner Eber- 
lein, Siegfried Lorenz, and Hans-Joachim Bohme, all experienced 
technocrats. These moves, as well as CPSU general secretary 
Mikhail S. Gorbachev's strong political endorsement of Honecker 
at the congress, helped the East German party chief reinforce his 
strong position in the top party ranks. In 1987 the first secretaries 
of two district party organizations (Berlin and Cottbus) were mem- 
bers of the Politburo. As a result of the personnel changes, six dis- 
tricts were represented in the Politburo by their party heads; the 
three new district representatives were Schabowski and Politburo 
candidates Gerhard Miiller (Erfurt), and Werner Walde (Cottbus). 
Rejuvenation of the ranks of the Politburo was clearly in progress. 
However, the only two women members, Ingeborg Lange and 
Margaret Miiller, candidates for thirteen and twenty-three years, 
respectively, were not selected to full membership. 

Secretariat 

The Secretariat is the "staff" of the Politburo, in charge of 



184 



Government and Politics 



implementing the policy and personnel decisions of the Politburo, 
with which it is closely linked. All major political decisions are made 
by the Politburo and the Secretariat. Unlike the CPSU, the mem- 
bers of the SED Secretariat usually are also full or candidate mem- 
bers of the Politburo. In 1987 there were ten secretaries, nine of 
whom were full Politburo members and one, a woman, a candi- 
date member. At the Eleventh Party Congress in April 1986, the 
East Berlin district party chief, Schabowski, was appointed a Central 
Committee secretary. The average age of the secretaries was fifty- 
nine. Each secretary directs a personal staff of three to five individ- 
uals. Politburo members who also are secretaries manage staffs con- 
sisting of Central Committee members, who in turn supervise 
smaller staffs for special assignments. The Secretariat is in charge 
of the daily work of the party; it supervises internal party affairs 
and directs the state and government apparatuses. The specific 
responsibilities of the Secretariat include managing elections, for- 
mulating cadre policy, operating party schools, and drafting and 
implementing the directives of the Politburo to the leaders of the 
SED district and county organizations. 

The Secretariat also directs the working organ of the Central 
Committee, the Central Committee apparatus, which consists of 
over 40 departments with approximately 2,000 members as well 
as the central party institutes (the Central Committee's Academy 
of Social Sciences, the Institute for Marxism-Leninism, the Cen- 
tral Institute for Socioeconomic Management, and the Karl Marx 
Party College). These departments work closely with the individual 
ministries of the Council of Ministers. Critical mechanisms by which 
the SED maintains ongoing contact with the CPSU are the vari- 
ous departments of the Secretariat, which are expected to main- 
tain close working relations with their Soviet counterparts, as well 
as those of the other "fraternal parties." 

Central Committee 

The Central Committee of the SED is designated by party stat- 
ute as the highest executive organ of the party and is responsible 
for carrying out the decisions of the party congress. When the New 
Economic System was launched in the 1960s, the Central Com- 
mittee changed from being a purely acclamatory and declamatory 
assembly to one increasingly involved in the substantive matters 
of party organizations and policies (see Economic Policy and Per- 
formance, ch. 3). 

Although the Central Committee performs a variety of impor- 
tant functions, its most important responsibility consists of bring- 
ing together diverse points of view, which contributes to the 



185 



East Germany: A Country Study 

formulation of short- and long-term SED policies. This role is par- 
ticularly important in the area of economic planning and adminis- 
tration, which remains a key policy area. In this respect, the Central 
Committee provides a sounding board for positions that the Polit- 
buro subsequently takes on various issues. During its plenary ses- 
sions, usually between two to four per year, the Central Committee 
routinely examines the work of the Politburo and Secretariat, and 
individual committee members evaluate Politburo reports that fall 
within their areas of expertise. Both the Politburo reports and the 
policy discussion papers presented at the party plenums are 
important to the functions of the Central Committee; they present 
guidelines for running the government and party apparatus. On 
occasion the Politburo directs the Central Committee to create spe- 
cial commissions, composed of members of the Council of Ministers 
and the Presidium, which are tasked with exploring areas of topi- 
cal interest to the Politburo or the Secretariat. 

District and Local Party Levels 

The SED is organized according to a "territorial- industrial" prin- 
ciple. The units of the party are organized on a hierarchical basis, 
conforming at the higher levels to administrative divisions within 
the country. The work of each subordinate party organization is 
subject to supervision and control by a superior one. In theory these 
restrictions and duties are counterbalanced by the "right of dis- 
cussion and the election of party organs." 

The basic party organizations, called Grundorganisationen (GOs) 
are "the foundation of the party"; they are organized primarily 
at places of work. There are several kinds of GOs: the industrial 
party organization, (Betriebsparteiorganisation), the residential 
party organization, (Wohnparteiorganisation), the local party orga- 
nization, (Ortsparteiorganisation), and basic party organizations 
in the armed forces. A GO is formed when there are at least three 
members in a factory, cooperative, office, institution, administra- 
tion, social welfare enterprise, urban or rural residential area, 
enterprise, university, or armed forces unit. To conform with the 
administrative divisions of the country, the GOs are integrated into 
district, city, and city-district party organizations, all within regional 
party organizations. 

Although a GO is formed when at least 3 party members are 
present in an area, a section party organization (Abteilungspartei- 
organisation — APO) may be formed in enterprises having more than 
150 party members. The duties of the APOs entail selection and 
dismissal of members and encouragement of higher productivity, 
greater civic consciousness, and strengthened ideological awareness. 



186 



Government and Politics 



The APO thus occupies a key position in the implementation of 
the party's program. 

According to SED statutes, the main task of the GO is "to secure 
the politico-ideological and organizational influence of the party 
in the realization of its leading role in all social spheres." The 
activity of the GO is oriented also toward "mobilizing and organiz- 
ing the masses to fulfilling state, economic, and cultural tasks." 
Party group organizers and their deputies meet regularly, at least 
once a month; the meetings are convened by the GO or APO party 
secretary, and members are briefed on the party work in their 
organizational area. The GO is an important conduit in the flow 
of information between the lower levels and the leading organs of 
the party and government, requisite to directing and planning the 
society. The GO is also designed to represent a forum for the pub- 
lic to express their opinions, concerns, interests, approval, or dis- 
approval of policies and activities. 

There are two kinds of GOs worthy of special note: those in 
government ministries and those in the armed forces. The former 
are responsible to the party level with jurisdiction over an entire 
ministry or regional government organization; the GOs report to 
the corresponding geographical (local, district, or national) party 
authority, thus enabling the party to maintain and enhance its con- 
trol over the activities of the state organs. In 1983 there were 57,782 
GOs and 26,386 APOs, or a total of 84,168 organizations. In 1987 
no figures were available concerning the number of GOs and APOs 
having large memberships. The official view is that these basic units 
secure the party's "political ideological influence ... in all spheres 
of social life"; for the individual member, they are said to be "a 
political home in which the member is firmly rooted and in whose 
communist sphere he feels at home and from which he draws new 
strength." 

Judging by the directives issued for the election of party organi- 
zation leadership in the fall of 1983, the chief task of party groups 
at the lower levels is to achieve particular economic goals. Although 
the "heart and soul of party work" are proclaimed to be "politi- 
cal and ideological work with the people," the "criteria . . . for 
judging the results of political leadership" by party organizations 
deal almost exclusively with the details of economic matters. 

Selection and Training Procedures 

At the Tenth Party Congress in 1981 , SED party chief Honecker 
stressed that "the continuous increase in the leading role of the 
party in all spheres of society is an objective necessity." The SED 
leadership holds that the "cadre question" is decisive and that the 



187 



East Germany: A Country Study 

best way to secure the party's "leading role" is to train loyal cadres 
who demonstrate devotion to the party, unconditional submission 
to the leadership, have the proper qualifications, and undergo ideo- 
logical instruction. 

In practice, every member of the SED who is active within the 
party or state apparatus must undergo continuous education dur- 
ing the course of his or her political career. The organizational back- 
bone of the party is the cadre, the leadership at all levels of the 
party organization. The selection and training of cadres, carried 
out by the higher levels of the party apparatus, is designed to 
strengthen internal party structures and to ensure the unity of the 
SED. 

Cadre selection is an involved procedure that begins with the 
Nomenklatur (see Glossary), a listing of the most critical positions 
in the party and state apparatuses over which the party exercises 
its appointment power. Because the Nomenklatur system does not 
provide a means for determining which individuals will ultimately 
qualify to take key positions in the party and state apparatuses, 
the SED has employed three interrelated programs for "long-term 
and purposeful cadre development." Known as the cadre reser- 
voir, cadre recruitment, and cadre reserve, these programs attempt 
to meet the constant demand for recruits in the dual party- 
government system. The cadre reservoir consists of all graduates 
of institutions of higher education. By the time they reach adoles- 
cence, students are required to demonstrate whether or not they 
are interested in pursuing a career in the cadre system. Through 
the FDJ and the FI3GB, the party provides those students interested 
in joining the cadre system with special opportunities for develop- 
ing such career interests and skills. The FDJ is particularly 
important in this regard, having provided a ladder of advancement 
for many leading members of the East German Nomenklatur. 
Individuals who demonstrate the motivation and ability for cadre 
training programs are moved into cadre recruitment, the second 
phase of the system. Cadre recruitment involves an extensive train- 
ing program, which the individual must complete in a period of 
two to five years, depending on the nature of the position for which 
the candidate undergoes training. At the time an individual is 
accepted into the cadre recruitment program, usually upon gradua- 
tion from a secondary institution, the person's name is also entered 
on the Nomenklatur, even though he or she cannot move into such 
a position until formal completion of the recruitment program. 

The final part of the program requires the trainee to undergo 
a more intensive program in the cadre reserve, which prepares the 
individual for entrance into the party or state apparatus. An 



188 



Government and Politics 



appropriate training program ensures that the individual will be 
fully prepared to undertake full-time cadre responsibilities. Although 
the duration of such a program varies, each trainee is required to 
work within the guidelines of a "cadre plan" and a long-term 
"cadre and educational program," both of which terminate at the 
end of a five-year planning period. 

Once they have entered the appropriate apparatus, party and 
state functionaries are required to undergo extended periods of 
additional training. Official training manuals recommend an on- 
going process of formal and informal training. The industrial and 
technological nature of East German society requires that political 
leaders have more than an awareness of technology, science, and 
the principles of large-scale organization. Party schools, the primary 
educational institutions for the cadres, offer courses of instruction 
in Marxism-Leninism and the technical and social sciences. An 
early 1980s listing of the available institutions for advanced cadre 
training included factory and regional schools of Marxism- 
Leninism, district party schools, various correspondence study 
courses, five-year study programs offering diplomas in the social 
sciences, and, finally, participation in special lecture series and even- 
ing courses at local educational institutions. For years, nearly all 
middle and higher functionaries have been indoctrinated at party 
schools, and to a great extent the same has been achieved for lower 
functionaries. In the early 1980s, over 80 percent of the approxi- 
mately 80,230 party secretaries who headed the basic SED orga- 
nizations had spent more than a year at a party school, and 
64.5 percent were graduates of universities or professional schools. 

Although it is difficult to evaluate in concrete terms the results 
of the selection and training programs, the educational level of the 
SED as a whole has risen substantially, as has the educational level 
of members of the party and state apparatuses. It is unclear to what 
extent subjective factors such as personality and political and family 
connections may bias both the administration and the outcomes 
of such programs. The need of the SED for individuals who can 
perform the administrative and political work required by a com- 
plex society is undisputed, however. 

Party Congresses 

According to SED statutes, the party congress is the supreme 
organ of the SED. Since 1971 congresses have been held every five 
years, the most recent being the Eleventh Party Congress in 
April 1986. In theory the party congress sets policy and elects the 
leadership, provides a forum for discussing the leadership's poli- 
cies, and undertakes activities that serve to legitimize the party as 



189 



East Germany: A Country Study 

a mass movement. It is formally empowered to pass both the Party 
Program and the Statute, to establish the general party line, to elect 
the members of the Central Committee and the members of the 
Central Auditing Commission, and to approve the Central Com- 
mittee report. Between congresses the Central Committee may con- 
vene a party conference to resolve policy and personnel issues. 

In the spring of 1971, the Eighth Party Congress rolled back some 
of the programs associated with the Ulbricht era and emphasized 
short-term social and economic problems. The SED used the 
occasion to announce its willingness to cooperate with West Ger- 
many and the Soviet Union in helping to solve a variety of inter- 
national problems, particularly the future political status of Berlin. 
Another major development initiated at the congress was a strength- 
ening of the Council of Ministers at the expense of the Council 
of State; this shift subsequently played an important role in 
administering the Main Task program. The SED further pro- 
claimed that greater emphasis would be devoted to the develop- 
ment of a "socialist nationalist culture" in which the role of artists 
and writers would be increasingly important. Honecker was more 
specific about the SED's position toward the intelligentsia at the 
Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee, where he stated: "As 
long as one proceeds from the firm position of socialism, there can 
in my opinion be no taboos in the field of art and literature. This 
applies to questions of content as well as of style, in short to those 
questions which constitute what one calls artistic mastery." 

The Ninth Party Congress in May 1976 can be viewed as the 
midpoint in the development of SED policy and programs. Most 
of the social and economic goals announced at the Eighth Party Con- 
gress had been reached; however, the absence of a definitive state- 
ment on further efforts to improve the working and living conditions 
of the population proved to be a source of concern. The SED sought 
to redress these issues by announcing, along with the Council of 
Ministers and the leadership of the FDGB, a specific program to 
increase living standards. The Ninth Party Congress initiated a 
hard line in the cultural sphere, which contrasted with the policy 
of openness and tolerance enunciated at the previous congress. Six 
months after the Ninth Party Congress, for example, the East Ger- 
man government withdrew permission for the singer Wolf Biermann 
to live in East Germany. The congress also highlighted the fact 
that East Germany had achieved international recognition in the 
intervening years. East Germany's growing involvement in both 
the East European economic system and the global economy 
reflected its new international status. This international status and 
the country's improved diplomatic and political standing were the 



190 



Government and Politics 



major areas stressed by this congress. The Ninth Party Congress 
also served as a forum for examining the future challenges facing 
the party in domestic and foreign policy. On the foreign policy front, 
the major events were various speeches delivered by representa- 
tives of West European Marxist-Leninist parties, particularly the 
Italian, Spanish, and French, all of which expressed in varying ways 
ideological differences with the Soviet Union. At the same time, 
although allowing different views to be heard, the SED rejected 
many of these criticisms in light of its effort to maintain the spe- 
cial relationship with the Soviet Union emphasized by Honecker. 
Another major point of emphasis at the congress was the issue of 
inter-German detente. From the East German side, the benefits 
were mixed. The East German regime considered economic benefits 
as a major advantage, but the party viewed with misgivings the 
rapid increase in travel by West Germans to and through East Ger- 
many. Additional problems growing out of the expanding relation- 
ship with West Germany included conflict between Bonn and East 
Berlin on the rights and privileges of West German news correspon- 
dents in East Germany; the social unrest generated by the "two- 
currency" system, in which East German citizens who possessed 
West German D-marks were given the privilege of purchasing 
scarce luxury goods at special currency stores (Intershops); and the 
ongoing arguments over the issue of separate citizenship for the 
two German states, which the SED has proclaimed but which Bonn 
as of 1987 had refused to recognize. 

During the Ninth Party Congress, the SED also responded to 
some of the public excitement and unrest that had emerged in the 
aftermath of the signing of the Helsinki Accords, the human rights 
documents issued at the meetings of the 1975 Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe. Before the congress was convened, 
the SED had conducted a "People's Discussion" in order openly 
to air public concerns related to East Germany's responsibility in 
honoring the final document of the Helsinki conference. 

The Tenth Party Congress, which took place in April 1981, 
celebrated the status quo; the meeting unanimously re-elected 
Honecker to the office of general secretary, and there were no 
electoral surprises, as all incumbents except the ailing seventy-six- 
year-old Albert Norden were returned to the Politburo and the 
Secretariat. The congress highlighted the importance of policies 
that had been introduced or stressed at the two previous congresses 
and that had dominated East German life during the 1970s. As 
in the past, Honecker stressed the importance of the ties to the Soviet 
Union. In his closing remarks, he stated: "Our party, the SED, 
is linked forever with the party of Lenin, [the CPSU] . " A delegation 



191 



East Germany: A Country Study 

led by Mikhail Suslov, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU 
and his party's leading ideologue, represented the CPSU at the 
SED congress. Honecker reiterated earlier positions on the rela- 
tionship between the two Germanies, stressing that they are two 
sovereign states that have developed along different lines since 
World War II and that their differences must be respected by both 
sides as they continue efforts toward peaceful coexistence despite 
membership in antagonistic alliances. In his speeches, Honecker, 
along with other SED officials, devoted greater attention to Third 
World countries than he had done in the past. Honecker mentioned 
the continually increasing numbers of young people from African, 
Asian, and Latin American countries who receive their higher edu- 
cation in East Germany, and he referred to many thousands of peo- 
ple in those countries who have been trained as apprentices, skilled 
workers, and instructors by teams from East Germany. 

The bulk of the Central Committee report delivered at the open- 
ing session of the congress by the general secretary discussed the 
economic and social progress made during the five years since the 
Ninth Party Congress. Honecker detailed the increased agricul- 
tural and industrial production of the period and the resultant social 
progress as, in his words, the country continued "on the path to 
socialism and communism." Honecker called for even greater 
productivity in the next five years, and he sought to spur individual 
initiative and productivity by recommending a labor policy that 
would reward the most meritorious and productive members of 
society. 

The Eleventh Party Congress, held April 17-21 , 1986, unequivo- 
cally endorsed the SED and Honecker, whom it confirmed for 
another term as party head. The SED celebrated its achievements 
as the "most successful party on German soil," praised East Ger- 
many as a "politically stable and economically efficient socialist 
state," and declared its intention to maintain its present policy 
course. East Germany's successes, presented as a personal triumph 
for Honecker, marked a crowning point in his political career. 
Gorbachev's presence at the congress endorsed Honecker' s policy 
course, which was also strengthened by some reshuffling of the party 
leadership. Overall, the Eleventh Party Congress exhibited confi- 
dence in East Germany's role as the strongest economy and the 
most stable country in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev praised the East 
German experience as proof that central planning can be effective 
and workable in the 1980s. 

Official statements on the subject of foreign policy were mixed, 
particularly with respect to East Germany's relations with West 
Germany and the rest of Western Europe. Honecker' s defense of 



192 



Government and Politics 



his policy of "constructive dialogue" appeared in tune with 
Gorbachev's own calls for disarmament and detente in Europe. 
However, the SED leadership made it unequivocally clear that its 
foreign policy, including relations with West Germany, would 
remain closely coordinated with Moscow's. Although Honecker's 
criticism of West Germany was low key, Gorbachev's was sharp, 
attacking Bonn's participation in the United States Strategic 
Defense Initiative and the alleged "revanchism" in West Germany. 
However, after a final round of talks with Gorbachev, Honecker 
signed a hard-line communique that openly attacked the policies 
of the West German government. Overall, Gorbachev's statements 
suggested that the foreign policy emphasis would be on a common 
foreign policy adhered to by all members of the Warsaw Pact under 
Soviet direction. Until the Eleventh Party Congress, East German 
leaders had maintained that small and medium states had a sig- 
nificant role to play in international affairs. As a result of Soviet 
pressure, such statements have disappeared from East German com- 
mentary on foreign policy. 

Giinther Tschacher, an official in the Academy of Social Sciences 
of the SED Central Committee, echoed the new thinking on domes- 
tic policy in a West German interview, when he remarked that 
although the SED is enthusiastic about Gorbachev's reforms in the 
Soviet Union, it does not necessarily consider these applicable to 
East Germany. Tschacher flatly rejected the notion that the Soviet 
Union's new course is necessarily relevant for East Germany, stating 
that this would "run counter to the independent policy of each 
party." He claimed it had become an established fact that "each 
party develops its policy independently." 

Alliance Policy 

East Germany follows the pattern of the Hungarian, Czecho- 
slovak, and Polish "multiparty" systems in permitting the exis- 
tence of small parties that accept the leadership of the ruling 
communist party and are its allies in the construction of socialism. 
In all cases, the parties merely exist to further the goals of the rul- 
ing Marxist-Leninist party and have no opportunity for genuine 
independent political action. In East Germany, this system is known 
as the Alliance Policy (Bundnispolitik), and the four parties subor- 
dinate to the SED are known as "alliance parties." These are the 
Christian Democratic Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union — 
CDU), the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (Liberal - 
Demokratische Partei Deutschlands — LDPD), the Democratic 
Peasants' Party of Germany (Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutsch- 
lands — DBD), and the National Democratic Party of Germany 



193 



East Germany: A Country Study 





Liberal Democratic Party 
of Germany (LDPD) 



National Democratic Party 
of Germany (NDPD) 





Democratic Peasants' Party 
of Germany (DBD) 



Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU) 



Figure 10. Logos of the Alliance Parties 

(National-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands — NDPD) (see Coun- 
cil of Ministers, this ch.; fig. 10.). In 1982 the small parties regis- 
tered the following memberships: the CDU — 125,000; the 
LDPD— 82,000; the DBD— 103,000; and the NDPD— 91,000. In 
contrast to the one-party system in the Soviet Union, these smaller 
parties assist the SED in reaching certain key sectors of the com- 
munity, such as the intelligentsia, businessmen, and manufacturers 
who are not members of the SED. Their chief function is securing 
the support of these groups for the aims of the party and the state 
and integrating into the socialist system citizens who are critical 
of the SED or who, because of their social or political background, 
cannot become members in the SED. Although represented in the 
People's Chamber, the alliance parties do not compete with SED 
delegates for seats or power. 

Christian Democratic Union 

The CDU is the only party in East Germany with a counter- 
part of the same name in West Germany; both parties have the 



194 



Government and Politics 



same roots. Originally CDU members came from the ranks of farm- 
ers, craftsmen, small manufacturers, and Christians, both Protes- 
tants and Roman Catholics. At the time of its formation in 1945, 
the CDU was an independent political party representing middle- 
class interests. By 1948, however, the original CDU leadership had 
been removed or suppressed, and the party had lost its indepen- 
dent status. Since that time, Western observers have considered 
the CDU an auxiliary of the SED, useful for its appeal to the Chris- 
tian, middle-class constituency. Since the CDU's Sixth Party Con- 
gress in 1952, when it embraced socialism and affirmed that a 
socialist society affords the best opportunity to practice Christianity, 
the party has been modeled on the SED's organizational pattern. 

Gerald Goetting, chairman of the CDU in 1987, has held that 
post since May 1966 and has been active in the party since the 
immediate post-World War II period. Goetting has been a deputy 
in the People's Chamber and a member of the Presidium of the 
National Front since 1950. Since 1960 Goetting has been a deputy 
chairman of the Council of State, and he was president of the Peo- 
ple's Chamber until he was replaced in 1976 by Horst Sindermann. 
At that time, Goetting was moved to the presidency of the League 
for Friendship Among Peoples (Liga fur Volker Freundschaft), 
which oversees the activities of twenty-five or thirty individual 
friendship committees involved in international relations. 

Liberal Democratic Party of Germany 

The founders of the LDPD considered the tradition of German 
liberalism as the legacy of their party. In general, the LDPD 
adhered to a policy of private ownership and individual initiative. 
Upon its establishment in 1945, its leaders announced that "the 
liberal creed and democratic political conviction" would form its 
political ideology, but by 1948 the SED had subjected the LDPD, 
like the CDU, to pressures to conform to the official communist 
party line. By the early 1950s, the LDPD had completely reversed 
its opposition to socialism and, in effect, had become an auxiliary 
of the SED. Since 1967 the LDPD has been chaired by Manfred 
Gerlach, who, like the CDU's Goetting, has been a deputy in the 
People's Chamber, a member of the Presidium of the National 
Front since 1950, and a deputy chairman of the Council of State 
since September 1960. 

Democratic Peasants ' Party of Germany 

Formed by the SED on April 12, 1948, in a calculated attempt 
to increase its influence among farmers, the DBD adopted a plat- 
form that advocated land reform and the strengthening of bonds 



195 



East Germany: A Country Study 

between farmers and workers. The DBD became a primary 
instrument in the drive to collectivize agriculture, an important 
SED goal. Like the other alliance parties, the DBD became an aux- 
iliary of the SED and has not diverged from the official SED party 
line since its founding. In May 1982 Ernst Mecklenburg took over 
the chairmanship of the DBD from Ernst Goldbaum, who had 
become a member of the KPD in 1919 but left the SED in 1948 
to form the DBD. Mecklenburg, who has been a deputy chairman 
of the Council of State since July 1982, is also a deputy in the Peo- 
ple's Chamber. 

National Democratic Party of Germany 

The NDPD was originally established as an instrument of com- 
munist influence over two specific segments of the population previ- 
ously excluded from political life: discharged German servicemen 
and the 2 million members of the National Socialist German Work- 
ers' Party (Nazis) in East Germany. The NDPD's appeal was based 
on nationalism and patriotism, and its principal goals were to 
develop support for the security services and to recruit experienced 
personnel to serve in that capacity. In 1987 Heinrich Homan con- 
tinued to chair the party, a position he has held since November 
1972. Homan has served as a deputy in the People's Chamber and 
as a member of the Presidium of the National Front. 

The Party and the Media 

The Politburo of the SED ultimately decides what is printed, 
published, and produced by the mass media in order to ensure ideo- 
logical and political uniformity and conformity. The SED Central 
Committee's Department of Agitation and Propaganda issues 
instructions to the editors of party and mass organization publica- 
tions on appropriate news topics and how they should be treated; 
the department ensures that the mass media carry out their assigned 
functions. Editors also receive directives on key campaigns, such 
as the Five-Year Plan, the National Front candidates during East 
German elections, military education in the schools, Soviet for- 
eign policy initiatives, the deployment of United States missiles in 
Western Europe, and the Strategic Defense Initiative. 

Because the SED controls all aspects of public life, it can plan 
headlines in advance. Anniversaries are a typical case, particularly 
special anniversaries such as the establishment of the People's Police 
(Volkspolizei), the National People's Army, civil defense services, 
and border police. Similar considerations apply to historical events, 
such as the Russian Revolution, the Liberation (Befreiung) in 1945, 
the establishment of the East German state and the SED, the 



196 



Government and Politics 



destruction of Dresden, and the erection of the Berlin Wall. Pre- 
planned congresses, the Leipzig Fair, visits by foreign politicians 
or by East German politicians abroad, Warsaw Pact force maneu- 
vers, and the Soviet space program are standard topics for East 
German media consumers. The single most important subject 
covered is the economy and the current Five- Year Plan. 

For the SED, newspapers are part of the campaign to build 
socialism and communism as defined by the SED leadership in con- 
sultation with the leadership of the CPSU. Thus, the SED not only 
attempts to "plan" the news but also to monopolize news sources. 
All international news, with minor exceptions, is channeled to the 
press from the country's sole news agency, Allgemeiner Deutscher 
Nachrichtendienst (ADN), which is under the direction of the Press 
Office of the chairman of the Council of Ministers. Most items in 
Neues Deutschland and in Der Morgen are credited to ADN. 

Neues Deutschland, in keeping with its function as the organ of 
the SED and the leading daily newspaper of East Germany, is 
assigned the best facilities and is one of the few publications to send 
correspondents abroad. With a circulation of nearly 1 million, it 
serves as the most authoritative paper. The SED is also responsi- 
ble for the leading district newspapers, such as the Leipziger Volk- 
zeitung. Each of the other four smaller parties has a national daily. 
They are the Bauern-Echo (DBD), National- Zeitung (NDPD), Neue 
Zeit (CDU); and Der Morgen (LDPD). These newspapers are not 
widely known outside the parties they serve. Tribune, the organ of 
the FDGB, and Junge Welt, the daily of the FDJ, have much higher 
circulations than the publications of the four allied parties. The 
only significant SED-controlled dailies that are not official organs 
of parties or mass organizations are the Berliner Zeitung (BZ) and 
BZ am Abend. 

The chief reason for maintaining such a relatively expensive news 
apparatus despite the uniformity and redundancy is the need to 
keep up appearances as a semipluralistic society, which is regarded 
as important for East Germany's influence abroad. Internally, these 
newspapers have their assigned segments of the population to 
influence, and the style and subject matter of the papers vary 
according to the segment of the population addressed. Like all key 
institutions, newspapers are given "plans" to fulfill. Non-SED party 
organs receive their plans and instructions from the aforementioned 
Press Office. 

The relatively high rates of newspaper consumption and almost 
universal ownership of radios and television sets make the public 
media important instruments of social integration. There are 
38 daily newspapers, having a total circulation of 8.3 million. 



197 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Regional and national SED papers (including Neues Deutschland) 
account for about two-thirds of the total circulation. Junge Welt 
accounts for about 10 percent, and Tribune accounts for about 
5 percent. Newspapers published by the 4 noncommunist parties 
amount to less than 5 percent of the total. In addition, there are 
more than 500 monthly magazines and weekly newspapers, rang- 
ing from Fur die h, an illustrated women's weekly, to Einheit, a pub- 
lication for party functionaries at all levels. Many periodicals focus 
on the special concerns of various professional groups. 

After starting on an experimental basis in 1952, television was 
officially introduced in 1956 under the name Deutscher Fernseh- 
funk, which was changed in 1972 to Fernsehen der DDR in accor- 
dance with the SED policy of Abgrenzung. Because the SED regards 
all radio and television programs as politically significant, producers, 
directors, and editors are expected to bear in mind the ultimate 
purpose of their medium when creating their programs. The 
government operates two color television channels, which together 
offer nineteen to twenty hours of daily programming. 

Since 1968 television has been under the control of the State Com- 
mittee for Television of the Council of Ministers; an analogous com- 
mittee administers radio. The chairmen and deputy chairmen of 
these committees are appointed by the chairman of the Council 
of Ministers. Other members are appointed by the chairmen of 
the respective committees. Heinrich Adamek, who has served as 
chairman of the State Committee for Television since its incep- 
tion, is a member of the SED Central Committee. 

The SED is keenly interested in using radio to influence people 
abroad and uses Voice of the GDR (Stimme der DDR), directed 
at German speakers outside East Germany, and Radio Berlin 
International, which broadcasts in numerous foreign languages, 
for this purpose. External consumers receive news of the world com- 
munist movement, East Germany and its politics and policies, and 
an SED view of world developments. 

The authorities restrict the influx of Western publications, which 
are available only to government, party, economic, and educational 
institutions. Publications from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
are freely permitted but rarely purchased. The electronic media 
are a different matter. Largely because of the central location of 
West Berlin transmitters, West German radio and television are 
received in East Germany, except for the southern mountain 
regions. Intershops carry decoder attachments required for clear 
reception of color broadcasts. As a practical matter, it is not possi- 
ble to prohibit viewing of Western television, not the least because 
it is a prime source of news and entertainment for the government 



198 



Government and Politics 



elite, who are also avid viewers of internationally syndicated United 
States programs, which are shown with German-language dubbing 
by West Berlin stations. 

Television thus promotes awareness of the higher standard of 
living in West Germany and provides divergent perspectives on 
world events. Public surveys have shown that East Germans are 
considerably more familiar with West German politicians than their 
own leaders. Since the mid-1970s, Western television has become 
an increasingly important source of news about political and eco- 
nomic conditions in East Germany itself. In late 1971, when 
Western television journalists were first regularly permitted in East 
Germany, they gained quick recognition. Some were even 
approached on the street by East German citizens and asked to 
do reports on specific issues. 

The penetration of Western media places a special burden on 
SED officials. Both the domestic electronic and the printed media 
continue to practice censorship. Certain kinds of economic, social, 
and military data are not disseminated, and no statements directly 
critical of either East German or Soviet leaders are permitted. At 
the same time, many sensitive topics are covered, if only in response 
to Western television broadcasts. East German television thus has 
gradually moved in the direction of more candid, if still biased, 
reporting. East German television journalists correctly perceive they 
are competing for the attention of East German viewers, and efforts 
to develop more interesting reporting styles and to be responsive 
to public opinion have become a source of professional pride. 

Political Stability, Legitimation, and Succession 

Despite its continuing search for political legitimation, since its 
formation East Germany has enjoyed a relatively stable political 
system. During the span of Ulbricht's rule, from approximately 
1950 to 1971, only the workers' uprising of 1953 and one large- 
scale purge of the SED ranks, which occurred in 1957, disrupted 
his regime. As of 1987, there had been no major upheavals during 
the sixteen years of Honecker's rule, although there had been peri- 
odic personnel reshuffling in the ranks of the party and the govern- 
ment, and important changes had occurred in the occupational and 
educational backgrounds of political decision makers. These changes 
reflected the rise to power of a more educated and technologically 
aware generation, a trend that is especially apparent in the rosters 
of the SED Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. 

Although stability marked the East German regime in the 1970s, 
three noteworthy political changes took place during that decade. 
The first and most significant political change occurred when 



199 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Ulbricht was removed from the post of first secretary. Ulbricht's 
ouster was extremely significant even though it was not followed 
by a purge of the party and state apparatuses. As a result of this 
change, over time the status of certain key SED officials was 
enhanced. In virtually every instance, the individuals involved were 
close associates of Honecker's or people responsible for policy areas 
that Honecker, the general secretary, considered necessary for 
stabilizing his leadership. Of particular importance in this regard 
were the promotions to full Politburo membership of Werner 
Krolikowski and Werner Lamberz, individuals with substantive 
experience in the agitation and propaganda apparatuses of the SED. 
The promotions of Krolikowski and Lamberz reflected Honecker's 
heightened sensitivity to the need to improve the public's level of 
political education. 

The second important change within the leadership of the SED 
took place on October 29, 1976, when Willi Stoph and Giinter 
Mittag were returned to their former respective positions as chair- 
man of the Council of Ministers and secretary in charge of the econ- 
omy on the Secretariat of the Central Comittee. The previous 
incumbents in these positions, Sindermann and Krolikowski, had 
been thrust into the political limelight in the aftermath of Ulbricht's 
death in August 1973 but replaced by Stoph and Mittag three days 
later. The move may have been motivated by Honecker's desire 
to bring back two key veterans who had gained considerable politi- 
cal influence during the turbulent 1950s and 1960s. Honecker also 
used the occasion to assume the post of chairman of the Council 
of State in addition to his position as general secretary. The third 
change in the SED hierarchy occurred in the spring of 1978 after 
the death of Politburo member Lamberz in a helicopter crash in 
Libya. Lamberz 's death was significant because of his close ties 
to Honecker; after Honecker he was the party's second most 
important ideological spokesman, and he was a leading proponent 
of the regime's increasingly ambitious policy toward Africa. 
Lamberz was replaced by Joachim Hermann, former chief editor 
of Neues Deutschland. 

Honecker's control of the party and state apparatuses has been 
secure since the early 1980s, and his leadership has been able to 
balance domestic policy priorities with expanding foreign policy 
demands. Honecker also has devoted considerable attention to the 
concerns of lower ranking functionaries and initiated a more active 
program of agitation and propaganda within the party and state 
structures than had been the case under Ulbricht. 

An enduring problem for the SED has been the desire to attain 
political legitimacy in the eyes of the East German public. The 



200 



Government and Politics 



multiparty system introduced at the end of the 1940s left some room 
for political participation outside the SED, but repression constituted 
a vital element of the system. Repressive factors included the sta- 
tioning of Soviet troops on East German territory, a sealed border, 
and an extensive network of political informants employed by the 
State Security Service (see Agencies of the Ministry of State Secu- 
rity, ch. 5). None of these aspects of the political system Can be 
challenged by public questioning or debate. The regime erected 
the Berlin Wall in August 1961 to halt illegal emigration after 
2.5 million people had escaped to the West. Since that time, the 
SED has attempted to strengthen its political authority through 
repressive measures when necessary, to encourage increased political 
participation and influence public opinion, and to improve the stan- 
dard of living and economic performance. 

The SED has continued to place significant emphasis on mass 
participation. The regime attempts to demonstrate that "socialist 
democracy," a term used to describe public participation, is an 
integral part of the political process. The concept, however, empha- 
sizes not the individual rights and liberties that define citizenship 
in Western Europe and North America but the opportunities for 
individuals publicly to participate in organized political activities. 
Thus it is common for East German sources to emphasize the vari- 
ety of opportunities for participation. For example, in the mid- 
1980s, approximately 195,000 citizens were members of national 
or local assemblies; 500,000 citizens were active in commissions 
of these local assemblies; 335,000 citizens participated in various 
committees of the National Front; 95,550 working people were 
engaged in the almost 10,000 production consultative bodies of the 
country's industrial enterprises; and 105,000 parents were active 
members of the parent associations that worked with teachers in 
the country's educational system. 

The political function of mass participation is largely one of 
mobilization for goals that have already been articulated by the 
party and state. Nonetheless, the public has some influence over 
both the content and the administration of policies formulated by 
the political leadership. Whether in the end the country's citizens 
supported the goals of the party and state apparatuses remains an 
open question. 

Despite its extremely powerful position in the society, since the 
mid-1970s the SED has been aware of the importance of public 
opinion. East Germany's research institutions have been particu- 
larly active in analyzing opinion on such issues as work, family 
life, the position of women in society, and leisure. The focus and 
results of public opinion research are carefully guarded secrets, and 



201 



East Germany: A Country Study 

it is known that the Politburo itself makes the final determination 
on basic emphases and content of the Central Research Plan. Two 
party institutes have played especially important roles in this area: 
the Institute for Opinion Research of the Central Committee of 
the SED and the Institute for Marxist-Leninist Sociology of the 
Academy for Social Sciences. 

In the mid-1980s, empirical research provided the SED with an 
up-to-date profile on the attitudes and feelings of the public across 
a range of major sociopolitical issues. Such data have provided the 
party with information that has helped it more effectively to com- 
municate its goals and purposes to the public. Since the 1970s, the 
SED has deliberately attempted to make respondents feel that their 
needs were being taken seriously. In other words, since the 1970s 
the regime has used public opinion research as another means to 
develop political legitimacy. Given the authoritarian character of 
the regime, it is worth considering whether citizens were willing 
to answer questions in a totally honest and open manner. 

The SED has used the instruments of socialization and control 
to achieve political passivity on the part of society, if not legitimacy. 
For example, the East German educational system has had an 
impact on the political values and expectations of the East Ger- 
man citizenry (see The Educational System, ch. 2). The military 
is also an important instrument for the inculcation of regime values 
(see The National Security System and the Citizen, ch. 5). Hence, 
there is reason to suggest that many of the social and political goals 
of the SED have been accepted by large parts of the public. (How 
strongly they support these goals is another matter entirely.) Still, 
the country's increased vulnerability to the industrial West, and 
particularly to West Germany, made the problem of legitimacy a 
troubling one for the SED. Despite efforts to instill an "East Ger- 
man consciousness" in the 1970s and 1980s, closer ties between 
the two German states have made that task increasingly difficult. 
All that can be said is that the political leaders remained aware 
of their legitimacy problems. 

Foreign Policy 

In the mid-1980s, East Germany enjoyed diplomatic recognition 
with over 130 countries. It was a member of the Soviet-directed 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and the War- 
saw Pact military alliance. In September 1973, both Germanies were 
admitted to membership in the United Nations (UN), and East Ger- 
many has been active ever since in advancing Soviet and East Euro- 
pean positions in that international forum. During the same period, 
it also became active in the developing world, particularly Africa. 



202 



Government and Politics 



The evolution of foreign policy is intimately tied to the condi- 
tion of inter-German relations and to the domestic situation. For 
the first two decades of its political existence, East Germany had 
been effectively excluded from international recognition by West 
Germany's Hallstein Doctrine, which required that diplomatic 
relations be broken with any country that recognized East Ger- 
many. The "diplomatic wave," a metaphor used to describe the 
rush of foreign governments to recognize East Germany, came after 
the Four Power Agreement on Berlin (1971) and the Basic Treaty 
(1972) had been signed. East Germany's foreign policy successes 
have also served domestic political purposes. Since the early 1970s, 
the regime has used the international recognition it has secured 
outside of Eastern Europe as a means to impress the East German 
public with its permanence and legitimacy. 

In light of East Germany's newfound diplomatic legitimacy, 
many of the traditional aspects of inter-German politics have 
become a significant aspect of broader East- West relations. In Third 
World countries, the two German states compete with each other 
for influence on behalf of their respective alliance systems. Within 
the UN, the two states have found themselves on opposite sides 
of most issues, from north-south economic and technology ques- 
tions to the subject of arms control. 

Principles of Foreign Policy 

From the earliest days of the republic, East Germany's foreign 
policy has been concerned with its survival as a separate political 
entity, international recognition, solution to the "two Germanies 
problem," accommodation to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, 
and development within Comecon and the Warsaw Pact. The state 
gained international recognition, signed treaties with West Ger- 
many, and solidified its position in Comecon and the Warsaw Pact 
by becoming the Soviet Union's staunchest ally. Since the late 
1970s, East Germany's foreign policy has been extended to include 
global interests, reflecting its position as one of the world's lead- 
ing industrial states. 

Five principles, which are established in Article 6 of the Consti- 
tution, underlie the foreign policy of East Germany: a "perpetual 
and irrevocable alliance" with the Soviet Union; an "insepara- 
ble" membership in the socialist community of states, toward whose 
members East Germany is committed in friendship, universal 
cooperation, and mutual assistance; the support of all peoples "who 
are struggling against imperialism and colonialism"; peaceful coex- 
istence of states with different social orders; and support for peace 



203 



East Germany: A Country Study 



and cooperation in Europe, a peaceful order throughout the world, 
and universal disarmament. 

East Germany's most important external contacts are with mem- 
bers of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, West Germany, and 
selected countries of the Third World. The determinant factor in 
East Germany's foreign policy is its integration into the Soviet 
sphere of influence following World War II. 

Relations with the Soviet Union 

The Soviet Union's relationship with East Germany is unique 
among Soviet relationships with East European states because of 
the substantial degree of East German dependence on the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet Union created the East German state; hence, 
the latter owes its continued existence to Moscow. East Germany 
has traditionally served three main functions for the Soviet Union. 
Strategically, it is the most important buffer state, the politico- 
military bulwark guaranteeing the Soviet security system in Eastern 
Europe. Second, East Germany is a vital source of economic assis- 
tance to the Soviet Union and provides advanced technology and 
manufactured goods unavailable in other East European countries. 
Third, East Germany is one of the most loyal replicas of the Soviet 
political system and offers both ideological and institutional legiti- 
macy for the Soviet-Marxist model. 

In the beginning of the 1970s, East Germany became increasingly 
significant in advancing Soviet foreign policy goals toward other 
members of the "socialist state community," the North Atlantic 
Treaty organization (NATO) countries (particularly West Ger- 
many), and the Third World. In each case, East Germany sup- 
ported and refined Soviet policy and long-term strategy toward these 
different arenas. It is also necessary to stress that although the 
activities of East Germany in international politics could not be 
undertaken without Soviet support, it is wrong to assume that subor- 
dination to Soviet direction reflects disinterest on the part of the 
East German regime. By working closely with the Soviet Union, 
East German leaders have been able to advance their own goal of 
promoting international recognition for their regime. 

In the 1980s, however, a change of attitude has taken place in 
East Germany's relations with the Soviet Union. In the mid-1980s, 
the Soviet Union disagreed with Honecker's attempts to pursue 
relations with West Germany despite the fact that the latter had 
accepted United States Pershing missiles on its soil. Although 
Moscow's leadership remains unquestioned, East German officials 
now argue that their state is at a different stage of development 



204 



ft i 



Kazakhstan, during his 1983 
visit to the Soviet Union 
Courtesy Panorama DDR 



of Alma Ata, the capital oj 



Erich Honecker receiving 
a welcome from residents 




and therefore must search for solutions that correspond to local 
(national) conditions. This view has resulted in a creeping diversity 
within the bloc that is well illustrated in Soviet-East German rela- 
tions. In recent years, a trend toward greater autonomy also has 
become discernible in East German domestic policy; although East 
Germany professes enthusiasm about Gorbachev's attempts to 
reform the Soviet economy, it does not view the changes as a model 
for its own problems. 

Determinants of Policy Toward the Soviet Union 

In the mid-1980s, close working relations between the Soviet 
Union and East Germany were based less on personality factors 
(as had been the case during the Ulbricht era) and more on struc- 
tural considerations that increasingly linked the two countries 
together. The emergence of East Germany as a diplomatic and 
political force was in large measure an outcome of Soviet detente 
policies toward the West. However, these same detente policies, 
at least toward West Germany, found allies in the very highest cir- 
cles of the SED elite, who wished to continue them despite the cool- 
ing of superpower relations in the early and mid-1980s. East 
Germany has demonstrated an ability to collaborate effectively with 
its larger partner across a range of issues. Several basic determinants 
will play crucial roles in defining the potential as well as the limi- 
tations of this relationship. 



205 



East Germany: A Country Study 



In the mid-1980s, a potential source of trouble in the East 
German-Soviet relationship lay in the SED leadership's unwilling- 
ness to emulate Gorbachev's economic and political reform pro- 
gram. The East German regime treats Gorbachev's reform program 
with caution and argues that because of East Germany's economic 
successes of the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet economic reforms are 
not relevant to its own situation. In a February 1987 meeting with 
Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Honecker was 
reported to have said that "the good [economic] balance of the year 
1986 presents a solid basis for the further dynamic development 
of the [East German] economy." The East German regime fears 
that Soviet political reforms, which include Gorbachev's calls for 
glasnost, or openness, and the use of the secret ballot and nomina- 
tion of rival candidates for party elections, will lead to social unrest 
if applied in East Germany. 

The relationship between East Germany and the Soviet Union 
will be influenced by the evolution of inter-German relations. In 
the mid-1980s, inter-German ties created strains in the East German- 
Soviet relationship. In the early and mid-1980s, despite the decline 
in superpower detente because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
the declaration of martial law in Poland, and the stationing of United 
States intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in West Ger- 
many, the Honecker regime sought to maintain good relations with 
the Bonn government. The Soviet Union was particularly upset with 
the West German decision to allow deployment of Pershing II mis- 
siles on its soil. The Soviet Union's inability to dissuade West Ger- 
many from stationing American missiles led to a deterioration of 
Soviet- West German relations. Yet, for economic and political rea- 
sons, the Honecker regime sought to insulate inter-German rela- 
tions from this broader international conflict. Economically, in the 
1980s East Germany's average annual intake of West German hard 
currency visa fees, minimum exchange rate revenues, and private 
transfers amounted to US$1 billion per year. Politically, the East 
Germans argued that the smaller powers could play a role in build- 
ing bridges between NATO and the Warsaw Pact when the super- 
powers found themselves in conflict. The discord between East Berlin 
and Moscow led to open disagreements. The traditionally maverick 
Hungarians backed East Germany, while East Berlin's nominal hard- 
line ally in Warsaw Pact affairs, Czechoslovakia, along with Poland, 
supported the Soviet Union. In September 1984, the disagreement 
culminated in Honecker' s indefinite postponement of a planned visit 
to West Germany. 

East Germany's active presence in the Third World will con- 
tinue to make the prospect of cooperation with the Soviet Union 



206 



Peace Rally held during the the sixth Festival of Friendship 
between Soviet and East German youth in Kiev in 1983 

Courtesy Panorama DDR 

an attractive one for both partners. Indeed, the value of that 
presence in this turbulent arena was consistently demonstrated 
throughout the early and mid-1980s. Because especially close work- 
ing relationships with a number of Marxist-Leninist countries in 
Africa have been established, the potential for increased Soviet- 
East German, as well as Cuban, collaboration in the late 1980s 
was substantial. The result could be a greater degree of operational 
independence in the global arena than East Germany has enjoyed 
in the past. 

Finally, the economic intercourse between the Soviet Union and 
East Germany represents another important sphere of activity with 
long-run implications for the overall relationship. It should be 
emphasized that the magnitude of the economic links binding the 
two systems is impressive and clearly dwarfs anything achieved by 
the two German states in their commercial dealings with each other. 

East Germany and the Soviet Union are bound together in a 
vast network of bilateral and multilateral agreements to share tech- 
nology and industrial production. A trade agreement between the 
two countries, signed in 1985, calls for trade turnover to increase 
28 percent over the 1986-90 plan period (see Foreign Trade, ch. 3). 
However, higher energy costs represent a potential source of fric- 
tion between the two partners. The Soviet Union has imposed 



207 



East Germany: A Country Study 

artificially low prices on imports from its Comecon partners and 
has demanded premium prices for the energy products that it 
exports to them (see Comecon, Appendix B). In light of the sig- 
nificant dependence on the Soviet Union for raw materials, such 
practices are undoubtedly troublesome for East German leaders. 

Joint East German-Soviet Relations with the West 

East Germany has its own specific foreign policy goals to advance 
in its effort to build a long-term relationship with the industrial 
West. As a direct result of its diplomatic breakthrough, beginning 
in the 1970s and continuing in the mid-1980s, East Germany also 
became an important partner of the Soviet Union in advancing 
both its own and Soviet national goals in Europe and North 
America. Two specific policy areas — European security and eco- 
nomic and technological cooperation — illuminate its role in help- 
ing to carry forward the goals of the Soviet-East German alliance 
system (see Appendix C). 

East Germany's forward position in the Warsaw Pact — as the 
westernmost point of the Soviet-East European alliance system- 
has made the SED particularly sensitive to East- West efforts to stabi- 
lize the military balance in Europe. Thus by actively publicizing 
the Soviet-sponsored Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE), it advanced its own specific goals. There is also 
a special point of convergence between the Soviet Union and East 
Germany on the subject of territorial inviolability, another issue 
dealt with by the CSCE. The two partners sought to get the West 
to agree on the permanent territorial division of Europe. As 
Honecker stated during an address delivered at the first CSCE meet- 
ing in Helsinki in July 30, 1975, "A socialist state in the heart of 
Europe at the boundary line between the most powerful alliances 
of our time, the German Democratic Republic accords high pri- 
ority to security. Only if security and the sovereignty of states are 
guaranteed can there be fruitful, beneficial, and mutually advan- 
tageous cooperation. The lessons of history and the current require- 
ments of European politics make respect for, and recognition of, 
the principle of the inviolability of frontiers the decisive factor. 
Security for the European states has always meant, first and fore- 
most, security for their frontiers." Whereas the Soviet Union has 
attempted to use the ongoing conference as a forum to campaign 
for its goal of attaining the West's acquiescence to the postwar 
division of the continent, East Germany has used it to ensure multi- 
lateral support in order to blunt real or alleged efforts by West Ger- 
many to change the existing boundaries that separate the two 
countries from each other. 



208 



In the early and mid-1980s, East Germany supported the Soviet 
Union in its efforts to stop the deployment of IRBMs in Europe. 
According to Honecker, "In an international situation percepti- 
bly exaggerated by imperialism, especially by the most aggressive 
United States circles, the world once again hears from Moscow 
the voice of peace and reason and of the willingness and call for 
constructive steps on behalf of detente, the ending of the arms race 
and disarmament." In addition, East Berlin has resolutely followed 
Moscow's lead in condemning the United States Strategic Defense 
Initiative and West European participation in the project, as well 
as supporting the Soviet Union's efforts in strategic arms control. 

Its exposed military position has been both an advantage and 
a disadvantage to East Germany in its attempts to coordinate its 
policy on arms control with that of the Soviet Union. East Germany 
clearly has an argument in its favor when it maintains that mili- 
tary confrontation in Europe directly threatens its political order. 
As a result, there is some plausibility to its assertion that East Ger- 
man leaders fully support multilateral efforts to reduce such ten- 
sion. However, the level of military preparedness within the 
country, which includes an extensive network of border patrols and 
fortifications that exists largely to prevent escapes to the West by 
its citizens, might in fact undermine the effectiveness of its cam- 
paign to work with the Soviet Union in reducing tensions (see 
Armed Forces; Paramilitary Forces, ch. 5). 



209 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Like the Soviet Union, East Germany is very eager to expand 
economic and technological links with the industrial West. Follow- 
ing the Soviet lead, East Germany increasingly supported proposals 
for technical and economic-financial cooperation between Come- 
con and the European Economic Community (EEC). Because East 
Germany enjoys access to the EEC, it is able to provide technology 
and hard currency transfers to Comecon. The 1970s witnessed a 
major expansion of trade between the Soviet Union, its East 
European allies, and the Western industrial countries. A partial 
reversal of this course has occurred in the 1980s, as the Soviets have 
warned their East European allies about becoming economically 
dependent on the West. However, it is clear that the Soviet Union 
and, to a lesser extent, East Germany will require assistance from 
the West if they are to modernize their economies through the 
introduction of high technology and other labor-intensive techniques. 

Ideological and Political Collaboration 

The interdependence between the Soviet Union and East Ger- 
many is based, first and foremost, on a shared interpretation of 
geopolitical power politics. Furthermore, the role of the Soviet 
Union in East German ideological and political development is a 
dominant one; the Soviet Union was responsible for the creation 
of East Germany and has given East Germany the opportunity to 
play an important role in world affairs. In return for this oppor- 
tunity, East Germany promotes Soviet interests in Europe and the 
Third World. 

The East German and Soviet leaderships have developed a pat- 
tern of cooperation that in large measure works to the mutual 
advantage of both systems. In general terms, they share a com- 
mon ideological and political orientation toward major issues that 
confront the Soviet-East European alliance system as a whole. From 
Eurocommunism to the conduct of proletarian internationalism in 
the developing areas of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, the two 
partners take common positions and adapt their foreign policy 
strategies to the needs of the other. Not only has the Soviet Union 
been the decisive factor in helping East Germany become an 
internationally recognized power since the beginning of the 1970s, 
but it also has consistently supported the SED leadership in domestic 
conflicts. From this vantage point, the approximately 400,000 Soviet 
troops stationed in East Germany represent the final deterrent avail- 
able in the event the regime's survival is threatened. As a result 
of the close ideological and political cooperation between the two 
countries, East Germany has taken the leading role in helping to 
establish the hegemony of Soviet-style Marxism in Eastern Europe. 



210 



Government and Politics 



East Germany demonstrated its value to the Soviet Union at the 
much-heralded meeting of the communist and worker parties of 
Europe, held in East Berlin on June 29-30, 1976, in the immedi- 
ate aftermath of the Ninth Party Congress. East Germany's role 
at the meeting was pronounced. The SED, which had begun prepar- 
ing the agenda for the meeting twenty months in advance, 
attempted to portray East Germany as a model of advanced 
socialism that could provide the West European comrades with 
important lessons in how to organize a complex industrial society 
along orthodox Marxist-Leninist lines. Until the mid-1980s, East 
Germany also had been a prominent proponent of closer coordi- 
nation of the economies of East European Comecon members with 
that of the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet leaders may have 
used Honecker's visit to China in 1986 to signal their desire for 
Sino-Soviet rapprochement. In the mid-1980s, East Germany 
strongly supported the Soviet Union's efforts to have the United 
States Pershing II missiles removed from West German soil (at the 
same time, however, the Honecker regime attempted to insulate 
inter-German relations from the impact of this issue). Finally, in 
the words of one Western analyst, East Germany "is the prime 
developer of the political, social, and economic infrastructure of 
the Soviet Union's allies in the Third World." 

Ideological and political collaboration between East Germany 
and the Soviet Union is of special importance within Eastern 
Europe, where the SED was particularly active in advancing Soviet 
positions toward Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Poland in 1980-81. 
In the Czechoslovak case, East Germany was probably the most 
influential East European voice urging the Soviet Union to put an 
end to the reform program of Alexander Dubcek in August 1968. 
In 1980-81 the East Germans also urged the Soviet Union to take 
action against the Solidarity movement and the reform policies of 
the Polish United Workers Party. In each case, the East Germans 
tried to persuade the Soviet leadership that events in Czechoslovakia 
and Poland constituted a danger to the ideological cohesion of the 
Warsaw Pact alliance system. Of particular concern to the East 
German regime were the threats to its own stability posed by the 
reform movements in Czechoslovakia and Poland; consequently, 
it became a strong advocate of intervention. 

Relations with West Germany 

Shifts in superpower relations in the late 1960s helped bring about 
a rapprochement between the two German states in the 1970s. 
Despite the decline in superpower detente, this rapprochement has 
continued in the 1980s. The normalization process took place on 



211 



East Germany: A Country Study 

two levels. On one level, outside powers negotiated a treaty deal- 
ing with Berlin; on another, the two Germanies dealt with each 
other. The Western powers (the United States, France, and Brit- 
ain) joined with the Soviet Union in negotiating the Four Power 
Agreement on Berlin (Berlin Agreement). Signed on September 3, 
1971 , the agreement served to normalize the political status of the 
divided city and provided for a specific number of guarantees 
safeguarding Western rights. As a result, the perennial crises over 
the future of West Berlin and its inhabitants have come to an end. 
Both German governments were kept informed over the course of 
the negotiations and during the intervening years have strongly 
backed the validity of the agreement. 

Normalized relations between the two German states have also 
concerned their respective political leaders. Two major agree- 
ments — the Transit Agreement and the Basic Treaty — were nego- 
tiated between Bonn and East Berlin in 1971-72, subsequently 
serving to expand and improve bilateral relations. The Transit 
Agreement carried through that portion of the Berlin Agreement 
applicable to the regulation of civilian passenger and goods transit 
between West Germany and West Berlin. Signed on December 17, 
1971, the Transit Agreement between the two German states 
ensures that agreed-upon transportation links (road, rail, and water) 
will be maintained by the respective parties. In the past, East Ger- 
man authorities had occasionally disrupted traffic as a means of 
communicating dissatisfaction with one or another aspect of Bonn's 
activities in West Berlin. During the 1970s and 1980s (most recently 
in May 1986), the two countries have disagreed occasionally, but 
both sides have, for the most part, observed the inviolability of the 
Transit Agreement. 

The Basic Treaty provided the two German states with a long- 
term framework for the conduct of their diplomatic, economic, and 
political relations. Signed on December 21, 1972, the treaty covers 
a broad range of common problems, ranging from environmental 
issues, trade and commercial relations, rights of citizens while visit- 
ing the other country, and an agreement jointly to negotiate minor 
rectifications of the common border. The treaty enjoyed the full 
support of both governments in the 1970s, and major changes in 
their relationship subsequently occurred. From 1970 to 1985, trade 
between the two countries more than doubled. Travel between East 
Germany and West Germany has also grown substantially. From 
January to April 1984, approximately 897,000 West Germans 
visited East Germany and East Berlin, an 18.4 percent increase 
over the same period in 1983. Visits in the other direction also 
increased; in 1986 approximately 500,000 East Germans of working 



212 



Government and Politics 



age traveled to West Germany, reflecting a substantial change in 
East German policy on this matter. In 1986 the East German 
government allowed approximately 20,000 Germans to resettle in 
West Germany, which was larger than the number allowed to leave 
in any one year in the 1970s, but lower than in 1984, when over 
30,000 East Germans left the country to settle in West Germany. 

The normalization of relations between the two Germanies 
manifests several inconsistencies. On the one hand, under Honecker 
East Germany has agreed to extensive economic and cultural con- 
tacts with West Germany. On the other hand, the Honecker regime 
has pursued a policy of Abgrenzung, designed to encourage a feel- 
ing of separate national identity on the part of the East German 
population (see The German Question Today: One Nation or Two, 
ch. 2). In the mid-1980s, with the revival of official interest in the 
German past and fewer references to Abgrenzung, it appeared that 
the regime had relaxed this policy. Another set of contradictory 
ideas is also applied to inter-German relations. On the one hand, 
as a price for closer relations, the Honecker regime has insisted 
that West Germany recognize East German citizenship and that 
East Germany's sovereignty be recognized through an exchange 
of ambassadors. On the other hand, as long as West Germany insists 
on acknowledging two German states in one German nation, an 
exchange of ambassadors is unlikely. 

Before Honecker came to power in 1971, the SED was formally 
committed to the goal of reunification of the two Germanies. Arti- 
cle 8 of the 1968 Constitution states that "The establishment and 
cultivation of normal relations and cooperation between the two 
German states on the basis of equality are national concerns of the 
GDR. The GDR and its citizens strive in addition to overcome 
the division of Germany imposed on the German nation by imperi- 
alism and support step-by- step rapprochement between the two Ger- 
man states until the time of their unification on the basis of 
democracy and socialism." The regime deleted that portion of 
Article 8 in the 1974 amendments to the Constitution. 

In the 1980s, in part as a function of alternate conflict and 
cooperation between the two states' superpower allies and in part 
as a function of the peculiar concerns of the two German states, 
relations between East Germany and West Germany fluctuated 
between conflict and cooperation. Upon coming to power in 1982, 
West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl emphasized Deutschlandpolitik 
(German policy), which had emerged under Kohl's predecessor, 
Helmut Schmidt, and was distinguished from the previous policy 
of Ostpolitik (eastern policy — see Glossary). Deutschlandpolitik involves 
the pursuit of three related policy aims: improving the lot of East 



213 



East German)': A Country Study 



Germans, alleviating the personal hardships on both sides of the 
border caused by the division of the German nation into two 
separate states, and fostering the unity of the German people. To 
pursue these policies requires the continuation and strengthening 
of detente between the two Germanies and. in a larger sense, 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. 

In the 1980s, the Honecker regime has also evinced an interest 
in detente between the two Germanies for both economic and 
political reasons. The Honecker regime needs West German eco- 
nomic support to meet the needs of East German consumers, and 
West Germany is the path the East Germans take to hard currency 
markets. Indeed, as if to show that relations between the two Ger- 
man states were not going to suffer if new NATO missiles were 
deployed in Europe, in 1983 the West German government 
arranged a 1 billion D-mark banking credit to East Germany by 
a West German consortium. In return, the East Germans have 
removed many of the SM-70 automatic firing devices along the 
inter-German border. In September 1983. the minimum daily cur- 
rency exchange requirement was eliminated for children between 
the ages of six and fourteen: in July 1984. this requirement was 
reduced from twenty-five to fifteen D-marks for pensioners. In the 
mid-1980s, the East Germans also demonstrated a willingness to 
undertake efforts to protect the environment in areas such as air 
pollution, acid rain, water pollution, and damage to forests that 
affect the two states. 

Political factors were also at work in the Honecker regime's 
attempt to continue rapprochement with West Germany in the 
1980s. Honecker has sought full diplomatic recognition from West 
Germany and an acknowledgement that East Berlin alone represents 
the sovereign interests of the East German state. Continuation of 
detente between the two Germanies held open the possibility that 
these two political objectives could be attained. 

Detente between the two Germanies was dealt a blow m 1984. 
however, by Honecker' s decision to postpone a visit to West Ger- 
many (see Relations with the Soviet Union, this ch. ). The Ameri- 
can scholar A. James McAdams has argued that for his own reasons 
Honecker himself played an important role in this decision. Recog- 
nizing that the West German public demanded that its government 
maintain good inter-German relations. Honecker mav have hoped 
that bv postponing his visit indefinitely, he could win resolution 
of outstanding issues between the two governments on terms more 
favorable to East Germany. From 1985 to 1987. both Bonn and 
East Berlin continued to reiterate that Honecker' s visit had only been 
postponed. However, in 1985 East Germany took up Moscow's 



214 



Government and Politics 



propaganda line, warning of West German "revanchism" and 
criticizing West Germany's celebrations of the fortieth anniversary 
of Nazi Germany's defeat. After the Eleventh Party Congress in 
April 1986, the East Germans again joined the Soviet Union in 
attacking West German policies. 

In the mid-1980s, several problems continued to divide the two 
Germanies. To a large extent, relations between the two. German 
states are held hostage to relations between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. When relations between the two superpowers 
worsen, each superpower exerts pressure on its German ally to 
refrain from extending relations with the other German state. There 
are also other outstanding issues that have previously been touched 
upon: the nature of German citizenship, East Germany's demand 
for West German recognition of East German sovereignty, and the 
need for the resolution of border issues left ambiguous by the vic- 
torious Allies after World War II (see Boundaries, ch. 2). Finally, 
there are other problems that divide the two German states. East 
Germany seeks the abandonment of the monitoring station in Salz- 
gitter used by West Germany to record human rights violations 
on the border. In turn, West Germany seeks a general improve- 
ment of conditions along the armed border and the Berlin Wall 
and the free movement of people and ideas between the two Ger- 
manies. 

Policy Toward the Third World 

Since the 1970s, East Germany has pursued an active policy in 
the Third World, particularly in Africa. East Germany pursues 
a vigorous Third World policy both to advance its own specific 
interests and as part of its role as a Soviet client. 

In the 1970s and 1980s, East Germany promoted two foreign 
policy interests in the Third World. First, in the late 1960s and 
1970s, East Germany, functioning as a divided state enjoying lit- 
tle international status as compared with West Germany, turned 
to the newly independent states of the Third World to gain recog- 
nition in return for economic and technical assistance. Compara- 
tive technological and economic backwardness vis-a-vis West 
Germany was less important in the Third World arena than in the 
West; East Germany could still proffer much-needed assistance to 
these economically backward states. Second, East Berlin launched 
a propaganda campaign to identify West Germany as the heir to 
Germany's imperial past, while representing itself as a German 
state able to offer all the qualities usually associated with Germans, 
such as efficiency, without the taint of a colonial past. Indeed, these 
policies paid off in 1969 when Sudan recognized East Germany. 



215 



East Germany: A Country Study 

In the early 1970s, recognition by a number of Arab governments 
followed, no doubt impelled by East German support of the Arab 
cause in the June 1967 War between the Arab states and Israel. 

East Germany has also developed trading relationships with a 
number of Third World states. Algeria, for example, has become 
a leading supplier of oil to East Germany. The East German govern- 
ment hopes to tap coal reserves held by Mozambique, and in the 
1980s East Germans were developing the infrastructure of the 
Moatize coal mining district in that country. In addition East Ger- 
many imports raw cotton, tropical fruits, coffee beans, and nuts 
from Africa. 

East Germany also promotes Soviet interests in the Third World 
by extending military, economic, and medical aid to states allied 
with the Soviet Union in the Third World, as well as selected Third 
World liberation movements. East Germany has concluded treaties 
of friendship and cooperation with Angola, Mozambique, and 
Ethiopia. These agreements call for cooperation in the fields of 
health, economic, scientific, political, and educational affairs. East 
Germany has also signed specific agreements covering much of the 
same ground as the treaties of friendship and cooperation with other 
Soviet allies in the Third World. In the mid-1980s, East Germany 
had a significant military presence in the Third World. In 1981 
the United States Department of Defense estimated that 2,225 East 
Germans were serving in the Middle East and Africa, specifically 
in Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mozambique, Algeria, Iraq, Afghani- 
stan, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South 
Yemen). Apparently East German troops do no fighting; they act 
primarily in an advisory and training capacity. The Soviet Union 
trains military officers in these countries, and East Germany trains 
the other ranks. Third World military and security personnel have 
also traveled to East Germany for instruction. Such personnel 
include members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
the South- West African People's Organization (SWAPO), the Afri- 
can National Congress (ANC), and the Zimbabwe African Peo- 
ple's Union (ZAPU). East German military advisers in Angola, 
Mozambique, and Zambia also train guerrillas of SWAPO, the 
ANC, and ZAPU. In addition, East Germany gives food, medi- 
cal, and educational assistance to these movements. 

One area of East German-Third World cooperation is police train- 
ing. In the 1980s, hundreds of students from Angola, Mozambique, 
Ethiopia, and Guinea-Bissau took instruction in internal security 
methods for periods ranging from three months to three years. 

East Germany also has played an important role in the develop- 
ment of the economic infrastructure of selected Soviet allies in the 



216 



Government and Politics 



Third World. East German education specialists have trained 
teachers, provided advice on the content of courses and books, and 
tendered instruction in educational administration in Benin, 
Mozambique, Angola, Congo, and Guinea-Bissau. In addition, 
East Germany has given assistance in the area of transportation; 
East German trucks operate in more than thirty countries, and in 
Angola and Mozambique the East Germans have set up centers 
to train indigenous personnel as mechanics and truck drivers. 
Finally, East German educational institutions that specialize in farm 
technology, health, construction, metalworking, finance, and indus- 
trial management have also trained personnel from countries such 
as Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. 

East Germany has encountered some frustrations in Africa. After 
Angola achieved its independence in 1975, East German techni- 
cians assisted in the operation of the port at Luanda. By 1981, 
however, Luanda had become very congested, and only a fraction 
of its equipment worked well. East Germany subsequently relin- 
quished control over the port, which was turned over to a private 
Portuguese company. In general, in its effort to compete with West 
Germany throughout Africa, East Germany has been at a disad- 
vantage because the West Germans have a considerably larger array 
of resources at their command, including substantial amounts of 
financial aid, which in the long run will probably be more impor- 
tant to the emerging societies than military and police expertise. 

Policy Toward the Industrial West 

Since the diplomatic wave of the early 1970s, East Germany has 
demonstrated a pronounced interest in expanding its economic and, 
where possible, political ties with the industrial societies of Western 
Europe and North America. This task has not been an easy one. 
West Germany continued to emphasize that it views East Germany 
as a special partner and accordingly reacted very negatively to efforts 
on behalf of the European allies to establish relations outside the 
existing framework that Bonn considered acceptable. 

East Germany's integration within Comecon and the Warsaw 
Pact also has limited the amount of diplomatic room available for 
building comprehensive ties with members of NATO. Furthermore, 
the country has not been able to expand trade with the West because 
of its existing delivery commitments to Comecon. Despite these 
restrictions, since the mid-1970s East Germany's economy has 
become increasingly tied to the market systems of Western Europe 
and Japan. Although the relative volume of its trade with those 
systems remained small, significant import and export growth has 
still been registered. 



217 



East Germany: A Country Study 

In line with the emphasis on "dialogue" and a "coalition of rea- 
son" with the West, in the 1980s East Germany pursued contacts 
with Western governments. In 1984 an official East German-British 
cultural agreement was signed. In 1984 Austria and East Germany 
also signed a long-term economic accord and an agreement on the 
bilateral recognition of certain university degrees. In 1985 Italy 
and East Germany signed a long-term economic cooperation agree- 
ment outlining an expansion in bilateral trade and pledged a prompt 
exchange of cultural centers in their respective capitals. Japanese 
premier Yasuhiro Nakasone's 1987 visit to East Berlin probably 
presaged greater economic cooperation between the two countries. 

France 

East Germany has demonstrated a pronounced interest in 
expanding its relations with France. Long-term historical reasons, 
as well as practical considerations, motivate that interest. In addi- 
tion, several members of the SED Politburo as well as government 
officials had spent some of their exile years during World War II 
in France. In 1967 a major diplomatic success was achieved by East 
Berlin when the "Friendship Group, France-GDR" was formed 
by a group of deputies in the French legislature. Diplomatic rela- 
tions between the two countries were begun on February 9, 1973. 
In the mid-1980s, the two countries strengthened their ties. In Janu- 
ary 1984, cultural centers were opened in East Berlin and Paris, 
and in June 1985 French premier Laurent Fabius visited East Ger- 
many. France's share of East Germany's foreign trade has climbed 
from 0.6 percent in 1960 to 1 .5 percent in 1985 (see Foreign Trade, 
ch. 3). 

The United States 

The absence of formal diplomatic relations between the United 
States and East Germany had represented a reluctance to accord 
political legitimacy to East Germany. When the two governments 
signed diplomatic protocols in Washington on September 4, 1974, 
the SED could rightly claim that an unpleasant era had come to 
an end. In a practical sense, East Germans were interested in 
establishing relations with the "main imperialist power," but the 
prospects for these relations always depended on the overall con- 
dition of East-West relations and on Washington's support for 
Ostpolitik. 

The major obstacle facing expanded trade relations was the 
unwillingness of the United States Congress to grant most-favored- 
nation treatment to imports from East Germany. Since 1974 a num- 
ber of governmental emissaries from East Berlin have passed 



218 



Government and Politics 



through Washington in an effort to promote bilateral trade in the 
absence of such treatment. Despite their efforts, from 1980 to 1985, 
the United States declined from East Germany's twelfth to its 
twenty-eighth largest trading partner. 

In the mid-1980s, political relations between the United States 
and East Germany have warmed somewhat. In 1984 Honecker's 
efforts to isolate inter-German relations from the effects of the 
decline of superpower detente won the regime some credit in 
Washington. A number of diplomatic exchanges between the two 
countries have occurred, including a meeting between East Ger- 
man foreign minister Oskar Fischer and United States secretary 
of state George Shultz in October 1984. 

* * * 

The DDR Handbuch, compiled and published in West Germany 
under the direction of Hartmut Zimmermann, Horst Ulrich, and 
Michael Fehlauer, is an invaluable source of information on East 
Germany. Other important works include Henry Krisch's The Ger- 
man Democratic Republic, Hermann Weber's Geschichte der DDR, C. 
Bradley Scharf's Politics and Change in East Germany, Klaus von 
Beyme and Hartmut Zimmermann' s Policymaking in the German 
Democratic Republic, and Martin McCauley's Power and Authority in 
East Germany. Notable works on East German foreign policy include 
Melvin C roan's East Germany: The Soviet Connection, A. James 
McAdams's East Germany and Detente, Eric C. Frey's Division and 
Detente, and articles by Ronald D. Asmus, B. V. Flow, Arthur M. 
Hanhardt, Jr. , Walther Leisler Kiep, and Woodrow J. Kuhns. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



219 



Border watchtower 



THE NATIONAL SECURITY problem for the German Demo- 
cratic Republic (East Germany) is unique among all the countries 
of the world. From the establishment of the Soviet Zone of Occu- 
pation in the aftermath of Nazi Germany's capitulation in 1945 
to the formation of the republic in 1949, its internal and external 
security was wholly in the hands of the Soviet occupation forces. 
Although the situation has changed significantly since 1949, the 
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) is the guarantor of 
East German security against external and, ultimately, internal 
threats. East Germany's substantial armed forces are overshadowed 
by the presence in their homeland of this powerful Soviet force. 
The GSFG is vastly superior to the East German forces in num- 
bers and equipment, and a scenario in which the home forces might 
act independently is difficult to imagine. Internal security is in the 
hands of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of State Secu- 
rity, but in this area also the Soviets would very likely intervene 
if they determined that local forces needed assistance. 

East Germany's principal external security problem during its 
first twenty-five years was hesitancy on the part of the rest of the 
world to perceive it as a legitimate, sovereign state. The principal 
internal threat was caused by traditional economic, cultural, 
familial, and historical ties with its larger and richer sister state, 
the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). 

Political events of the 1970s, such as formal recognition by the 
United States, the signing of the Basic Treaty between the Ger- 
manies, and admission to the United Nations, indicated that the 
external problem had been largely resolved. The relationship with 
West Germany, however, has remained an issue, and new chal- 
lenges emerged in the 1980s. East Germany sought to strengthen 
its position as the Soviets' chief ally, expand its role in the Third 
World, increase the militarization of all aspects of society, and cope 
with a rising crime rate — particularly among young people — and 
persistent signs of disaffection and dissent. How the East Germans 
successfully solved some problems and sought to deal with others 
is best understood by tracing the historical development of their 
national security. 

The Soviet Zone of Occupation 

On May 8, 1945, when Germany surrendered unconditionally 
to the Allied powers, the mold for its divided future already had 



223 



East Germany: A Country Study 

been cast. The Yalta Conference of February of that year and the 
Potsdam Conference of July- August left, at least in Western minds, 
the perception that ultimately post-World War II Germany would 
be a demilitarized and, to a degree, deindustrialized state of 
undetermined but shrunken borders. In dividing Germany into 
occupation zones, however, the Allies wittingly or unwittingly 
doomed such a state to failure from the start. After the common 
enemy was defeated, the traditional forces dividing the Soviet Union 
from the West reasserted themselves, and occupied Germany 
became the initial focus of conflict. 

Scholars still argue about who was truly responsible for the mak- 
ing of two Germanies. Opposing positions had emerged among 
the Allies while the war was being fought, and, in the postwar 
division of Germany into occupation zones, each occupying power 
intended to establish a local administration in its own image. The 
Soviet Union was no more likely to acquiesce to a Germany united 
as a Western-style democracy than the United States was to accept 
a united Germany under a communist dictatorship. Compromise 
by either side would have required a retreat from ideals and a degree 
of faith in the good intentions of the other side that simply did not 
exist. 

Although neither side may have recognized initially that the 
"temporary" division of Germany would become permanent, the 
pragmatic and suspicious Joseph Stalin probably accepted the pos- 
sibility much more quickly than did the Western leaders. Stalin 
took the first step toward the institution of East German statehood 
when he began creating a centralized, armed military force in the 
Soviet zone in October 1945 under the guise of a police force. 

The Soviet Military Administration 

The day after the formal German surrender, the Soviet com- 
mander established the Soviet Military Administration in Germany 
(Sowjetische Militaradministration in Deutschland — SMAD) to 
govern the Soviet occupation zone. Headquartered in Berlin- 
Karlshorst, the SMAD was the Soviet occupation authority until 
its functions were handed over to the Soviet Control Commission 
on October 7, 1949, the day on which the German Democratic 
Republic was founded. 

The Yalta and Potsdam agreements entered into by the Soviet 
Union, Britain, and the United States called for Germany's com- 
plete disarmament. Not only would no German ground, sea, or 
air forces capable of military action be created, but also no indus- 
trial capability to support such forces would be permitted. Police 
forces were to be local and decentralized. 



224 



National Security 



Almost from the beginning of the occupation, the Communist 
Party of Germany, headed by Walter Ulbricht, began to assume 
civil authority. In the process of constructing a socialist system in 
the country, the party looked for political reliability as the prin- 
cipal qualification for leadership, even at the expense of compe- 
tence. Initially, at least, reliability was measured primarily by a 
person's anti-Nazism. Not all persons selected were communist or 
of working-class background. None, however, were anticommunist. 
To ensure their reliability, the German Administration of the 
Interior, which later became the Ministry of the Interior, was 
established by the SMAD. The supervision of the police forces — 
reorganized on the basis of the five existing states of the Soviet 
zone — was a prime objective of the new German Administration 
of the Interior. 

At the same time that the police forces were being reorganized, 
the system of justice underwent a similar and much more strin- 
gent restructuring. All judges, prosecutors, and lawyers who had 
Nazi connections were summarily removed from office. Because 
the Nazis had dominated the legal system, this meant virtually a 
clean sweep. To fill the void, members of the legal profession who 
had retired before 1933 were pressed into temporary service. For 
a longer term solution, people with anti-Nazi and preferably 
working-class backgrounds were trained in intensive law courses, 
lasting six to nine months, run by the Soviet Army. 

Foundation of the People's Police 

By December 1945 — within six months of the end of the war — 
each of the five states in the Soviet zone had a central police force, 
in clear violation of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. In early 
January 1946, the term Volkspolizei (People's Police) was applied 
publicly to the new police forces in East Germany, and in August 
of the same year these forces were placed under the central control 
of the newly created German Administration of the Interior, headed 
by Erich Reschke. 

Included within the structure of the People's Police was a spe- 
cial group called the Garrisoned People's Police (Kasernierte 
Volkspolizei — KVP). The group, first known as the Garrisoned 
Alert Units, was organized in 1948 but not officially recognized 
until 1952. These police, as the name indicates, lived in garrisons, 
or barracks, which usually were located in rural areas. The forces 
were organized and equipped as light infantry. The cadre com- 
prised mostly former officers of Adolf Hitler's Wehrmacht who had 
undergone a conversion to communism while held as prisoners in 
the Soviet Union. Later the KVP was to be the major source of 



225 



East Germany: A Country Study 

cadres for the armed forces of East Germany. The basic organiza- 
tion was similar to that of a Soviet battalion, and the uniforms were 
supplied by the Soviet Union. Initially the KVP was armed with 
captured German weapons, but gradually these were phased out 
in favor of Soviet weapons. 

Why the People's Police was created is more difficult to explain. 
It could be argued that creation of the force was one of the first 
steps in the establishment of a sovereign state. The preponderance 
of evidence, however, indicates that in 1945 Stalin had no inten- 
tion of forming an independent East German state. A reasonable 
explanation for the establishment of the police force may be found 
in the Soviet model on which the German Administration of the 
Interior was patterned. Under the Soviet system, uniformed troops 
subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior were assigned to tacti- 
cal units to prevent counterrevolutionary activities. It would seem 
logical from the Soviet standpoint that the German Administra- 
tion of the Interior have similar security forces. 

Whatever the motivation, centralization of the police, beginning 
at the state level, was underway within a few months of the end 
of the war. According to Otto Opitz, who at that time was presi- 
dent of the police in Dresden and later became a senior official in 
the East German government, the SMAD approved the arming 
of community-level police forces on October 31, 1945, a date that 
East Germany also recognizes as the birth date of its armed 
forces. 

From its inception, the People's Police prospered rapidly. By 
November 1946, the force numbered 45,000 men; two years later, 
it had grown to 60,000. By 1950 the KVP component alone totaled 
70,000. With this growth came better definition of functions and 
a more sophisticated organization. In November 1946, the SMAD 
directed the organization of the Border Police. The initial 3,000 
recruits were organized and trained from People's Police resources, 
and by April 1948 the branch numbered 10,000, the total reach- 
ing 18,000 in 1950. In December 1946, the Railroad Police was 
established in the same manner. By 1948 the latter unit, redesig- 
nated the Transport Police, consisted of 7,400 men. 

By the end of 1948, the German Administration of the Interior 
had a large, well-organized security force under its command. The 
units were subordinate to the Main Administration of the Border 
Police and Alert Units, one of the primary agencies. Correspond- 
ing offices formed in each of the five states to coordinate police 
activities were removed from the jurisdiction of local authorities 
and directly subordinated to the central administration. While 
efforts were made to ensure the professional competence of security 



226 



National Security 



forces by exploiting the experience of Wehrmacht veterans, of whom 
there was no shortage, the principal concern was political reliability. 

In its pursuit of reliability, the SMAD gave its first purge order 
in spring of 1949. This order directed the dismissal, from all 
branches of the police, of personnel who had been German police 
before 1945, had been prisoners of war in the West for extended 
periods, or had come to the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany as 
refugees from former German territories that had been placed under 
Polish or Soviet control. Those with close relatives in West Ger- 
many were also dismissed. In effect, anyone suspected of possible 
political unreliability was fired. At the same time, the first steps 
toward producing a reliable and professional cadre were taken by 
establishing the Main Administration of Training. The first training 
courses, run in 1949, were directed by such venerable communists 
as General Wilhelm Zaisser, the renowned "General Gomez" of 
the Spanish Civil War, and his deputy, the Soviet-trained general 
Heinz Hoffmann. Hoffmann later became minister of defense, com- 
mander of the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee — 
NVA), and a member of the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party 
of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands — SED), 
positions he continued to hold until his death in 1985. 

By 1949 the nascent East German state had a well-organized and 
centrally controlled national security force. Although it had no 
armed forces in name, the foundation for the services had been 
well laid, and the establishment of the German Democratic Republic 
justified creating such a force. 

The Republic 

On October 7, 1949, the formation of the German Democratic 
Republic as an independent socialist state superimposed on the 
Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany was announced. There may 
be reason to doubt the degree of Soviet devotion to the survival 
of an independent East German state at the time; however, there 
is no doubt that Ulbricht intended to make his state work and sur- 
vive. Although independence had been declared, the republic did 
not receive full sovereignty until 1955. It still had no peace treaties 
with former enemies, and ultimate authority still lay with the 
occupying Soviet forces. 

Ministry of the Interior and the Soviet Control Commission 

The new status required some changes in the structure of the 
governing apparatus of the country and in its relationship with its 
occupying power. The degree of direct Soviet involvement in day- 
to-day affairs diminished after independence was declared, and for 



227 



East Germany: A Country Study 

this and other cosmetic reasons the SMAD became the Soviet Con- 
trol Commission. The former German administrations that had 
been agencies of the SMAD became ministries of the new govern- 
ment. The new Ministry of the Interior evolved from the German 
Administration of the Interior and maintained its former direc- 
torates and functions. 

Although statehood brought many changes in the structure and 
functioning of the East German government, only one was of 
immediate and particular importance for national security. With 
the formation of the republic, all justification for maintaining 
political and administrative ties with the West was effectively 
abolished. Politically this meant that officials acceptable to the West 
no longer had to be tolerated and could be removed from posi- 
tions of authority. It also justified measures designed to establish 
loyalty to an independent, socialist East German state among the 
population. Administratively the country and the government could 
be restructured to facilitate policy without concern for the reac- 
tion of Western powers. The new state sought to ensure its sur- 
vival by centralizing authority and eliminating all sources of 
potential power other than those of the ruling party. These changes 
represented a clear-cut move toward a Soviet-style dictatorship. 

Political centralization was marked by another traditional Soviet 
device, the establishment of the National Front, the umbrella 
organization that facilitates control of all political parties and mass 
organizations. Gradually, the emphasis of the National Front shifted 
from antifascist to pro-Soviet. As a mark of this shift, 1950 saw 
what might be called "the second purge," a Soviet-style purge of 
the membership of the SED, in which all members turned in their 
party cards. After careful examination, cards were reissued to those 
deemed fit. The most common reason for refusing to reissue a card 
was the charge that the cardholder was a West German agent. In 
practice, the weight of the purge fell most heavily on Jews and those 
communists who had spent the war in the West. In the case of the 
Jews, the purge reflected events taking place in the Soviet Union. 
In the case of communists from the West, the purge strengthened 
Ulbricht's hand against other party factions. 

Along with attempting to improve national security through 
political and military means, East German leadership also worked 
to create a formal military and police structure. Although the Soviet 
Union and its East European allies may have been less enthusias- 
tic about the creation of East Germany's armed forces than they 
were about the creation of the republic itself, the state needed the 
trappings of nationhood, including armed forces, if it was to be 
recognized as legitimate. 



228 



National Security 



Creation of the National Defense Forces under the Ministry 
of the Interior 

In the initial stages of reorganization, the nonmilitary units of 
the People's Police, the Border Police, and the Transport Police 
were subordinated to the Main Administration of the People's Police 
within the Ministry of the Interior. The Alert Units of the KVP 
were assigned to the Main Administration of Training as the first 
step toward creation of the NVA and the Ministry of Defense. 

In the spring of 1950, the process of dividing the Alert Units 
into separate branches of the armed services was initiated. The first 
pilot training occurred at an aviation club at Lausitz, and shortly 
thereafter Special Section 2 of the KVP was created as the nucleus 
of the East German air force. In 1952 Special Section 2 was redesig- 
nated Main Administration for Air Police. 

A similar process established East Germany's navy. On June 15 
1950, the existence of the Main Administration of Sea Police 
(Hauptverwaltung Seepolizei) was announced formally. Headquar- 
tered at Berlin-Niederschoneweide, the Sea Police initially were 
responsible for protection of fisheries and for antismuggling activi- 
ties. A school for sailors established at Kiihlungsborn, a school for 
petty officers at Parow, and an officer training school at Stralsund — 
all on the Baltic Coast — provided the basis for the future navy. 
By 1952 the Sea Police had assumed the additional duties of 
minesweeping in coastal waters and, in cooperation with the Border 
Police, surveillance of the sea. Until shipyards — which began opera- 
tion in 1952 — could launch new ships, the Sea Police were limited 
to a few German World War II patrol boats and minesweepers 
turned over to them by the Soviets. 

The ground forces were structured on the light infantry battal- 
ions of the KVP and subordinated to the Main Administration of 
Garrisoned People's Police. Except for resubordination of the 
Border Police, the KVP changed the least of the three services. 

Organization and training for all services closely adhered to the 
Soviet model, and Soviet advisers were present at all levels down 
to battalion. Although much of the equipment and most of the 
weapons were initially of German World War II vintage, there was 
an increasingly rapid introduction of newer Soviet materiel. In a 
move to assert a separate identity, the East German leadership 
introduced unique uniforms, similar to the Soviet field uniforms, 
to differentiate the armed forces from the police forces. 

Creation of the Ministry of State Security 

It was during this same period, from 1950 to 1952, that the 
Ministry of State Security was established. Although set up on a 



229 



East Germany: A Country Study 



much-reduced scale, the ministry was parallel to the Soviet security 
police in its general organization and functions. Its operations were 
more closely supervised and controlled by Soviet agents than those 
of any other branch of the East German government. Although 
the details of the ministry's work were shrouded in secrecy, in 1987 
it was generally known that it ran East Germany's foreign intelli- 
gence network, especially the network in West Germany, in addi- 
tion to conducting its own clandestine security operations against 
foreigners and East German citizens. The ministry also had 
uniformed units in the form of the Emergency Police and the Feliks 
Dzierzynski Guard Regiment (see Paramilitary Forces, this ch.). 
As in the case of the armed forces, the Ministry of State Security 
had its genesis as part of the Ministry of the Interior. However, 
the Ministry of State Security became a separate ministry on 
February 8, 1950, before the establishment of the Ministry of 
Defense. 

By early 1953, the fundamental structure of the national security 
system, which followed the Soviet design, was in place and func- 
tioning. Although the system provided the external appearance of 
national sovereignty, its degree of autonomy was called into ques- 
tion in the uprising of 1953, when the disappointing performance 
of the People's Police in quelling the rebellion resulted in tight- 
ened Soviet control. 

Uprising 

In the early 1950s, problems within the country were causing 
dissatisfaction among East German citizens. These problems 
included confusion within the ruling SED following the death of 
Stalin, economic pressures resulting from collectivization, payment 
of reparations, an increasingly disadvantageous comparison with 
West Germany, and resentment of Soviet presence and influence. 
Eventually these factors combined to trigger a spontaneous general 
uprising that started in East Berlin on June 17, 1953, and rapidly 
spread throughout much of the country. The rebellion was quickly 
suppressed by Soviet troops on June 17. This short but intense epi- 
sode had far-reaching effects on the evolution of the national secu- 
rity system. 

The uprising taught the Soviets that the socialist revolution 
imposed from without had not been accepted by the German peo- 
ple. The absorption of this lesson brought fundamental changes 
to the status of the country. Recognizing that its economic policy 
of reparations was dangerous and that communism would not be 
a significant force in a unified neutral Germany, the Soviet Union 
shelved plans for German reunification and made a political and 



230 



National Security 



economic commitment to the survival of East Germany as a politi- 
cal entity. 

For its part, the Ulbricht government also was forced to recog- 
nize that it lacked legitimacy in the eyes of its own people. In the 
short run, the most notable response was what could be called "the 
third purge" in the summer of 1953. This purge resulted in changes 
in the top ranks of the SED, including replacement of Zaisser, the 
minister of state security. During the remainder of the summer, 
12,000 men of all ranks and grades were dismissed from the Peo- 
ple's Police for "unreliability." 

The uprising, which raised doubts in the Soviet Union about 
the dependability of the young republic, also resulted in intensi- 
fied supervision by the Soviet military, recall of MiG-15s destined 
for the new air force, and curtailment of training and other pro- 
grams. The Soviets continued to restrict military development in 
East Germany until the early 1960s, when the country appeared 
politically and socially stable enough to receive full support. 

Thus East Germany's national security organization was unable 
to pass its first serious test. Faced with an internal threat, its secu- 
rity organs failed to prevent or suppress the uprising. The shock 
of events, however, had the effect of forcing both the East German 
and the Soviet leadership to commit themselves to the difficult tasks 
necessary to make the state viable. 

Establishment of the Ministry of Defense 

On January 18, 1956, the People's Chamber (the national legis- 
lature) passed a bill creating the NVA and the Ministry of Defense. 
This act formally acknowledged the existence of East Germany's 
armed forces. The NVA incorporated the KVP, Sea Police, and 
Air Police into a single armed force having three branches: ground, 
naval, and air. The Ministry of Defense was headed by Colonel 
General (Generaloberst) Willi Stoph, who was also minister of the 
interior. In 1987 Stoph was chairman of the Council of Ministers 
and a member of the SED Politburo. General Hoffmann, who was 
listed as first deputy minister of defense, attended the Soviet General 
Staff Academy in the mid-1950s and replaced Stoph as defense 
minister in 1960. Hoffmann held the post until his death in 1985. 

Concurrent with the establishment of the NVA as a legal entity 
was a return to public manifestations of German military tradi- 
tions, with the addition of socialist elements. The training regi- 
men for recruits approximated that of the former Wehrmacht, as 
did drill and ceremonies. New uniforms, whose color and cut were 
far closer to those of German World War II forces than to Soviet 
models, were introduced. Only the helmet represented a radical 



231 



East Germany: A Country Study 

departure from World War II, but here too the design differed from 
the Soviet model. 

The creation of the NVA addressed both internal and external 
security problems. Internally the physical appearance of the NVA 
spoke to the population in terms of their traditional German heritage 
and differentiated the NVA from the Soviet Army. In theory at 
least, East German citizens could have pride in their own army. 
The swift creation of the NVA as a force of more than 120,000 
officers and other ranks practicing Prussian-style drill was a dra- 
matic gesture of nationalism that was impossible for the world to 
ignore. 

The creation of the Ministry of Defense and the NVA seemingly 
should have been a blow to the authority and prestige of the Ministry 
of the Interior. The bureaucratic impact of this action was mitigated 
by permitting Stoph to carry both portfolios for four years. In 
addition, police activities, both civil and secret, remained under 
the Ministry of the Interior, as did the Border Police. The Minis- 
try of the Interior established its own Alert Units for the specific 
function of internal security. The Alert Units were militarily struc- 
tured, fully motorized units with modern weapons and equipment. 
Garrisoned and trained in battalion-size units, they were capable 
of carrying out police tasks and other security functions. They have 
been used in major disturbances or in civil disasters affecting pub- 
lic order and safety. 

East Germany Joins the Warsaw Pact 

In spite of external appearances, the creation of the NVA did 
not imply that the Soviet Union was surrendering its authority over 
East Germany. Soviet control was subtle but nonetheless perva- 
sive: from its inception, the NVA was fully integrated into the 
Warsaw Pact (see Appendix C). East Germany assumed complete 
responsibility for its military security within its own borders. 
External security was ensured by membership in the Warsaw Pact. 
Presumably, East European concerns about a new German army 
were laid to rest by assurances that East German troops operating 
outside their own borders would be under joint command. 

The integration of East Germany into the Warsaw Pact lent the 
state a certain amount of internationally recognized legitimacy and 
made it difficult for the Soviet Union to negotiate the country out 
of existence in an agreement with the West. Ultimately, the Soviet 
Union recognized this fact by signing the bilateral Treaty on Mutual 
Assistance and Cooperation with East Germany on June 12, 1964. 
This treaty completed the process of integrating East Germany into 
the network that bound Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. 



232 




Propaganda poster, which reads "Long Live the Indestructible 
Brotherhood- in- Arms of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact!" 

Courtesy V. Jeffrey Gedmin 

Crisis Control 

The beginning of the 1960s marked a new stage in the history 
of East Germany. Although it certainly had not solved all its secu- 
rity problems, the country had made significant progress. Control 
over society had been stabilized, and party authority was well 
established. The basic governmental structures necessary to guaran- 
tee the internal and external security of the state had been created 
and were functioning at a surprisingly high level of efficiency. In 
grudging acceptance of these realities, the Soviet Union had given 
the republic increasing authority over its own internal affairs, and 
the neighboring East European states had accepted it as a full mem- 
ber of the Warsaw Pact. 

There were, however, serious national security problems to be 
faced. The most serious was the mass exodus of East German 
citizens to West Germany from East Berlin to West Berlin and 
through the east-west border. The figures are indeed monumen- 
tal. In 1959 about 144,000 persons fled; in 1960 the figure rose 
to 199,000; and in the first seven months of 1961, about 207,000 
left the country. The damage caused by this exodus was 
compounded by the fact that the defectors represented a high 
proportion of the young, better educated, and most productive 
members of society. 



233 



East Germany: A Country Study 

An equally important though less pressing problem concerned 
international recognition. Although the East German government 
received formal recognition within the communist world, the non- 
communist world either ignored it or refused the regime recogni- 
tion on the basis of its being a puppet government. National security 
efforts during the 1960s were devoted to resolving these problems. 

During the early months of 1961 , the government actively sought 
a means of halting the emigration of its population to the West. 
By the early summer of 1961, Ulbricht apparently had persuaded 
the Soviets that an immediate solution was necessary and that the 
only way to stop the exodus was to use force. This presented a deli- 
cate problem for the Soviet Union because the four-power status 
of Berlin specified free travel between zones and specifically for- 
bade the presence of German troops in Berlin. Although it is not 
known who made the actual decision to erect the Berlin Wall, it 
is generally accepted that overall operations were directed by 
Marshal Ivan Konev, commander in chief of the GSFG. Appar- 
ently Konev appointed Major General Martin Blek of the NVA 
as the operational commander. 

During the spring and early summer, the East German regime 
procured and stockpiled building materials for the erection of the 
Berlin Wall. Although this extensive activity was widely known, 
few outside the small circle of Soviet and East German planners 
believed that East Germany would be sealed off. 

It may have been that neither the Soviets nor the East Germans 
were certain of the reaction that they would have to face from the 
East or the West. For this reason, 8,000 Working-Class Combat 
Group's personnel from East Berlin, Saxony, and Thuringia were 
employed as the so-called first line of the operation. The Working- 
Class Combat Groups, a workers' militia, were present in a police 
capacity to ensure that the troops and the local population remained 
passive during the construction of the Wall. 

Approximately 32,000 NVA combat and engineer troops were 
used in building the Wall; they constituted the second line. Once 
their efforts were completed, the Border Police assumed the func- 
tions of manning and improving the barrier. The third line consisted 
of the Soviet Army, which was present to discourage interference 
by the West and presumably to assist the NVA in the event of large- 
scale riots. 

The operation started at 2:00 a.m. on August 13, 1961. Con- 
struction of the Berlin Wall proved three important facts. First, 
the NVA could plan, organize, and rapidly execute a large-scale 
operation in complete secrecy. Second, the government could and 
would take tough and brutal measures to ensure its own survival. 



234 



National Security 



Third, the operation resolved questions concerning the reliability 
of People's Police units that had originated during the June 17, 
1953, uprising. 

Differentiation between the Ministry of Defense and the Minis- 
try of the Interior was still in progress in the 1960s. Another issue 
in this process was the subordination of the Border Police. On Sep- 
tember 15, 1961, by order of the National Defense Council, the 
entire Border Police was transferred to the NVA and redesignated 
the Border Troops of the NVA. Various explanations for this shift 
have been offered by different authorities. The official reason 
stressed improvement in the level of training through closer rela- 
tionship with the NVA and provision for reinforcement of the 
Border Troops with other NVA assets. The actual reason proba- 
bly had more to do with standardization within the Warsaw Pact 
since similar reorganizations occurred in roughly the same time 
period in all the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies. 

By the end of the 1960s, the security forces had probably achieved 
the maximum strength possible under existing conditions. Mili- 
tary service was not extremely popular with the postwar genera- 
tion, and any move toward conscription during the 1950s would 
have only added to the flood of emigration. After the building of 
the Berlin Wall, however, this restriction vanished. On Septem- 
ber 20, 1961, little more than a month after the Wall was built, 
the People's Chamber passed the Act on the Defense of the German 
Democratic Republic, which, among other things, prescribed per- 
sonal obligations for national service. Although the act did not legis- 
late conscription, it set the base for the National Service Act of 
January 24, 1962, which required military service for all males 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six and made all males 
up to the age of fifty liable for military service. In a declared "state 
of defense," males were made liable for service until sixty years 
of age, and women between the ages of eighteen and fifty could 
be drafted for medical or supply service in the NVA. 

As the 1960s progressed, Soviet confidence in the new republic 
and its armed forces reached ever higher levels. As the decade drew 
to a close, the position of the country within the socialist camp was 
far more certain than it had been at the beginning of the 1960s. 
All was not well, however, in the rest of the socialist camp. Liber- 
alizing forces were appearing, their most apparent manifestation 
occurring in the Prague Spring in neighboring Czechoslovakia. 
Given East Germany's own uncertain history, liberalization was 
then, as it continued to be, an unsettling thought for the East Ger- 
man leadership. 



235 



East Germany: A Country Study 

For this reason, Ulbricht was willing to support a Soviet initia- 
tive to re-establish a "reliable" government in Czechoslovakia. When 
the Warsaw Pact states declared the situation in Czechoslovakia 
"absolutely unacceptable," East Germany was in full agreement 
and was ready to follow the Soviet lead. On the night of August 20, 
1968, when the forces of five Warsaw Pact nations invaded and 
occupied the country, NVA troops were among the participants. 
Although NVA participation was minor (limited to two divisions 
that were kept out of populated areas) and its forces were withdrawn 
after only five days, the invasion of Czechoslovakia marks a 
watershed in the history of East Germany. For the first time since 
World War II, German troops marched upon foreign soil. 

East Germany's participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
showed the world that the NVA could — and would — use its newly 
created military might to function effectively outside its borders. 
In addition to the other political repercussions in the world, it was 
now clear that East Germany could no longer be ignored. The 
invasion also had an internal impact. East Germans, who were able 
to watch footage of the invasion on West German television, were 
well informed about the events in Czechoslovakia. Within seven 
days after the invasion, over 5,000 East Berliners went to the 
Czechoslovak embassy to sign protests against the occupation. 
Throughout the country, there were numerous antiregime and anti- 
Soviet incidents. In Erfurt, People's Police Alert Units went on 
patrol to forestall planned protest demonstrations, and in Leipzig 
the Soviet consulate had to be protected. In Schwerin police used 
water cannons to disperse demonstrators. 

East German reaction to the invasion clearly showed that the 
government had not captured the hearts and minds of a signifi- 
cant portion of its citizens. The use of massive repressive meas- 
ures demonstrated that the government was not in complete control. 
In contrast to the situations in 1953 and 1961, however, East Ger- 
man security forces quickly and effectively managed the 1968 cri- 
sis without Soviet participation or support. 

The National Security System and the Citizen 

Having successfully met challenges at home and abroad, East Ger- 
many entered the decade of the 1970s with a stronger external secu- 
rity image than it had had previously and with a fully active state 
security apparatus in operation. Internal security had been tight- 
ened, and the Berlin Wall had stemmed the emigration problem. 
The regime was perceptibly closer to international recognition. Mat- 
ters involving the organization of the national security system and 
political and social integration still had to be addressed, however. 



236 



National Security 



Civil Defense 

As a member of the Warsaw Pact, East Germany is obliged to 
ensure that its security organization corresponds to the norms 
accepted for the other member states. In 1961 the Soviet Union 
had created a comprehensive civil defense system that brought all 
functions — military, police, economic, and medical — into a single 
organized body. By 1969 the other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states 
had followed suit, and on September 16, 1970, East Germany came 
into compliance when the People's Chamber passed a law creat- 
ing a comprehensive civil defense system. This law was replaced 
by the Civil Defense Law of 1978, later modified by decree in 1981 . 
These laws regulated mobilization, set forth the obligations of the 
population in the event of war, and determined the role of the 
citizenry in peacetime civil defense work. Since 1981, for exam- 
ple, all East German males between the ages of sixteen and sixty- 
five and all females between the ages of eighteen and sixty have 
been required to participate in civil defense training exercises that 
frequently simulate nuclear warfare and involve entire sections of 
a city. 

Under the new law, the minister of defense, through the direc- 
tor of civil defense, was made responsible for national civil defense. 
Until 1978 civil defense had been the responsibility of the minister 
of the interior; the change was made throughout the Warsaw Pact 
in the 1970s in accordance with Soviet doctrine, which began to 
define civil defense as an element of warfare. The Central Civil 
Defense Staff had been created to formulate plans, conduct day- 
to-day business, and coordinate activities should an emergency 
arise. For local operations, regional, urban, and district staffs were 
established. People's Police officers and others specially trained at 
national civil defense schools in the Soviet Union occupied many 
staff positions. 

The law also provided for the formation of civil defense com- 
mittees at local levels, down to the level of cooperatives; directors 
of plants, offices, and schools would be responsible for civil defense 
affairs in their organizations. Civil defense training was mandatory 
for all citizens beginning at the age of sixteen and extending through 
the age of sixty for women and sixty-five for men. Training included 
formal schooling at the district level and tournaments with com- 
petition in individual and team civil defense skills. Also included 
in the law was a provision for construction of civil defense shelters, 
giving emphasis to the safety of the leaders of the SED and the 
government. Possibly because of shortages of building materials, 
shelters for the general public were few and of poor quality. 



237 



East Germany: A Country Study 

In 1987 the civil defense cadre numbered about 3,000, and several 
hundred thousand civilians were subject to mobilization as needed 
(see Paramilitary Forces, this ch.). Public safety organizations, 
including police, fire, Red Cross, and communications, could be 
mobilized under the direction of the local Civil Defense Staff. 
Volunteer formations known since 1982 as Civil Defense Alert Units 
could also be activated in an emergency. In addition, certain 
branches of the economy, such as construction organizations and 
the public health system, created their own civil defense sectors, 
having specific responsibilities in their own areas of competence. 

Another aspect of the civil defense structure was its mass nature. 
Civil defense not only served its direct purpose of protecting the 
state, the economy, and the public from the effects of war and 
natural catastrophe, but it also represented a socializing instrument, 
or a means of providing mass participation in state affairs without 
sharing political authority. Civil defense, as one of the methods 
used to educate the population to think and act as citizens of East 
Germany, was an important feature of the system of national 
security. 

Socialist Military Education 

Civil defense was but one vital element of East Germany's com- 
prehensive system of socialist military education. As a result of 
extensive measures aimed at the political and ideological educa- 
tion and military training of all citizens fit for military service, more 
East Germans engaged in military activity in the 1980s than did 
citizens of any other Warsaw Pact country. Of every 10,000 Ger- 
mans, 433 were members of the armed forces or of paramilitary 
units in 1983, in comparison with 210 Czechoslovaks, 185 Soviets 
and 115 Poles. 

Military education had been stressed in East Germany since the 
founding of the republic, and in 1978 it was made a formal com- 
ponent of the school curriculum as an independent educational sub- 
ject for the ninth and tenth grades of the republic's schools. In 
March 1982, the new Military Service Law expanded the obliga- 
tions of East German citizens yet again with five major new provi- 
sions. Preparation for military service was required by law. All state 
organs, factories, organizations, schools, and universities were 
legally obligated to provide such preparation. Every citizen was 
obliged to contribute toward defense. The term of military service 
for reservists was lengthened. The state was given the right to draft 
women between the ages of eighteen and fifty for general military 
service; previously they could be conscripted only into noncombat 
roles. Service in construction troops was declared equivalent to 



238 



National Security 



fulfillment of the military service obligation, and certain conditions 
for this service were set forth. These measures were in part a 
response to declining birthrates and an increasing need for con- 
scripts who had enough basic training behind them to spend their 
active duty learning to master more sophisticated technology. They 
also could be viewed as a response to growing indications of popu- 
lar resistance. Signs of resistance included an increasing number 
of young men who chose to serve in construction troops or refused 
to serve at all, protests from East Germany's Lutheran Church 
against the militarization of the educational system and organized 
military youth activities, and waning interest among young men 
in an NVA career. The Military Service Law of 1982 gave a more 
precise and binding legal basis to premilitary training, which had 
been stressed in East Germany since 1951. In the early 1980s, even 
before implementation of the new law began in 1983, as many as 
eight of every ten draftees had had premilitary training. Educa- 
tional and career opportunities often were tied directly to partici- 
pation in premilitary activities and to military service. 

Socialist military education began in kindergarten, where the 
children played games with a military orientation and learned songs 
and poems about soldiers. Older children, as members of the Young 
Pioneers, took part in military games and the annual Snowflake 
Maneuver directed by NVA officers. The school system, reinforced 
by the family, was to lay the basis for forming — as early as pos- 
sible — what the SED called the image of the enemy and instilling 
hatred for all foes of socialism, with emphasis on the soldiers of 
the West German Bundeswehr. 

The premilitary education curriculum stressed civil defense and 
general military subjects. Instruction consisted of lessons on such 
themes as national defense, the nature of a possible war, the duties 
of soldiers and territorial defense forces, and the weapons and equip- 
ment of the socialist armies. Classroom work was supplemented 
by a self-contained course of approximately fifty hours taught during 
the last two weeks of the ninth grade. At the end of the tenth grade, 
the NVA conducted a closing exercise of several days. 

Premilitary Training by Mass Organizations 

A major component of socialist military education was the man- 
datory premilitary basic training provided for all young men 
between sixteen and nineteen in training units of the Society for 
Sport and Technology (Gesellschaft fur Sport und Technik — GST) 
at expanded secondary schools, vocational schools, or other voca- 
tional training institutions. According to law, the Free German 
Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend — FDJ) was jointly responsible with 



239 




An accent on the military in a Pioneer camp near Erfurt 
Courtesy V. Jeffrey Gedmin 

the GST for premilitary training, particularly for its political 

aspects. 

Of the two mass youth organizations, it was the FDJ that had 
the earlier influence on young East Germans. In 1946 the FDJ 
began to provide, as part of its program, military training for young 
men and women between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five. It 
had the right to maintain organizations in schools, factories, offices, 
and the armed services. It also ran the Ernst Thalmann Pioneer 
Organization for children between the ages of six and fourteen. 
The most important aspects of FDJ premilitary training were dis- 
cipline, physical training, and political reliability. Discipline was 
instilled through the group's semimilitary organization, which 
emphasized order and obedience to authority. Physical training 
was reinforced through an extensive, well-organized system of 
calisthenics, physical conditioning programs, and athletic compe- 
titions. Participation in the FDJ's annual Hans Beimler Contest, 
a premilitary competition, was required for boys and girls in grades 
eight through ten. Political reliability was taught through partici- 
pation in ceremonies and was incorporated in lectures and other 
events in the FDJ program. 

The leadership of the NVA was particularly pleased with the 
physical training program and stated that the physical quality of 
recruits coming from the FDJ was decidedly above that for 



240 



National Security 



nonmembers. The most important role for the FDJ, however, was 
in the area of political reliability. Even after members entered the 
service, the FDJ organizations there oversaw their off-duty time 
and ensured that they maintained proper socialist values. It was 
the FDJ that was selected to sponsor campaigns in the mid-1980s 
to encourage young conscripts to add another eighteen months or 
more to their term of active military service. In the early 1980s, 
about 80 percent of the young service personnel were FDJ mem- 
bers. For those young men or women who wished to become officers 
in the NVA, the People's Police, and probably the Ministry of State 
Security as well, an endorsement by their local FDJ organization 
was an unofficial but nonetheless real requirement. 

FDJ brigades also had a role to play in the Third World. Young 
East Germans, regarded as industrious, skilled, and well behaved, 
were much sought after. In the early 1980s, there were approxi- 
mately fifteen FDJ brigades in nine African countries. These youth 
brigades did construction and repair work and trained truck drivers 
and mechanics. 

The GST, founded in 1952 and directly subordinate to the 
minister of defense, had as its primary tasks the development of 
public military readiness and the premilitary preparation of young 
people between fourteen and twenty-five for service in the armed 
forces. The organization soon enjoyed a certain popularity because 
it offered numerous opportunities to engage in expensive hobbies 
and activities that as a rule were not easily accessible to East Ger- 
man teenagers. In 1982, with the passage of the new Military Ser- 
vice Law, premilitary training became compulsory; hence the GST 
was an essential instrument in East Germany's system of socialist 
military education and national defense. As of April 1983, the 
society had approximately 480,000 members and almost 100,000 
instructors. Many of the latter were NVA reservists. The top offi- 
cials of the GST were NVA officers and generals. Vice Admiral 
Gunther Kutzschebauch, a graduate of the Naval Academy of the 
Soviet Armed Forces in Leningrad, has headed the GST since 1982. 

Like the FDJ, the GST was responsible for physical training and 
for inculcating political reliability and military discipline. The GST 
differed from the FDJ, however, in that it concentrated on teach- 
ing military and military-related skills and knowledge. In addition 
to compulsory basic training, the premilitary training program 
included specialized preparation for specific NVA career fields. Par- 
ticipation in career training was voluntary except for young men 
between sixteen and nineteen who intended to be career service- 
men. Among the offerings were vehicle driving, mechanics, radio 
and telegraphy, sailing, diving, parachute jumping, gliding and 



241 



East Germany: A Country Study 

flying, and marksmanship. Successful completion of a requirement 
earned a badge that later could be worn on the NVA uniform. 

The GST also pursued its goals through classes on socialism and 
SED objectives, patriotic activities such as visits to war memorials, 
organization of national and international military and athletic com- 
petitions, and sponsorship of annual training camps, which were 
considered the high point of general premilitary training. Young 
people in vocational training attended camp during the first year 
of their apprenticeship, while university students went at the 
beginning of the second phase of their studies. All university stu- 
dents, even those who already had served in the armed forces, were 
subject to military student training. The program for young women 
attending the camp focused on civil defense, and members of the 
Red Cross received special training. After camp training — at the 
start of the second year of apprenticeship or the third phase of 
university study — additional advanced training began. 

Conscientious Objection to Military Service 

The work of the FDJ, GST, families, and schools was com- 
plemented by vocational counseling centers, parent associations, 
and military district commands. The entire apparatus of socialist 
military education, in turn, was part of a sophisticated, compre- 
hensive structure that tied together police, traditional military, and 
uniformed as well as plainclothes security organs in a network of 
professional services that blanketed the entire society. The result- 
ing system was so pervasive that it touched every citizen and every 
activity in the country. 

As the regime stepped up its efforts in the late 1970s and the 
1980s to militarize society still further, popular resistance increased 
as well, despite tightened controls. One source reported that the 
number of young men who refused to do any military service at 
all had risen from 8 in 1980 to about 150 in 1985. Traditionally 
such refusal resulted in a prison sentence of twenty-four months, 
greater than the length of the military service obligation. The num- 
ber of young East Germans choosing to serve in the NVA's con- 
struction units — the only route open to those who wished to do 
unarmed service — also was on the rise, from about 700 a year to 
approximately 1,000, according to one source. 

Since the autumn of 1964, there have existed NVA engineer com- 
panies that do not bear arms, in accordance with an order of the 
National Defense Council. On this basis, in well-founded excep- 
tional cases, those subject to induction who for religious or similar 
reasons refuse to bear arms are permitted to serve as construction 
soldiers. The Military Service Law of 1982 did not permit refusal 



242 



National Security 



to serve for reasons of conscience. The new law no longer used 
the term "alternative service" (Wehrersatzdienst) . 

Beginning in the 1980s, construction soldiers had to take a vow 
to increase defense readiness rather than the oath of allegiance 
required of other soldiers. They wore gray uniforms with the design 
of a spade on the shoulder patch, performed military construction 
and rear-guard services as well as some tasks in the industrial and 
social-service sectors, were subject to military law and disciplinary 
regulations, were commanded by NVA officers and noncommis- 
sioned officers (NCOs), and received engineer training and politi- 
cal education. In 1983, of the 230,000 soldiers in the NVA, 
0.6 percent — about 1,400 persons — were allowed to serve in the 
construction units. According to one report, however, the num- 
ber of persons electing such service was so high that draft officials 
claimed the plan was overfulfilled, and in 1983 young East Ger- 
mans unwilling to bear arms had to join the regular troops. In 
February 1983, in Schwerin, Dresden, and East Berlin, five young 
men were sentenced to eighteen months in prison because they tried 
to exercise their right to join the construction units. Service in the 
construction troops did, however, have certain consequences. In 
the 1970s, East German leaders acknowledged that former con- 
struction soldiers were at a disadvantage when they rejoined the 
civilian sphere. They were not allowed to enter certain professions 
or to pursue a university education. In 1984, however, Honecker 
and Defense Minister Hoffmann asserted that construction soldiers 
no longer suffered such discrimination; like others who had com- 
pleted their military service, they were given preference in the 
university admission process. 

Since 1978 the East Germany's Lutheran Church has sought a 
liberalization of the system for conscientious objectors, who have 
only one option: service as construction soldiers. Reaction to the 
1982 Military Service Law was strong, and the church advocated 
a program of social service for peace, that is, alternative service 
in hospitals, old-age homes, and the like. Church leaders also 
opposed the introduction of compulsory military education in 
schools, the practice of teaching hatred of the foes of socialism, and 
the SED's emphasis on the image of the enemy. The church became 
the focus of a growing independent peace movement, which 
expressed its goals in the suggestion that swords once again be 
turned into plowshares. After passage of the 1982 law, the East 
German Roman Catholic Church grew more active as well. In a 
pastoral letter in January 1983, Catholic bishops condemned the 
militarization of life in East Germany (see Religion and Religious 
Organization, ch. 2). 



243 



East Germany: A Country Study 



The National People's Army and the Third World 

In support of its external security function, the NVA has pur- 
sued an increasingly assertive role since the 1950s, promoting both 
East German and Soviet interests in the Third World. Having 
gained the Soviets' trust and having assumed the role of the Soviet 
Union's leading surrogate in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, by 
1986 the NVA had come to play a large part in Moscow's Third 
World strategy. 

In Africa, where East Germany has been active since the late 
1950s, early efforts were modest, motivated partly by a desire for 
international recognition and a quest for a stable supply of raw 
materials. The diplomatic isolation imposed by West Germany's 
Hallstein Doctrine — which precluded diplomatic relations between 
West Germany and any state that had such relations with East 
Germany — ended in 1972, and the coming of detente altered East 
Germany's international standing. In 1973 the East German regime 
renewed interest in military aid to Africa, and in the same year 
East German military advisers were seen in Brazzaville. Congo, 
for the first time. As involvement continued to diversify and 
increase, other motivations became pre-eminent. New intentions 
included a desire to demonstrate the permanence and prestige of 
the East German republic: a determination to compete in the 
international arena with West Germany, which the East Germans 
depicted as the sole heir to German imperialism and colonialism; 
and an eagerness to prove its value as the front runner for the Soviet 
Union in endorsing liberation movements and acting on the Leninist 
tenet that Moscow's road to Europe leads through Africa. In pro- 
viding assistance in military, security, scientific, technical, and 
economic spheres, East Germany's goals, both national and inter- 
national, remained consonant with those of the Soviet Union and 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 

Estimates of the numbers of East German military advisers in 
Africa varied widely, as did reports on their location. According 
to the West German Foreign Office, in the mid-1980s East Ger- 
man military advisers in Africa — members of the NVA as well as 
the Ministry of State Security — numbered between 2,000 and 
4,000, the majority being in Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique. 
Their influence reached far deeper than the numbers suggest, since 
the East Germans concentrated on establishing internal security 
organizations and intelligence services, training cadres and guer- 
rilla commanders, and organizing national military systems. In 1982 
East Germany acknowledged that it delivered arms and military 
technology, educated cadres, established plants for defense 



244 



National Security 



industries, granted patents for production of defense materiel, and 
helped organize and train troops in East Germany as well as in 
their home countries. According to some sources, East Germany 
was training all categories of African officers except staff officers, 
who received their training in the Soviet Union. Angolan paratroop- 
ers, for example, reportedly participated with an East German 
paratrooper battalion in joint exercises on Riigen Island in the Baltic 
Sea. 

In the 1980s, East Germany's primary clients in Africa were 
Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique. Others receiving East Ger- 
man military aid included Algeria, Cape Verde, Guinea, Guinea- 
Bissau, Nigeria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zaire, and Zambia, as well 
as the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and 
the African National Congress (ANC). East German military 
exports to Africa generally averaged about US$60 million in the 
1980s. This reflected the underdeveloped state of the republic's 
armaments industry as well as competition within the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), but the low figure may 
also have resulted from diversion of arms shipments through a third 
country, Czechoslovakia being the most likely conduit. Some assis- 
tance not labeled as military, but as scientific^technical, had clear 
potential for military application: port expansion and moderniza- 
tion; construction of hospitals and training of physicians; and 
development of transportation and telecommunications systems. 

Many of the client countries in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as 
the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), had 
East German-trained civil and secret police, border troops, or prison 
guards. The elite Feliks Dzierzynski Guard Regiment of the Minis- 
try of State Security trained security personnel in Angola, Mozam- 
bique, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, for example. 

In addition to training, East Germany also provided "solidarity 
aid" to a number of African states and Vietnam. In the mid-1980s, 
disaster relief was provided to Ethiopia during a severe famine. 
East German civil and military air assets participated with the 
Soviets in delivering such items as foodstuffs, blankets and cloth- 
ing, tents, and vitamins and medicines. Shipments of "solidarity 
goods" were coordinated with other East European states because 
of Comecon's arrangements for a division of labor (see Appendix B). 

In the 1980s, an aspect of East Germany's involvement in the 
Third World — the republic's increasing identification with world 
terrorism — posed a significant danger to the West and to United 
States allies in the Middle East. East Germans allegedly trained 
terrorists in camps in Libya and South Yemen, and the NVA oper- 
ated a school for terrorists in Pankow, a northern part of East Berlin. 



245 



East Germany: A Country Study 

The school had ties with a Palestinian terrorist organization and 
perhaps with the Soviet Committee of State Security as well. 

In response to changes in the political scene, East Germany 
became more active outside Africa as well. In the 1980s, East Ger- 
many gave support to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
South Yemen, Iraq, Vietnam, India, Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
Afghanistan, and other countries or movements in less-developed 
countries. For example, it flew wounded Afghan soldiers to East 
Berlin and supplied medical and other equipment to the Afghan 
army, while El Salvador and Nicaragua received various forms of 
military assistance. 

Since the mid-1970s, East Germany has been involved indirectly 
in virtually every large-scale conflict in Africa. In many cases — 
Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, for instance — East German 
support was crucial. Despite the financial expense of support for 
Africa and other Third World countries, East Germany in the 
mid-1980s was strengthening its existing ties and seeking new ones 
as part of a policy expressly based on Marxist-Leninist doctrine 
and proletarian internationalism. 

Armed Forces 

In 1987 East Germany maintained a regular military establish- 
ment with a strength of 175,300, about 1 percent of the popula- 
tion. Conscripts totaled about 95,000, or approximately 54 percent 
of the armed forces. 

The ground, air/air defense, and naval forces were included in 
the NVA, which had grown out of the police units created under 
the Soviet occupation after World War II. The close association 
thus established with the Soviet Army continued to exist in 1987 
and was reflected in the missions and roles of the NVA. Even the 
military oath of allegiance taken by all NVA service personnel refers 
to the alliance with the Soviet Army (see fig. 11). 

Since the mid-1970s, East Germany has had three military 
districts — I, III, and V — defined as higher military-administrative 
groupings of formations, units, and military facilities in a certain 
area (see fig. 12). Until the mid-1970s, the People's Navy had con- 
stituted Military District IV, while the Air Force/Air Defense Force 
had formed Military District II; these two districts as such were 
abolished in the mid-1970s. In 1987 the air/air defense and naval 
forces were under the orders of their respective commands. The 
military districts were also separate from the fifteen districts of the 
civil administration and from the air defense districts, which were 
part of the Warsaw Pact air defense system. Within the NVA's 



246 



National Security 



OWTtt O? ALL'EQISVKPE 

I swear 

at alt times toyatfy to serve the Qerman 'Democratic Republic, my 
fatherland, and to protect it against any enemy when so ordered by the. 
workers' and peasants' government. 

I swear 

as a soldier of the 'National People's Army to Be ready at all times, side 
by side with the Soviet Army and the armies of the socialist countries 
allied with us, to defend socialism against all enemies and to stake my 
life for the achievement of victory. 

I swear 

to be an honorable, brave, disciplined, and vigilant soldier, to render 
unconditional obedience to my military superiors, to carry out orders 
with complete determination, and always strictly to guard military and 
state secrets. 

I swear 

conscientiously to acquire military knowledge, to observe military 
regulations, and always and everywhere to guard the honor of our 
republic and of its 'National People's Army. Should I ever violate this, 
my solemn military oath, may I suffer the stern penalties of the laws of 
our republic and the contempt of the working people. 



Figure 11. National People's Army Oath of Allegiance, 1987 

system of military justice, each military district constituted a judi- 
cial district for a military high court. 

In 1987 Military District I, headquartered at Strausberg — a small 
town near Brandenburg, thirty-five kilometers west of Berlin — 
was essentially the capital district. The district included the Ministry 
of Defense, the Border Troops, and Civil Defense. Military Dis- 
trict III and Military District V — the two ground force districts — 
have been subordinate to the Ground Forces Command in Pots- 
dam since 1972. The head of each district was supported by a staff 
and an advisory military council. Military District III, embracing 
the southern half of the country, was headquartered in Leipzig; 



247 



East Germany: A Country Study 




Figure 12. Deployment of Major Ground Units as of 1981 



Military District V, which included the northern half of East Ger- 
many, had its headquarters in Neubrandenburg. 

The decline in East Germany's population from a high of 
18.4 million in 1950 to the 1987 figure of 16.7 million, caused seri- 
ous manpower problems for the armed forces. The Military Service 



248 



National Security 



Law contained several measures designed to increase the pool of 
potential service personnel, including a provision for mandatory 
premilitary training for all young men and women. As of 1987, 
women were not subject to compulsory military service, but they 
were permitted to volunteer and were doing so in increasing num- 
bers. For the most part, women served as temporary NCOs, career 
NCOs, or warrant officers in the NVA and the Border Troops. 
Typically, they worked in the administrative service as secretar- 
ies, in stationary communications centers as telephone and tele- 
type operators, and in the medical service as nurses. More and 
more women displayed interest in becoming officers, and in Sep- 
tember 1985 the Franz Mehring Officer School of the Air Force/ Air 
Defense Force for the first time admitted women for education as 
political officers or technicians. Women were not assigned to line 
units in mid- 1987, although official publications contained discus- 
sions of the possibility of a combat role for women. 

During mobilization and in a national defense emergency, East 
German women between the ages of eighteen and fifty (through 
December 31 of the year in which they turned fifty) might be 
included in the general draft. Since appropriate peacetime prepara- 
tion was a prerequisite, they might at any time receive an order 
to report for induction for training purposes. One source estimated 
that in the mid-1980s women accounted for as much as one-third 
of the country's active civil defense forces. Socialist military edu- 
cation stressed women's important contribution to national defense, 
and in January 1983 the magazine Sport und Technik, an official GST 
publication, appealed to young women to volunteer for service in 
the NVA, since the mission of the armed forces — the prevention 
of war — is not men's concern exclusively. 

For the fiscal year ending on December 31, 1986, the sum of 
14.1 billion GDR marks — 5.8 percent of the total budget — was ear- 
marked for national defense and security (for value of the GDR 
mark — see Glossary). The figures published may have little indica- 
tive value, however, since East Germany does not fully disclose 
defense expenditures. Many Western experts agree that economic 
problems apparently have resulted in a trend toward negative real 
growth in defense spending. Numerous economy measures have 
been instituted in the armed forces, particularly in regard to con- 
sumption of petroleum, oil, and lubricants. 

Missions and Roles 

Official literature stresses that the reliable protector of the East 
German state is the Soviet Union and that the NVA contributes 
to the Soviet effort. Article 6 of the Constitution states that the 



249 



East Germany: A Country Study 

"German Democratic Republic is forever and irrevocably allied 
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." In referring to the 
NVA, Article 7 states that "the National People's Army and other 
national defense bodies protect the socialist achievements of the 
people against all external attacks. In the interest of the preserva- 
tion of the peace and security of the socialist state, the National 
People's Army cultivates close comradeship-in-arms with the armies 
of the Soviet Union and other socialist states." Thus the NVA is 
constitutionally bound to the armed forces of another state. 

The mission of the NVA is defined in terms of reinforcing the 
Warsaw Pact. Specifically, the ground forces of the NVA are trained 
and organized to fight separately as a national army or as part of 
a Soviet front (army group). The NVA's People's Navy, even in 
peacetime, operates in close coordination with the Soviet Baltic Fleet 
and the Polish navy. In wartime it probably would be absorbed 
completely into the Soviet Baltic Fleet. The primary role of the 
NVA's air force is air defense, and in this function the force is com- 
pletely integrated into the Soviet air defense network. To a limited 
extent, it could supply close air support to NVA ground and naval 
forces. 

Historically, the NVA has played a limited role in internal secur- 
ity in comparison with other security services. Naval units in their 
routine coastal patrol activities have cooperated closely with units 
of Border Troops and the Ministry of the Interior. In 1987 the 
Border Troops, which were separated from the NVA in 1974 
although they remained subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, 
had a major role in preventing illegal emigration, but primary 
responsibility for internal security lay with forces of the Ministry 
of State Security and the Ministry of the Interior. The NVA, 
however, because it is subject to direct party control through the 
Central Committee of the SED, could and would be used if the 
situation demanded. 

Ministry of Defense 

The NVA is administered through the Ministry of Defense, one 
of the principal branches of the national government. In Decem- 
ber 1985, General (Armeegeneral) Heinz Kessler became minister 
of defense with headquarters in Strausberg, just outside Berlin. 
Kessler replaced Hoffmann, who held the post from 1960 until his 
death in 1985. Kessler was assisted by a colloquium of deputy 
ministers who were also chiefs of certain key administrations within 
the ministry. 

In 1987 the deputy ministers and their assignments were as follows: 
Lieutenant General (Generalleutnant) Klaus-Dieter Baumgarten, 



250 



National Security 



chief of the Border Troops; Admiral Wilhelm Ehm, chief of the 
People's Navy; Colonel General (Generaloberst) Joachim Gold- 
bach, chief of Technology and Weaponry; Lieutenant General 
Horst Briinner, chief of the Main Political Administration (Kessler's 
former post); Colonel General Wolfgang Reinhold, chief of the Air 
Force/Air Defense Force; Colonel General Horst Stechbarth, chief 
of the ground forces; Colonel General Fritz Streletz, chief of the 
Main Staff and secretary of the National Defense Council; Lieu- 
tenant General Fritz Peter, chief of Civil Defense; and Lieutenant 
General Manfred Graetz, chief of Rear Services. 

The organization of the East German Ministry of Defense, which 
closely follows the pattern of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, com- 
prises several administrations and departments, among which there 
appears to be a certain amount of overlapping authority. In the 
mid-1980s, its complement of about 4,200 personnel had a military- 
to-civilian ratio of approximately three to one, in contrast to com- 
parable Western ministries or departments that generally have a 
much higher proportion of civilian employees. Approximately 100 
Soviet officers also were assigned to the East German ministry. The 
chiefs of the major administrations and commands concurrently 
served as deputies to the defense minister (see fig. 13). 

Ground Forces 

The ground forces in 1987 made up 68 percent of the NVA, hav- 
ing a total strength of 120,000, of whom 60 percent were draftees. 
Ground forces included two tank divisions, four motorized rifle 
regiments, two surface-to-surface missile brigades, two artillery regi- 
ments and one antiaircraft artillery regiment, eight air defense regi- 
ments, one airborne battalion, two antitank battalions, and several 
support units. 

Because East Germany produced primarily military supplies — 
such as computers, clothing, military vehicles, and communica- 
tions equipment — rather than arms, major items of weaponry and 
equipment were obtained from the Soviet Union. Of the equip- 
ment used by the ground forces, only some wheeled vehicles were 
of East German design and manufacture. Some small arms and 
ammunition were also of local manufacture but were licensed copies 
of Soviet designs. The NVA had purchased 170 RM-70 122mm 
multiple rocket launchers and a number of FUG- 70 scout cars from 
Czechoslovakia, but most of its weapons and equipment were of 
Soviet design and manufacture. In 1985 the tank inventory included 
an estimated 1,500 T-54s, T-55s, and T-72s assigned to units and 
approximately 1,600 more armored vehicles, including T-34s, in 
storage. Reconnaissance units were equipped with 1,000 BRDM-1 



251 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Main Staff 

of the NVA* 

Operations 

Intelligence 

Organization 

Mobilization 

Topography 

Cryptography 

Other 



Ministry of 
Defense 



Minister 

Deputy Ministers 
Ministry Staff 



Ground Forces 



Main Inspectorate 
of Training 
of the NVA 

Combat Training 

Schools 

Physical Training 

Sports 

Other 



Technology and 
Weaponry 
of the NVA 

Research and 

Development 
Planning 
Other 



Main Political 
Directorate 
of the NVA 

Cadres 

Agitation and 
Propaganda 

Political Training 

Other 



Rear Services 
of the 
NVA 



Billeting 
Finance 
Transportation 
Uniforms and 

Equipment 
Petroleum , Oil 

and Lubricants 
Medical 
Veterinary 
Other 



Civil 
Defen; 



Separate Departments 
and Troop Directorates 

Rocket and Artillery Troops 
Tank Troops 
Engineer Troops 
Chemical Troops 
Motor Transport 
Military Construction 
Military Courts 
Cadres 
Other 



Air Force/ 
Air Defense Force 



People's Navy 



Border Troops 



Nationale Volksarmee (National People's Army) 



Figure 13. Organization of Ministry of Defense 



and BRDM-2 scout cars. Motorized infantry units had 1,000 BMP 
infantry combat vehicles, as well as 1,500 BTR-50Ps, BTR-60Ps, 
and BTR-152s and 200 BTR-70s (armored personnel carriers) and 
MT-LBs (multipurpose towing and transport vehicles). The 
artillery inventory included the following guns: 400 D-44s and self- 
propelled SD-44s (85mm); M-1931s and M-1937s (122mm); and 
72 M-46s (130mm). There were also 108 M-1937 gun howitzers 
and 54 self-propelled M-197 and D-20 (152mm) gun howitzers, 
as well as various other kinds of howitzers: D-30s, M- 1938s 
(M-30s), and self-propelled M-1974s (122mm). Other artillery 
assets were 250 mortars (120mm); 24 FROG-7 and 18 SCUD-B 
tactical missile launchers; and multiple rocket launchers, which 
included 108 BM-21s, Czechoslovak RM-70s (122mm), and 
BM-24s (240mm) (see fig. 14). 



252 



National People's Army artillerymen during a firing exercise 

The NVA's antitank inventory consisted of 120 T-12 guns 
(100mm) and various quantities of AT-3 SAGGER (including self- 
propelled BRDM-2s) and AT-4 SPIGOT antitank guided weap- 
ons. In terms of air defense assets, the East German ground forces 
had ninety-six self-propelled ZSU-23-4 guns, as well as SA-4, 
SA-6, and SA-9 antiaircraft missiles. 

People's Navy 

The People's Navy (Volksmarine) of the NVA had a total 
strength in 1987 of approximately 16,300, of whom 50 percent were 
conscripts. The navy comprised three flotillas, the Coastal Border 
Brigade, and several supporting units; the command was in 
Rostock-Gehlsdorf. 

The naval forces were viewed as the forward contingent of the 
Warsaw Pact's Combined Baltic Fleet. The commander of the 
Soviet Baltic Fleet was also the head of this alliance of the three 
Warsaw Pact fleets in the Baltic. The Soviet Navy — unlike the 
Soviet ground and air forces in the GSFG — had no bases with per- 
sonnel of its own in East Germany. 

The People's Navy, which in 1987 had surface and naval avia- 
tion forces but no submarine component, performed intelligence 
and patrol missions in the western Baltic, antisubmarine warfare 
operations, minesweeping and minelaying, and amphibious land- 
ing operations. The Coastal Border Brigade patrolled the east-west 



253 



East Germany: A Country Study 



MOTORIZED 
RIFLE DIVISION 



HEADQUARTERS 
AND 

HEADQUARTERS 
ELEMENTS 



MOTORIZED 
RIFLE REGIMENT 



TANK 
REGIMENT 



ROCKET 
BATTALION 
(FROG) 



MULTIPLE 
ROCKET LAUNCHER 



CHEMICAL 
DEFENSE 
BATTALION 



ARTILLERY 
REGIMENT 



AIR DEFENSE 
REGIMENT 



RECONNAISSANCE 
BATTALION 



ENGINEER 
BATTALION 



SIGNAL 
BATTALION 



MOTOR 
TRANSPORT 
BATTALION 



MAINTENANCE 
BATTALION 



MEDICAL 
BATTALION 



TRAFFIC 
CONTROL 
COMPANY 



FIELD 
BAKERY 



TANK 
DIVISION 



HEADQUARTERS 
AND 

HEADQUARTERS 
ELEMENTS 



TANK 
REGIMENT 



MOTORIZED 
RIFLE REGIMENT 



ARTILLERY 
REGIMENT 



AIR DEFENSE 
REGIMENT 



ROCKET 
BATTALION 
(FROG) 



MULTIPLE 
ROCKET LAUNCHER 
BATTALION 



RECONNAISSANCE 
BATTALION 



ENGINEER 
BATTALION 



SIGNAL 
BATTALION 



CHEMICAL 
DEFENSE 
BATTALION 



MOTOR 
TRANSPORT 
BATTALION 



MAINTE 
BATT/ 


NANCE 
\LION 





MEDICAL 
BATTALION 



TRA 
CON 
COM 


FFIC 
rROL 
3 ANY 





FIELD 
BAKERY 



Figure 14. Representative Motorized Rifle and Tank 
Divisions, Early 1980s 



254 



National Security 



border into the Baltic to secure the sea border against "those GDR 
citizens who turn their backs on the republic. ' ' The Border Troops 
maintained their own boat companies on the ninety-three kilometers 
of the Elbe between East Germany and West Germany and in the 
waterways around West Berlin. These units, although linked 
through their work to the People's Navy, were subordinated to the 
Border Troops rather than to the NVA. The boat crews wore naval 
uniforms and held naval ranks, but bands on their caps and sleeves 
identified them as Border Troops. 

In early 1987, East Germany's naval forces were structured as 
follows: the 1st Flotilla, headquartered in Peenemiinde; the 4th 
Flotilla, based in Rostock- Warnemunde; the 6th Flotilla, headquar- 
tered in Dranske on Riigen Island; the Coastal Border Brigade in 
Rostock, and one communications regiment, stationed on Riigen 
Island. Also subordinated to the People's Navy Command were 
a naval fighter regiment in Laage; a naval helicopter squadron in 
Parow; a combat swimmer company in Kiihlungsborn; a naval 
engineer battalion in Stralsund; the Naval Hydrographic Service 
in Rostock; the Karl Liebknecht Officer School in Stralsund; the 
Walter Steffens Fleet School in Stralsund; the Naval Manning 
Division, with offices in Rostock, Stralsund, and Wolgast; a test- 
ing facility at Wolgast; the Central Military Hospital in Stralsund; 
at least one coastal rocket regiment, probably in Tarnewitz; the 
Central Supply Depot in Waren; and coastal artillery detachments. 

The People's Navy had bases at Peenemiinde, Warnemunde, 
Rostock, Stralsund, Tarnewitz, and Dranske. The People's Navy 
and the Coastal Border Brigade also made use of berths at Darsser 
Ort, Greifswald, Ueckermunde, Wisborn, Kiihlungsborn, and 
Sassnitz. According to one source, patrol vessels from the Soviet 
Baltic Fleet were frequently present at Sassnitz. The construction 
of a large rail ferry port at Mukran on Riigen Island, linking East 
Germany with Klaipeda in the Soviet Union, might indicate an 
intention to make Sassnitz into a base as well. 

The approximately 131 surface combatants and 48 auxiliary craft 
operated by the People's Navy in 1987 were designed and built 
at shipyards in East Germany or in the Soviet Union. The largest 
were three Soviet Koni-class frigates — Rostock, Berlin, and Halle — 
which were commissioned in 1978, 1979, and 1986, respectively. 
There were also sixteen Parchim-class corvettes; fifteen OSA-I 
(three of which were in reserve for training and were to be replaced) 
and two Tarantul-I-class fast attack craft (missile); and fifteen 
Shershen-class and twenty-five Libelle-class fast attack craft 
(torpedo). The mine force included twenty-five Kondor-II-class 
coastal minesweepers. The amphibious capability was structured 



255 



East Germany: A Country Study 



around twelve Frosch-I-class amphibious vehicle landing ships. The 
Coastal Border Brigade had ten Bremse guard boats and eighteen 
Kondor-I-class submarine chasers. In addition to the combatants, 
the navy operated two salvage and rescue ships; six underway 
replenishment ships; a training ship, the Wilhelm Pieck; thirty-nine 
other auxiliaries (including intelligence-collection ships, hydro- 
graphic survey ships, and cargo ships); and a large number of ser- 
vice craft. 

The naval aviation branch was equipped with twenty Mi-8 and 
Mi-14/HAZE helicopters configured for antisubmarine warfare, 
coastal observation, and reconnaissance, and ten jet fighter- 
bombers. 

The Coastal Border Brigade, headquartered at Rostock, 
accounted for approximately 2,750 of the 16,300 members of East 
Germany's naval forces. The brigade was organized into eight boat 
groups to patrol coastal waters and twelve battalions to patrol 
beaches and shores. The Coastal Border Brigade operated its own 
school. 

Amphibious forces were subordinated to the 1st Flotilla, based 
at Peenemiinde. Although the NVA did not have a naval infantry 
as such in 1987, the Ernst Moritz Arndt Motorized Rifle Regi- 
ment 29, stationed at Prora on Riigen Island, and the Wilhelm Florin 
Motorized Rifle Regiment 28, at Rostock, were trained as amphibi- 
ous landing units. Both were equipped with the BTR-60PB, 
an eight-wheeled amphibious armored personnel carrier; both par- 
ticipated in amphibious training in cooperation with landing ships 
of the People's Navy. If the NVA were to create a force of naval 
infantry, these motorized rifle regiments undoubtedly would form 
its nucleus. In 1987 the principal shipyard supporting the People's 
Navy was the Peenewerft shipyard in Wolgast. Peenewerft was 
apparently the primary source of amphibious ships. 

The People's Navy was generally rated by Western observers 
as professionally competent and fully capable of securing the coun- 
try's Baltic seacoast. For more ambitious operations, however, the 
navy would be employed as part of the Combined Baltic Fleet. 

Air Force/Air Defense Force 

The air force of the NVA, known as the Air Force/Air Defense 
Force (Luftstreitkrafte/Luftverteidigung), maintained headquar- 
ters at Strausberg. The main mission of the air force was to pre- 
vent penetration of East German airspace by hostile missiles or 
aircraft. To perform this mission, both aircraft and antiaircraft units 
were made organic to the air force. The antiaircraft assets assigned 
to the ground forces were to defend NVA ground formations from 



256 



Launching missile from 
East German naval vessel 




attack by hostile aircraft and were not part of the national air 
defense. 

The operations of the NVA's air force were closely linked with 
those of the GSFG, and the air defense component was fully 
integrated into the Soviet and Warsaw Pact air defense system. 
Both interceptor aircraft and missile units were fundamental parts 
of the Duty System, in which Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovak, and 
East German air defenses were maintained in a continuous high 
state of alert. 

In 1987, the Air Force numbered approximately 39,000 person- 
nel, of whom 38 percent were conscripts. The latter figure, which 
was substantially lower than the 60 percent for the ground forces 
and the 50 percent for the People's Navy, reflected the higher 
proportion of officers and NCOs in the air force. Officer candi- 
dates were trained at the Franz Mehring Officer School in Kamenz. 
Much of the pilot training was conducted in Bautzen, not far from 
Kamenz, and in Rothenburg. Many East Germans received flight 
training as teenagers, through participation in the GST, and were 
licensed pilots when they entered military service. Essential in the 
training of air force officers was a good knowledge of Russian, the 
language of the Warsaw Pact's Duty System of air defense. 

Except for a few Czechoslovak trainers, the approximately 380 
aircraft, 70 armed helicopters, and other equipment of the air force 
were of Soviet design and manufacture. In the mid-1980s, there 



257 



East Germany: A Country Study 



were two regiments of fighter aircraft, probably composed of six 
squadrons — three with thirty-five MiG-17s and two with twenty- 
four MiG-23Fs. There were some Su-22s as well. The NVA's sin- 
gle reconnaissance squadron had eighteen MiG-21s. The transport 
regiment was made up of three squadrons equipped with eighteen 
An-26s, fifteen Tu-134s, An-2s, An-14s, An-26Bs, and some six 
L-410UVPs. This regiment provided the airlift for the airborne 
battalions of the ground forces. The three helicopter regiments 
included nine squadrons: three attack squadrons with thirty Mi-24s; 
three assault/transport squadrons with thirty-six armed Mi-8s; and 
three transport squadrons with some forty-five Mi-8s. 

The Air Defense Command, with 26,000 troops — almost 67 per- 
cent of the manpower total for the Air Force/Air Defense Force — 
was organized in two air defense districts. The 6 air regiments in- 
cluded 6 squadrons with 100 MiG-21Fs, MiG-21MFs, MiG-21PFs, 
and MiG-21Us, and 12 squadrons with 200 MiG-23s. The seven 
surface-to-air missile (SAM) regiments had SA-2 and SA-3 mis- 
siles at some thirty sites. The missile inventory included 205 stra- 
tegic SAMs and 270 tactical SAMs. Two radar regiments were 
available as well. 

Other assets of the Air Force/Air Defense Force included an 
inventory of some sixty Yak- 11, L-39, Zlin 226, MiG-15UTI, 
MiG-21U, and other small aircraft controlled by the chief of flight 
training. The available liaison aircraft included Zlin Z-43s. In 
addition, the NVA had AA-2/ATOLL air-to-air missiles and 
AT-3/SAGGER guided weapons for antitank warfare. 

The air force could provide limited ground attack support for 
the ground forces and defense of the country's airspace. Acquisi- 
tion of heavily armed assault helicopters suggested an increased 
emphasis on developing the capability for close air support. The 
air transport capability was adequate for the logistic and airlift needs 
of the NVA. Its helicopter component provided a degree of air 
mobility for NVA ground forces. The air arm of the NVA was, 
however, basically a tactical air force that was totally reliant upon 
the Soviet Union for strategic or long-range operations. 

Border Troops 

In 1987 the Border Troops numbered approximately 50,000, 
about 50 percent of whom were conscripts. Although subordinated 
to the Ministry of Defense, they were no longer part of the NVA. 
Formerly known as the NVA Border Command, (and before that 
the Border Police), they were separated from the NVA in 1974 
and renamed Border Troops (see Fig. 15). This step may have been 



258 



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259 



East Germany: A Country Study 

taken to keep the units from being affected by international agree- 
ments on force reductions. 

According to East German law, service in the Border Troops 
was the equivalent of NVA service in terms of fulfilling the mili- 
tary obligation, as was service in the Garrisoned Units of the Minis- 
try of the Interior (the People's Police Alert Units and portions 
of the Transport Police) and the Ministry of Security (the Feliks 
Dzierzynski Guard Regiment in East Berlin and the units of that 
regiment stationed in the district capitals). The Border Troops' 
oath of allegiance did not differ materially from that of the NVA. 
The troops were composed of conscripts, term soldiers, and career 
soldiers. Women served as term and career soldiers on the staffs 
and in the rear services of the Border Troops. Care was taken to 
ensure that members of the Border Troops had no family ties with 
the West. Young men eager to climb the ladder fast in East Ger- 
man civilian life frequently volunteered for term service in these 
troops, and the SED expected that many of its members who were 
earmarked for cadre assignments would serve there. 

These troops, with a central command in Patz, near Konigs- 
wusterhausen, were organized into three border commands and 
two independent regiments. Border Command North, headquar- 
tered in Stendal, patrolled the east- west border from its northern- 
most point at Liibecker Bucht to Nordhausen. Border Command 
South, with its seat in Erfurt, guarded the border from Nordhaus- 
en to the Czechoslovak border. Border Command Center, in Patz 
and East Berlin, was responsible for the regiments and units whose 
troops operated in the area around Berlin. The Polish and Czecho- 
slovak borders were each patrolled by an independent border regi- 
ment, with headquarters in Frankfurt am Oder and Pirna, 
respectively. The seacoast was guarded by the Coastal Border 
Brigade of the People's Navy. 

Border Command North was reinforced on the Elbe by a boat 
section independent of the People's Navy, based at Domitz, and 
was assisted by the Water Police. Other than this augmentation, 
the northern and southern commands had identical organizations. 
Each had 6 regiments and 2 training regiments, with 1 ,200 to 1 ,400 
men in each regiment. Border Command Center operated in the 
area around Berlin. In addition to six border regiments and two 
training regiments, it included the special Border Crossing-Point 
Regiment that controlled the access points to West Berlin. 

Border regiments each comprised three battalions of four com- 
panies. The regiments also had a staff company (headquarters) and 
transport, rear services, engineer, signal, and artillery companies. 
Overall, there were approximately 150 border companies, each with 



260 



National Security 



an authorized strength of 100. Weapons and equipment corre- 
sponded to those found in a motorized rifle battalion; T-54s and 
T-55s were available for antitank operations. Along the border with 
West Germany, there were three helicopter squadrons, equipped 
with Mi-2, Mi-8, and Mi-24 helicopters. Flight personnel were 
trained by the NVA's Air Force/Air Defense Force, which proba- 
bly supplied the technical personnel as well. In addition, the GSFG 
maintained its own helicopter forces for border security. The Border 
Crossing-Point Regiment was made up of eight companies; the 
other regiments of Border Command Center were each reinforced 
with a boat company to patrol the waterways in and around Berlin. 

The Border Troops were quite successful in halting illegal emigra- 
tion. Improvements in facilities and procedures were made when 
a new system known as company security was introduced in 1981 . 
Only 160 persons were known to have succeeded in crossing the 
border illegally in 1985, as compared with 192 in 1984, 228 in 1983, 
and 207,000 in 1961, before the Berlin Wall was built. Special 
awards for preventing escapes, as well as special pay and rations, 
were provided to members of the Border Troops. 

The Border Troops operated their own training establishment 
for officers, NCOs, and recruits. Beginning in 1983, however, war- 
rant officers (Fahnriche) were trained at the NVA's Erich Habersath 
Military Technical School at Prora, on Riigen Island. Members 
of the Border Troops were closely supervised and intensely indoc- 
trinated, largely because of their ease of access to West German 
territory. East German military defections between 1961 and 1985 
totaled 2,500, and 90 percent of these were members of the Border 
Troops, primarily enlisted men. Reorganization, stricter border 
zone security, and stringent training brought a steady decline in 
the defection rate. In 1985 there were only ten military defectors 
overall. 

Guarding the border was not the only mission of the Border 
Troops. According to a Politburo resolution of 1985, the Border 
Troops, as well as the NVA, reliably defended the socialist order 
and guaranteed the inviolability of the borders of the workers' and 
peasants' state and its national security. In case of an attack from 
the West, these troops would be East Germany's first line of defense. 
Authorized to operate and fight independently until the approach 
of the NVA, they were trained to seize and hold commanding 
heights, important lines of communication, military facilities, and 
vital civilian installations on enemy — presumably West German — 
territory, or to destroy major objectives that they were not equipped 
to defend. 



261 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Uniforms, Decorations, and Insignia 

With the exception of the People's Navy, whose dark-blue uni- 
forms follow the style of the majority of navies around the world, 
all NVA services and the Border Troops wear the same basic uni- 
form adopted in 1956 when the NVA was officially established. 
Several improvements have been made since that time, but the style 
and cut remain fundamentally the same. There are various kinds 
of uniforms, worn according to the work or social situation and 
differing in material for summer or winter wear. Most uniforms — 
service, semidress, and parade — are stone gray, a brownish-gray 
color that is conspicuously different from the gray-green of the Peo- 
ple's Police uniform. 

Several basic categories of uniforms — field (Felddienstuniform), 
service (Dienstuniform), semidress (Ausgangsuniform) , parade (Parade- 
uniform), and fatigue (Arbeitsuniform) — are worn. The better quality 
and texture of the cloth in officers' uniforms distinguish them from 
the uniforms of enlisted personnel. The field and service uniforms 
are normal attire in garrison and for most other duty activities. 

In summer, the field uniform consists of a jacket and trousers 
with a dark-brown raindrop camouflage pattern on a stone-gray 
background. The uniform is worn with a field cap, service cap, 
or steel helmet; high black boots; and a leather belt with vertical 
web shoulder suspenders. In winter, a quilted stone-gray padded 
suit without a camouflage pattern is worn over the service uniform. 
The winter uniform also includes a fur pile cap or a steel helmet, 
boots, knitted gray gloves, belt, and suspenders. 

The summer service uniform for officers features a bloused jacket, 
worn without a shirt, trousers, and a visored service cap. In winter, 
a service jacket with four large patch pockets with button-down 
tabs, worn with a black belt, the service cap, breeches, shirt, tie, 
belt, and high boots are provided for officers and NCOs. For winter, 
there also is a long, heavy, belted overcoat. 

The semidress uniform, except in details, is the same for all ranks 
and is worn on off-duty or off-post occasions. It includes the ser- 
vice cap, jacket, long trousers, and black low-quarter shoes. The 
single-breasted jacket is worn without a belt, with a silver-gray shirt 
and a dark-gray tie. Officers may wear the jacket with a white shirt. 
During periods of warm summer weather, either the shirt and tie 
or the jacket may be omitted. 

The parade uniform for officers is the semidress jacket worn with 
all authorized awards and decorations, breeches and riding boots, 
steel helmet, white shirt, dark- gray necktie, and a ceremonial dagger 
on the left side, fastened to a silver-gray parade belt. Officers in 



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National Security 



guards of honor carry sabers. In winter, overcoat and gloves are 
worn. 

Seasonal considerations and weather govern the kind of fatigue, 
or work, uniform worn. Generally, reconditioned items of service 
clothing — field, semidress, and winter padded uniforms — are dyed 
black and issued for all kinds of fatigue and maintenance details. 
Coveralls are also used by the lower ranks, especially armor and 
air force personnel. Officers in technical branches supervising 
fatigue details wear a laboratory-style smock. 

Other kinds of NVA uniforms exist as well. High-ranking officers 
occasionally wear white uniforms, and staff officers are supplied 
with staff service uniforms. Women service members have their 
own uniforms — jackets, skirts or slacks, blouses, caps, boots or 
pumps, and other appropriate items in accordance with the sea- 
son and the occasion. Paratroopers, motorcyclists, tank personnel, 
and others have special items of apparel. The uniform of the Border 
Troops is distinguished from that of the NVA ground force and 
Air Force/Air Defense Force by a green armband with large silver 
letters identifying the wearer's affiliation. 

East German armed forces personnel display rank insignia on 
shoulder boards or shoulder loops on service, semidress, and parade 
uniforms, and subdued sleeve insignia midway between the shoulder 
and elbow on the left sleeve of the field uniform, coveralls, or other 
special uniforms. General officer rank is denoted by five-pointed 
silver stars mounted on a gold and silver braided shoulder cord 
set on a bright red base. All other officers and NCOs wear a four- 
pointed star (see fig. 16; fig. 17). 

The regime has some seventy decorations for persons or groups 
it wishes to recognize, and it bestows them liberally. Some, such 
as battle decorations, are specifically set aside for armed forces per- 
sonnel, many may be awarded to soldiers and civilians alike, and 
others, although ordinarily civilian awards, can on occasion be earned 
by those on military duty. The latter group includes decorations for 
achievement in the arts, literature, production, and work methods. 
They may be awarded to service personnel or specific units that have 
participated in civil production projects or assisted during harvesting. 

The Order of Karl Marx, Order of Merit, Star of People's 
Friendship, Banner of Labor, Order of Scharnhorst, Order for Ser- 
vice to the Fatherland, and the National Prize are among the more 
important awards. Some, including the Order of Merit and the 
Star of People's Friendship, are awarded in three classes. A few 
are accompanied by substantial monetary premiums. Unlike the 
Bundeswehr of West Germany, the NVA does not permit mili- 
tary personnel to wear Wehrmacht awards and decorations. 



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East Germany: A Country Study 




264 



National Security 




East Germany: A Country Study 

Military Traditions and Ceremonies 

The fostering of military traditions occupies a large place in the 
political and ideological instruction of East Germans before, dur- 
ing, and after military service. In the NVA, this instruction is said 
to be based on resolutions of the SED Central Committee and the 
government, as well as the research findings of Marxist-Leninist 
historiography. 

Numerous forms of recalling military, socialist, and revolution- 
ary traditions are observed: the presentation of banners; ceremo- 
nies centered on the taking of the oath of allegiance; the awarding 
of honorifics to units, garrisons, schools, and ships; the creation 
of unit museums; the maintenance of rolls of honor; meetings with 
veterans; visits to historic sites and the East German Army 
Museum; and anniversary celebrations. Major elements in these 
observances, which are continually revised and augmented, can 
be categorized as follows: commemoration of glorious feats of arms 
in the service of progress; recognition of exemplary soldiers, politi- 
cal figures, socialist groups, and NVA units; celebration of East 
German-Soviet and socialist brotherhood-in-arms; and identifica- 
tion of military traditions that are to be rejected because of their 
undesirable historic associations. Certain historic events such as 
the Great Peasant War of 1525, the 1923 communist uprising in 
Hamburg, and the building of the Berlin Wall fall into the first 
category. Among the exemplary personalities are Rosa Luxemburg, 
August Bebel, Gotz von Berlichingen, General Carl von Clausewitz, 
Richard Sorge, Friedrich Engels, and General Gerhard von Scharn- 
horst. In the modern army, NVA soldiers and entire units can be 
declared worthy of emulation as well. Marching songs, parades, 
garrison reveille, honor guards at the Memorial to the Victims of 
Fascism and Militarism and elsewhere, and celebrations com- 
memorating such events as anniversaries, the completion of a cer- 
tain amount of flight time, or victories in socialist competition also 
serve as reminders of socialist tradition and instruments of politi- 
cal and social integration. 

Each NVA unit has its own banner, which is used in taking the 
oath of allegiance. It is held so sacred that the unit itself is not per- 
mitted to repair a damaged banner. The banner must be defended 
at all costs; if it is lost or falls into enemy hands, the unit is dis- 
solved, and the commander and those soldiers deemed directly cul- 
pable are called to account. 

Some traditions of recent vintage have a public relations func- 
tion. For example, upon leaving active duty every member of the 
NVA or Border Troops is given two reservist handkerchiefs. One, 



266 



Change of the guard at the Neue Wache, East Berlin 

Courtesy Paul Rood 

a fancy handkerchief, is for the reservist himself; the other, made 
of lace, is intended for his wife, girlfriend, or mother. Other tradi- 
tions intentionally recall historic antecedents: the uniforms, except 
for the fur cap of the winter uniform, resemble in cut those of the 
Wehrmacht. In fact, the steel helmet was designed at the end of 
World War II by the Wehrmacht's Army Ordnance Office. 

Conditions of Service 

The NVA may be a people's army, but in early 1987 it was not 
a classless army. It had a precise classification by rank group, and 
a superior-subordinate or senior-junior relationship that would be 
familiar to those experienced with the distribution of authority in 
Western armies. Basically, service personnel were broken down 
into soldiers, NCOs, warrant officers, officers, and generals. 

Service in the NVA is defined as conscript service, term service, 
or career service. Conscripts are draftee privates who serve eighteen 
months. Term privates and NCOs usually enlist for three years 
but may choose to serve for up to ten years. Term enlisted personnel 
can be promoted to the rank of sergeant or its equivalent. Term 
officers serve at the pleasure of the Ministry of Defense and can 
be promoted to the grade of captain or its equivalent. Career NCOs 
serve at least ten years or until they reach the age of retirement. 



267 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Warrant officers serve for at least fifteen years; career officers, for 
a minimum of twenty-five years. 

The pay scale in the NVA is according to rank. Special bonuses 
are given for outstanding performance, and additional pay is given 
for certain functions and for those serving in the Border Troops 
or airspace security work. There was a 25 percent increase in mili- 
tary pay in 1982. Military pay is exempt from income taxes or social 
security requirements. Additionally, upon completion of service, 
career service personnel are guaranteed a position in the civilian 
sector with pay that at least equals that received in the NVA. 

The average daily ration prescribes 4,200 calories per day. Border 
Troops receive a supplemental ration, as do flight personnel and 
personnel at sea. In all, there are ten different ration scales. As 
in the Soviet Army, mess personnel procure much of the ration 
from the local economy, and units often supplement the ration by 
cultivating gardens. 

Most basic training is conducted within the unit to which the 
soldier is assigned. The Border Troops and certain naval personnel 
are taught in centralized special training units. An extensive net- 
work of educational institutions exists for improving the technical 
specialties of NCOs and officers, and with only a few exceptions, 
those of senior rank are sent to schools in the Soviet Union. 

The training program in the NVA focuses upon two goals: 
political reliability and technical competence. The remainder of 
the training effort emphasizes developing technical skills to employ, 
maintain, or repair equipment. Particularly within the Air Force, 
Air Defense Force, and the People's Navy, officers must become 
proficient in the Russian language. The NVA training program 
not only serves the traditional function of improving the perfor- 
mance of units and individuals but also is an important tool for 
disciplining the people and teaching citizenship. In this way, the 
NVA fulfills its role as a "school of socialism." 

The NVA takes seriously its responsibilities for regulating and 
disciplining military personnel. In 1982, following passage of the 
new Military Service Law, these responsibilities were increased. 
The new law expressly stated that disciplined behavior was the duty 
of all military personnel. As before, the commander was held 
responsible for maintaining discipline among his subordinates. 
Commanding officers from the level of division commander up were 
given the right to reduce a subordinate in rank, and the already 
extensive system of reward and punishment was enlarged further. 
New disciplinary units were instituted, where those being punished 
typically spend one to three months. This extreme penalty was 



268 



National Security 



intended for enlisted personnel and NCOs who did not respond 
to less stringent disciplinary measures. 

Reserves and Mobilization 

Under law the Council of State is empowered to declare a repub- 
licwide "state of defense" in the event of an international crisis 
or an internal or external threat to security. Under such a declara- 
tion, the National Defense Council can declare either partial or 
total mobilization. The principal purpose of the mobilization is 
apparently to reinforce the rear services of the NVA rather than 
to create additional combat units. 

Of particular importance to mobilization are the transport, postal, 
and communications systems. During mobilization the government 
is able to transfer these functions rapidly from support of the civilian 
economy to support of military operations. Essentially mobiliza- 
tion is best understood in terms of militarizing the entire country. 
The National Defense Council, which includes the senior leader- 
ship of the SED and the government, assumes military command 
over all administrative, economic, and social apparatuses of the 
country. Under the defense law, "every able-bodied citizen, in the 
event of a state of defense, can be required to serve in or beyond 
his place of residence." It should be noted that this requirement 
is beyond the statutory obligation for military service. 

The reserve system maintains an inventory of trained manpower 
for expansion of the armed forces or for replacing casualties in the 
event of war. All men between the ages of eighteen and fifty auto- 
matically belong to the reserves if they are not on active duty. 
Reserves are organized into two classes — Reserve I and Reserve 
II. The first category includes all men under age thirty-five who 
are not serving in the NVA, former company grade officers and 
NCOs under age thirty-five, and former field grade officers under 
age sixty. The second reserve category includes former company 
grade officers between ages thirty-five and sixty, former NCOs 
between ages thirty-five and fifty (in certain cases to age sixty), 
and all other men between ages thirty-five and fifty who have not 
served in the NVA. The main reserve group is Reserve I, which 
reinforces combat units. Reserve II, which would probably only 
be activated in event of total mobilization, is charged with rein- 
forcing units of the rear services. In 1987 the total size of the reserve 
was estimated to be 400,000. 

In accordance with the Military Service Law and the Reservist 
Regulation, both of which became law on March 25, 1982, reservists 
have been called up for exercises more frequently than before. 
Moreover, call-ups were in line with the requirements of mobilization 



269 



East Germany: A Country Study 



and a national defense emergency. The total length of the qualify- 
ing period for reservists after basic training was extended, and the 
role of reservists in the GST's premilitary training was expanded. 
These measures should be seen in conjunction with the NVA's man- 
power problems. In 1984 there were 6.2 million males between 17 
and 30; by 1999 this figure will have dropped to 4.2 million. In 
the mid-1980s, an average of 121,000 young men were reaching 
military age annually, and almost 95,000 men — about 80 percent 
of that figure — were being drafted each year. 

The new laws also left reservists no opportunity to avoid mili- 
tary service. Anyone who refused to serve at all, even in the con- 
struction troops, had to be prepared to face military court 
proceedings and a term of imprisonment up to four years in length. 
Despite the stiff penalties, East German military courts had about 
seventy such cases pending in 1983. 

The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany 

The westernmost and most formidable concentration of Soviet 
armed might outside the borders of the Soviet Union is the GSFG. 
In 1987 this force of about 380,000 men, organized into 20 ground 
force divisions and one air army and stationed entirely in East Ger- 
many, was over twice the size of the NVA. 

The importance that the Soviets attach to their position in East 
Germany is underscored by the disparity in size between the GSFG 
and the other Soviet groups of forces in Eastern Europe. The North- 
ern Group of Forces in Poland, for instance, comprised three 
divisions, the Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia numbered 
six divisions, and the Southern Group of Forces in Hungary had 
four divisions. The other groups totaled slightly more than half the 
size of the GSFG. The GSFG dominated not only East Germany 
but also the rest of Eastern Europe, not to mention the image that 
it projected into Western Europe. In 1987 the GSFG, under the 
command of General Valerii Aleksandrovich Belikov, had its head- 
quarters in the former Wehrmacht command center in Zossen- 
Wiinsdorf, south of Berlin. 

In 1987 the ground forces of the GSFG were organized into five 
armies, which had been strengthened continually during the 1980s. 
These forces were fully motorized, equipped with tactical nuclear 
weapons, and provided with high operational mobility. The ground 
forces included about 5,000 to 6,000 main battle tanks, the majority 
of them T-72s. The First Guards Tank Army, headquartered at 
Dresden, included four tank divisions and one motorized rifle 
division; the Second Guards Army, at Fiirstenberg, had one tank 
and two motorized rifle divisions; the Eighth Guards Army, at 



270 



A Soviet officer walks across 
the Bahnhofsplatz in Erfurt 
on his way to work 
Courtesy V. Jeffrey Gedmin 




Members of the National 
People's Army undergoing 
training in conditions resembling 
those of actual combat; 
Soviet surface-to-air missile 
is in the background 
Courtesy Panorama DDR 




271 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Weimar-Nohra, had one tank and three motorized rifle divisions; 
the Twentieth Guards Army, at Eberswalde, had three motorized 
rifle divisions; and the Third Shock Army, at Magdeburg, had four 
tank divisions and one motorized rifle division. In addition to the 
necessary artillery units at army and division levels, artillery support 
was provided by an independent division of rocket troops 
and artillery — the Thirty-fourth Artillery Division — stationed at 
Potsdam-Elstal and directly subordinate to the GSFG. A Spets- 
naz (see Glossary) company was assigned to each army, and an 
independent Spetsnaz brigade was stationed in Neuruppin. Air sup- 
port was provided by the Twenty-fourth Air Army, with headquar- 
ters at Wunsdorf. It is considered the best-equipped part of the 
Soviet air forces. In 1987 about 80 percent of the 1,000 to 2,000 
aircraft were potential carriers of nuclear weapons. 

The GSFG conducts its own maneuvers and training inde- 
pendently of the NVA. There is a program, however, called 
Brotherhood-in-Arms, which promotes contacts and cooperation 
between the East German and Soviet troops. Both the NVA and 
the GSFG participate in the various joint Warsaw Pact maneu- 
vers and exercises. 

Paramiltary Forces 

In addition to the NVA and the Border Troops, SED military 
doctrine recognizes several categories of armed agencies, primarily 
certain agencies of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry 
of State Security, the Civil Defense forces, and the Working-Class 
Combat Groups. Western analysts generally define these additional 
categories, along with the GST, as paramilitary forces, although 
at least one source relegates the Border Troops also to the paramili- 
tary category. Moreover, other elements of the two ministries, while 
not classified as armed agencies, also play a role in national secu- 
rity. The GST, although de facto a paramilitary organization, is 
not officially designated an armed agency by the East Germans 
because it, as a premilitary training society, cannot constitute a 
direct component of national defense in a state of emergency. 

Agencies of the Ministry of the Interior 

The members of the armed agencies of the Ministry of the 
Interior observe military discipline and bear rank designations. In 
1987 the minister of the interior, Friedrich Dickel, for example, 
was a colonel general. Dickel also was chief of the People's Police, 
whose Alert Units, numbering some 12,000 troops, were composed 
of 21 battalions equipped with BTR-40 and BTR-152 armored 
personnel carriers and 82mm mortars. Also of military significance 



272 



National Security 



are the Transport Police, with approximately 8,500 men in dark- 
blue uniforms who do work related to the railroad system. They 
were organized into sixteen companies and equipped with small 
arms and RPG-7 shoulder-fired antitank grenade launchers. 

In addition to the armed groups, the Ministry of the Interior 
has other branches that control the Fire Fighters, Prison Adminis- 
tration, Municipal Police, Traffic Police, Criminal Police, Train- 
ing Administrations, Passport Department, and registration system, 
as well as some 135,000 volunteer police assistants (see fig. 18). 

Agencies of the Ministry of State Security 

In early 1987, the Ministry of State Security was headed by 
General Erich Mielke, who had held the post since 1957. In 1986 
the ministry had only one armed force at its disposal: the Feliks 
Dzierzynski Guard Regiment, named for the founder of the Cheka, 
the Bolshevik secret police. The approximately 7,000 members of 
this regiment, who served at least 3 years, were responsible for pro- 
tecting government buildings and personnel. The regiment was 
composed of six motorized rifle battalions, one artillery battalion, 
and one training battalion. Its equipment included PSZH-IV 
armored personnel carriers, 120mm mortars, 85mm and 100mm 
antitank guns, ZU-23 antiaircraft guns, and helicopters. A Swiss 
source reported in 1986 that the troops of the Ministry of State 
Security also had commando units similar to the Soviet Union's 
Spetsnaz forces. These East German units were said to wear the 
uniform of the airborne troops, although with the violet collar patch 
of the Ministry of State Security rather than the orange one of 
paratroopers. They also wore the sleeve stripe of the Feliks 
Dzierzynski Guard Regiment. 

The Ministry of State Security also includes the Main Adminis- 
tration for Reconnaissance. This unit focuses its efforts primarily 
upon West Germany and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
but it also operates East German intelligence in all foreign coun- 
tries. The Main Coordinating Administration of the Ministry of 
State Security coordinates its work with Soviet intelligence agen- 
cies. The Main Department for Communications Security and Per- 
sonnel Protection provides personal security for the national 
leadership and maintains and operates an internal secure commu- 
nications system for the government. Protection against sabotage 
or espionage is a function of the Administration for Security of 
Heavy Industry and Research and the Main Administration for 
Security of the Economy. The Main Administration for Struggle 
Against Suspicious Persons is charged with the surveillance of 
foreigners — particularly from the West — legally traveling or residing 



273 



East Germany: A Country Study 





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274 



National Security 



within the country. This includes the diplomatic community, 
tourists, and official guests. Surveillance of mail and telephone com- 
munications is the function of Administration 12. Reliability of the 
personnel of the NVA is the responsibility of Administration 2000, 
which operates a secret, unofficial network of informants within 
the NVA. To facilitate its mission of enforcing the political security 
of East Germany, the Ministry of State Security operates its own 
penal system, distinct from that of the Ministry of the Interior. 
This system comprises prison camps for political, as opposed to 
criminal, offenders (see fig. 19). 

The Working-Class Combat Groups 

The Working-Class Combat Groups, actually a workers' militia, 
had over 500,000 members in 1987. Since their creation in 1953, 
they have increasingly assumed the character of a territorial force 
of considerable military importance. They consist of volunteer 
reserve units organized around 100-member companies formed in 
factories and other enterprises for the purpose of providing local 
security to the state. For training, equipment, and supplies they 
are responsible to the Ministry of the Interior, specifically to the 
Main Administration of the People's Police. These forces had 
armored fighting vehicles, including SK-1 armored personnel car- 
riers; 82mm mortars; 76mm antitank guns; and 23mm and 37mm 
antiaircraft guns. The Combat Groups train after work and on 
weekends for a total of 136 hours annually. In addition, they take 
part in monthly exercises and a large annual exercise and occa- 
sionally perform labor duties said to benefit the national economy. 
Further, experienced and politically reliable Combat Group mem- 
bers are active in political instruction in the NVA and in military 
education in the schools. Finally, the Combat Groups also have 
been involved in East Germany's program of military aid to Africa, 
providing training and equipment for militia groups, in Brazzaville, 
for example. 

Civil Defense 

The minister of defense is responsible for Civil Defense, through 
Lieutenant General Fritz Peter, chief of Civil Defense. As of 1987, 
there were about 3,000 Civil Defense officers and NCOs, who work 
on the Civil Defense Staff that exists in each of the country's 15 
districts, under military command. These forces take an oath of 
allegiance that differs only slightly from that of the NVA. The words 
"of Civil Defense" are added to all rank designations except those 
for generals. The highest-ranking field-grade officer, for instance, 
is a colonel of Civil Defense. 



275 



East Germany: A Country Study 





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276 



National Security 



In addition to the regular personnel, in 1987 the civil defense 
program included several hundred thousand civilian volunteers, 
most of them women, who could be called upon if needed. Train- 
ing was conducted for three to four hours per year, in five-year 
cycles, outside working hours. 

Basically the mission of Civil Defense is to support the armed 
forces and ensure their ability to operate in the territory of East 
Germany. In official terms, the principal mission is defined as pro- 
tection of the public, the economy, vital facilities, and cultural values 
against the effects of military aggression, agents of mass destruc- 
tion, and natural catastrophes. 

Crime and Punishment 

The socialist countries of Eastern Europe, and particularly East 
Germany, have a perception of the roots of criminal behavior that 
differs fundamentally from the general beliefs accepted in Western 
culture. This perception, based upon Marxist-Leninist social theory, 
strongly influences the structure of the criminal justice system and 
the administration of criminal justice. To understand the struc- 
ture and functioning of the East German criminal justice system, 
it is necessary to understand this Marxist-Leninist perception of 
the roots of crime in society. 

Public Order and Mass Participation 

Crime is viewed historically as the product of class societies that 
have private ownership of the means of production. It is this pri- 
vate ownership that breeds exploitation of man by man, antagonism 
between individuals, and conflict between individuals and society 
as a whole. It feeds individual egoism that is destructive to human 
and community interests. In a perfected communist society where 
social conditions, life-styles, and human personalities have been 
altered radically, deviant behavior would be impossible. Under 
socialism, the transitional phase from capitalism to communism, 
crime exists, but not as a rebellion against existing conditions. 
Rather, it is a residue or relic of the old, imperfect society. East 
Germany considers itself a socialist, or transitional, society. 

The leadership is not so dogmatic as to ascribe all deviant 
behavior to social causes. It is believed that genetic or biological 
factors can reduce the competence of individuals below the point 
where normal societal influences can compensate fully. In these 
instances, more stringent efforts by the state to recognize criminal 
potential may be required. These efforts may range from genetic 
counseling and therapeutic abortion to early recognition and 
diagnosis of personality disorders in schools and the work place. 



277 



East Germany: A Country Study 



The perception of the root causes of criminal behavior and, there- 
fore, the attitude and approach toward addressing the problems 
of crime and punishment have certain fundamental characteris- 
tics that are totally foreign to traditional Western practices, even 
while preserving some external similarities. The administration of 
justice, particularly criminal justice, is viewed very much in prag- 
matic and utilitarian terms. The rule of law that is so important 
to Western political thought is subordinated to the concept of social 
(socialist) justice. Because criminality is viewed as a social anach- 
ronism left over from capitalism that presumably will disappear 
with time or is traceable to biological causes correctable by science, 
justice need not be tempered by legal restraint. The juridical struc- 
ture of courts, judges, and lawyers, although serving an immediate 
need, is not fundamentally important to a socialist society. Fur- 
ther, the real function of law is one of educating members of soci- 
ety, both criminal and law-abiding, in the fulfillment of civic duties. 

The Legal System 

Crime control takes place on two levels. The first level involves 
the leadership of state organs and their functionaries, who plan all 
social processes. These organs, including national government agen- 
cies, local government, and industrial enterprises, have established 
the system of criminal law. The second level is based upon rigorous 
exposure, persecution, and punishment of criminals and elimina- 
tion of the causes of criminal acts. This second level involves active 
participation by citizens through service on conflict commissions, 
arbitration commissions, and juries. 

These two levels concentrate actual power and authority in the 
criminal system in the hands of the government and the SED by 
reserving to them the sole responsibility for establishing social 
processes and laws. The second level involves the masses in enforce- 
ment of state laws and processes. In this sense, "involving the 
masses" is a euphemism for social pressure to enforce the law by 
creating an atmosphere of intolerance toward criminals. 

The Court System 

The court system is similar to that of the Soviet Union and, in 
its basic structure, shows clear roots in the Napoleonic Code, which 
underlies many of the legal systems of continental Europe. The 
Napoleonic Code differs in two ways from Anglo-Saxon law: it does 
not subscribe to the adversary system, and it does not recognize 
common law or precedent. In reference to the adversary system, 
the prosecutor in an East German court is responsible for present- 
ing all the evidence, both for and against defendants, and the judge 



278 



National Security 



reaches a decision based upon this presentation. A defense attor- 
ney, if present, is subordinate to the prosecutor and serves only 
to ensure that the presentation is balanced. The judge is bound 
only by law as written in the statute books. The judge interprets 
the law as it applies to the specific case, and that interpretation, 
since it is unique, sets no precedent for other judges. 

The court system is subordinate to the legislative branch, the 
People's Chamber. The Supreme Court is the highest court and 
establishes the jurisdiction of subordinate courts. Under the 
Supreme Court are district, regional, and social courts. District 
courts generally try major cases occurring within their geographic 
jurisdiction. District prosecutors, appointed by the general prosecut- 
ing attorney, present the cases in district courts. Regional courts 
normally try minor cases occurring within their geographic juris- 
diction. As is the case in the district courts, judges in regional courts 
are appointed by the Supreme Court, and the regional prosecutor 
is appointed by the general prosecuting attorney. District courts 
and district prosecutors have no authority over regional courts or 
regional prosecutors. The court system also includes social courts 
of nonjudicial members established within enterprises and coopera- 
tives for the purpose of enforcing labor discipline or moral behavior. 
These courts, patterned on the Soviet people's courts, are quasi- 
legal institutions that give voice to mass social pressure on non- 
conforming persons. Although they are, in the strict sense of the 
word, extralegal, they have been placed under the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court, ostensibly to prevent excesses. 

There is also a separate military justice system, created in 1962 
with the passage of the Military Criminal Law. In 1979 the juris- 
diction of the military courts was greatly expanded, a reflection 
of increasing concern with law and order in all spheres of society. 
As in the case of the other courts, military prosecutors and mili- 
tary courts come under the final authority of the Supreme Court 
and the general prosecuting attorney. Military courts, however, 
are administered by the Main Department for Military Courts, 
and military prosecutors are administered by the military attor- 
ney general. Under this central umbrella, there are military courts 
and attorneys for the various arms of service, military districts, 
and formations of the NVA. Military courts exercise jurisdiction 
over both military personnel and civilians. The judges are NVA 
officers with law degrees. Military personnel may be tried for either 
military or civilian offenses. Civilians, at the direction of the 
Supreme Court, may be tried in military courts for the capital 
offenses of treason, espionage, and sabotage. 



279 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Penal Institutions 

There are two distinct penal systems in the country. One, oper- 
ated by the Ministry of the Interior, is for criminal offenses and 
accepts persons convicted and sentenced by the court system. Statis- 
tics on crime and prison populations are not published, and infor- 
mation on these subjects is scant and unreliable. 

The penal institutions operated by the Ministry of State Security 
make up a second system. Little is known of them since they oper- 
ate outside the jurisdiction of the legal system. Incarceration is for 
political, as opposed to criminal, offenses, and sentencing may be 
dealt with through ministry hearings rather than the judicial process. 

The military legal system may impose military detention upon 
soldiers for minor infractions for periods from ten days to three 
months. This punishment is limited to males and does not consti- 
tute a conviction to be entered on criminal records. 

Penal Code 

The Penal Code in use in 1987 became effective on December 1 , 
1968, after several years of preparation. It replaced the German 
code of 1871 that had been extensively modified to make it com- 
patible with the Soviet code. According to authorities, the 
nineteenth-century code had been based on personal relationships 
relevant only to private ownership of the means of production, and 
the compromises between it and a socialist code had never been 
satisfactory. The 1968 code was amended in 1974, 1977, and again 
in 1979. The 1979 amendment and other new legal provisions were 
more stringent. Authorities were given broader power, public order 
was generally strengthened, and police were given greater latitude 
in securing evidence. 

The code is divided into nine sections: crimes against the 
sovereignty of the regime and against peace, humanity, and human 
rights; crimes against the regime; offenses against the individual; 
offenses against youth and the family; offenses against socialist 
property; offenses against personal and private property; offenses 
against the general security; offenses against the regime and pub- 
lic order; and military offenses. Other than for its accommodation 
of property rights in a socialist system, the 1968 code is noteworthy 
in that five of its nine sections deal primarily with offenses against 
the regime and the social system. 

Punishments usually consist of fines or imprisonment but also 
frequently involve efforts at rehabilitation. Special consideration — 
job training and social rehabilitation — is usually given to juvenile 
offenders. Until July 1987, execution in time of peace could be 



280 



National Security 



authorized for eleven crimes against the state and for murder. Mili- 
tary courts, even in peacetime, had the right to sentence both 
civilians and military personnel to death for a variety of offenses. 
On July 16, 1987, however, East Germany announced the aboli- 
tion of the death penalty. 

Criminal Behavior 

Many observers reported an increase in crime throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. In the 1970s, with population growth at virtually 
zero, the number of persons convicted began to rise significantly 
following a drop in the 1960s. 

A West German analyst identified young people as the most fre- 
quent offenders. The districts with the highest incidence of crimi- 
nal activity all lie in the north, he determined, where the country's 
population base is youngest. Theft, fraud, and embezzlement 
accounted for 50 percent of all crimes. Drastic increases were 
reported in robbery, blackmail, and juvenile delinquency. Alco- 
hol abuse was linked to about 32 percent of violent crimes. Murder 
remained constant, while serious economic offenses — white-collar 
crimes such as illegal building and graft — decreased somewhat. 

Some East German authorities attributed the sharp upswing in 
crime to the moral impairment of a small group of young people 
who had come under imperialist influence, while other experts also 
blamed domestic remnants of presocialist society and, in cases of 
insanity or near-insanity, biological and psychological factors. 
Western analysts attributed the persistence of crime largely to 
apathy, cynicism, and declining public morale resulting from the 
high regulation of society. 

Prevention has centered on efforts to address citizens' grievances 
more quickly and thoroughly; analyze and influence public opin- 
ion; instill in young people a belief that work is an honor and dis- 
cipline a duty to society; use the penal system as well as the family, 
mass youth organizations, unions, and schools as tools in rehabilitat- 
ing criminals; and encourage popular participation in law enforce- 
ment. Voluntary assistance forces, for example, help the People's 
Police and the Border Troops in their work. Where prevention fails, 
punitive measures are available, including probationary sentences, 
fines, restitution, and increasingly severe sentences for crimes 
against property motivated by capitalist influences. 

* * * 

Because of the communist penchant for secrecy, particularly 
where military issues are concerned, reliable primary source data 



281 



East Germany: A Country Study 



on East Germany's national security systems are scarce. Few good 
sources are available in English. The most definitive treatment of 
this subject comes from West German sources. The nature of West 
Germany's relationship with its East German neighbor, however, 
sometimes precludes unbiased analysis or interferes with an even- 
handed approach to the subject. Scholarly research on East Ger- 
many by non-German Westerners exhibits a preference for 
economics, politics, demography, and other subjects less controver- 
sial than military affairs and national security. There are, however, 
some useful sources. A definitive source is Die NVA: Kernstiick der 
Landesverteidigung der DDR by Thomas M. Forster. Forster has pub- 
lished several editions of this book, each more professionally writ- 
ten and displaying better research than the last. An excellent English 
translation of the 1980 edition is available; as of mid-1987 the most 
recent edition, dated 1983, had not yet been translated. NVA in 
Stichworten, edited by Ullrich Riihmland, is a dictionary that lists 
terms and titles used in the NVA and describes their origin, history, 
and meaning in encyclopedia-style entries. Although a bit polemi- 
cal in style, it is an extremely valuable source. As of mid- 1987, 
the 1985 edition had not been translated, although English ver- 
sions of earlier editions were available. Bewaffnete Organe in der DDR: 
Nationale Volksarmee und andere militdrische und paramilitdrische Verbdnde, 
by Joachim Nawrocki, contains a wealth of detail on the organiza- 
tion of the NVA and other armed agencies. Siegfried Breyer's Die 
Volksmarine der DDR: Entwicklung, Aufgaben, Ausrilstung, published 
in 1985, provides excellent information on the history, missions, 
and equipment of the People's Navy. For data on the Border 
Troops, the best source is Frontdienst im Frieden: Die Grenztruppen 
der DDR by Peter Joachim Lapp. In English, The Military Balance 
by the International Institute for Strategic Studies is a good source 
for a current summary of the overall strength and arms inventory 
of East Germany. Other useful sources in English are East European 
Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier by A. Ross 
Johnson and Challenges to Soviet Control in Eastern Europe by J. F. 
Brown and A. Ross Johnson. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



282 



Appendix A 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Marriages, Divorces, and Infant Mortality, Selected Years, 

1950-85 

3 Annual Per Capita Consumption of Selected Agricultural 

Products, 1960 and 1985 

4 Production in Key Areas, 1936 and 1950 

5 Composition of National Income, Selected Years, 1950-85 

6 Gross Domestic Product and National Income, Selected Years, 

1950-85 

7 Distribution of Investment by Sector, Selected Years, 1950-85 

8 Average Annual Production of Key Products, 1956-60, 

1966-70, and 1976-80 

9 Average Annual Growth Rate of Gross Industrial Production 

by Sector, 1961-85 

10 Average Monthly Income by Sector, Selected Years, 1955-85 

1 1 Rank Order of East Germany's Twenty Most Important Trad- 

ing Partners, Selected Years, 1960-85 

12 Interlocking Party-State Hierarchies, 1987 



283 



Appendix A 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) divide by 5 

and add 32 



Table 2. Marriages, Divorces, and Infant Mortality, 
Selected Years, 1950-85 
(per 1,000 population) 



Infant Mortality 
per 

Year Marriages Divorces 1,000 Live Births 



1950 11.7 2.7 n.a. 

1960 9.7 1.4 38.8 

1970 7.7 1.6 18.5 

1971 7.6 1.8 n.a. 

1972 7.8 2.0 n.a. 

1973 8.1 2.3 n.a. 

1974 8.2 2.5 n.a. 

1975 8.4 2.5 15.9 

1976 8.6 2.7 14.0 

1977 8.8 2.6 13.1 

1978 8.4 2.6 13.1 

1979 8.2 2.7 12.9 

1980 8.0 2.7 12.1 

1981 7.7 2.9 12.3 

1982 7.5 3.0 11.4 

1983 7.5 3.0 10.7 

1984 8.0 3.0 10.0 

1985 7.9 3.1 n.a. 



n.a. — not available 

Source: Based on information from German Democratic Republic, Zentralverwaltung fur 
Statistik, Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [East Berlin], 1986, 
360. 



285 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Table 3. Annual Per Capita Consumption of Selected 
Agricultural Products, 1960 and 1985 



Percent 

Product Unit 1960 1985 Increase 



Meat kilograms 55 96 75 

Butter -do- 13 16 23 

Milk liters 94 106 13 

Eggs each 197 305 53 

Citrus and tropical 

fruit kilograms 7 13 86 



Source: Based on information from German Democratic Republic, Zentralverwaltung fur 
Statistik, Statutuches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [East Berlin]. 1986. 

282. 



Table 4. Production in Key Areas, 1936 and 1950 



1950 
Percent 

Product Unit 1936 Increase 



Electricity billion 14,000 139 

kilowatt-hours 

Lignite million tons 101 136 

Sulfuric acid -do- 369 82 

Potash fertilizers -do- 953 140 

Nitrogren fertilizers -do- 229 101 

Phosphate fertilizers -do- 32 78 

Raw steel -do- 1 109 

Cement -do- 2 99 

Cattle million head 1.6 99 

Laying hens -do- 3.6 98 



Source: Based on information from German Democratic Republic, Zentralverwaltung fur 
Statistik, Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [East Berlin]. 1986. 



286 



Appendix A 



Table 5. Composition of National Income, 
Selected Years, 1950-85 



Percent Percent Consumption 2 

Year Accumulation 1 Individual Social Total 



National income used domestically = 100 

1950 9.3 80.4 10.3 90.7 

1955 10.9 78.6 10.5 89.1 

1960 19.3 70.9 9.8 80.7 

1965 21.2 68.7 10.1 78.8 

1970 25.6 63.5 10.9 74.4 

1975 , 23.4 63.9 12.7 76.6 

1980 22.7 64.9 12.4 77.3 

1983 17.9 69.4 12.7 82.1 

1985 17.1 70.4 12.5 82.9 



1 Percent investment. 

2 In constant prices; base year 1980. 

Source: Based on information from German Democratic Republic, Zentralverwaltung fur 
Statistik, Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [East Berlin], 1986, 
102. 



287 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Table 6. Gross Domestic Product and National Income, 
Selected Years, 1950-82 1 
(in constant prices; base year 1980) 







Gross Domestic r 


roduct 




National Inco 


me 






Index 


Growth Rate 




Index 


Growth Rate 


Year 


Value 1 


(1950 = 100) 


(in percentage) 


Value 2 


(1950= 100) 


(in percentage) 


1950 


77.8 


100 


n.a. 


29.3 


100 


n.a 


1955 


134.4 


173 


11.6 3 


54.3 


185 


13.1 3 


1960 


195.2 


251 


7.8 4 


76.7 


262 


7.3 4 


1965 


249.5 


JZ. 1 


5.1 s 


91.0 


310 


Q C 5 
J.O 


1970 


333.6 


429 


6.1 G 


117.4 


401 


5.3 6 


1975 


438.8 


564 


5.7 7 


152.8 


521 


5.5 7 


1980 


541.8 


696 


4.4 8 


187.1 


638 


4.2 8 


1981 


561.9 


722 


3.7 


196.1 


669 


4.8 


1982 


563.8 


725 


3.4 


201.1 


686 


2.5 


1983 


580.2 


746 


2.9 


210.4 


718 


4.6 


1984 


601.6 


773 


3.7 


222.1 


758 


5.6 


1985 


623.2 


801 


3.6 


233.6 


797 


5.2 


n.a. not 


available 












1 Gross domestic 


jroduct (GDP) incl 


udes "transferred value" (cost of materials) and 


"newly created 


value" (profit anc 


wages). National 1 


ncome includes 


only "newly 


created value." " 


Nonproductive" 


activities (services 


i are not included i 


n either GDP or 


national income; thus they are 


not comparable 


to the Western concepts of GNF or 


national income 








2 In billions of GDR marks (for value of the GDR mark— see G 


ossary). 




1 Annual 


percent 


increase 1951-55 (average). 








4 Annual 


percent 


increase 1956-60 ( 


average). 








r> Annual 


percent 


increase 1961-65 ( 


average). 








e Annual 


percent 


increase 1966-70 ( 


average). 








7 Annual 


percent 


increase 1971-75 ( 


average). 








H Annual 


percent 


increase 1976-80 ( 


average). 









Source: Based on information from German Democratic Republic, Zcntralverwaltung fur 
Statistik, Statistiches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [East Berlin], 1986, 
13-14. 



288 



Appendix A 



Table 7. Distribution of Investment by Sector, Selected Years, 1950-85 

(in percentage) 



Sector 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 1983 1985 



Industry 44.6 47.7 50.1 48.5 53.8 58.4 56.1 

Construction 0.8 2.6 3.3 3.5 2.5 1.2 1.1 

Agriculture and 

forestry 11.7 11.9 13.0 11.8 9.7 8.6 7.4 

Transport and 

communications 13.7 10.5 8.7 10.4 8.5 7.2 8.9 

Domestic trade 1.5 2.8 4.6 3.7 3.0 2.3 2.8 

Other producing areas ... 0.3 0.5 1.5 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.8 

Nonproducing areas 27.4 24.1 18.8 21.2 21.8 21.6 22.9 



Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 



TOTAL VALUE* ........ 3.9 17.9 36.4 46.0 53.1 53.1 52.3 



*In billions of GDR marks (for value of the GDR mark — see Glossary). 

Source: Based on information from German Democratic Republic, Zentralverwaltung fur 
Statistik, Statistiches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [East Berlin], 1986, 
105. 



Table 8. Average Annual Production of Key Products, 1956-60, 
1966-70, and 1976-80 



Product 


Unit 


1956-60 


1966-70 


1976-80 


Slaughter animals 


. . . . tons 


1,275,800 


1,762,800 


2,387,800 


Milk 


-do- 


5,497,000 


7,036,400 


8,155,200 


Eggs 


. . . thousands 


2,961,600 


4,114,000 


5,287,000 



Source: Based on information from German Democratic Republic, Zentralverwaltung fur 
Statistik, Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [East Berlin], 1986, 
38. 



289 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Table 9. Average Annual Growth Rate of Gross 
Industrial Production by Sector, 1961-85 
(in percentage) 



Sector 


1961-65 


1966-70 


1971-75 


1976-80 


1981-85 


Energy and fuels 


4.4 


3.4 


2.7 


4.8 


3.7 


Chemicals 


7.8 


7.7 


8.2 


4.8 


3.8 


Metallurgy 


4.1 


6.3 


6.8 


4.0 


3.7 


Construction materials 


6.8 


6.0 


7.0 


2.3 


0.7 


Machinery and vehicles .... 


7.5 


7.0 


5.8 


6.1 


4.6 


Electric and electronic 














9.5 


9.6 


9.2 


8.7 


9.2 


Light industry 


4.2 


6.1 


5.9 


4.2 


3.1 


Textiles 


2.5 


4.4 


5.2 


3.9 


2.4 


Food processing 


3.4 


4.5 


5.5 


2.8 


2.2 


OVERALL AVERAGE . . . 


5.6 


6.1 


6.5 


4.7 


4.0 



Source: Based on information from German Democratic Republic, Zentralverwaltung fur 
Statistik, Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [East Berlin], 1986, 
21-22. 



Table 10. Average Monthly Income by Sector, 
Selected Years, 1955-85 



Sector 1 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 2 1980 1985 



Industry 104.7 102.3 102.5 101.0 99.8 100.9 100.6 

Construction 100.0 107.5 107.2 109.3 105.8 101.1 101.6 

Agriculture and 

forestry 73.8 85.1 89.5 93.2 98.8 97.1 94.4 

Transportation 101.1 105.2 105.0 110.8 110.4 109.4 108.9 

Communications 78.6 83.9 89.7 86.7 91.2 90.1 94.3 

Domestic trade 86.6 87.3 83.8 87.7 89.0 87.9 89.6 



OVERALL AVERAGE 3 .. 439 558 640 762 897 1,030 1,140 



' Percentage of overall average. 

2 Methods of calculation were altered slightly in 1973. 

3 In GDR marks (for value of the GDR mark — see Glossary). 

Source: Based on information from German Democratic Republic, Zentralverwaltung fur 
Statistik, Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [East Berlin], 1986, 
129. 



290 



Appendix A 



Table 11. Rank Order of East Germany's Twenty Most Important 
Trading Partners, Selected Years, 1960-85 
(in percentage) 



Country 


1960 


1965 


1970 


1975 


1980 


1985 


. 


4.9 ft 


4.9 ft 




■3^ 7 
jj. / 


jj. j 


*?ft ft 

JO.O 




1 n ^ 


Q ^ 

J7 . J 


1 n 9 


ft 7 


ft 4 


ft ^ 

O . J 




ft fi 


Q A 


Q C. 




7 7 


7 9 




7 


7 n 


7 3 


ft Q 


4 
0.4- 


^ 4 




4. 1 


4 "3 


^ 9 


^ 4 


D . J 


4 Q 




9 ft 


^ 9 


j . J 




1 9 


9 Q 




9 3 


9 4- 


9 4 


9 7 


^ 9 


9 ft 




fi Q 


n q 
u.y 


U.o 


1 1 
1 . 1 


1 .0 


9 A. 


Switzerland and 














Liechtenstein 


0.6 


0.5 


1.5 


1.5 


2.1 


1.8 




1.4 


1.3 


1.4 


1.4 


1.5 


1.5 




0.6 


1.0 


1.2 


1.5 


1.8 


1.5 


Yugoslavia 


1.8 


2.4 


1.4 


2.1 


2.3 


1.4 


Belgium and 














Luxembourg 


0.8 


0.8 


0.7 


1.2 


1.3 


1.3 


Cuba 


0.2 


0.9 


1.2 


0.8 


0.9 


1.2 


Netherlands 


1.0 


1.1 


1.4 


1.6 


1.5 


1.0 


Sweden 


1.0 


1.0 


1.0 


1.3 


1.2 


0.9 


Japan 


0.1 


0.4 


0.3 


0.9 


0.9 


0.9 


Iran 


0.1 


0.1 


0.1 


0.1 


0.5 


0.7 




0.1 


0.1 


0.1 


1.0 


1.3 


0.6 


Italy 


0.6 


0.7 


0.9 


0.8 


0.8 


0.5 



Source: Based on information from German Democratic Republic, Zentralverwaltung fur 
Statistik, Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [East Berlin], 1986, 
421. 



291 



East Germany: A Country Study 





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292 



Appendix A 



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293 



East Germany: A Country Study 



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294 



Appendix A 



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295 



Appendix B 



The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 

THE FOUNDING of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(also referred to as Comecon, CMEA, CEMA, or the Council) 
dates from a 1949 communique agreed upon by the Soviet Union, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The 
precise reasons for Comecon' s formation in the aftermath of World 
War II are quite complex, given the political and economic tur- 
moil of that time. However, Joseph Stalin's desire to enforce Soviet 
domination of the small states of Eastern Europe and to mollify 
some states that had expressed interest in the Marshall Plan (see 
Glossary) were the primary factors in Comecon' s formation. The 
stated purpose of the organization was to enable member states 
"to exchange economic experiences, extend technical aid to one 
another, and to render mutual assistance with respect to raw materi- 
als, foodstuffs, machines, equipment, etc." 

Until the late 1960s, cooperation was the official term used to 
describe Comecon activities. In 1971, with the development and 
adoption of the Comprehensive Program for the Further Exten- 
sion and Improvement of Cooperation and the Further Develop- 
ment of Socialist Economic Integration by Comecon Member 
Countries, Comecon activities were officially termed integration. In 
simplest terms, economic integration is defined as internationaliz- 
ing the production of manufactured and semimanufactured goods, 
resources, and services. More specifically, integration attempts to 
equalize "differences in relative scarcities of goods and services 
between states through the deliberate elimination of barriers to trade 
and other forms of interaction." Although such equalization has 
not been a pivotal point in the formation and implementation of 
Comecon's economic policies, improved economic integration has 
always been Comecon's goal. 

Soviet domination of Comecon is a function of its economic, 
political, and military power. The Soviet Union possesses 90 per- 
cent of Comecon members' land and energy resources, 70 percent 
of their population, 65 percent of their national income, and 
industrial and military capacities second in the world only to those 
of the United States. The location of many Comecon committee 
headquarters in Moscow and the large number of Soviet nationals 
in positions of authority also testify to the power of the Soviet Union 
within the organization. 



297 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Soviet efforts to exercise political power over its Comecon part- 
ners, however, have been met with determined opposition. The 
"sovereign equality" of members, as described in the Comecon 
Charter, assures members that if they do not wish to participate 
in a Comecon project, they may abstain. East European members 
have frequently invoked this principle in fear that economic inter- 
dependence would further reduce political sovereignty. Thus, 
neither Comecon nor the Soviet Union as a major force within 
Comecon has supranational authority. Although this fact ensures 
some degree of freedom from Soviet economic domination of the 
other members, it also deprives Comecon of necessary power to 
achieve maximum economic efficiency. 

As of 1987, those countries holding full membership in Come- 
con were the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Ger- 
man Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Romania, 
Poland, Cuba, the Mongolian People's Republic (Mongolia), and 
Vietnam. (For the purposes of this appendix, the phrases "East 
bloc," the "six European members," or the "European members 
of Comecon" are used interchangeably to refer to Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. 
When Yugoslavia and Albania are referred to, they are mentioned 
specifically by name.) The primary documents governing the objec- 
tives, organization, and functions of Comecon are the Charter of 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (first adopted in 1959 
and subsequently amended; all references herein are to the amended 
1974 text); the Comprehensive Program for the Further Extension 
and Improvement of Cooperation and the Further Development 
of Socialist Economic Integration by the Comecon Member Coun- 
tries, adopted in 1971; and the Comprehensive Program for Scien- 
tific and Technical Progress up to the Year 2000, adopted in 
December 1985. The 1985 Comprehensive Program for Scientific 
and Technical Progress and the rise to power of Soviet general secre- 
tary Mikhail S. Gorbachev have increased Soviet influence in 
Comecon operations and have led to attempts to give Comecon 
some degree of supranational authority. The Comprehensive Pro- 
gram for Scientific and Technical Progress seeks to improve eco- 
nomic cooperation through the development of a more efficient and 
interconnected scientific and technical base. 

Membership, Structure, Nature, and Scope 
Membership 

In a January 1949 meeting in Moscow, representatives of Bul- 
garia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet 



298 



Appendix B 



Union reached the formal decision to establish the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance. The communique announcing the 
event cited the refusal of these countries to "subordinate them- 
selves to the dictates of the Marshall Plan" (see Glossary) and their 
intention to resist the trade boycott imposed by "the United States, 
Britain and certain other countries of Western Europe" as the major 
factors contributing to the decision "to organize a more broadly 
based economic cooperation among the countries of the people's 
democracy and the USSR." 

Albania joined the six original members in February 1949, and 
East Germany entered Comecon in 1950. (Albania, although it 
had not formally revoked its membership as of mid- 1987, stopped 
participating in Comecon activities in 1961.) Mongolia acceded 
to membership in 1962, and in the 1970s Comecon expanded its 
membership to include Cuba (1972) and Vietnam (1978). As of 
1987 there were ten full members: the Soviet Union, six East 
European countries, and three extraregional members (see table 
A, this Appendix). 

Geography, therefore, no longer unites Comecon members. Wide 
variations in economic size and level of economic development have 
also tended to generate divergent interests among the member 
countries. All these factors have combined to give rise to signifi- 
cant differences in the member states' expectations about the 
benefits to be derived from membership in Comecon. 

Unity is provided instead by political and ideological factors. All 
Comecon members are "united by a commonality of fundamen- 
tal class interests and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism" and have 
common approaches to economic ownership (state versus private) 
and management (plan versus market). In 1949 the ruling com- 
munist parties of the founding states were also linked internation- 
ally through the Cominform (see Glossary), from which Yugoslavia 
had been expelled the previous year. Although the Cominform was 
disbanded in 1956, interparty links continue to be strong among 
Comecon members, and all participate in periodic international 
conferences of communist parties. Comecon provides a mechanism 
through which its leading member, the Soviet Union, has sought 
to foster economic links with and among its closest political and 
military allies. The East European members of Comecon are also 
militarily allied with the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact (see 
Appendix C). 

Official statements stress, however, that Comecon is an open 
international organization. Its Charter (Article II, Paragraph 2) 
invites membership from "other countries which share the aims 
and principles of the Council and have expressed their willingness 



299 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Table A. National Participation in the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (Comecon), November 1986 1 



Member Countries 



Bulgaria (1949) 
Czechoslovakia (1949) 
Hungary (1949) 
Poland (1949) 
Romania (1949) 
Soviet Union (1949) 



Albania (1949) 2 
East Germany (1950) 
Mongolia (1962) 
Cuba (1972) 
Vietnam (1978) 



Nonmember Countries 



That regularly sent observer That have concluded 

delegations to annual ses- formal agreements of 

sions in 1981-86: cooperation with 

Comecon: 



Afghanistan 
Angola 
Ethiopia 
Laos 

Mozambique 
Nicaragua 
South Yemen 
Yugoslavia 



Yugoslavia (1964) 
Finland (1973) 
Iraq (1975) 
Mexico (1975) 
Nicaragua (1983) 
Mozambique (1985) 



1 Dates of accession in parentheses. 

2 Albania joined Comecon in February 1949, one month after the organization was 
formed by the original six members. Although it has not formally revoked its mem- 
bership, Albania has not participated in Comecon activities since 1961. 



to assume the obligations contained in the . . . Charter." In the 
late 1950s, a number of other communist-ruled countries — China, 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Mon- 
golia, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia — were invited to participate as 
observers in Comecon sessions. Although Mongolia and Vietnam 
later gained full membership, China stopped attending Come- 
con sessions after 1961. Yugoslavia negotiated a form of associate 
status in the organization, specified in its 1964 agreement with 
Comecon. 



300 



Appendix B 



There are four kinds of relationships a country may have with 
Comecon: full membership, associate membership, nonsocialist 
"cooperant" status, and "observer country" status. Mutual agree- 
ment determines the precise nature of the relationship. As has been 
noted, Comecon has ten full members. Yugoslavia is the only coun- 
try considered to have associate member status. On the basis of 
the 1964 agreement, Yugoslavia participates in twenty-one of the 
thirty-two key Comecon institutions as if it were a full member. 
Finland, Iraq, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Mozambique have a non- 
socialist cooperant status with Comecon. Because the governments 
of these countries are not empowered to conclude agreements in 
the name of private companies, the governments do not take part 
in Comecon operations. They are represented in Comecon by com- 
missions made up of members of the government and the business 
community. The commissions are empowered to sign various 
"framework" agreements with Comecon's Joint Commission on 
Cooperation. Since 1957 Comecon has allowed certain countries 
with communist or pro-Soviet governments to attend sessions as 
observers. In November 1986, delegations from Afghanistan, Ethio- 
pia, Laos, Nicaragua, and the People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen (South Yemen) attended the 42d Council Session as 
observers. 

Structure 

Although not formally part of the organization's hierarchy, the 
Conference of First Secretaries of Communist and Workers' Par- 
ties and of the Heads of Government of the Comecon Member 
Countries is Comecon's most important organ. These party and 
government leaders gather for conference meetings regularly to dis- 
cuss topics of mutual interest. Because of the rank of conference 
participants, decisions made here have considerable influence on 
the actions taken by Comecon and its organs. 

The official hierarchy of Comecon consists of the Session of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Executive Committee 
of the Council, the Secretariat of the Council, four council com- 
mittees, twenty-four standing commissions, six interstate confer- 
ences, two scientific institutes, and several associated organizations 
(see fig. A, this Appendix). These bodies will be examined in turn. 

The Session, officially the highest Comecon organ, examines fun- 
damental problems of socialist economic integration and directs 
the activities of the Secretariat and other subordinate organizations. 
Delegations from each Comecon member country attend these 
meetings. Prime ministers usually head the delegations, which meet 
during the second quarter of each year in a member country's 



301 



East Germany: A Country Study 

capital (the location of the meeting is determined by a system of 
rotation based on the Cyrillic alphabet). All interested parties must 
consider recommendations handed down by the Session. A treaty 
or other kind of legal agreement implements adopted recommen- 
dations. Comecon itself may adopt decisions only on organizational 
and procedural matters pertaining to itself and its organs. 

Each country appoints one permanent representative to main- 
tain relations between members and Comecon between annual 
meetings. An extraordinary Session, such as the one in December 
1985, may be held with the consent of at least one-third of the mem- 
bers. Such meetings usually take place in Moscow. 

The highest executive organ in Comecon, the Executive Com- 
mittee, is entrusted with elaborating policy recommendations and 
supervising their implementation between sessions. In addition, 
it supervises work on plan coordination and scientific-technical 
cooperation. Composed of one representative from each member 
country, usually a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, 
the Executive Committee meets quarterly, usually in Moscow. In 
1971 and 1974, the Executive Committee acquired economic 
departments that rank above the standing commissions. These eco- 
nomic departments considerably strengthened the authority and 
importance of the Executive Committee. 

There are four council committees: Council Committee for 
Cooperation in Planning, Council Committee for Scientific and 
Technical Cooperation, Council Committee for Cooperation in 
Material and Technical Supply, and Council Committee for Coop- 
eration in Machine Building. Their mission is "to ensure the com- 
prehensive examination and a multilateral settlement of the major 
problems of cooperation among member countries in the economy, 
science, and technology." All committees are headquartered in 
Moscow and usually meet there. These committees advise the stand- 
ing commissions, the Secretariat, the interstate conferences, and 
the scientific institutes in their areas of specialization. Their juris- 
diction is generally wider than that of the standing commissions 
because they have the right to make policy recommendations to 
other Comecon organizations. 

The Council Committee for Cooperation in Planning is the most 
important of the four. It coordinates the national economic plans 
of Comecon members. As such, it ranks in importance only after 
the Session and the Executive Committee. Made up of the chair- 
men of Comecon members' national central planning offices, the 
Council Committee for Cooperation in Planning draws up draft 
agreements for joint projects, adopts a resolution approving these 
projects, and recommends approval to the concerned parties. If 



302 



Appendix B 



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303 



East Germany: A Country Study 

its decisions were not subject to approval by national governments 
and parties, this committee would be considered Comecon's 
supranational planning body. 

The international Secretariat, Comecon's only permanent body, 
is Comecon's primary economic research and administrative organ. 
The secretary, who has been a Soviet official since Comecon's crea- 
tion, is the official Comecon representative to Comecon member 
states and to other states and international organizations. Subor- 
dinate to the secretary are his deputy and the various departments 
of the Secretariat, which generally correspond to the standing com- 
missions. The Secretariat's responsibilities include preparation and 
organization of Comecon sessions and other meetings conducted 
under the auspices of Comecon; compilation of digests on Comecon 
activities; conduct of economic and other research for Comecon 
members; and preparation of recommendations on various issues 
concerning Comecon operations. 

In 1956 eight standing commissions were set up to help Comecon 
make recommendations pertaining to specific economic sectors. The 
commissions have been rearranged and renamed a number of times 
since the establishment of the first eight. In 1986 there were twenty- 
four standing commissions (see fig. B, this Appendix). 

Each commission is headquartered in the capital of a member 
country and headed by one of that country's leading authorities 
in the field addressed by the commission. The Secretariat super- 
vises the actual operations of the commissions. The standing com- 
missions have authority only to make recommendations, which must 
then be approved by the Executive Committee, presented to the 
Session, and ratified by the interested member countries. Com- 
missions usually meet twice a year in Moscow. 

The six interstate conferences (on water management, internal 
trade, legal matters, inventions and patents, pricing, and labor 
affairs) serve as forums for discussing shared issues and experiences. 
They are purely consultative and generally act in an advisory 
capacity to the Executive Committee or its specialized committees. 

The scientific institutes on standardization and on economic 
problems of the world socialist system concern themselves with theo- 
retical problems of international cooperation. Both are headquar- 
tered in Moscow and are staffed by experts from various member 
countries. 

Several affiliated agencies, having a variety of relationships with 
Comecon, exist outside the official Comecon hierarchy. They serve 
to develop "direct links between appropriate bodies and organi- 
zations of Comecon member countries." These affiliated agencies 
are divided into two categories: intergovernmental economic 



304 



Comecon headquarters, 
Moscow 




organizations (which work on a higher level in the member coun- 
tries and generally deal with a wider range of managerial and coor- 
dinative activities) and international economic organizations (which 
work closer to the operational level of research, production, or 
trade). A few examples of the former are the International Bank 
for Economic Cooperation (manages the transferable ruble system), 
the International Investment Bank (in charge of financing joint 
projects), and Intermetal (encourages cooperation in ferrous metal- 
lurgy). International economic organizations generally take the form 
of either joint enterprises, international economic associations or 
unions, or international economic partnerships. The latter includes 
Interatominstrument (nuclear machinery producers), Intertekstil- 
mash (textile machinery producers), and Haldex (a Hungarian- 
Polish joint enterprise for reprocessing coal slag). 

Nature of Operation 

Comecon is an interstate organization through which members 
attempt to coordinate economic activities of mutual interest and 
to develop multilateral economic, scientific, and technical coopera- 
tion. The Charter states that "the sovereign equality of all mem- 
bers" is fundamental to the organization and procedures of 
Comecon. The Comprehensive Program further emphasizes that 
the processes of integration of members' economies are "completely 
voluntary and do not involve the creation of supranational bodies." 



305 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Hence under the provisions of the Charter, each country has the 
right to equal representation and one vote in all organs of Comecon, 
regardless of the country's economic size or the size of its contri- 
bution to Comecon's budget. 

The "interestedness" provisions of the Charter reinforce the prin- 
ciple of "sovereign equality." Comecon's recommendations and 
decisions can be adopted only upon agreement among the inter- 
ested members, and each has the right to declare its "interest" 
in any matter under consideration. Furthermore, in the words of 
the Charter, "recommendations and decisions shall not apply to 
countries that have declared that they have no interest in a particu- 
lar matter." 

Although Comecon recognizes the principle of unanimity, disin- 
terested parties do not have a veto but rather the right to abstain 
from participation. A declaration of disinterest cannot block a project 
unless the disinterested party's participation is vital. Otherwise, the 
Charter implies that the interested parties may proceed without the 
abstaining member, affirming that a country that has declared a 
lack of interest "may subsequently adhere to the recommendations 
and decisions adopted by the remaining members of the Council." 

The descriptive term Comecon applies to all multilateral activi- 
ties involving members of the organization and is not restricted 
to the direct functions of Comecon and its organs. This usage may 
be extended as well to bilateral relations among members, because 
in the system of socialist international economic relations, multi- 
lateral accords — typically of a general nature — tend to be imple- 
mented through a set of more detailed, bilateral agreements. 

Comecon Versus the European Economic Community 

Although Comecon is loosely referred to as the "European Eco- 
nomic Community (EEC) of Eastern Europe," important contrasts 
exist between the two organizations. Both organizations administer 
economic integration; however, their economic structure, size, 
balance, and influence differ. The EEC incorporates the 270 mil- 
lion people of Western Europe into economic association through 
intergovernmental agreements aimed at maximizing profits and 
economic efficiency on a national and international scale. It is a 
regionally, not ideologically, integrated organization, whose mem- 
bers have all attained an accomplished level of industrialization and 
are considered to be roughly equal trading partners. The EEC is 
a supranational body that can adopt decisions (such as removing 
tariffs) and enforce them. Activity by members is based on initia- 
tive and enterprise from below (on the individual or enterprise level) 
and is strongly influenced by market forces. 



306 



Appendix B 











Chemical Industry (East Berlin, 1956) 1 




Oil and Gas Industry 
(Bucharest, 1956) 










Nonferrous Metallurgy 
(Budapest, 1956) 




Electrical Power (Moscow, 1956) 






Ferrous Metallurgy (Moscow, 1956) 




Foreign Trade (Moscow, 1956) 






Machine Building (Prague, 1956) 




Agriculture (Sofia, 1956) 




Coal Industry (Warsaw, 1956) 




Construction (East Berlin, 1958) 












Light Industry (Prague, 1958) 




Transportation (Warsaw, 1958) 
















Peaceful Utilization of Atomic 
Energy (Moscow, 1960) 




Standardization (East Berlin, 1962) 




Currency and Finance (Moscow, 1962) 


Statistics (Moscow,1962) 














Radio Technology and Electronics 
(Budapest, 1963) 




Food Industry (Sofia, 1963) 
















Geology (Ulan Bator, 1963) 




Post and Communications 
(Moscow, 1971) 




Civil Aviation (Moscow, 1975) 


Public Health (Moscow, 1975) 






New Materials and Technologies for 2 
Their Production and Development 




Biotechnology 2 














Location of headquarters and date of formation in parentheses. 
2 These two commissions were formed sometime after 1980. They were probably formed as a part of the 
Comprehensive Program of Scientific and Technical Progress approved at the 41st Council Session in 
December 1985. The location of their headquarters is unknown. 





Source: Based on information from O.A. Chukanov, ed., Nauchno-tekhnicheskoe sotrud- 
nichestvo stran SEV, Moscow, 1986, 10-11; andJozefM. van Brabant, Socialist 
Economic Integration, Cambridge, 1980, 189. 

Figure B. Comecon Standing Commissions, 1986 

Comecon joins together 450 million people in 10 countries and 
on 3 continents. The level of industrialization from country to coun- 
try differs greatly: the organization links three underdeveloped 



307 



East Germany: A Country Study 



countries — Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam — with some highly 
industrialized states. Likewise, a large national income difference 
exists between European and non-European members. The physi- 
cal size, military power, and political and economic resource base 
of the Soviet Union make it the dominant member. In trade among 
Comecon members, the Soviet Union usually provides raw materi- 
als, and East European countries provide finished equipment and 
machinery. The three underdeveloped Comecon members have 
a special relationship with the other seven. Comecon realizes dis- 
proportionately more political than economic gains from its heavy 
contributions to these three countries' underdeveloped economies, 
(see Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam, this Appendix). 

Socialist economic integration, or "plan coordination," forms 
the basis of Comecon's activities. In this system, which mirrors 
the member countries' planned economies, the decisions handed 
down from above ignore the influences of market forces or private 
initiative. Comecon has no supranational authority to make deci- 
sions or to implement them. Its recommendations can only be 
adopted with the full concurrence of interested parties and do not 
affect those members who declare themselves disinterested parties. 

Evolution 
Early Years 

During Comecon's early years (through 1955), its sessions were 
convened on an ad hoc basis. The organization lacked clear struc- 
ture and operated without a charter until a decade after its found- 
ing. These loose arrangements reflected the limited goals of 
Comecon at the time and the character of the Marshall Plan (also 
governed by a loose structure), to which Comecon served as a 
response. 

From 1949 to 1953, Comecon's function consisted primarily of 
redirecting trade of member countries toward each other and 
introducing import-replacement industries, thus making members 
economically more self-sufficient. Little was done to solve economic 
problems through a regional policy. This was a period, moreover, 
when their first five-year plans, formulated along the Soviet model, 
preoccupied the East European members. In the headlong pursuit 
of parallel industrialization strategies, East European governments 
turned their attention inward. Because of Stalin's distrust of mul- 
tilateral bodies, bilateral ties with the Soviet Union quickly came 
to dominate the East European members' external relations. Each 
country dealt with the Soviets on a one-to-one basis by means ol 
direct consultations with Moscow through local Soviet missions. 



308 



Appendix B 



Although reparations transfers (extracted by the Soviet Union in 
the immediate postwar years from those East European states it 
regarded as former World War II enemies) had been replaced by 
more normal trade relations, outstanding reparations obligations 
were not halted until 1956. In these circumstances, there was 
scarcely need or scope for multilateral policies or institutions. 

Rediscovery of Comecon after Stalin's Death 

After Stalin's death in 1953, however, new leaders and new 
approaches emerged in the countries of the region. The more 
industrialized and the more trade dependent of the East European 
countries (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland) had 
belatedly recognized the need to adapt the Soviet autarkic model 
to their own requirements. New approaches to foreign trade 
emerged during discussions of economic reform. Given their iso- 
lation from the rest of the world and the dominance of intrabloc 
trade in their external relations, interest in these countries inevitably 
centered on new forms of regional cooperation. For small, centrally 
planned economies, this meant the need to develop a mechanism 
through which to coordinate investment and trade policies. 

Instability in Eastern Europe and integration in Western Europe 
increased the desirability of regularizing intrabloc relations in a 
more elaborate institutional framework. The 1955 Warsaw Treaty 
on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (see Appen- 
dix C) and its implementing machinery reinforced political-military 
links. On the economic front, Comecon was rediscovered. The 
example of the 1957 Treaty of Rome (see Glossary), which initiated 
the processes of West European economic integration, gave impe- 
tus and direction to Comecon 's revival. 

Rapid Growth in Comecon Activity, 1956-63 

The years 1956 to 1963 witnessed the rapid growth of Comecon 
institutions and activities, especially after the 1959 Charter went 
into effect. Comecon, for example, launched a program to unify 
the electrical power systems of its member states and in 1962 created 
the Central Dispatching Board to manage the unified system. The 
organization took similar steps to coordinate railroad and river 
transport. In 1963 a special bank, the International Bank for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation, was created to facilitate financial settlements 
among members. In this period, Comecon also undertook a num- 
ber of bilateral and multilateral investment projects. The most nota- 
ble project led to the coordinated construction of the Friendship 
(Druzhba) oil pipeline for the transport and distribution of crude 
oil from the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe. The joint Institute 



309 



East Germany: A Country Study 

for Nuclear Research, established in 1956, initiated cooperation 
in another area of long-term importance. 

Parallel to these developments, the Soviet Union led efforts to 
coordinate the investment strategies of the members in the interest 
of a more rational pattern of regional specialization, increased 
productivity, and a more rapid overtaking of the capitalist econo- 
mies. These efforts culminated in 1962 with the adoption at the 
15th Council Session of the Basic Principles of the International 
Socialist Division of Labor. Although the principles of specializa- 
tion were generally favored by the more industrial, northern-tier 
states, the less developed East European countries were concerned 
that such specialization would lead to a concentration of industry 
in the already established centers and would thus thwart their own 
ambitious industrialization plans. Moreover the increased economic 
interdependence that the Basic Principles called for had inevitable 
political connotations. The latter were reinforced in 1962 by arti- 
cles and speeches by Soviet party leader Nikita Khrushchev propos- 
ing a central Comecon planning organ to implement the Basic 
Principles and foreseeing the evolution of a "socialist common- 
wealth" based on a unified regional economy. 

These proposals provoked strong and open reaction from 
Romania on the grounds of "sovereign equality" of members, as 
articulated most forcefully in the April 1964 Declaration of the 
Romanian Central Committee. Romania's opposition (combined 
with the more passive resistance of some other members) succeeded 
in forestalling supranational planning and reinforcing the interested- 
party provisions of the Charter. The institutional compromise was 
the creation of the Bureau for Integrated Planning, which was 
attached to the Executive Committee and limited to an advisory 
role on coordination of members' development plans. The Basic 
Principles, having lost their momentum, were superseded several 
years later by the Comprehensive Program. 

A Lull and Subsequent Revitalization in the Late 1960s 

After the fall of Khrushchev in 1964, the new Soviet leadership 
was preoccupied with internal matters, and the East European coun- 
tries were themselves busy with programs of economic reform. A 
comparative lull in Comecon activities ensued, which lasted until 
well after the 1968 Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia. By 
the end of the 1960s, Eastern Europe had been shaken by the 1968 
events, and there was an obvious need to revitalize programs that 
would strengthen regional cohesion. 

In the late 1960s, the question of how to proceed with plans for 
economic integration received considerable discussion in specialized 



310 



Appendix B 



journals and at international meetings of experts. Disillusioned by 
traditional instruments and concerned with the need to decentral- 
ize planning and management in their domestic economies, the 
reformers argued for the strengthening of market relations among 
Comecon states. The conservatives continued to stress the impor- 
tance of planned approaches. If carried to a logical extreme, the 
latter would involve supranational planning of major aspects of 
members' economies and the inevitable loss of national autonomy 
over domestic investment policy. The old conflict between planned 
approaches to regional specialization and the principle of sover- 
eign equality could not be avoided in any discussion of the mechan- 
ism for future cooperation. 

The Comprehensive Program for Socialist Economic Integration, 
1971 

The controversy over supranational planning led to a compromise 
in the form of the 1971 Comprehensive Program for the Further 
Extension and Improvement of Cooperation and the Further 
Development of Socialist Economic Integration, which laid the 
guidelines for Comecon activity through 1990. The Comprehen- 
sive Program incorporated elements of both the market and the 
plan approaches. Following the market approach, the Comprehen- 
sive Program sought to strengthen the role of money, prices, and 
exchange rates in intra-Comecon relations and to encourage direct 
contacts among lower level economic entities in the member coun- 
tries. At the same time, the Comprehensive Program called for more 
joint planning on a sectoral basis through interstate bodies that 
would coordinate members' activities in a given sector. New organs 
were also envisaged in the form of international associations that 
would engage in actual operations in a designated sector on behalf 
of the participating countries. Finally, the Comprehensive Program 
emphasized the need for multilateral projects to develop new 
regional sources of fuels, energy, and raw materials. Such projects 
were to be jointly planned, financed, and executed. 

The Comprehensive Program introduced a new concept in 
relations among members: "socialist economic integration." Sec- 
tion I, Paragraph 2 of the Comprehensive Program refers to the 
need "to intensify and improve" cooperation among members and 
"to develop socialist economic integration." This phrasing, which 
has since become standard, implies that the latter is a new and 
higher level of interaction, "a process of the international socialist 
division of labor, the drawing closer of [member states'] econo- 
mies and the formation of modern, highly effective national eco- 
nomic structures." The Comprehensive Program avoids, however, 



311 



East Germany: A Country Study 

the suggestion of ultimate fusion of members' economies that had 
been contained in the 1962 Basic Principles. It sets limits to the 
integrative process in the following terms: "Socialist economic 
integration is completely voluntary and does not involve the crea- 
tion of supranational bodies." 

The term integration had formerly been used to designate the 
activities of Western regional organizations such as the EEC. Its 
new usage in the Comprehensive Program suggested parity of sta- 
tus between Comecon and the EEC. Under subsequent amend- 
ments to its Charter, the competence of Comecon to deal with other 
international organizations and third countries on behalf of its mem- 
bers was made clear. Comecon sought to attract the participation 
of developing countries in its activities. The language of the Com- 
prehensive Program may thus also be regarded as an attempt to 
revitalize the image of Comecon in order to make association with 
it an attractive alternative to associated status with the EEC. 

Comecon members adopted the Comprehensive Program at a 
time when they were actively developing economic relations with 
the rest of the world, especially with the industrialized Western 
economies. The Comprehensive Program viewed the two sets of 
policies as complementary and affirmed that "because the inter- 
national socialist division of labor is effected with due account taken 
of the world division of labor, the Comecon member countries shall 
continue to develop economic, scientific, and technological ties with 
other countries, irrespective of their social and political system." 

In the years following the adoption of the Comprehensive Pro- 
gram, Comecon made some progress toward strengthening mar- 
ket relations among members. The Comprehensive Program's 
objectives proved somewhat inconsistent with the predominant 
trends within members' economies in the 1970s, which was a period 
of recentralization — rather than decentralization — of domestic sys- 
tems of planning and management. The major exception to this 
lack of progress lay in the area of intra-Comecon pricing and pay- 
ment, where the expansion of relations with the West contributed 
to the adoption of prices and extra-plan settlements closer to inter- 
national norms. Achievements under the Comprehensive Program 
have fallen under the heading of planned approaches, especially 
in the area of joint resource development projects. A second 
Comecon bank, the International Investment Bank, was established 
in 1970 to provide a mechanism for the joint financing of such 
projects. In 1973 Comecon decided to draw up a general plan 
incorporating these measures. A number of projects formulated 
in the years immediately following adoption of the Comprehen- 
sive Program were then assembled in a document signed at the 



312 



Appendix B 



29th Council Session in 1975. Entitled the "Concerted Plan for 
Multilateral Integration Measures," the document covered the 
1976-80 five-year-plan period and was proclaimed as the first 
general plan for the Comecon economies. The joint projects 
included in the plan were largely completed in the course of the 
plan period. 

A second major initiative toward implementation of the Com- 
prehensive Program came in 1976 at the 30th Council Session, when 
a decision was made to draw up Long-Term Target Programs for 
Cooperation in major economic sectors and subsectors. The ses- 
sion designated a number of objectives to which target programs 
would be directed: "guarantee of the economically based require- 
ments of Comecon member countries for basic kinds of energy, 
fuels, and raw materials; the development of the machine-building 
industries on the basis of intense specialization and cooperation 
in production; the fulfillment of national demands for basic food- 
stuffs and industrial consumer goods; and modernization and 
development of transport links among member countries." The 
32d Council Session, held in 1978, approved target programs for 
cooperation through 1990 in the first two areas, as well as in agricul- 
ture and the food industries. These programs established the com- 
mitments to multilateral cooperation that member countries were 
to take into account when drawing up their five-year plans for the 
1980s. 

By the end of the 1970s, with the exception of Poland's agricul- 
tural sector, the economic sectors of all Comecon countries had 
converted to the socialist system. Member states had restructured 
their economies to emphasize industry, transportation, communi- 
cations, and material and technical supply, and they had decreased 
the share of resources devoted to agricultural development. Within 
industry, member states devoted additional funds to machine build- 
ing and production of chemicals. Socialist economic integration 
resulted in the production of goods capable of competing on the 
world market. 

The 1980s 

Most Comecon countries ended their 1981-85 five-year plans 
with decreased extensive economic development (see Glossary), 
increased expenses for fuel and raw materials, and decreased 
dependency on the West for both credit and hard currency imports. 
In the early 1980s, external economic relations had greater impact 
on the Comecon countries than ever before. When extending credit 
to East European countries, Western creditors did so assuming that 
the Soviet Union would offer financial assistance in the event that 



313 



East Germany: A Country Study 



payment difficulties arose. This principle, which has always been 
rejected in the East bloc, proved inoperable in the aftermath of 
the Polish crisis of 1979-82. The sharp rise in interest rates in the 
West put the Polish debt at an excessively high level, beyond the 
amount that the Soviet Union could cover. The resulting liquidity 
shortage (see Glossary) that occurred in all Comecon countries in 
1981 forced them to reduce hard-currency imports. 

In the 1980s, high interest rates and the increased value of the 
United States dollar on international markets made debt servicing 
more expensive. Thus, reducing indebtedness to the West also 
became a top priority within Comecon. From 1981 to 1985, the 
European countries of Comecon attempted to promote the faster 
growth of exports over imports and sought to strengthen intra- 
regional trade, build up an increased trade surplus, and decrease 
indebtedness to Western countries. 

In the 1980s, Comecon sessions were held on their regular annual 
schedule. The two most notable meetings were the special sessions 
called in June 1984 and December 1985. The first summit-level 
meeting of Comecon member states in fifteen years was held with 
much fanfare on June 12-14, 1984, in Moscow (the 23d "Special" 
Session of Comecon Member Countries). The meeting was held 
to discuss coordination of economic strategy and long-term goals 
in view of the "differing perspectives and contrary interests" that 
had developed among Comecon members since 1969. More spe- 
cifically, the two fundamental objectives of the meeting were to 
strengthen unity among members and establish a closer connec- 
tion between the production base, scientific and technological 
progress, and capital construction. However, despite the introduc- 
tion of proposals for improving efficiency and cooperation in six 
key areas, Western and some Eastern analysts claimed that the 
meeting was anticlimactic and even a failure. 

The ideas and results of the June 14 session were elaborated at 
the Extraordinary 41st Council Session, which was held on Decem- 
ber 17-18, 1985, in Moscow. The meeting was heralded in the 
Comecon community as "one of the more memorable events in 
Comecon history." This special session featured the culmination 
of several years of work on the new Comprehensive Program for 
Scientific and Technical Progress up to the Year 2000. It aimed 
to create "a firm base for working out an agreed, and in some areas, 
unified scientific and technical policy and the practical implemen- 
tation, in the common interest, of higher achievements in science 
and technology." 

The Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical 
Progress up to the Year 2000 was originally to be ratified in 1986, 



314 



Appendix B 



but the Soviets advocated an earlier date of completion to enable 
the Comecon countries to incorporate their commitments to 
implement the program in their next five-year plans (which started 
in January 1986). The program laid out sizable tasks in five key 
areas: electronics, automation systems, nuclear energy, develop- 
ment of new materials, and biotechnology. It sought to restruc- 
ture and modernize the member states' economies to counteract 
constraints on labor and material supplies. The need to move to 
intensive production techniques within Comecon was evident from 
the fact that from 1961 to 1984 the overall material intensiveness 
of production did not improve substantially. The 1985 program 
provided a general framework for Comecon 's new direction of 
development. Details were to be settled in bilateral agreements. 

Cooperation under the 1971 Comprehensive Program 

The distinction between "market" relations and "planned" 
relations made in the discussions within Comecon prior to the adop- 
tion of the 1971 Comprehensive Program remains a useful approach 
to understanding Comecon activities. Comecon remains in fact a 
mixed system, combining elements of both plan and market econo- 
mies. Although official rhetoric emphasizes regional planning, it 
must be remembered that intra-Comecon relations continue to be 
conducted among national entities not governed by any suprana- 
tional authority. They thus interact on a decentralized basis 
according to terms negotiated in bilateral and multilateral agree- 
ments on trade and cooperation. 

Market Relations and Instruments 

It is not surprising, given the size of the Soviet economy, that 
intra-Comecon trade has been dominated by exchanges between 
the Soviet Union and the other members. Exchanges of Soviet fuels 
and raw materials for capital goods and consumer manufactures 
have characterized trade, particularly among the original mem- 
bers. The liquidity shortage in the early 1980s forced the European 
Comecon countries to work to strengthen the importance of 
intraregional trade. In the early 1980s, intraregional trade rose to 
60 percent of foreign trade of Comecon countries as a whole; for 
individual members it ranged from 45 to 50 percent in the case 
of Hungary, Romania, and the Soviet Union, to 83 percent for 
Cuba and 96 percent for Mongolia. 

Trade among the members is negotiated on an annual basis and 
in considerable detail at the governmental level and is then followed 
up by interenterprise contracts. Early Comecon efforts to facili- 
tate trade among members concentrated on development of uniform 



315 



East Germany: A Country Study 

technical, legal, and statistical standards and on encouragement 
of long-term trade agreements. The 1971 Comprehensive Program 
sought to liberalize the system somewhat by recommending broad 
limits to "fixed-quota" trade among members (trade subject to 
quantitative or value targets set by bilateral trade agreements). Sec- 
tion VI, Paragraph 19 of the Comprehensive Program affirms that 
"mutual trade in commodities for which no quotas are established 
shall be carried on beginning in 1971 with a view to stimulating 
the development of trade turnover, through expansion of the range 
and assortment of traded commodities, and to making trade in these 
commodities more brisk." Later in the same paragraph the Com- 
prehensive Program calls on members to "seek opportunities to 
develop the export and import of quota-free commodities and to 
create conditions essential for trade in such commodities." There 
is no evidence, however, that this appeal has had significant effect 
or that quota-free trade has grown in importance under the 
program. 

Prices 

The 1971 Comprehensive Program also called for improvement 
in the Comecon system of foreign trade prices. Administratively 
set prices, such as those used in intra-Comecon trade, do not reflect 
costs or relative scarcities of inputs and outputs. For this reason, 
intra-Comecon trade has been based on world market prices. By 
1971 a price system governing exchanges among members had 
developed, under which prices agreed on through negotiation were 
fixed for five-year periods (corresponding to those of the syn- 
chronized, five-year plans of the members). These contract prices 
were based on adjusted world market prices averaged over the 
immediately preceding five years; that is, a world-price base was 
used as the starting point for negotiation. Under this system, there- 
fore, intra-Comecon prices could and did depart substantially from 
relative prices on world markets. 

Although the possibility of breaking this tenuous link with world 
prices and developing an indigenous system of prices for the 
Comecon market had been discussed in the 1960s, the evolution 
of Comecon prices after 1971 went in the opposite direction. Far 
from a technical or academic matter, the question of prices under- 
lay vital issues of the terms of, and hence gains from, intra-Comecon 
trade. In particular, relative to actual world prices, intra-Comecon 
prices in the early 1970s penalized raw materials exporters and 
benefited exporters of manufactures. After the oil price explosion 
of 1973, Comecon foreign trade prices swung still further away from 
world prices to the disadvantage of Comecon suppliers of raw 



316 



Appendix B 



materials, in particular the Soviet Union. In view of the extra- 
regional opportunities opened up by the expansion of East-West 
trade, this yawning gap between Comecon and world prices could 
no longer be ignored. Hence in 1975, at Soviet instigation, the sys- 
tem of intra-Comecon pricing was reformed. 

The reform involved a substantial modification of existing proce- 
dures (known as the "Bucharest formula," from the location of 
the 9th Council Session in 1958 at which it was adopted), but not 
their abandonment. Under the modified Bucharest formula (which 
remained in effect as of 1987), prices were fixed every year and 
were based on a moving average of world prices for the preceding 
five years. The world-price base of the Bucharest formula was thus 
retained and still represented an average (although now moving) 
of adjusted world prices for the preceding five years. For 1975 alone, 
however, the average was for the preceding three years. Under these 
arrangements, intra-Comecon prices were more closely linked with 
world prices than before and throughout the remainder of the 1970s 
rose with world prices, although with a lag. Until the early 1980s, 
this new system benefited both the Soviet Union and the other 
Comecon countries since Soviet oil, priced with the lagged formula, 
was considerably cheaper than Organization of Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries (OPEC) oil, the price of which increased drastically 
in the 1970s. By 1983-84 this system turned to the Soviet Union's 
advantage because world market oil prices began to fall, whereas 
the lagged Soviet oil prices continued to rise. 

Exchange Rates and Currencies 

Basic features of the state trading systems of the Comecon coun- 
tries are multiple exchange rates and comprehensive exchange con- 
trols that severely restrict the convertibility of members' currencies. 
These features are rooted in the planned character of the mem- 
bers' economies and their systems of administered prices. Currency 
inconvertibility in turn dictates bilateral balancing of accounts, 
which has been one of the basic objectives of intergovernmental 
trade agreements among members. An earlier system of bilateral 
clearing accounts was replaced on January 1, 1964, by accounts 
with the International Bank for Economic Cooperation, using the 
transferable ruble as the unit of account. Although the bank pro- 
vided a centralized mechanism of trade accounting and swing credits 
to cover temporary imbalances, it could not establish a system of 
multilateral clearing given the centrally planned nature of the mem- 
bers' economies and the inconvertibility of their currencies. In 1987 
the transferable ruble remained an artificial currency functioning 
as an accounting unit and was not a common instrument for 



317 



East Germany: A Country Study 



multilateral settlement. For this reason, this currency continued 
to be termed "transferable" and not "convertible." 

The member countries recognize that the multiplicity and incon- 
sistency of their administered exchange rates, the separation of their 
domestic prices from foreign prices, and the inconvertibility of their 
currencies are significant obstacles to multilateral trade and coopera- 
tion. As of early 1987, Comecon lacked not only a flexible means 
of payment but also a meaningful, standard unit of account. Both 
problems have vastly complicated the already complex multilateral 
projects and programs envisaged by the Comprehensive Program. 
The creation in 1971 of the International Investment Bank provided 
a mechanism for joint investment financing, but, like the Inter- 
national Bank for Economic Cooperation, this institution could not 
by itself resolve these fundamental monetary problems. 

Recognizing that money and credit should play a more active 
role in the Comecon system, the Comprehensive Program estab- 
lished a timetable for the improvement of monetary relations. 
According to the timetable, measures would be taken "to strengthen 
and extend" the functions of the "collective currency" (the trans- 
ferable ruble), and the conditions would be studied and prepared 
"to make the transferable ruble convertible into national curren- 
cies and to make national currencies mutually convertible." To 
this end, steps would be taken to introduce "economically well- 
founded and mutually coordinated" rates of exchange between 
members' currencies and "between 1976 and 1979" to prepare 
the groundwork for the introduction by 1980 of a "single rate of 
exchange for the national currency of every country." This time- 
table was not met. Only in Hungary were the conditions for con- 
vertibility gradually being introduced by reforms intended to link 
domestic prices more directly to world prices. 

Cooperation in Planning 

If countries are to gain from trade, that trade must be based on 
rational production structures reflecting resource scarcities. Since 
the early 1960s, official Comecon documents have stressed the need 
to promote among members' economies a more cost-effective pat- 
tern of specialization in production. This "international socialist 
division of labor" would, especially in the manufacturing sector, 
involve specialization within major branches of industry. In the 
absence of significant, decentralized allocation of resources within 
these economies, however, production specialization can be brought 
about only through the mechanism of the national plan and the 
investment decisions incorporated in it. In the absence at the 
regional level of supranational planning bodies, a rational pattern 



318 



Appendix B 



of production specialization among members' economies requires 
coordination of national economic plans, a process that is not merely 
technical but also poses inescapable political problems. 

The coordination of national five-year economic plans is the most 
traditional form of cooperation among the members in the area 
of planning. Although the process of consultation underlying plan 
coordination remains essentially bilateral, Comecon organs are 
indirectly involved. The standing commissions draw up proposals 
for consideration by competent, national planning bodies; the 
Secretariat assembles information on the results of bilateral con- 
sultations; and the Council Committee for Cooperation in Plan- 
ning (created by Comecon in 1971 at the same session at which 
the Comprehensive Program was adopted) reviews the progress 
of plan coordination by members. 

In principle, plan coordination covers all economic sectors. 
Effective and comprehensive plan coordination has, however, been 
significantly impeded by the continued momentum of earlier parallel 
development strategies and the desire of members to minimize the 
risks of mutual dependence (especially given the uncertainties of 
supply that are characteristic of the members' economies). Plan 
coordination in practice, therefore, remains for the most part limited 
to mutual adjustment, through bilateral consultation, of the for- 
eign trade sectors of national five-year plans. Under the Compre- 
hensive Program, there have been renewed efforts to extend plan 
coordination beyond foreign trade to the spheres of production, 
investment, science, and technology. 

Plan Coordination 

According to the 1971 Comprehensive Program, joint planning — 
multilateral or bilateral — is to be limited to "interested countries" 
and is "not to interfere with the autonomy of internal planning." 
Participating countries will, moreover, retain national ownership 
of the productive capacities and resources jointly planned. But 
"joint plans worked out by the member countries will be taken 
into account by them when drafting their long-term or five-year 
plans." 

The Comprehensive Program does not clearly assign responsi- 
bility for joint planning to any single agency. On the one hand, 
"coordination of work concerned with joint planning shall be car- 
ried out by the central planning bodies of Comecon member coun- 
tries or their authorized representatives." On the other hand, 
"decisions on joint, multilateral planning of chosen branches and 
lines of production by interested countries shall be based on 
proposals by countries or Comecon agencies and shall be made by 



319 



East Germany: A Country Study 

the Comecon Executive Committee, which also determines the 
Comecon agencies responsible for the organization of such work." 
Finally, mutual commitments resulting from joint planning and 
other aspects of cooperation shall be incorporated in agreements 
signed by the interested parties. 

It is extremely difficult to gauge the implementation of plan coor- 
dination or joint planning under the Comprehensive Program or 
to assess the activities of the diverse international economic organi- 
zations. There is no single, adequate measure of such cooperation. 
The only data on activities among the Comecon countries pub- 
lished by the annual Comecon yearbooks refer to merchandise trade, 
and these trade figures cannot be readily associated with coopera- 
tive measures taken under the Comprehensive Program. Occasional 
official figures are published, however, on the aggregate number 
of industrial specialization and co-production agreements signed 
by members. 

Joint Projects 

The clearest area of achievement under the Comprehensive Pro- 
gram has been the joint exploitation and development of natural 
resources for the economies of the member countries. Joint projects 
ease the investment burden on a single country when expansion 
of its production capacity is required to satisfy the needs of other 
members. Particular attention has been given to energy and fuels, 
forest industries, iron and steel, and various other metals and miner- 
als. Most of this activity has been carried out in the Soviet Union, 
the great storehouse of natural resources within Comecon. 

Joint development projects are usually organized on a "com- 
pensation" basis, a form of investment "in kind." Participating 
members advance materials, equipment, and, more recently, man- 
power and are repaid through scheduled deliveries of the output 
resulting from, or distributed through, the new facility. Repay- 
ment includes a modest "fraternal" rate of interest, but the real 
financial return to the participating countries depends on the value 
of the output at the time of delivery. Deliveries at contract prices 
below world prices will provide an important extra return. No doubt 
the most important advantage from participation in joint projects, 
however, is the guarantee of long-term access to basic fuels and 
raw materials in a world of increasing uncertainty of supply of such 
products. 

The Concerted Plan 

The multilateral development projects concluded under the Com- 
prehensive Program formed the backbone of Comecon' s Concerted 



320 



Appendix B 



Plan for the 1976-80 period. The program allotted 9 billion rubles 
(nearly US$12 billion at the official 1975 exchange rate of US$1.30 
per ruble) for joint investments. The Orenburg project was the larg- 
est project under the Comprehensive Program. It was undertaken 
by all East European Comecon countries and the Soviet Union at 
an estimated cost ranging from the equivalent of US$5 billion to 
US$6 billion, or about half of the cost of all Comecon projects under 
the Concerted Plan. It consists of a natural gas complex at Oren- 
burg in western Siberia and the 2,677-kilometer Union (Soiuz) 
natural-gas pipeline, completed in 1978, which links the complex 
to the western border of the Soviet Union. Construction of a pulp 
mill in Ust' Ilim (in central Siberia) was the other major project 
under this program. 

These two projects differed from other joint Comecon invest- 
ments projects in that they were jointly planned and jointly built 
in the host country (the Soviet Union in both cases). Although the 
other projects were jointly planned, each country was responsible 
only for construction within its own borders. Western technology, 
equipment, and financing played a considerable role. The Soviet 
Union owns the Orenburg complex and the Ust' Ilim installation 
and is repaying its East European co-investors at a 2 percent interest 
rate with an agreed-upon amount of natural gas and wood pulp. 

The early 1980s were characterized by more bilateral investment 
specialization but on a much smaller scale than required for the 
Orenburg and Ust' Ilim projects. In these latter projects, Eastern 
Europe provided machinery and equipment for Soviet multilateral 
resource development. Work also progressed on the previously men- 
tioned Long-Term Target Programs for Cooperation (see The 
Comprehensive Program for Socialist Economic Integration, 1971 , 
this Appendix). 

Cooperation in Science and Technology 

To supplement national efforts to upgrade indigenous technol- 
ogy, the 1971 Comprehensive Program emphasizes cooperation in 
science and technology. The development of new technology is 
envisaged as a major object of cooperation; collaboration in resource 
development and specialization in production are to be facilitated 
by transfers of technology between members. The 1971 Comecon 
session, which adopted the Comprehensive Program, decided to 
establish the Special Council Committee for Scientific and Tech- 
nical Cooperation to ensure the organization and fulfillment of the 
provisions of the program in this area. Jointly planned and coor- 
dinated research programs have extended to the creation of joint 
research institutes and centers. In terms of number of patents, 



321 



East Germany: A Country Study 



documents, and other scientific and technical information 
exchanges, the available data indicate that the Soviet Union has 
been the dominant source of technology within Comecon. It has, 
on the whole, provided more technology to its East European part- 
ners than it has received from them, although the balance varies 
considerably from country to country depending upon relative levels 
of industrial development. Soviet science also forms the base for 
several high-technology programs for regional specialization and 
cooperation, such as nuclear power and computers. 

The Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical 
Progress up to the Year 2000, adopted in December 1985, has 
boosted cooperation in science and technology. The program sets 
forth 93 projects and 800 subprojects within 5 broad areas of 
development (see Early Years, this Appendix). A Soviet ministry 
will supervise each of the areas and will be responsible for the tech- 
nical level and quality of output, compliance with research and 
production schedules, costs, and sales. Each project will be headed 
by a Soviet organization, which will award contracts to other 
Comecon-member organizations. The Soviet project heads, who 
will not be responsible to domestic planners, will have extensive 
executive powers of their own and will closely supervise all activi- 
ties. The program represents a fundamentally new approach to 
multilateral collaboration and a first step toward investing Comecon 
with some supranational authority. 

Labor Resources 

Just as the 1971 Comprehensive Program stimulated investment 
flows and technology transfers among members, it also increased 
intra-Comecon flows of another important factor of production: 
labor. Most of the transfers occurred in connection with joint 
resource development projects, e.g., Bulgarian workers aiding in 
the exploitation of Siberian forest resources, Polish workers assist- 
ing in the construction of the Union pipeline, or Vietnamese work- 
ers helping on the Friendship pipeline in the Soviet Union. Labor 
was also transferred in response to labor imbalances in member 
countries. Hungarian workers, for example, were sent to work in 
East Germany under a bilateral agreement between the two coun- 
tries. Such transfers, however, are restricted by the universal scarcity 
of labor that has emerged with the industrialization of the less 
developed Comecon countries. Moreover the presence of foreign 
workers has raised practical and ideological issues in socialist 
planned economies. It should be noted, finally, that cooperation 
in the area of labor has been by no means limited to planned 
exchanges of manpower. Comecon countries have exchanged 



322 



Appendix B 



information on experience in manpower planning and employment 
and wage policies through Comecon organs and activities. 

Power Configurations Within Comecon 
The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 

Since Comecon's creation in 1949, the relationship between the 
Soviet Union and the six East European countries has generally 
remained the same. The Soviet Union has provided fuel, nonfood 
raw materials, and semimanufactures (hard goods) to Eastern 
Europe, which in turn has supplied the Soviet Union with finished 
machinery and industrial consumer goods (soft goods). 

This kind of economic relationship stemmed from a genuine need 
by the parties in the 1950s. Eastern Europe has poor energy and 
mineral resources, a problem exacerbated by the low energy effi- 
ciency of East European industry. As of mid- 1985, factories in 
Eastern Europe still used 40 percent more fuel than those in the 
West. As a result of these factors, Eastern European countries have 
always relied heavily on the Soviet Union for oil. For its part, in 
the 1950s Eastern Europe supplied the Soviet Union with those 
goods otherwise unavailable because of Western embargoes. Thus, 
from the early 1950s to the early 1970s, during the time when there 
was no world shortage of energy and raw materials, the Soviet 
Union inexpensively supplied its East European clients with hard 
goods in exchange for finished machinery and equipment. In 
addition, Soviet economic policies bought political and military sup- 
port. During these years, the Soviet Union could be assured of rela- 
tive political tranquillity within the bloc, obedience in international 
strategy as laid down by the Soviet Union, and military support 
of Soviet aims. By the 1980s, both parties were accustomed to this 
arrangement. The Soviet Union was particularly happy with the 
arrangement since it still could expand its energy and raw materi- 
als complex quickly and relatively cheaply. 

In the 1970s, the terms of trade for the Soviet Union had 
improved. The OPEC price for oil had soared, which put the Soviet 
Union in a very advantageous position because of its bountiful sup- 
ply of oil. The soaring price increased the opportunity cost (see 
Glossary) of providing Eastern Europe with oil at prices lower than 
those established by OPEC. In addition, extraction and transpor- 
tation costs for these goods, most of which originated in Siberia, 
were also rising. In response to the market, the Soviet Union 
decreased its exports to its East European partners and increased 
its purchases of soft goods from these countries. This policy forced 
the East European countries to turn to the West for hard goods 



323 



East Germany: A Country Study 

despite the fact that they had fewer goods to export in return for 
hard currency. 

Any hard goods supplied to Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union 
were sold essentially at a discount price because Comecon prices 
lagged behind and were lower that those of the world market. 
Developments in the 1980s made this situation even more com- 
plex. The 1983-84 decline in international oil prices left the Soviets 
with large holdings of oil that, because of the lag in Comecon prices, 
were still increasing in price. The "nonmarket gains from preferen- 
tial trade" became quite expensive for the Soviets. East European 
profits from the implicit subsidization were almost US$102 billion 
(in 1981 dollars, using an exchange rate of 1 .81 dollars to the ruble) 
between 1972 and 1981. 

Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam 

Soviet-initiated Comecon support for the Council's three least- 
developed members — Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam — has clearly 
benefited them, but the burden on the six East European Comecon 
members has been most unwelcome. Comecon is structured in such 
a way that the more economically developed members provide sup- 
port for the less developed members in their major economic sec- 
tors. Initially, when Mongolia joined Comecon in 1962, there was 
no great added burden. The population of Mongolia was relatively 
small (1 million), and the country's subsidies came primarily from 
the Soviet Union. The addition of Cuba (9 million people) in 1972 
and Vietnam (40 million people) in 1978, however, quickly esca- 
lated the burden. As of early 1987, three-fourths of Comecon 's over- 
seas economic aid went to Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam: almost 
US$4 billion went to Cuba, US$2 billion to Vietnam (half in mili- 
tary aid), and US$1 billion to Mongolia. 

Although the Soviets carry most of the burden, since 1976 the 
East Europeans have been persuaded to take part in projects to 
boost the developing countries' economies. East European coun- 
tries import Cuban nickel and Mongolian molybdenum and cop- 
per; they are also pressed to buy staples, such as Cuban sugar 
(80 percent of Cuba's exports), at inflated prices. Eastern Europe 
also contributes to the International Investment Bank, from which 
the underdeveloped three can acquire loans at lower interest rates 
(0.5 to 2 percent) than the East Europeans themselves (2 to 5 per- 
cent). In addition, the Soviets sell their fuel and raw materials to 
Cuba, Vietnam, and Mongolia for less than it is sold to the six 
East European members. Hence the latter have become competi- 
tors for the slowly diminishing Soviet resources. As of 1987, the 
only benefit accruing to the East Europeans was the services 



324 



Appendix B 



provided by Vietnamese guest workers. However, the majority of 
the Vietnamese have worked primarily on the Friendship pipeline 
in the Soviet Union. 

Undeniably, Comecon has been investing heavily in Mongolia, 
Cuba, and Vietnam; and the three countries have benefited sub- 
stantially from these resources. In 1984 increases in capital invest- 
ments within Comecon were the highest for Vietnam and Cuba 
(26.9 percent for Vietnam and 14 percent for Cuba, compared with 
3.3 percent and less for the others, except Poland and Romania). 
Increased investments in Mongolia lagged behind Poland and 
Romania but were nevertheless substantial (5.8 percent). In 1984 
the economies of the three developing countries registered the fastest 
industrial growth of all the Comecon members (see table B, this 
Appendix). 

Given their locations, Comecon membership for Mongolia, 
Cuba, and Vietnam appears principally to serve Soviet foreign 
policy interests. The Soviet Union contributes the most to the 
development to the three poorer Comecon members, and it also 
reaps most of the benefits. The Soviet Union imports most of Cuba's 
sugar and nickel and all of Mongolia's copper and molybdenum 
(widely used in the construction of aircraft, automobiles, machine 
tools, gas turbines, and in the field of electronics). Cuba has pro- 
vided bases for the Soviet navy and military support to Soviet allies 
in Africa. Vietnam makes its naval and air bases, as well as some 
100,000 guest workers, available to the Soviets. 

At the June 1984 Comecon economic summit and at subsequent 
Council sessions, the policy of equalizing the levels of economic 
development between Comecon member countries was repeatedly 
stressed. At the November 1986 Comecon session in Bucharest, 
the East European members "outlined measures to further improve 
cooperation with Vietnam, Cuba, and Mongolia with a view to 
developing the main sectors of these countries' national economies." 
Moreover, the Soviets have repeatedly stressed their earnestness 
in "normalizing the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and in 
including that region in the overall process of creating a universal 
system of international security." 

Support for Developing Countries 

Comecon provided economic and technical support to 34 develop- 
ing countries in 1960, 62 countries in 1970, and over 100 coun- 
tries in 1985. As of 1987, Comecon had assisted in the construction 
or preparation of over 4,000 projects (mostly industrial) in Asia, 
Latin America, and Africa (see fig. C, this Appendix). A monetary 
figure for this assistance is difficult to estimate, although a June 



325 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Table B. Change in Industrial Growth Within Comecon 
Member Countries from 1983 to 1984 
(in percentage) 



Country Change 



Bulgaria 4.3 

Cuba 12.0 

Czechoslovakia 3.9 

East Germany 4.2 

Hungary 2.8 

Mongolia 8.3 

Poland 6.0 

Romania 7.0 

Soviet Union 4.2 

Vietnam 7.2 



Source: Based on information from SEV: Voprosy i otvety [Moscow], 1985. 62. 

1986 Czechoslovak source valued the exchange between Comecon 
and developing countries at 34 billion rubles per year (US$48.4 
at the official June 1986 exchange rate of US$1.42 per ruble). The 
precise nature of this aid was unclear, and Western observers believe 
the data to be inflated. 

From the 1960s to the mid-1980s, Comecon has sought to 
encourage the development of industry, energy, transportation, 
mineral resources, and agriculture of Third World countries. 
Comecon countries have also provided technical and economic 
training for personnel in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. When 
Comecon initially lent support to developing countries, it generally 
concentrated on developing those products that would support the 
domestic economies of the Third World, including replacements 
for imports. In the 1970s and 1980s, assistance from Comecon has 
been directed toward export-oriented industries. Third World coun- 
tries have paid for this support with products produced by the 
project for which Comecon rendered help. This policy has provided 
Comecon with a stable source of necessary deliveries in addition 
to political influence in these strategically important areas. 

Trends and Prospects 

Comecon has served for more than three decades as a frame- 
work for cooperation among the planned economies of the Soviet 
Union, its allies in Eastern Europe, and, now, Soviet allies in the 



326 



Appendix B 



<§>■•*■□• 



a® ■ 



a * a 




<>•- 



*® 



a*O®0» 



A * A 

J®H*Q» A 



®# 




O® 



J ■ • 



▲ ®« 




Source: Based on information from Figyelo [Budapest], October 16, 1986. 

Figure C. Most Important Facilities Built in Africa by Comecon Countries, 
December 31, 1985 



Third World. Over the years, the Comecon system has grown 
steadily in scope and experience. The organization now encom- 
passes a complex and sophisticated set of institutions that represent 
a striking advance over the capabilities of the organization m the 
early 1960s. 

This institutional evolution has reflected changing and expand- 
ing goals. Initial, modest objectives of "exchanging experience" 
and providing "technical assistance" and other forms of "mutual 



327 



East Germany: A Country Study 

aid" have been extended to the development of an integrated set 
of economies based on a coordinated international pattern of 
production and investment. These ambitious goals are pursued 
through a broad spectrum of cooperative measures extending from 
monetary to technological relations. 

At the same time, the extraregional goals of the organization have 
expanded; other countries, both geographically distant and systemi- 
cally different, are being encouraged to participate in Comecon 
activities. Parallel efforts have sought to develop Comecon as a 
mechanism through which to coordinate the foreign economic poli- 
cies of the members as well as their actual relations with nonmem- 
ber countries and such organizations as the EEC and the United 
Nations. 

Asymmetries of size and differences in levels of development 
among Comecon members have deeply affected the institutional 
character and evolution of the organization. The overwhelming 
dominance of the Soviet economy has necessarily meant that the 
bulk of intra-Comecon relations takes the form of bilateral relations 
between the Soviet Union and the smaller members of Comecon. 

These asymmetries have served in other ways to impede progress 
toward multilateral trade and cooperation within the organization. 
The sensitivities of the smaller states have dictated that the sover- 
eign equality of members remains a basic tenet of the organiza- 
tion. Despite Soviet political and economic dominance, sovereign 
equality has constituted a very real obstacle to the acquisition of 
supranational powers by Comecon organs. Nevertheless, the 1985 
Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress up 
to the Year 2000 took steps to instill some organizations with 
supranational authority. 

The planned nature of the members' economies and the lack of 
effective market-price mechanisms to facilitate integration have fur- 
ther hindered progress toward Comecon goals. Without the auto- 
matic workings of market forces, progress must depend upon 
conscious acts of policy. This tends to politicize the processes of 
integration to a greater degree than is the case in market economies. 

By 1987 Comecon's Comprehensive Program, adopted in 1971, 
had undergone considerable change. Multilateral planning faded 
into traditional bilateral cooperation, and the Bucharest formula 
for prices assumed a revised form. The 1985 Comprehensive Pro- 
gram for Scientific and Technical Progress, or, as some Western 
analysts call it, the "Gorbachev Charter," was Comecon's new 
blueprint for taking a firm grip on its future. Experience in the 
early 1980s showed that turning to the West and Japan for tech- 
nological advancement put Comecon in a very dangerous position 



328 



Appendix B 



because it pulled the East European members further away from 
the Soviet Union and threatened to leave the entire organization 
at the mercy of the West. The purpose of the 1985 program was 
to offset centrifugal forces and reduce Comecon's vulnerability to 
"technological blackmail" through broadened mutual cooperation, 
increased efficiency of cooperation, and improved quality of output. 

The success of the 1985 program will be closely tied to the suc- 
cess of Gorbachev's changes in the Soviet economy. Major projects 
for the 1986-90 period include a 5,600-kilometer natural-gas pipe- 
line from the Yamburg Peninsula (in northern Siberia) to Eastern 
Europe; the Krivoy Rog (in the Ukraine), a mining and enrich- 
ment combine that will produce 13 million tons of iron ore annu- 
ally; the annual production and exchange of 500 million rubles' 
worth of equipment for nuclear power plants; and joint projects 
for extracting coal in Poland, magnesite in Czechoslovakia, nickel 
in Cuba, and nonferrous metals in Mongolia. Recalling the failure 
record of previous Comecon projects (for example, the disappointing 
Riad computer project, which in its attempt to standardize com- 
ponents and software is producing unreliable and costly products 
that fellow members refuse to buy), some Western analysts ques- 
tion whether the 1985 program will accomplish all that it has set 
out to do. 

* * * 

Although the selection is still rather sparse, several English- 
language works on Comecon appeared in the early 1980s. Socialist 
Economic Integration by Jozef van Brabant discusses in great detail 
the mechanisms and operations of socialist economic integration 
in general and Comecon in particular. It is perhaps the most com- 
prehensive English-language work on the subject. Several chap- 
ters in East European Integration and East- West Trade, edited by Paul 
Marer and John Michael Montias, are particularly helpful in 
analyzing the mechanisms of Comecon and comparing it with the 
EEC. Analysis of Comecon's operations and development in the 
modern economic and political arena is provided in Marer' s "The 
Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe' ' in Soviet 
Policy in Eastern Europe. The best sources for up-to-date political and 
economic analysis are the Radio Free Europe background reports. 
Articles by Vladimir Sobell, in particular, give good insight into 
the 1985 Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical 
Development. 

Russian-language sources provide useful information on Come- 
con procedures and structure in addition to insight into the Soviet 



329 



East Germany: A Country Study 



and East European view of Comecon's goals and shortcomings. 
Articles in this vein can be found in Voprosy ekonomiki and the 
"Ekonomika" series published in Moscow by Znanie. Transla- 
tions of selected articles from these publications can be found in 
the Joint Publications Research Service's USSR Report on Eco- 
nomic Affairs. The Comecon Secretariat publishes a bimonthly 
bulletin (Ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo stran-chlenov SEV), which has 
a table of contents and a summary in English; an annual Statisticheskii 
ezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV; and various handbooks. (For further 
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



330 



Appendix C 



The Warsaw Pact 

IN APRIL 1985, the general secretaries of the communist and 
workers' parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania gathered in Warsaw to sign a protocol 
extending the effective term of the 1955 Treaty on Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which originally established 
the Soviet-led political-military alliance in Eastern Europe. Their 
action ensured that the Warsaw Pact, as it is commonly known, 
will remain part of the international political and military land- 
scape well into the future. The thirtieth anniversary of the Warsaw 
Pact and its renewal make a review of its origins and evolution 
particularly appropriate. 

The Warsaw Pact alliance of the East European socialist states 
is the nominal counterweight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation (NATO) on the European continent (see fig. A, this Appen- 
dix). Unlike NATO, founded in 1949, however, the Warsaw Pact 
does not have an independent organizational structure but func- 
tions as part of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. In fact, through- 
out the more than thirty years since it was founded, the Warsaw 
Pact has served as one of the Soviet Union's primary mechanisms 
for keeping its East European allies under its political and mili- 
tary control. The Soviet Union has used the Warsaw Pact to erect 
a facade of collective decision making and action around the reality 
of its political domination and military intervention in the inter- 
nal affairs of its allies. At the same time, the Soviet Union also 
has used the Warsaw Pact to develop East European socialist armies 
and harness them to its military strategy. 

Since its inception, the Warsaw Pact has reflected the changing 
pattern of Soviet-East European relations and manifested problems 
that affect all alliances. The Warsaw Pact has evolved into some- 
thing other than the mechanism of control the Soviet Union origi- 
nally intended it to be, and it has become increasingly less 
dominated by the Soviet Union since the 1960s. The organizational 
structure of the Warsaw Pact has grown and has provided a forum 
for greater intra-alliance debate, bargaining, and conflict between 
the §oviet Union and its allies over the issues of national indepen- 
dence, policy autonomy, and East European participation in alli- 
ance decision making. While the Warsaw Pact retains its internal 



331 



East Germany: A Country Study 



100 200 Miles 



100 200 Kttom«ter« 



SOVIET 
UNION 




Figure A. The Warsaw Pact Member States, 1987 



function in Soviet-East European relations, its non-Soviet members 
have also developed sufficient military capabilities to become use- 
ful adjuncts of Soviet power against NATO in Europe. 



332 



Appendix C 



The Soviet Alliance System, 1943-55 

Long before the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, the 
Soviet Union had molded the East European states into an alli- 
ance serving its security interests. While liberating Eastern Europe 
from Nazi Germany in World War II, the Red Army established 
political and military control over that region. The Soviet Union's 
size, economic weight, and sheer military power made its domi- 
nation inevitable in this part of Europe, which historically had been 
dominated by great powers. The Soviet Union intended to use 
Eastern Europe as a buffer zone for the forward defense of its 
western borders and to keep threatening ideological influences at 
bay. Continued control of Eastern Europe became second only to 
defense of the homeland in the hierarchy of Soviet security priori- 
ties. The Soviet Union ensured its control of the region by turn- 
ing the East European countries into subjugated allies. 

The Organization of East European National Units, 1943-45 

During World War II, the Soviet Union began to build what 
Soviet sources refer to as history's first coalition of a progressive 
type when it organized or reorganized the armies of Eastern Europe 
to fight with the Red Army against the German Wehrmacht. The 
command and control procedures established in this military alli- 
ance would serve as the model on which the Soviet Union would 
build the Warsaw Pact after 1955. During the last years of the war, 
Soviet commanders and officers gained valuable experience in 
directing multinational forces that would later be put to use in the 
Warsaw Pact. The units formed between 1943 and 1945 also 
provided the foundation on which the Soviet Union could build 
postwar East European national armies. 

The Red Army began to form, train, and arm Polish and 
Czechoslovak national units on Soviet territory in 1943. These units 
fought with the Red Army as it carried its offensive westward into 
German-occupied Poland and Czechoslovakia and then into Ger- 
many itself. By contrast, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania were 
wartime enemies of the Soviet Union. Although ruled by ostensi- 
bly fascist regimes, these countries allied with Nazi Germany mainly 
to recover territories lost through the peace settlements of World 
War I or seized by the Soviet Union under the terms of the 1939 
Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. However, bv 1943 the Red 
Army had destroyed the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Romanian 
forces fighting alongside the Wehrmacht. In 1944 it occupied 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, and shortly thereafter it began 
the process of transforming the remnants of their armies into allied 



333 



East Germany: A Country Study 

units that could re-enter the war on the side of the Soviet Union. 
These allied units represented a mix of East European nationals 
fleeing Nazi occupation, deportees from Soviet-occupied areas, and 
enemy prisoners of war. Red Army political officers organized 
extensive indoctrination programs in the allied units under Soviet 
control and purged any politically suspect personnel. In all, the 
Soviet Union formed and armed more than 29 divisions and 
37 brigades or regiments, which included more than 500,000 East 
European troops. 

The allied national formations were directly subordinate to the 
headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command and its 
executive body, the Soviet General Staff. Although the Soviet Union 
directly commanded all allied units, the Supreme High Command 
included one representative from each of the East European forces. 
Lacking authority, these representatives simply relayed directives 
from the Supreme High Command and General Staff to the com- 
manders of East European units. While all national units had 
so-called Soviet advisers, some Red Army officers openly discharged 
command and staff responsibilities in the East European armies. 
Even when commanded by East European officers, non-Soviet con- 
tingents participated in operations against the Wehrmacht only as 
part of Soviet fronts. 

The Development of Socialist Armies in Eastern Europe, 1945-55 

At the end of World War II, the Red Army occupied Bulgaria, 
Romania, Hungary, Poland, and eastern Germany, and Soviet 
front commanders headed the Allied Control Commission in each 
of these occupied countries. The Soviet Union gave its most 
important occupation forces a garrison status when it established 
the Northern Group of Forces (NGF) in 1947 and the Group of 
Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) in 1949. By 1949 the Soviet 
Union had concluded twenty-year bilateral treaties on friendship, 
cooperation, and mutual assistance with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland, and Romania. These treaties prohibited the East 
European regimes from entering into relations with states hostile 
to the Soviet Union, officially made these countries Soviet allies, 
and granted the Soviet Union rights to a continued military presence 
on their territory. The continued presence of Red Army forces 
guaranteed Soviet control of these countries. By contrast, the Soviet 
Union did not occupy either Albania or Yugoslavia during or after 
the war, and both countries remained outside direct Soviet control. 

The circumstances of Soviet occupation facilitated the installa- 
tion of communist-dominated governments called "people's 
democracies" in Eastern Europe. The indoctrinated East European 



334 



Appendix C 



troops that had fought with the Red Army to liberate their coun- 
tries from Nazi occupation became politically useful to the Soviet 
Union as it established socialist states in Eastern Europe. The East 
European satellite regimes depended entirely on Soviet military 
power — and the continued deployment of 1 million Red Army 
soldiers — to stay in power. In return, the new East European 
political and military elites were obliged to respect Soviet political 
and security interests in the region. 

While transforming the East European governments, the Soviet 
Union also continued the process of strengthening its political con- 
trol over the East European armed forces and reshaping them along 
Soviet military lines after World War II. In Eastern Europe, the 
Soviet Union instituted a system of local communist party con- 
trols over the military based on the Soviet model. The East Euro- 
pean communist parties thoroughly penetrated the East European 
military establishments to ensure their loyalty to the newly estab- 
lished political order. At the same time, the Soviet Union built these 
armies up to support local security and police forces against domestic 
disorder or other threats to communist party rule. Reliable East 
European military establishments could be counted on to support 
communist rule and, consequently, ensure continued Soviet con- 
trol of Eastern Europe. In fact, in the late 1940s and the 1950s 
the Soviet Union was more concerned about cultivating and 
monitoring political loyalty in its East European military allies than 
increasing their utility as combat forces. 

The postwar military establishments in Eastern Europe consisted 
of rival communist and noncommunist wartime antifascist resistance 
movements, national units established on Soviet territory during 
the war, prewar national military commands, and various other 
armed forces elements that spent the war years in exile or fighting 
in the West. Using the weight of the Red Army and its occupation 
authority, the Soviet Union purged or co-opted the noncommunist 
nationalists in the East European armies and thereby eliminated 
a group likely to oppose their restructuring along Soviet lines. In 
the case of communist forces, the Soviet Union trusted and 
promoted personnel who had served in the national units formed 
on its territory over native communists who had fought in the East 
European underground organizations independent of Soviet control. 

After 1948 the East European armies adopted regular political 
education programs. This Soviet-style indoctrination was aimed 
primarily at raising communist party membership within the officer 
corps and building a military leadership cadre loyal to the socialist 
system and the national communist regime. Unquestionable politi- 
cal loyalty was more important than professional competence for 



335 



East Germany: A Country Study 

advancement in the military hierarchy. Appropriate class origin 
became the principal criterion for admission to the East European 
officer corps and military schools. The Soviet Union and national 
communist party regimes transformed the East European military 
establishments into a vehicle of upward mobility for the working 
class and peasantry, who were unaccustomed to this kind of 
opportunity. Many of the officers in the new East European armed 
forces supported the new regimes because their newly acquired 
professional and social status hinged on the continuance of com- 
munist party rule. 

The Soviet Union assigned trusted national communist party 
leaders to the most important East European military command 
positions despite their lack of military qualifications. The East 
European ministries of defense established political departments 
on the model of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army 
and Navy. Throughout the 1950s, prewar East European com- 
munists served as political officers, sharing command prerogatives 
with professional officers and evaluating their loyalty to the com- 
munist regime and compliance with its directives. Heavily armed' 
paramilitary forces under the control of the East European inter- 
nal security networks became powerful rivals for the national armies 
and checked their potentially great influence within the political 
system. The Soviet foreign intelligence apparatus also closely moni- 
tored the allied national military establishments. 

Despite the great diversity of the new Soviet allies in terms of 
military history and traditions, the Sovietization of the East Euro- 
pean national armies, which occurred between 1945 and the early 
1950s, followed a consistent pattern in every case. The Soviet Union 
forced its East European allies to emulate Soviet Army ranks and 
uniforms and abandon all distinctive national military customs and 
practices; these allied armies used all Soviet-made weapons and 
equipment. The Soviet Union also insisted on the adoption of Soviet 
Army organization and tactics within the East European armies. 
Following the precedent established during World War II, the Soviet 
Union assigned Soviet officers to duty at all levels of the East 
European national command structures, from the general (main) 
staffs down to the regimental level, as its primary means of mili- 
tary control. Although officially termed advisers, these Soviet Army 
officers generally made the most important decisions within the 
East European armies. Direct Soviet control over the national mili- 
tary establishments was most complete in strategically important 
Poland. Soviet officers held approximately half the command 
positions in the postwar Polish Army despite the fact that few spoke 
Polish. Soviet officers and instructors staffed the national military 



336 



Appendix C 



academies, and the study of Russian became mandatory for East 
European army officers. The Soviet Union also accepted many of 
the most promising and eager East European officers into Soviet 
mid-career military institutions and academies for the advanced 
study essential to their promotion within the national armed forces 
command structures. 

Despite Soviet efforts to develop political and military instru- 
ments of control and the continued presence of Soviet Army occu- 
pation forces, the Soviet Union still faced resistance to its 
domination of Eastern Europe. The Soviet troops in the GSFG 
acted unilaterally when the East German Garrisoned People's Police 
refused to crush the June 1953 workers' uprising in East Berlin. 
This action set a precedent for the Soviet use of force to retain con- 
trol of its buffer zone in Eastern Europe. 

The Warsaw Pact, 1955-70 

East-West Diplomacy and the Formation of the Warsaw Pact 

In May 1955, the Soviet Union institutionalized its East Euro- 
pean alliance system when it gathered together representatives from 
Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Roma- 
nia in Warsaw to sign the multilateral Treaty on Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which was identical to their 
existing bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union. Initially, the Soviets 
claimed that the Warsaw Pact was a direct response to the inclu- 
sion of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in 
NATO in 1955. The formation of a legally defined, multilateral 
alliance organization also reinforced the Soviet Union's claim to 
great power status as the leader of the world socialist system, 
enhanced its prestige, and legitimized its presence and influence 
in Eastern Europe. However, as events inside the Soviet alliance 
developed, this initial external impetus for the formation of the War- 
saw Pact lost its importance, and the Soviet Union found a formal 
alliance useful for other purposes. The Soviet Union created a struc- 
ture for dealing with its East European allies more efficiently when 
it superimposed the multilateral Warsaw Pact on their existing 
bilateral treaty ties. 

In the early 1950s, the United States and its Western allies car- 
ried out an agreement to re-arm West Germany and integrate it 
into NATO. This development threatened a vital Soviet foreign 
policy objective: the Soviet Union was intent on preventing the 
resurgence of a powerful German nation and particularly one allied 
with the Western powers. In an effort to derail the admission of 
West Germany to NATO, the Soviet representative at the 1954 



337 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference in Berlin, Viacheslav 
Molotov, went so far as to propose the possibility of holding simul- 
taneous elections in both German states that might lead to a 
re-unified, though neutral and unarmed, Germany. At the same 
time, the Soviet Union also proposed to the Western powers a gen- 
eral treaty on collective security in Europe and the dismantling of 
existing military blocs (meaning NATO). When this tactic failed 
and West Germany joined NATO on May 5, 1955, the Soviet 
Union declared that West Germany's membership in the Western 
alliance created a special threat to Soviet interests. The Soviet Union 
also declared that this development made its existing network of 
bilateral treaties an inadequate security guarantee and forced the 
East European socialist countries to "combine efforts in a strong 
political and military- alliance." On May 14, 1955, the Soviet Union 
and its East European allies signed the Warsaw Pact. 

While the Soviets had avoided formalizing their alliance to keep 
the onus of dividing Europe into opposing blocs on the West, the 
admission into NATO of the European state with the greatest poten- 
tial military power forced the Soviet Union to take NATO into 
account for the first time. The Soviet Union also used West Ger- 
many's membership in NATO for propaganda purposes. The 
Soviets evoked the threat of a re-armed, "revanchist" West Ger- 
many seeking to reverse its defeat in W T orld War II to remind the 
East European countries of their debt to the Soviet Union for their 
liberation, their need for Soviet protection against a recent enemy, 
and their corresponding duty to respect Soviet security interests 
and join the Warsaw Pact. 

The Soviet Union had important reasons for institutionalizing 
the informal alliance system established through its bilateral treaties 
with the East European countries, concluded before the 1949 for- 
mation of NATO. As a formal organization, the Warsaw Pact 
provided the Soviet Union an official counterweight to NATO in 
East- West diplomacy. The Warsaw Pact gave the Soviet Union 
an equal status with the United States as the leader of an alliance 
of ostensibly independent nations supporting its foreign policy 
initiatives in the international arena. The multilateral Warsaw Pact 
was an improvement over strictly bilateral ties as a mechanism for 
transmitting Soviet defense and foreign policy directives to the East 
European allies. The Warsaw Pact also helped to legitimize the 
presence of Soviet troops — and overwhelming Soviet influence — 
in Eastern Europe. 

The 1955 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 
Assistance between the Soviet Union and its East European allies, 
which established the Warsaw Pact, stated that relations among 



338 



Appendix C 



the signatories were based on total equality, mutual noninterfer- 
ence in internal affairs, and respect for national sovereignty and 
independence. It declared that the Warsaw Pact's function was col- 
lective self-defense of the member states against external aggres- 
sion, as provided for in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 
The terms of the alliance specified the Political Consultative Com- 
mittee (PCC) as the highest alliance organ. The founding docu- 
ment formed the Joint Command to organize the actual defense 
of the Warsaw Pact member states, declared that the national deputy 
ministers of defense would act as the deputies of the Warsaw Pact 
commander in chief, and established the Joint Staff, which included 
the representatives of the general (main) staffs of all its member 
states. The treaty set the Warsaw Pact's duration at twenty years 
with an automatic ten-year extension, provided that none of the 
member states renounced it before its expiration. The treaty also 
included a standing offer to disband simultaneously with other mili- 
tary alliances, i.e., NATO, contingent on East- West agreement 
about a general treaty on collective security in Europe. This pro- 
vision indicated that the Soviet Union either did not expect that 
such an accord could be negotiated or did not consider its new multi- 
lateral alliance structure very important. 

Early Organizational Structure and Activities 

Until the early 1960s, the Soviet Union used the Warsaw Pact 
more as a tool in East-West diplomacy than as a functioning 
political-military alliance. Under the leadership of General Secre- 
tary Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Union sought to project a more 
flexible and less threatening image abroad and, toward this end, 
used the alliance's PCC to publicize its foreign policy initiatives 
and peace offensives, including frequent calls for the formation of 
an all-European collective security system to replace the continent's 
existing military alliances. The main result of Western acceptance 
of these disingenuous Soviet proposals would have been the removal 
of American troops from Europe, the weakening of ties among the 
Western states, and increasingly effective Soviet pressure on 
Western Europe. The Soviet Union also used the PCC to propose 
a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and 
the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. 

In the first few years after 1955, little of the Warsaw Pact's activity 
was directed at building a multilateral military alliance. The Soviet 
Union concentrated primarily on making the Warsaw Pact a reliable 
instrument for controlling the East European allies. In fact, the 
putatively supranational military agencies of the Warsaw Pact were 
completely subordinate to a national agency of the Soviet Union. 



339 



East Germany: A Country Study 

The Soviet General Staff in Moscow housed the alliance's Joint 
Command and Joint Staff and, through these organs, controlled 
the entire military apparatus of the Warsaw Pact as well as the allied 
armies. Although the highest ranking officers of the alliance were 
supposed to be selected through the mutual agreement of its member 
states, the Soviets unilaterally appointed a first deputy Soviet 
minister of defense and first deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff 
to serve as Warsaw Pact commander in chief and chief of staff, 
respectively. While these two Soviet officers ranked below the Soviet 
minister of defense, they still outranked the ministers of defense 
in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries. The Soviet 
General Staff also posted senior colonel generals as resident 
representatives of the Warsaw Pact commander in chief in all East 
European capitals. Serving with the "agreement of their host coun- 
tries," these successors to the wartime and postwar Soviet advisers 
in the allied armies equaled the East European ministers of defense 
in rank and provided a point of contact for the commander in chief, 
Joint Command, and Soviet General Staff inside the national mili- 
tary establishments. They directed and monitored the military train- 
ing and political indoctrination programs of the national armies 
to synchronize their development with the Soviet Army. The strict 
Soviet control of the Warsaw Pact's high military command posi- 
tions, established at this early stage, clearly indicated the subordi- 
nation of the East European allies to the Soviet Union. 

In 1956 the Warsaw Pact member states admitted East Germany 
to the Joint Command and sanctioned the transformation of its 
Garrisoned People's Police into a full-fledged army. But the Soviet 
Union took no steps to integrate the allied armies into a multi- 
national force. The Soviet Union organized only one joint War- 
saw Pact military exercise and made no attempt to make the alliance 
functional before 1961 except through the incorporation of East 
European territory into the Soviet national air defense structure. 

De-Stalinization and National Communism 

In his 1956 secret speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Com- 
munist Party of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Khrushchev 
denounced the arbitrariness, excesses, and terror of the Joseph Stalin 
era. Khrushchev sought to achieve greater legitimacy for communist 
party rule on the basis of the party's ability to meet the material 
needs of the Soviet population. His de-Stalinization campaign 
quickly influenced developments in Eastern Europe. Khrushchev 
accepted the replacement of Stalinist Polish and Hungarian lead- 
ers with newly rehabilitated communist party figures, who were 
able to generate genuine popular support for their regimes by 



340 



Appendix C 



molding the socialist system to the specific historical, political, and 
economic conditions in their countries. Pursuing his more sophisti- 
cated approach in international affairs, Khrushchev sought to turn 
Soviet-controlled East European satellites into at least semisover- 
eign countries and to make Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact 
less obvious. The Warsaw Pact's formal structure served Khrush- 
chev's purpose well, providing a facade of genuine consultation 
and of joint defense and foreign-policy decision making by the Soviet 
Union and the East European countries. 

De-Stalinization in the Soviet Union made a superficial rena- 
tionalization of the East European military establishments possi- 
ble. The Soviet Union allowed the East European armies to restore 
their distinctive national practices and to re-emphasize professional 
military opinions over political considerations in most areas. Mili- 
tary training supplanted political indoctrination as the primary task 
of the East European military establishments. Most important, the 
Soviet Ministry of Defense recalled many Soviet Army officers and 
advisers from their positions within the East European armies. 
Although the Soviet Union still remained in control of its alliance 
system, these changes in the Warsaw Pact and the NSWP armies 
removed some of the most objectionable features of Sovietization. 

In October 1956, the Polish and Hungarian communist parties 
lost control of the de-Stalinization process in their countries. The 
ensuing crises threatened the integrity of the entire Soviet alliance 
system in Eastern Europe. Although Khrushchev reacted quickly 
to rein in the East European allies and thwart this challenge to Soviet 
interests, his response in these two cases led to a significant change 
in the role of the Warsaw Pact as an element of Soviet security. 

The "Polish October" 

The October 1956, workers' riots in Poland defined the bound- 
aries of national communism acceptable to the Soviet Union. The 
Polish United Workers Party found that the grievances that inspired 
the riots could be ameliorated without presenting a challenge to 
its monopoly on political power or its strict adherence to Soviet 
foreign policy and security interests. At first, when the Polish Army 
and police forces refused to suppress rioting workers, the Soviet 
Union prepared its forces in East Germany and Poland for an 
intervention to restore order in the country. However, Poland's 
new communist party leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, and the Pol- 
ish Army's top commanders indicated to Khrushchev and the other 
Soviet leaders that any Soviet intervention in the internal affairs 
of Poland would meet united, massive resistance. While insisting 
on Poland's right to exercise greater autonomy in domestic matters, 



341 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Gomulka also pointed out that the Polish United Workers Party 
remained in firm control of the country and expressed his inten- 
tion to continue to accept Soviet direction in external affairs. 
Gomulka even denounced the simultaneous revolution in Hungary 
and Hungary's attempt to leave the Warsaw Pact, which nearly 
ruptured the Soviet alliance system in Eastern Europe. Gomulka' s 
position protected the Soviet Union's most vital interests and en- 
abled Poland to reach a compromise with the Soviet leadership to 
defuse the crisis. Faced with Polish resistance to a possible inva- 
sion, the Soviet Union established its minimum requirements for 
the East European allies: upholding the leading role of the com- 
munist party in society and remaining a member of the Warsaw 
Pact. These two conditions ensured that Eastern Europe would 
remain a buffer zone for the Soviet Union. 

The Hungarian Revolution 

By contrast, the full-scale revolution in Hungary, which began 
in late October with public demonstrations in support of the riot- 
ing Polish workers, openly flouted these Soviet stipulations. An 
initial domestic liberalization acceptable to the Soviet Union quickly 
focused on nonnegotiable issues like the communist party's exclu- 
sive hold on political power and genuine national independence. 
With overwhelming support from the Hungarian public, the new 
communist party leader, Imre Nagy, instituted multiparty elec- 
tions. More important, Nagy withdrew Hungary from the War- 
saw Pact and ended Hungary's alliance with the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Army invaded with 200,000 troops, crushed the Hungarian 
Revolution, and brought Hungary back within limits tolerable to 
the Soviet Union. The five days of pitched battles left 25,000 Hun- 
garians dead. 

After 1956 the Soviet Union practically disbanded the Hungarian 
Army and reinstituted a program of political indoctrination in the 
units that remained. In May 1957, unable to rely on Hungarian 
forces to maintain order, the Soviet Union increased its troop level 
in Hungary from two to four divisions and forced Hungary to sign 
a status-of-forces agreement, placing the Soviet military presence 
on a solid and permanent legal basis. The Soviet Army forces sta- 
tioned in Hungary officially became the Southern Group of Forces 
(SGF). 

The events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary forced a Soviet 
re-evaluation of the reliability and roles of the NSWP countries 
in its alliance system. Before 1956 the Soviet leadership believed 
that the Stalinist policy of heavy political indoctrination and enforced 
Sovietization had transformed the national armies into reliable 



342 



Appendix C 



instruments of the Soviet Union. However, the East European 
armies were still likely to remain loyal to national causes. Only 
one Hungarian Army unit fought beside the Soviet troops that put 
down the 1956 revolution. In both the Polish and the Hungarian 
military establishments, a basic loyalty to the national communist 
party regime was mixed with a strong desire for greater national 
sovereignty. With East Germany still a recent enemy and Poland 
and Hungary now suspect allies, the Soviet Union turned to 
Czechoslovakia as its most reliable junior partner in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. Czechoslovakia became the Soviet Union's first 
proxy in the Third World when its military pilots trained Egyptian 
personnel to fly Soviet-built MiG fighter aircraft. The Soviet Union 
thereby established a pattern of shifting the weight of its reliance 
from one East European country to another in response to various 
crises. 

The Post-1956 Period 

After the very foundation of the Soviet alliance system in Eastern 
Europe was shaken in 1956, Khrushchev sought to shore up the 
Soviet Union's position. Several developments made the task even 
more difficult. Between 1956 and 1962, the growing Soviet-Chinese 
dispute threatened to break up the Warsaw Pact. In 1962 Albania 
severed relations with the Soviet Union and terminated Soviet rights 
to the use of a valuable Mediterranean naval base on its Adriatic 
Sea coast. That same year, Albania ended its active participation 
in the Warsaw Pact and sided with the Chinese against the Soviets. 
Following the example of Yugoslavia in the late 1940s, Albania 
was able to resist Soviet pressures. Lacking a common border with 
Albania and having neither occupation troops nor overwhelming 
influence in that country, the Soviet Union was unable to use either 
persuasion or force to bring Albania back into the Warsaw Pact. 
Khrushchev used Warsaw Pact meetings to mobilize the political 
support of the Soviet Union's East European allies against China 
and Albania, as well as to reinforce its control of Eastern Europe 
and its claim to leadership of the communist world. More impor- 
tant, however, after Albania joined Yugoslavia and Hungary on 
the list of defections and near-defections from the Soviet alliance 
system in Eastern Europe, the Soviets began to turn the Warsaw 
Pact into a tool for militarily preventing defections in the future. 

The Internal Function of the Warsaw Pact 

Although Khrushchev invoked the terms of the Warsaw Pact as 
a justification for the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the action was 
in no sense a cooperative allied effort. In the early 1960s, however, 



343 



East Germany: A Country Study 

the Soviets took steps to turn the alliance's Joint Armed Forces 
(JAF) into a multinational invasion force. In the future, an appeal 
to the Warsaw Pact's collective self-defense provisions and the par- 
ticipation of allied forces would put a multilateral cover over 
unilateral Soviet interventions to keep errant member states in the 
alliance and their communist parties in power. The Soviet Union 
sought to legitimize its future policing actions by presenting them 
as the product of joint Warsaw Pact decisions. In this way, the 
Soviets hoped to deflect the kind of direct international criticism 
they were subjected to after the invasion of Hungary. However, 
such internal deployments were clearly contrary to the Warsaw 
Pact's rule of mutual noninterference in domestic affairs and con- 
flicted with the alliance's declared purpose of collective self-defense 
against external aggression. To circumvent this semantic difficulty, 
the Soviets merely redefined external aggression to include any 
spontaneous anti-Soviet, anticommunist uprising in an allied state. 
Discarding domestic grievances as a possible cause, the Soviet 
Union declared that such outbreaks were a result of imperialist 
provocations and thereby constituted external aggression. 

In the 1960s, the Soviet Union began to prepare the Warsaw 
Pact for its internal function of keeping the NSWP member states 
within the alliance. The Soviet Union took a series of steps to trans- 
form the Warsaw Pact into its intra-alliance intervention force. 
Although it had previously worked with the East European mili- 
tary establishments on a bilateral basis, the Soviet Union started 
to integrate the national armies under the Warsaw Pact framework. 
Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Grechko, who became com- 
mander in chief of the alliance in I960, was uniquely qualified to 
serve in his post. During World War II, he commanded a Soviet 
Army group that included significant Polish and Czechoslovak 
units. Beginning in 1961, Grechko made joint military exercises 
between Soviet forces and the allied national armies the primary 
focus of Warsaw Pact military activities. 

The Soviet Union arranged these joint exercises to prevent any 
NSWP member state from fully controlling its national army and 
to reduce the possibility that an East European regime could suc- 
cessfully resist Soviet domination and pursue independent policies. 
The Soviet-organized series of joint Warsaw Pact exercises was 
intended to prevent other East European national command 
authorities from following the example of Yugoslavia and Albania 
and adopting a territorial defense strategy. Developed in the 
Yugoslav and Albanian partisan struggles of World War II, ter- 
ritorial defense entailed a mobilization of the entire population for 
a prolonged guerrilla war against an intervening power. Under this 



344 



Appendix C 



strategy, the national communist party leadership would maintain 
its integrity to direct the resistance, seek international support for 
the country's defense, and keep an invader from replacing it with 
a more compliant regime. Territorial defense deterred invasions 
by threatening considerable opposition and enabled Yugoslavia and 
Albania to assert their independence from the Soviet Union. By 
training and integrating the remaining allied armies in joint exer- 
cises for operations only within a multinational force, however, the 
Soviet Union reduced the ability of the other East European coun- 
tries to conduct military actions independent of Soviet control or 
to hinder a Soviet invasion, as Poland and Hungary had done in 
October 1956. 

Large-scale multilateral exercises provided opportunities for 
Soviet officers to command troops of different nationalities and 
trained East European national units to take orders from the War- 
saw Pact or Soviet command structure. Including Soviet troops 
stationed in the NS WP countries and the western military districts 
of the Soviet Union, joint maneuvers drilled Soviet Army forces 
for rapid, massive invasions of allied countries with the symbolic 
participation of NSWP units. Besides turning the allied armies into 
a multinational invasion force for controlling Eastern Europe, joint 
exercises also gave the Warsaw Pact armies greater capabilities for 
a coalition war against NATO. In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union 
modernized the NSWP armies with T-54 and T-55 tanks, self- 
propelled artillery, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) equipped 
with conventional warheads, and MiG-21 and Su-7 ground attack 
fighter aircraft. The Soviet Union completed the mechanization 
of East European infantry divisions, and these new motorized rifle 
divisions trained with the Soviet Army for combined arms combat 
in a nuclear environment. These changes greatly increased the mili- 
tary value and effectiveness of the NSWP forces. In the early 1960s, 
the Soviet Union gave the East European armies their first real 
supporting role in its European theater operations. 

Romania and the Warsaw Pact 

Ironically, at the very time that the Soviet Union gave the War- 
saw Pact more substance and modernized its force structure, resent- 
ment of Soviet political, organizational, and military domination 
of the Warsaw Pact and the NSWP armies increased. There was 
considerable East European dissatisfaction with a Warsaw Pact 
hierarchy that placed a subordinate of the Soviet minister of defense 
over the East European defense ministers. The Soviets considered 
the national ministers of defense, with the rank of colonel general, 
equivalent only to Soviet military district commanders. The strongest 



345 



East Germany: A Country Study 

objections to the subordinate status of the NSWP countries inside 
the Warsaw Pact came from the Communist Party of Romanian 
(Partidul Communist Roman) and its military leadership under 
Nicolae Ceausescu. 

The first indications of an independent Romanian course 
appeared while the Soviet Union was shoring up its hold on Eastern 
Europe through formal status-of- forces agreements with its allies. 
In 1958 Romania moved in the opposite direction by demanding 
the withdrawal from its territory of all Soviet troops, advisers, and 
the Soviet resident representative. To cover Soviet embarrassment, 
Khrushchev called this a unilateral troop reduction contributing 
to greater European security. Reducing its participation in War- 
saw Pact activities considerably, Romania also refused to allow 
Soviet or NSWP forces, which could serve as Warsaw Pact inter- 
vention forces, to cross or conduct exercises on its territory. 

In the 1960s Romania demanded basic changes in the Warsaw 
Pact structure to give the East European member states a greater 
role in alliance decision making. At several PCC meetings, Roma- 
nia proposed that the leading Warsaw Pact command positions, 
including its commander in chief, rotate among the top military 
leaders of each country. In response, the Soviet Union tried again 
to mollify its allies and deemphasize its control of the alliance by 
moving the Warsaw Pact military organization out of the Soviet 
General Staff and making it a distinct entity, albeit still within the 
Soviet Ministry of Defense. The Soviet Union also placed some 
joint exercises held on NSWP territory under the nominal com- 
mand of the host country's minister of defense. However, Soviet 
Army commanders still conducted almost two-thirds of all War- 
saw Pact maneuvers, and these concessions proved too little and 
too late. 

With the aim of ending Soviet domination and guarding against 
Soviet encroachments, Romania reasserted full national control over 
its armed forces and military policies in 1963 when, following the 
lead of Yugoslavia and Albania, it adopted a territorial defense 
strategy called "War of the Entire People." This nation-in-arms 
strategy entailed compulsory participation in civilian defense 
organizations, militias, and reserve and paramilitary forces, as well 
as rapid mobilization. The goal of Romania's strategy was to make 
any Soviet intervention prohibitively protracted and costly. Roma- 
nia rejected any integration of Warsaw Pact forces that could 
undercut its ability to resist a Soviet invasion. For example, it ended 
its participation in Warsaw Pact joint exercises because multi- 
national maneuvers required the Romanian Army to assign its 
forces to a non-Romanian command authority. Romania stopped 



346 



Appendix C 



sending its army officers to Soviet military schools for higher edu- 
cation. When the Romanian military establishment and its educa- 
tional institutions assumed these functions, training focused strictly 
on Romania's independent military strategy. Romania also ter- 
minated its regular exchange of intelligence with the Soviet Union 
and directed counterintelligence efforts against possible Soviet 
penetration of the Romanian Army. These steps combined to make 
it a truly national military establishment responsive only to domestic 
political authorities and ensured that it would defend the country's 
sovereignty. 

Romania's independent national defense policy helped to 
underwrite its assertion of greater policy autonomy. In the only 
Warsaw Pact body in which it continued to participate actively, 
the PCC, Romania found a forum to make its disagreements with 
the Soviet Union public, to frustrate Soviet plans, and to work to 
protect its new autonomy. The Soviet Union could not maintain 
the illusion of Warsaw Pact harmony when Romanian recalcitrance 
forced the PCC to adopt "coordinated" rather than unanimous 
decisions. Romania even held up PCC approval for several weeks 
of the appointment of Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Iakubovskii 
as Warsaw Pact commander in chief. However, Romania did not 
enjoy the relative geographical isolation from the Soviet Union that 
made Yugoslav and Albanian independence possible, and the Soviet 
Union would not tolerate another outright withdrawal from the 
Warsaw Pact. 

The Prague Spring 

In 1968 an acute crisis in the Soviet alliance system suddenly 
overwhelmed the slowly festering problem of Romania. The Prague 
Spring represented a more serious challenge than that posed by 
Romania because it occurred in an area more crucial to Soviet secu- 
rity. The domestic liberalization program of the Czechoslovak com- 
munist regime led by Alexander Dubcek threatened to generate 
popular demands for similar changes in the other East European 
countries and even parts of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union 
believed it necessary to forestall the spread of liberalization and 
to assert its right to enforce the boundaries of ideological permissi- 
bility in Eastern Europe. However, domestic change in Czechoslo- 
vakia also began to affect defense and foreign policy, just as it had 
in Hungary in 1956, despite Dubcek's declared intention to keep 
Czechoslovakia within the Warsaw Pact. This worrying develop- 
ment was an important factor in the Soviet decision to invade 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 — one that Western analysts have generally 
overlooked. 



347 



East Germany: A Country Study 



The new political climate of the Prague Spring and the lifting 
of press censorship brought into the open a longstanding debate 
within the Czechoslovak military establishment over the nature of 
the Warsaw Pact and Czechoslovakia's membership in it. In the 
mid-1960s, this debate centered on Soviet domination of the NSWP 
countries and of the Warsaw Pact and its command structure. 
Czechoslovakia had supported Romania in its opposition to Soviet 
calls for greater military integration and backed its demands for 
a genuine East European role in alliance decision making at PCC 
meetings. 

In 1968 high-ranking Czechoslovak officers and staff members 
at the Klement Gottwald Military Academy began to discuss the 
need for a truly independent national defense strategy based on 
Czechoslovakia's national interests rather than the Soviet security 
interests that always prevailed in the Warsaw Pact. The fundamen- 
tal premise of such an independent military policy was that an 
all-European collective security system, mutual nonaggression 
agreements among European states, the withdrawal of all troops 
from foreign countries, and a Central European nuclear-free zone 
could guarantee the country's security against outside aggression 
better than its membership in the Warsaw Pact. Although the Soviet 
Union had advocated these same arrangements in the 1950s, 
Czechoslovakia was clearly out of step with the Soviet line in 1968. 
Czechoslovakia threatened to complicate Soviet military strategy 
in Central Europe by becoming a neutral country dividing the War- 
saw Pact into two parts along its front with NATO. 

The concepts underpinning this developing Czechoslovak 
national defense strategy were formalized in the Gottwald Academy 
Memorandum circulated to the general (main) staffs of the other 
Warsaw Pact armies. The Gottwald Memorandum received a 
favorable response from Poland, Hungary, and Romania. In a tele- 
vised news conference, at the height of the 1968 crisis, the chief 
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia's military department, 
Lieutenant General Vaclav Prchlik, denounced the Warsaw Pact 
as an unequal alliance and declared that the Czechoslovak Army 
was prepared to defend the country's sovereignty by force, if neces- 
sary. In the end, the Soviet Union intervened to prevent the 
Czechoslovak Army from fully developing the military capabili- 
ties to implement its newly announced independent defense strategy, 
which could have guaranteed national independence in the politi- 
cal and economic spheres. The August 1968 invasion preempted 
the possibility of the Czechoslovak Army's mounting a credible 
deterrent against future Soviet interventions. The Soviet decision 



348 



Appendix C 



in favor of intervention focused, in large measure, on ensuring its 
ability to maintain physical control of its wayward ally in the future. 

In contrast to its rapid, bloody suppression of the 1956 Hun- 
garian Revolution, the Soviet Union engaged in a lengthy cam- 
paign of military coercion against Czechoslovakia. In 1968 the 
Soviet Union conducted more joint Warsaw Pact exercises than 
in any other year since the maneuvers began in the early 1960s. 
The Soviet Union used these exercises to mask preparations for, 
and threaten, a Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia that would 
occur unless Dubcek complied with Soviet demands and abandoned 
his political liberalization program. Massive Warsaw Pact rear ser- 
vices and communications exercises in July and August enabled 
the Soviet General Staff to execute its plan for the invasion without 
alerting Western governments. Under the pretext of exercises, 
Soviet and NSWP divisions were brought up to full strength, reserv- 
ists were called up, and civilian transportation resources were 
requisitioned. The cover that these exercises provided allowed the 
Soviet Union to deploy forces along Czechoslovakia's borders in 
Poland and East Germany and to demonstrate to the Czechoslo- 
vak leadership its readiness to intervene. 

On August 20, a force consisting of twenty-three Soviet Army 
divisions invaded Czechoslovakia. Token NSWP contingents, 
including one Hungarian, two East German, and two Polish divi- 
sions, along with one Bulgarian brigade, also took part in the 
invasion. In the wake of its invasion, the Soviet Union installed 
a more compliant communist party leadership and concluded a 
status-of-forces agreement with Czechoslovakia, which established 
a permanent Soviet presence in that country for the first time. Five 
Soviet Army divisions remained in Czechoslovakia to protect the 
country from future "imperialist threats." These troops became 
the Central Group of Forces (CGF) and added to Soviet strength 
directly bordering NATO. The Czechoslovak Army, having failed 
to oppose the Soviet intervention and defend the country's 
sovereignty, suffered a tremendous loss of prestige after 1968. At 
Soviet direction, reliable Czechoslovak authorities conducted a 
purge and political re-education campaign in the Czechoslovak 
Army and cut its size. After 1968 the Soviet Union closed and 
reorganized the Klement Gottwald Military Academy. With its one- 
time junior partner now proven unreliable, the Soviet Union turned 
to Poland as its principal East European ally. 

The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia showed the hollow- 
ness of the Soviet alliance system in Eastern Europe in both its 
political and its military aspects. The Soviet Union did not convene 
the PCC to invoke the Warsaw Pact's terms during the 1968 crisis 



349 



East Germany: A Country Study 

because a formal PCC session would have revealed a deep rift in 
the Soviet alliance and given Czechoslovakia an international plat- 
form from which it could have defended its reform program. The 
Soviet Union did not allow NS WP officers to direct the Warsaw 
Pact exercises that preceded the intervention in Czechoslovakia, 
and Soviet Army officers commanded all multinational exercises 
during the crisis. While the intervention force was mobilized and 
deployed under the Warsaw Pact's commander in chief, the Soviet 
General Staff transferred full operational command of the inva- 
sion to the commander in chief of the Soviet ground forces, Army 
General I.G. Pavlovskiy Despite the participation of numerous 
East European army units, the invasion of Czechoslovakia was not 
in any sense a multilateral action. The Soviet invasion force car- 
ried out all important operations on Czechoslovakia's territory. 
Moreover, the Soviet Union quickly withdrew all NSWP troops 
from Czechoslovakia to forestall the possibility of their ideological 
contamination. NSWP participation served primarily to make the 
invasion appear to be a multinational operation and to deflect direct 
international criticism of the Soviet Union. 

While the participation of four NSWP armies in the Soviet-led 
invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated considerable Warsaw Pact 
cohesion, the invasion also served to erode it. The invasion of 
Czechoslovakia proved that the Warsaw Pact's internal mission 
of keeping orthodox East European communist party regimes in 
power — and less orthodox ones in line — was more important than 
the external mission of defending its member states against exter- 
nal aggression. The Soviet Union was unable to conceal the fact 
that the alliance served as the ultimate mechanism for its control 
of Eastern Europe. Formulated in response to the crisis in Czecho- 
slovakia, the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine declared that the East 
European countries had "limited" sovereignty to be exercised only 
as long as it did not damage the interests of the "socialist com- 
monwealth" as a whole. Since the Soviet Union defined the interests 
of the "socialist commonwealth," it could force its NSWP allies 
to respect its overwhelming security interest in keeping Eastern 
Europe as its buffer zone. 

The Romanian leader, Ceau§escu, after refusing to contribute 
troops to the Soviet intervention force as the other East European 
countries had done, denounced the invasion of Czechoslovakia as 
a violation of international law and the Warsaw Pact's cardinal 
principle of mutual noninterference in internal affairs. Ceau§escu 
insisted that collective self-defense against external aggression was 
the only valid mission of the Warsaw Pact. Albania also objected 
to the Soviet invasion and indicated its disapproval by withdrawing 



350 



Appendix C 



formally from the Warsaw Pact after six years of inactive mem- 
bership. 

The Organizational Structure of the Warsaw Pact 

The Warsaw Pact administers both the political and the mili- 
tary activities of the Soviet alliance system in Eastern Europe. A 
series of changes beginning in 1969 gave the Warsaw Pact the struc- 
ture it retained through the mid-1980s. 

Political Organization 

The general (first) secretaries of the communist and workers' 
parties and heads of state of the Warsaw Pact member states meet 
in the PCC (see table A, this Appendix). The PCC provides a for- 
mal point of contact for the Soviet and East European leaders in 
addition to less formal bilateral meetings and visits. As the highest 
decision-making body of the Warsaw Pact, the PCC is charged with 
assessing international developments that could affect the security 
of the allied states and warrant the execution of the Warsaw Pact's 
collective self-defense provisions. In practice, however, the Soviet 
Union has been unwilling to rely on the PCC to perform this func- 
tion, fearing that Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania could 
use PCC meetings to oppose Soviet plans and policies. The PCC 
is also the main center for coordinating the foreign policy activi- 
ties of the Warsaw Pact countries. Since the late 1960s, when several 
member states began to use the alliance structure to confront the 
Soviets and assert more independent foreign policies, the Soviet 
Union has had to bargain and negotiate to gain support for its for- 
eign policy within Warsaw Pact councils. 

In 1976 the PCC established the permanent Committee of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs (CMFA) to regularize the previously 
ad hoc meetings of Soviet and East European representatives to 
the Warsaw Pact. Given the official task of preparing recommen- 
dations for and executing the decisions of the PCC, the CMFA 
and its permanent Joint Secretariat have provided the Soviet Union 
an additional point of contact to establish a consensus among its 
allies on contentious issues. Less formal meetings of the deputy 
ministers of foreign affairs of the Warsaw Pact member states 
represent another layer of alliance coordination. If alliance problems 
can be resolved at these working levels, they will not erupt into 
embarrassing disputes between the Soviet and East European lead- 
ers at PCC meetings. 

Military Organization 

The Warsaw Pact's military organization is larger and more active 



351 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Table A. Formal Meetings of the Warsaw Pact Agencies, 1956-87 





Date 


Place 


Body 


Final Communique Summary 


1956 


January 


Prague 


PCC 1 


National People's Army of East 
Germany formed 


1958 


May 


Moscow 


-do- 


Proposed nonaggression pact with 
NATO. Removal of Soviet troops 
from Romania 


1960 


February 


-do- 


-do- 




1961 


March 


-do- 


-do- 




1962 


June 


-do- 


-do- 




1963 


July 


-do- 


-do- 




1965 


January 


Warsaw 


-do- 


Convening a conference on collec- 
tive security in Europe 1966 




July 


Bucharest 


-do- 


Strengthening peace and security 
in Europe 


1968 


March 


Sofia 


-do- 




1969 


-do- 


Budapest 


-do- 


The Committee of Ministers of 
Defense (CMD) established. An 
appeal for a Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). Improving the command 
and control, structure, and agen- 
cies of the Warsaw Pact 




J_JcccmDcr 


IVlUbLUW 


iviiiiLdi y 

Council 


^trpnoftripniTiff t \\ t* / v i tTi nn 9 mm ann 
oil ciitdniciiiiit; liic \~yJiiiiiia.iL\~L aiiu 

control agencies of the Warsaw 
Pact 




-do- 


-do- 


CMD 


Strengthening the defense capabil- 
ity of the Warsaw Pact 


1970 


April 


Budapest 


Military 
Council 






May 


Sofia 


CMD 






August 


Moscow 




The situation in Europe 




October 


Varna 


Military 
Council 






December 


East Berlin 


PCC 


Third World conflicts. Strengthen- 
ing security in Europe 


1971 


March 


Budapest 


CMD 


Developing Warsaw Pact com- 
mand, control, and communica- 
tions systems 




May 


East Berlin 


Military 
Council 






October 


Poland 


-do- 





352 



Appendix C 



Table A. — Continued 



Date 



Place 



Body 



Final Communique Summary 



1972 January 

February 
April 

October 



Prague 

East Berlin 
Bucharest 

Minsk 



PCC 



CMD 

Military 
Council 



Peace, security, and cooperation 
in Europe 

The situation in Europe 

Interaction among the allied 
armies 



-do- 



1973 February 
May 

October 



Warsaw 
Sofia 

Prague 



CMD 

Military 
Council 

-do- 



1974 February 
March 

April 

November 



Bucharest 
Budapest 

Warsaw 
East Berlin 



CMD 

Military 
Council 

PCC 

Military 
Council 



Third World conflicts 



1975 January 

May 

October 
November 



Moscow 

Warsaw 

Bucharest 
Prague 



CMD 

Military 
Council 

-do- 

CMD 



Current activities of the directive 
agencies of the JAF 2 



Improving training methods. Cur- 
rent activities of the directive 
agencies of the JAF 



1976 May Kiev 

November Bucharest 



December 



Sofi; 



Military 
Council 

PCC 



CMD 



Furthering detente in Europe. 
Committee of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs (CMFA) estab- 
lished 

Current activities of the JAF's 
command and control agencies 



1977 May 
-do- 
October 
November 



Prague 
Moscow 

Sofia 
Budapest 



Military 
Council 

CMD 



Military 
Council 

CMD 



Problems of peace, security, and 
cooperation in Europe 



353 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Table A. — Continued 



Date 



Place 



Body 



Final Communique Summary 



1978 April 
May 



October 

November 

December 



Sofia 

Budapest 

East Berlin 

Moscow 
East Berlin 



CMFA 

Military 
Council 

-do- 

PCC 

CMD 



The Belgrade CSCE review 
meeting 



The status of detente in Europe 



1979 April 



May 
October 

December 
-do- 



Warsaw 

Budapest 
Bucharest 

Warsaw 
-do- 



Military 
Council 

CMFA 

Military 
Council 

CMD 

CMFA 



Detente 



1980 May 
-do- 



October 
-do- 
December 



-do- 
Moscow 

Prague 
Warsaw 
Bucharest 



PCC 



Military 
Council 



-do- 
CMFA 
CMD 



The status of detente. The War- 
saw Pact's twenty-fifth anniversary 

Detente. Summarized twenty-five 
years of work to develop the allied 
armies 



1981 April 

October 
December 
-do- 
-do- 

1982 October 
-do- 

1983 January 

-do- 
April 
-do- 
October 



Sofia 

Budapest 
Bucharest 
Moscow 
East Berlin 

Warsaw 
Moscow 

Prague 

-do- 
-do- 
Bucharest 

Sofia 



Military 
Council 

-do- 

CMFA 

CMD 

Military 
Council 

-do- 

CMFA 



PCC 

CMD 

CMFA 

Military 
Council 

CMFA 



Measures to strengthen peace and 
security in Europe 

A proposal for a non-use-of-force 
pact with NATO 3 



Detente 



The situation in Europe 



354 



Appendix C 



Table A. — Continued 





Date 


Place 


Body 


Final Communique Summary 




-do- 


East Berlin 


CMD 


The tense and dangerous situation 
in Europe 




October 


Lvov 


Military 
Council 






December 


Sofia 


CMD 




1984 


April 


Budapest 


CMFA 


The situation in Europe 




-do- 


Prague 


Military 
Council 






October 


Sofia 


-do- 






December 


East Berlin 


CMFA 


The international situation exacer- 
bated by the United States and 
NATO 




-do- 


Budapest 


CMD 




1985 


May 


-do- 


Military 
Council 






October 


Sofia 


PCC 






November 


East Berlin 


Military 
Council 






December 


-do- 


CMD 




1986 


March 


Warsaw 


CMFA 






April 


-do- 


Military 
Council 






June 


Budapest 


PCC 






October 


Bucharest 


CMFA 


The Reykjavik summit meeting 


1987 


March 


Moscow 


-do- 






April 


Minsk 


Military 
Council 






May 


East Berlin 


PCC 





1 PCC — Political Consultative Committee 

2 JAF — Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States 

3 NATO— North Atlantic Treaty Organization 



than the alliance's political bodies. Several different organizations 
are responsible for implementing PCC directives on defense mat- 
ters and developing the capabilities of the national armies that con- 
stitute the JAF. However, the principal task of the military 
organizations is to link the East European armies to the Soviet 
armed forces. The alliance's military agencies coordinate the train- 
ing and mobilization of East European national forces assigned to 



355 



East Germany: A Country Study 

the Warsaw Pact. In turn, these forces can be deployed in accor- 
dance with Soviet military strategy against an NS WP country or 
NATO. 

Soviet control of the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance is scarcely 
veiled. The Warsaw Pact's JAF has no command structure, logis- 
tics network, air defense system, or operations directorate separate 
from the Soviet Ministry of Defense. The 1968 invasion of Czecho- 
slovakia demonstrated how easily control of the JAF could be trans- 
ferred in wartime to the Soviet General Staff and Soviet field 
commanders. The dual roles of the Warsaw Pact commander in 
chief, who is a first deputy Soviet minister of defense, and the War- 
saw Pact chief of staff, who is a first deputy chief of the Soviet 
General Staff, facilitate the transfer of Warsaw Pact forces to Soviet 
control. The subordination of the Warsaw Pact to the Soviet General 
Staff is also shown clearly in the Soviet military hierarchy. The 
chief of the Soviet General Staff is listed above the Warsaw Pact 
commander in chief in the Soviet order of precedence, even though 
both positions are filled by first deputy Soviet ministers of defense. 

Ironically, the first innovations in the Warsaw Pact's structure 
since 1955 came after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which had 
clearly underlined Soviet control of the alliance. At the 1969 PCC 
session in Budapest, the Soviet Union agreed to cosmetic altera- 
tions in the Warsaw Pact designed to address East European com- 
plaints about Soviet domination of the alliance. These changes 
included the establishment of the formal Committee of Ministers 
of Defense (CMD) and the Military Council as well as the addi- 
tion of more non-Soviet officers to the Joint Command and the 
Joint Staff (see fig. B, this Appendix). 

The CMD is the leading military body of the Warsaw Pact. In 
addition to the ministers of defense of the Warsaw Pact member 
states, the commander in chief and the chief of staff of the JAF 
are statutory members of the CMD. With its three seats on the 
CMD, the Soviet Union can exercise a working majority in the 
nine-member body with the votes of only two of its more loyal East 
European allies. The chairmanship of the CMD supposedly rotates 
among the ministers of defense. In any event, the brief annual meet- 
ings of the CMD severely limit its work to pro forma pronounce- 
ments or narrow guidelines for the Joint Command, Military 
Council, and Joint Staff to follow. 

The Joint Command develops the overall training plan for joint 
Warsaw Pact exercises and for the national armies to promote the 
assimilation of Soviet equipment and tactics. Headed by the War- 
saw Pact's commander in chief, the Joint Command is divided into 
distinct Soviet and East European tiers. The deputy commanders 



356 



Appendix C 



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357 



East Germany: A Country Study 

in chief include Soviet and East European officers. The Soviet 
officers serving as deputy commanders in chief are specifically 
responsible for coordinating the East European navies and air forces 
with the corresponding Soviet service branches. The East Euro- 
pean deputy commanders in chief are the deputy ministers of 
defense of the NSWP countries. While providing formal NSWP 
representation in the Joint Command, the East European deputies 
also assist in the coordination of Soviet and non-Soviet forces. The 
commander in chief, deputy commanders in chief, and chief of staff 
of the JAF gather in the Military Council on a semiannual basis 
to plan and evaluate operational and combat training. With the 
Warsaw Pact's commander in chief acting as chairman, the ses- 
sions of the Military Council rotate among the capitals of the War- 
saw Pact countries. 

The Joint Staff is the only standing Warsaw Pact military body 
and is the official executive organ of the CMD, commander in chief, 
and Military Council. As such, it performs the bulk of the Warsaw 
Pact's work in the military realm. Like the Joint Command, the 
Joint Staff has both Soviet and East European officers. These non- 
Soviet officers also serve as the principal link between the Soviet 
and East European armed forces. The Joint Staff organizes all joint 
exercises and arranges multilateral meetings and contacts of Warsaw 
Pact military personnel at all levels. 

The PCC's establishment of official CMD meetings, the Mili- 
tary Council, and the bifurcation of the Joint Command and Joint 
Staff allowed for greater formal East European representation, as 
well as more working-level positions for senior non-Soviet officers, 
in the alliance. Increased NSWP input into the alliance decision- 
making process ameliorated East European dissatisfaction with con- 
tinued Soviet dominance of the Warsaw Pact and even facilitated 
the work of the JAF. However, a larger NSWP role in the alliance 
did not reduce actual Soviet control of the Warsaw Pact command 
structure. 

The 1969 PCC meeting also approved the formation of two more 
Warsaw Pact military bodies, the Military Scientific-Technical Coun- 
cil and the Technical Committee. These innovations in the Warsaw 
Pact structure represented a Soviet attempt to harness NSWP 
weapons and military equipment production, which had greatly 
increased during the 1960s. The Military Scientific-Technical Coun- 
cil assumed responsibility for directing armaments research and 
development within the Warsaw Pact, while the Technical Com- 
mittee coordinated standardization. Comecon's Military-Industrial 
Commission supervised NSWP military production facilities (see 
Appendix B). 



358 



Appendix C 



After 1969 the Soviet Union insisted on tighter Warsaw Pact 
military integration as the price for greater NSWP participation 
in alliance decision making. Under the pretext of directing Warsaw 
Pact programs and activities aimed at integration, officers from 
the Soviet Ministry of Defense penetrated the East European armed 
forces. Meetings between senior officers from the Soviet and East 
European main political directorates allowed the Soviets to monitor 
the loyalty of the national military establishments. Joint Warsaw 
Pact exercises afforded ample opportunity for the evaluation and 
selection of reliable East European officers for promotion to com- 
mand positions in the field, the national military hierarchies, and 
the Joint Staff. Warsaw Pact military science conferences, including 
representatives from each NSWP general (main) staff, enabled the 
Soviets to check for signs that an East European ally was formulating 
a national strategy or developing military capabilities beyond Soviet 
control. In 1973 the deputy ministers of foreign affairs signed the 
"Convention on the Capacities, Privileges, and Immunities of the 
Staff and Other Administrative Organs of the Joint Armed Forces 
of the Warsaw Pact Member States," which established the prin- 
ciple of extraterritoriality for alliance agencies, legally sanctioned 
the efforts of these Soviet officers to penetrate the East European 
military establishments, and prevented any host government inter- 
ference in their work. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact commander in 
chief still retained his resident representatives in the national minis- 
tries of defense as direct sources of information on the situation 
inside the allied armies. 

The Warsaw Pact, 1970-87 

The crisis in Czechoslovakia and Romania's recalcitrance gave 
a new dimension to the challenge facing the Soviet Union in Eastern 
Europe. The Soviet Union's East European allies had learned that 
withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact and achieving independence 
from Soviet control were unrealistic goals, and they aimed instead 
at establishing a greater measure of autonomy within the alliance. 
Romania had successfully carved out a more independent position 
within the bounds of the Warsaw Pact. In doing so, it provided 
an example to the other East European countries of how to use 
the Warsaw Pact councils and committees to articulate positions 
contrary to Soviet interests. Beginning in the early 1970s, the East 
European allies formed intra-alliance coalitions in Warsaw Pact 
meetings to oppose the Soviet Union, defuse its pressure on any 
one NSWP member state, and delay or obstruct Soviet policies. 
The Soviets could no longer use the alliance to transmit their 
positions to, and receive an automatic endorsement from, the 



359 



East Germany: A Country Study 

subordinate NSWP countries. While still far from genuine con- 
sultation, Warsaw Pact policy coordination between the Soviet 
Union and the East European countries in the 1970s was a step 
away from the blatant Soviet control of the alliance that had charac- 
terized the 1950s. East European opposition forced the Soviet Union 
to treat the Warsaw Pact as a forum for managing relations with 
its allies and bidding for their support on issues like detente, the 
Third World, the Solidarity crisis in Poland, alliance burden- 
sharing, and relations with NATO. 

Detente 

In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union abandoned its earlier efforts 
to achieve the simultaneous dissolution of the two European mili- 
tary blocs and concentrated instead on legitimizing the territorial 
status quo in Europe. The Soviets asserted that the official East- 
West agreements reached during the detente era "legally secured 
the most important political-territorial results of World War II." 
Under these arrangements, the Soviet Union allowed its East 
European allies to recognize West Germany's existence as a separate 
state. In return the West, and West Germany in particular, 
explicitly accepted the inviolability of all postwar borders in Eastern 
Europe and tacitly recognized Soviet control of the eastern half of 
both Germany and Europe. The Soviets claim the 1975 Helsinki 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which 
ratified the existing political division of Europe, as a major victory 
for Soviet diplomacy and the realization of longstanding Soviet calls, 
issued through the PCC, for a general European conference on 
collective security. 

The consequences of detente, however, also posed a significant 
challenge to Soviet control of Eastern Europe. First, detente caused 
a crisis in Soviet-East German relations. East Germany's leader, 
Walter Ulbricht, opposed improved relations with West Germany 
and, following Ceau§escu's tactics, used Warsaw Pact councils to 
attack the Soviet detente policy openly. In the end, the Soviet Union 
removed Ulbricht from power, in 1971, and proceeded unhindered 
into detente with the West. Second, detente blurred the strict 
bipolarity of the cold war era, opened Eastern Europe to greater 
Western influence, and loosened Soviet control over its allies. The 
relaxation of East-West tensions in the 1970s reduced the level of 
threat perceived by the NSWP countries, along with their perceived 
need for Soviet protection, and eroded Warsaw Pact alliance 
cohesion. After the West formally accepted the territorial status 
quo in Europe, the Soviet Union was unable to point to the danger 
of "imperialist" attempts to overturn East European communist 



360 



Appendix C 



party regimes to justify its demand for strict Warsaw Pact unity 
behind its leadership, as it had in earlier years. The Soviets resorted 
to occasional propaganda offensives, accusing West Germany of 
revanchism and aggressive intentions in Eastern Europe, to remind 
its allies of their ultimate dependence on Soviet protection and to 
reinforce the Warsaw Pact's cohesion against the attraction of good 
relations with the West. 

Despite these problems, the detente period witnessed relatively 
stable Soviet-East European relations within the Warsaw Pact. In 
the early 1970s, the Soviet Union greatly expanded military 
cooperation with the NSWP countries. The joint Warsaw Pact 
exercises, conducted in the 1970s, gave the Soviet allies their first 
real capability for offensive operations other than intra-bloc polic- 
ing actions. The East European countries also began to take an 
active part in Soviet strategy in the Third World. 

The Role of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Countries in the Third 
World 

With Eastern Europe in a relatively quiescent phase, the Soviet 
Union began to build an informal alliance system in the Third 
World during the 1970s. In this undertaking the Soviets drew on 
their experiences in developing allies in Eastern Europe after 1945. 
Reflecting this continuity, the Soviet Union called its new Third 
World allies "people's democracies" and their armed forces 
"national liberation armies." The Soviets also drew on their East 
European resources directly by enlisting the Warsaw Pact allies 
as proxies to "enhance the role of socialism in world affairs," that 
is, to support Soviet interests in the Middle East and Africa. Since 
the late 1970s, the NSWP countries have been active mainly in 
Soviet-allied Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Libya, Mozambique, the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), and Syria. 

The Soviet Union employed its Warsaw Pact allies as surrogates 
primarily because their activities would minimize the need for direct 
Soviet involvement and obviate possible international criticism of 
Soviet actions in the Third World. Avowedly independent East 
European actions would be unlikely to precipitate or justify a 
response by the United States. The Soviet Union also counted on 
closer East European economic ties with Third World countries 
to alleviate some of Eastern Europe's financial problems. From the 
East European perspective, involvement in the Third World offered 
an opportunity for reduced reliance on the Soviet Union and for 
semiautonomous relations with other countries. 

In the 1970s, the East European allies followed the lead of Soviet 
diplomacy and signed treaties on friendship, cooperation, and mutual 



361 



East Germany: A Country Study 



assistance with most of the important Soviet Third World allies. 
These treaties established a ''socialist division of labor" among the 
East European countries, in which each specialized in the provi- 
sion of certain aspects of military or economic assistance to differ- 
ent Soviet Third World allies. The most important part of the 
treaties concerned military cooperation: the Soviets have openlv 
acknowledged the important role of the East European allies in 
providing weapons to the "'national armies of countries with socialist 
orientation. 

In the 1970s and 1980s. Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, and East Ger- 
many were the principal Soviet proxies for arms transfers to the Third 
World. These NSWP countries supplied Soviet-manufactured equip- 
ment, spare parts, and training personnel to various Third World 
armies. The Soviet Union used these countries to transship weapons 
to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) in the 
early 1970s. Soviet-backed forces in the 1975 Angolan civil war, 
and Nicaragua in the 1980s. The Soviet Union also relied on East 
German advisers to set up armed militias, paramilitary police forces, 
and internal security and intelligence organizations for selected 
Third World allies. The Soviets considered this task especiallv 
important because an efficient security apparatus would be essen- 
tial for suppressing opposition forces and keeping a ruling regime, 
allied to the Soviet Union, in power. In addition to on-site activi- 
ties, Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, and particularly East Germany 
trained Third World military and security personnel in Eastern 
Europe during the 1980s. 

During this period, the Soviet Union also relied on its East 
European allies to provide the bulk of Soviet bloc economic aid 
and credits to the countries of the Third World. Perhaps revealing 
their hesitancy about military activities outside the Warsaw Pact's 
European operational area. Hungary and Poland have confined 
their Third World involvement to commercial assistance. Both 
countries sent economic and administrative advisers to assist in the 
management of state-directed industrial enterprises in the Third 
World as part of a Soviet campaign to demonstrate the advantages 
of the "socialist path of development" to potential Third World 
allies. 

The Warsaw Pact has added no new member states in the more 
than thirty years of its existence. Even at the height of its Third 
World activities in the mid-to late 1970s, the Soviet Union did not 
offer W T arsaw Pact membership to any of its important Third World 
allies. In 1986. after the United States bombed Libya in retalia- 
tion for its support of international terrorism, the Soviet Union 
was reported to have strongly discouraged Libyan interest in 



362 



Appendix C 



Warsaw Pact membership, expressed through one or more NSWP 
countries, and limited its support of Libya to bilateral consulta- 
tions after the raid. Having continually accused the United States 
of attempting to extend NATO's sphere of activity beyond Europe, 
the Soviets did not want to open themselves to charges of broadening 
the Warsaw Pact. In any event, the Soviet Union would be unlikely 
to accept a noncommunist, non-European state into the Warsaw 
Pact. Moreover, the Soviets have already had considerable suc- 
cess in establishing strong allies throughout the world, outside their 
formal military alliance. 

Beginning in the late 1970s, mounting economic problems 
sharply curtailed the contribution of the East European allies to 
Soviet Third World activities. In the early 1980s, when turmoil 
in Poland reminded the Soviet Union that Eastern Europe remained 
its most valuable asset, the Third World became a somewhat less 
important object of Soviet attention. 

The Solidarity Crisis 

The rise of the independent trade union Solidarity shook the foun- 
dation of communist party rule in Poland and, consequently, Soviet 
control of a country the Soviet Union considers critical to its secu- 
rity and alliance system. Given Poland's central geographic posi- 
tion, this unrest threatened to isolate East Germany, sever vital 
lines of communication to Soviet forces deployed against NATO, 
and disrupt Soviet control in the rest of Eastern Europe. 

As in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union used the Warsaw 
Pact to carry out a campaign of military coercion against the Polish 
leadership. In 1980 and 1981, the Soviet Union conducted joint 
Warsaw Pact exercises with a higher frequency than at any time 
since 1 968 to exert pressure on the Polish regime to solve the Solidar- 
ity problem. Under the cover that the exercises afforded, the Soviet 
Union mobilized and deployed its reserve and regular troops in 
the Belorussian Military District as a potential invasion force. In 
the West-81 and Union-81 exercises, Soviet forces practiced 
amphibious and airborne assault landings on the Baltic Sea coast 
of Poland. These maneuvers demonstrated a ready Soviet capa- 
bility for intervention in Poland. 

In the midst of the Polish crisis, Warsaw Pact commander in 
chief Viktor Kulikov played a crucial role in intra- alliance diplomacy 
on behalf of the Soviet leadership. Kulikov maintained almost con- 
stant contact with the Polish leadership and conferred with the lead- 
ers of Bulgaria, East Germany, and Romania about a possible 
multilateral Warsaw Pact military action against Poland. In Decem- 
ber 1981, Kulikov pressed Polish United Workers Party first 



363 



East Germany: A Country Study 

secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski to activate his contingency plan for 
declaring martial law with the warning that the Soviet Union was 
ready to intervene in the absence of quick action by Polish authori- 
ties. As it turned out, the Polish government instituted martial law 
and suppressed Solidarity just as the Soviet press was reporting 
that these steps were necessary to ensure that Poland could meet 
its Warsaw Pact commitment to the security of the other member 
states. 

From the Soviet perspective, the imposition of martial law by 
Polish internal security forces was the best possible outcome. Martial 
law made the suppression of Solidarity a strictly domestic affair 
and spared the Soviet Union the international criticism that an 
invasion would have generated. However, the extensive use of 
Polish paramilitary police and riot troops suggested that the Soviet 
Union could not count on the Polish Army to put down Polish work- 
ers. Moreover, while the Brezhnev Doctrine of using force to main- 
tain the leading role of the communist party in society was upheld 
in Poland, it was not the Soviet Union that enforced it. 

Some question remains as to whether the Soviet Union could 
have used force successfully against Poland. An invasion would 
have damaged the Soviet Union's beneficial detente relationship 
with Western Europe. Intervention would also have added to the 
evidence that the internal police function of the Warsaw Pact was 
more important than the putative external collective self-defense 
mission it had never exercised. Moreover, Romania, and conceiv- 
ably Hungary, would have refused to contribute contingents to a 
multinational Warsaw Pact force intended to camouflage a Soviet 
invasion. Failure to gain the support of its allies would have 
represented a substantial embarrassment to the Soviet Union. In 
stark contrast to the unopposed intervention in Czechoslovakia, 
the Soviets probably also anticipated tenacious resistance from the 
general population and the Polish Army to any move against 
Poland. Finally, an invasion would have placed a weighty economic 
and military burden on the Soviet Union; the occupation and 
administration of Poland would have tied down at least ten Soviet 
Army divisions for an extended period of time. Nevertheless, had 
there been no other option, the Soviet Union would certainly have 
invaded Poland to eliminate Solidarity's challenge to communist 
party rule in that country. 

Although the Polish Army had previously played an important 
role in Soviet strategy for a coalition war against NATO, the Soviet 
Union had to revise its plans and estimates of Poland's reliability 
after 1981 , and it turned to East Germany as its most reliable ally. 
In the early 1980s, because of its eager promotion of Soviet 



364 



Appendix C 



interests in the Third World and its importance in Soviet military 
strategy, East Germany completed its transformation from defeated 
enemy and dependent ally into the premier junior partner of the 
Soviet Union. Ironically, East Germany's efficiency and loyalty 
have made the Soviet Union uncomfortable. Encroaching some- 
what on the leading role of the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact, 
East Germany has been the only NSWP country to institute the 
rank of marshal, matching the highest Soviet Army rank and 
implying its equality with the Soviet Union. 

The End of Detente 

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the West grew disenchanted 
with detente, which had failed to prevent Soviet advances in the 
Third World, the deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range ballis- 
tic missiles (IRBMs) aimed at West European targets, the inva- 
sion of Afghanistan, or the suppression of Solidarity. The Soviet 
Union used the renewal of East- West conflict as a justification for 
forcing its allies to close ranks within the Warsaw Pact. But restoring 
the alliance's cohesion and renewing its confrontation with Western 
Europe proved difficult after several years of good East-West rela- 
tions. The East European countries had acquired a stake in main- 
taining detente for various reasons. In the early 1980s, internal 
Warsaw Pact disputes centered on relations with the West after 
detente, NSWP contributions to alliance defense spending, and the 
alliance's reaction to IRBM deployments by NATO. The resolu- 
tion of these disputes produced significant changes in the Warsaw 
Pact as, for the first time, two or more NSWP countries simul- 
taneously challenged Soviet military and foreign policy preferences 
within the alliance. 

In the PCC meetings of the late 1970s and early 1980s, Soviet 
and East European leaders of the Warsaw Pact debated about the 
threat emanating from NATO. When the Soviet Union argued 
that a new cold war loomed over Europe, the East European coun- 
tries insisted that the improved European political climate of detente 
still prevailed. On several occasions, the Soviets had to compromise 
on the relative weight of these two alternatives in the language of 
PCC declarations. Although the Soviet Union succeeded in offi- 
cially ending detente for the Warsaw Pact, it was unable to achieve 
significantly greater alliance cohesion or integration. 

Discussions of the "NATO threat" also played a large part in 
Warsaw Pact debates about an appropriate level of NSWP mili- 
tary expenditure. The Soviet Union used the 1978 PCC meeting 
to try to force its allies to match a scheduled 3-percent, long-term 
increase in the military budgets of the NATO countries. Although 



365 



East Germany: A Country Study 

the East European countries initially balked at this Soviet demand, 
they eventually agreed to the increase. However, only East Ger- 
many actually honored its pledge, and the Soviet Union failed to 
achieve its goal of increased NSWP military spending. 

The debate on alliance burden-sharing did not end in 1978. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, the Soviets carefully noted that one 
of the Warsaw Pact's most important functions was monitoring 
the "fraternal countries and the fulfillment of their duties in the 
joint defense of socialism." In 1983 Romania adopted a unilateral 
three-year freeze on its military budget at its 1982 level. In 1985 
Ceau§escu frustrated the Soviet Union by calling for a unilateral 
Warsaw Pact reduction in arms expenditures, ostensibly to put pres- 
sure on NATO to follow its example. At the same time, Hungary 
opposed Soviet demands for increased spending, arguing instead 
for more rational use of existing resources. In the mid-1980s, East 
Germany was the only Soviet ally that continued to expand its mili- 
tary spending. 

The refusal of the NSWP countries to meet their Warsaw Pact 
financial obligations in the 1980s clearly indicated diminished 
alliance cohesion. The East European leaders argued that the costs 
of joint exercises, their support for Soviet Army garrisons, and the 
drain of conscription represented sufficient contributions to the 
alliance at a time of hardship in their domestic economies. In 
addition to providing access to bases and facilities opposite NATO, 
the East European communist regimes were also obligated to abide 
by Soviet foreign policy and security interests to earn a Soviet 
guarantee against domestic challenges to their continued rule. For 
its part, the Soviet Union paid a stiff price in terms of economic 
aid and subsidized trade with the NSWP countries to maintain its 
buffer zone in Eastern Europe. 

The issue of an appropriate Warsaw Pact response to NATO's 
1983 deployment of American Pershing II and cruise missiles, 
matching the Soviet SS-20s, proved to be the most divisive one 
for the Soviet Union and its East European allies in the early and 
mid-1980s. After joining in a vociferous Soviet propaganda cam- 
paign against the deployment, the East European countries split 
with the Soviet Union over how to react when their "peace offen- 
sive" failed to forestall it. 

In 1983 East Germany, Hungary, and Romania indicated their 
intention to "limit the damage" to East- West ties that could have 
resulted from the deployment of NATO's new missiles. In doing 
so, these countries raised the possibility of an independent role for 
the smaller countries of both alliances in reducing conflicts between 
the two superpowers. In particular, East Germany sought to insulate 



366 



Appendix C 



its profitable economic ties with West Germany, established through 
detente, against the general deterioration in East- West political 
relations. While East Germany had always been the foremost propo- 
nent of "socialist internationalism," that is, strict adherence to 
Soviet foreign policy interests, its position on this issue caused a 
rift in the Warsaw Pact. In effect, East Germany asserted that the 
national interests of the East European countries did not coincide 
exactly with those of the Soviet Union. 

The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia attacked the East Ger- 
man stand, accusing the improbable intra-bloc alliance of East 
Germany, Hungary, and Romania of undermining the class basis 
of Warsaw Pact foreign policy. The Soviet Union indicated that 
it would not permit its allies to become mediators between East 
and West. The Soviet Union forced East Germany to accept its 
"counterdeployments" of SS-21 and SS-23 SRBMs and compelled 
SED general secretary Erich Honecker to cancel his impending visit 
to West Germany. The Soviets thereby reaffirmed their right to 
determine the conditions under which the Warsaw Pact member 
states would conduct relations with the NATO countries. However, 
the Soviet Union also had to forego any meeting of the PCC in 
1984 that might have allowed its recalcitrant allies to publicize their 
differences on this issue. 

As late as 1985, Soviet leaders still had not completely resolved 
the question of the proper connection between the national and 
international interests of the socialist countries. Some Soviet com- 
mentators adopted a conciliatory approach toward the East Euro- 
pean position by stating that membership in the Warsaw Pact did 
not erase a country's specific national interests, which could be com- 
bined harmoniously with the common international interests of all 
the member states. Others, however, simply repeated the Brezhnev 
Doctrine and its stricture that a socialist state's sovereignty involves 
not only the right to independence but also a responsibility to the 
"socialist commonwealth" as a whole. 

The Problem of Romania in the 1970s and 1980s 

The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was, tangentially, 
a warning to Romania about its attempts to pursue genuine national 
independence. But Ceausescu, in addition to refusing to contrib- 
ute Romanian troops to the Warsaw Pact invasion force, openly 
declared that Romania would resist any similar Soviet interven- 
tion on its territory. Romania pronounced that henceforth the Soviet 
Union represented its most likely national security threat. After 
1968 the Romanian Army accelerated its efforts to make its inde- 
pendent defense strategy a credible deterrent to a possible Soviet 



367 



East Germany: A Country Study 



invasion of the country. In the 1970s Romania also established 
stronger ties to the West, China, and the Third World. These diplo- 
matic, economic, and military relations were intended to increase 
Romania's independence from the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet 
Union, while guaranteeing broad international support for Romania 
in the event of a Soviet invasion. 

Throughout the 1970s, Romania continued to reject military inte- 
gration within the Warsaw Pact framework and military interven- 
tion against other member states, while insisting on the right of 
the East European countries to resolve their internal problems 
without Soviet interference. Romanian objections to the Soviet line 
within the Warsaw Pact forced the Soviet Union to acknowledge 
the "possibility of differences arising in the views of the ruling com- 
munist parties on the assessment of some international develop- 
ments." To obtain Romanian assent on several questions, the 
Soviet Union also had to substitute the milder formulation "inter- 
national solidarity" for "socialist internationalism" — the code 
phrase for the subordination of East European national interests 
to Soviet interests — in PCC declarations. Pursuing a policy opposed 
to close alliance integration, Romania resisted Soviet domination 
of Warsaw Pact weapons production as a threat to its autonomy 
and refused to participate in the work of the Military Scientific- 
Technical Council and Technical Committee (see The Military 
Organization of the Warsaw Pact, this Appendix). Nevertheless, 
the Soviets have insisted that a Romanian Army officer hold a 
position on the Technical Committee; his rank, however, is not 
appropriate to that level of responsibility. The Soviet claims are 
probably intended to obscure the fact that Romania does not 
actually engage in joint Warsaw Pact weapons production efforts. 

Despite continued Romanian defiance of Soviet policies in the 
Warsaw Pact during the 1980s, the Soviet Union successfully 
exploited Romania's severe economic problems and bribed Roma- 
nia with energy supplies on several occasions to gain its assent, 
or at least silence, in the Warsaw Pact. Although Romania raised 
the price the Soviet Union had to pay to bring it into line, Roma- 
nian dependence on Soviet economic support may foreshadow 
Romania's transformation into a more cooperative Warsaw Pact 
ally. Moreover, in 1985 Ceau§escu dismissed Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Stefan Andrei and Minister of Defense Constantin Olteanu, 
who helped establish the country's independent policies and would 
have opposed closer Romanian involvement with the Warsaw Pact. 

The Renewal of the Alliance 

In his first important task after becoming general secretary of 



368 



Appendix C 



the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, Mikhail 
S. Gorbachev organized a meeting of the East European leaders 
to renew the Warsaw Pact, which was due to expire that May after 
thirty years. There was little doubt that the Warsaw Pact member 
states would renew the alliance. However, there was some specu- 
lation that the Soviet Union might unilaterally dismantle its for- 
mal alliance structure to improve the Soviet image in the West and 
put pressure on NATO to disband. The Soviets could still have 
relied on the network of bilateral treaties in Eastern Europe, which 
predated the formation of the Warsaw Pact and had been renewed 
regularly. Combined with later status-of-forces agreements, these 
treaties ensured that the essence of the Soviet alliance system and 
buffer zone in Eastern Europe would remain intact, regardless of 
the Warsaw Pact's status. But despite their utility, the bilateral 
treaties could never substitute for the Warsaw Pact. Without a for- 
mal alliance, the Soviet Union would have to coordinate foreign 
policy and military integration with its East European allies through 
cumbersome bilateral arrangements. Without the Warsaw Pact, 
the Soviet Union would have no political equivalent of NATO for 
international negotiations like the CSCE and Mutual and Balanced 
Force Reduction talks, or for issuing its arms control pronounce- 
ments. The Soviet Union would also have to give up its equal status 
with the United States as an alliance leader. 

Although the Soviet and East European leaders debated the terms 
of the Warsaw Pact's renewal at their April 1985 meeting — 
Ceau§escu reportedly proposed that it be renewed for a shorter 
period — they did not change the original 1955 document, or the 
alliance's structure, in any way. The Soviets concluded that this 
outcome proved that the Warsaw Pact truly embodied the "fun- 
damental long-term interests of the fraternal countries." The 
decision to leave the Warsaw Pact unamended was probably the 
easiest alternative for the Soviet Union and its allies; the alliance 
was renewed for another twenty-year term with an automatic ten- 
year extension. 

In the mid- to late 1980s, the future of the Warsaw Pact hinged 
on Gorbachev's developing policy toward Eastern Europe. At the 
Twenty-seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union in 1986, Gorbachev acknowledged that differences existed 
among the Soviet allies and that it would be unrealistic to expect 
them to have identical views on all issues. There has been no firm 
indication, as yet, of whether Gorbachev would be willing to grant 
the Soviet allies more policy latitude or insist on tighter coordina- 
tion with the Soviet Union. However, demonstrating a greater sen- 
sitivity to East European concerns than previous Soviet leaders, 



369 



East Germany: A Country Study 

Gorbachev briefed the NSWP leaders in their own capitals after 
the 1985 Geneva and 1986 Reykjavik superpower summit meetings. 

According to many Western analysts, mounting economic 
difficulties in the late 1980s and the advanced age of trusted, long- 
time communist party leaders, like Gustav Husak in Czechoslo- 
vakia, Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria, and Janos Kadar in Hungary, 
presented the danger of domestic turmoil and internal power strug- 
gles in the NSWP countries. These problems had the potential to 
monopolize Soviet attention and constrain Soviet global activities. 
But the Soviet Union could turn these potential crises into oppor- 
tunities, using its economic leverage to pressure its East European 
allies to adhere more closely to Soviet positions or to influence the 
political succession process to ensure that a new generation of leaders 
in Eastern Europe would respect Soviet interests. Soviet insistence 
on greater NSWP military spending could fuel further economic 
deterioration, leading to political unrest and even threats to the 
integrity of the Soviet alliance system in several countries simul- 
taneously. Conversely, limited, Soviet-sanctioned deviation from 
orthodox socialism could make the East European regimes more 
secure and reduce the Soviet burden of policing the Warsaw Pact. 

Soviet Military Strategy and the Warsaw Pact 

The Soviet ground forces constitute the bulk of the Warsaw Pact's 
military power. In 1987 the Soviet Union provided 73 of the 126 
Warsaw Pact tank and motorized rifle divisions. Located in the 
Soviet Groups of Forces (SGFs) and four westernmost military dis- 
tricts of the Soviet Union, these Soviet Army divisions comprise 
the majority of the Warsaw Pact's combat-ready, full-strength units. 
Looking at the numbers of Soviet troops stationed in or near Eastern 
Europe, and the historical record, one could conclude that the 
Warsaw Pact is only a Soviet mechanism for organizing intra- 
alliance interventions or maintaining control of Eastern Europe and 
does not significantly augment Soviet offensive power vis-a-vis 
NATO. Essentially a peacetime structure for NSWP training and 
mobilization, the Warsaw Pact has no independent role in wartime 
nor a military strategy distinct from Soviet military strategy. 
However, the individual NSWP armies play important parts in 
Soviet strategy for war, outside the formal context of the Warsaw 
Pact. 

Soviet Military Strategy 

The goal of Soviet military strategy in Europe is a quick victory 
over NATO in a nonnuclear war. The Soviet Union would attempt 
to defeat NATO decisively before its political and military command 



370 



Appendix C 



structure could consult and decide how to respond to an attack. 
Under this strategy, success would hinge on inflicting a rapid suc- 
cession of defeats on NATO to break its will to fight, knock some 
of its member states out of the war, and cause the collapse of the 
Western alliance. A quick victory would also keep the United States 
from escalating the conflict to the nuclear level by making retalia- 
tion against the Soviet Union futile. A rapid defeat of NATO would 
preempt the mobilization of its superior industrial and economic 
resources, as well as reinforcement from the United States, which 
would enable NATO to prevail in a longer war. Most significant, 
in a strictly conventional war the Soviet Union could conceivably 
capture its objective, the economic potential of Western Europe, 
relatively intact. 

In the 1970s, Soviet nuclear force developments increased the 
likelihood that a European war would remain on the conventional 
level. By matching the United States in intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and adding intermediate-range SS-20s to its nuclear forces, 
the Soviet Union undercut NATO's option to employ nuclear 
weapons to avoid defeat in a conventional war. After the United 
States neutralized the Soviet SS-20 IRBM advantage by deploy- 
ing Pershing II and cruise missiles, the Soviet Union tried to use 
its so-called "counterdeployments" of SS-21 and SS-23 SRBMs 
to gain a nuclear war-fighting edge in the European theater. At 
the same time, the Soviet Union made NATO's dependence on 
nuclear weapons less tenable by issuing Warsaw Pact proposals for 
mutual no-first-use pledges and the establishment of nuclear-free 
zones. 

The Soviet plan for winning a conventional war quickly to 
preclude the possibility of a nuclear response by NATO and the 
United States was based on the deep-strike concept Soviet mili- 
tary theoreticians first proposed in the 1930s. After 1972 the Soviet 
Army put deep strike into practice in annual joint Warsaw Pact 
exercises, including "Brotherhood-in- Arms," "Union," "Friend- 
ship , " " West , ' ' and ' ' Shield . ' ' Deep strike would carry an attack 
behind the front lines of battle, far into NATO's rear areas. The 
Soviet Union would launch simultaneous missile and air strikes 
against vital NATO installations to disrupt or destroy the Western 
alliance's early warning surveillance systems, command and com- 
munications network, and nuclear delivery systems. Following this 
initial strike, the modern-day successor of the World War II-era 
Soviet mobile group formations, generated out of the SGFs in 
Eastern Europe, would break through and encircle NATO's pre- 
pared defenses in order to isolate its forward forces from reinforce- 
ment. Consisting of two or more tank and motorized rifle divisions, 



371 



East Germany: A Country Study 

army-level mobile groups would also overrun important NATO 
objectives behind the front lines to facilitate the advance of Soviet 
follow-on forces, which would cross NSWP territory from the 
westernmost Soviet military districts. 

The Warsaw Pact countries provide forward bases, staging areas, 
and interior lines of communication for the Soviet Union against 
NATO. Peacetime access to East European territory under the 
Warsaw Pact framework has enabled the Soviet military to pre- 
position troops, equipment, and supplies and to make reinforce- 
ment plans for wartime. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union increased 
road and rail capacity and built new airfields and pipelines in 
Eastern Europe. However, a quick Soviet victory through deep 
strike could be complicated by the fact that the attacking forces 
would have to achieve almost total surprise. Past Soviet mobiliza- 
tions for relatively small actions in Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, 
and Poland took an average of ninety days, while United States 
satellites observed the entire process. Moreover, the advance notifi- 
cation of large-scale troop movements, required under agreements 
made at the CSCE, would also complicate the concealment of 
mobilization. Yet the Soviet Union could disguise its offensive 
deployments against NATO as semiannual troop rotations in the 
GSFG, field exercises, or preparations for intervention against an 
ally. 

The Role of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Countries in 
Soviet Military Strategy 

The Warsaw Pact has no multilateral command or decision- 
making structure independent of the Soviet Army. NSWP forces 
would fight in Soviet, rather than joint Warsaw Pact, military opera- 
tions. Soviet military writings about the alliances of World War I 
and World War II, as well as numerous recent works marking the 
thirtieth anniversary of the Warsaw Pact in 1985, reveal the cur- 
rent Soviet view of coalition warfare. The Warsaw Pact's chief of 
staff, A.I. Gribkov, has written that centralized strategic control, 
like that the Red Army exercised over the allied East European 
national units between 1943 and 1945, is valid today for the Warsaw 
Pact's JAF (see The Organization of East European National Units, 
1943-45, this Appendix). 

Soviet military historians indicate that the East European allies 
did not establish or direct operations on independent national fronts 
during World War II. The East European forces fought in units, 
at and below the army level, on Soviet fronts and under the Soviet 
command structure. The headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High 
Command exercised control over all allied units through the Soviet 



372 



Appendix C 



General Staff. At the same time, the commanders in chief of the 
allied countries were attached to and "advised" the Soviet Supreme 
High Command. There were no special coalition bodies to make 
joint decisions on operational problems. A chart adapted from a 
Soviet journal indicates that the Soviet-directed alliance in World 
War II lacked a multilateral command structure independent of 
the Red Army's chain of command, an arrangement that also 
reflects the current situation in the Warsaw Pact (see fig. C, this 
Appendix). The Warsaw Pact's lack of a wartime command struc- 
ture independent of the Soviet command structure is clear evidence 
of the subordination of the NSWP armies to the Soviet Army. 

Since the early 1960s, the Soviet Union has used the Warsaw 
Pact to prepare non-Soviet forces to take part in Soviet Army opera- 
tions in the European theater of war. In wartime the Warsaw Pact 
commander in chief and chief of staff would transfer NSWP forces, 
mobilized and deployed under the Warsaw Pact aegis, to the oper- 
ational control of the Soviet ground forces. After deployment the 
Soviet Union could employ NSWP armies, comprised of various 
East European divisions, on its fronts (see Glossary). In joint 
Warsaw Pact exercises, the Soviet Union has detached care- 
fully selected, highly reliable East European units, at and below 
the division-level, from their national command structures. These 
specific contingents are trained for offensive operations within Soviet 
ground forces divisions. NSWP units, integrated in this man- 
ner, would fight as component parts of Soviet armies on Soviet 
fronts. 

The East European countries play specific roles in Soviet strategy 
against NATO based on their particular military capabilities. 
Poland has the largest and best NSWP air force that the Soviet 
Union could employ in a theater air offensive. Both Poland and 
East Germany have substantial naval forces that, in wartime, would 
revert to the command of the Soviet Baltic Fleet to render fire sup- 
port for Soviet ground operations. These two Soviet allies also have 
amphibious forces that could carry out assault landings along the 
Baltic Sea coast into NATO's rear areas. While its mobile groups 
would penetrate deep into NATO territory, the Soviet Union would 
entrust the less reliable or capable East European armies, like those 
of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, with a basically defen- 
sive mission. The East European countries are responsible for secur- 
ing their territory, Soviet rear areas, and lines of communication. 
The air defense systems of all NSWP countries are linked directly 
into the Soviet Air Defense Forces command. This gives the Soviet 
Union an impressive early warning network against NATO air 
attacks. 



373 



East Germany: A Country Study 

The Reliability of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Armies 

The Soviet Union counts on greater cooperation from its Warsaw 
Pact allies in a full-scale war with NATO than in intra-alliance 
policing actions. Nevertheless, the Soviets expect that a protracted 
war in Europe would strain the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact. This 
view may derive from the experience of World War II, in which 
Nazi Germany's weak alliance partners, Romania, Hungary, and 
Bulgaria, left the war early and eventually joined the Soviet side. 
A stalemate in a protracted European war could lead to unrest, 
endanger communist party control in Eastern Europe, and frac- 
ture the entire Soviet alliance system. NSWP reliability would also 
decline, requiring the Soviet Army to reassign its own forces to 
carry out unfulfilled NSWP functions or even to occupy a non- 
compliant ally's territory. 

Continuing Soviet concern over the combat reliability of its East 
European allies influences, to a great extent, the employment of 
NSWP forces under Soviet strategy. Soviet military leaders believe 
that the Warsaw Pact allies would be most likely to remain loyal 
if the Soviet Army engaged in a short, successful offensive against 
NATO, while deploying NSWP forces defensively. Under this 
scenario, the NSWP allies would absorb the brunt of NATO attacks 
against Soviet forces on East European territory. Fighting in Eastern 
Europe would reinforce the impression among the NSWP coun- 
tries that their actions constituted a legitimate defense against out- 
side attack. The Soviet Union would still have to be selective in 
deploying the allied armies offensively. For example, the Soviet 
Union would probably elect to pit East German forces against non- 
German NATO troops along the central front. Other NSWP forces 
that the Soviet Union employed offensively would probably be 
interspersed with Soviet units on Soviet fronts to increase their relia- 
bility. The Soviet Union would not establish separate East Euro- 
pean national fronts against NATO. Independent NSWP fronts 
would force the Soviet Union to rely too heavily on its allies to per- 
form well in wartime. Moreover, independent East European fronts 
could serve as the basis for a territorial defense strategy and suc- 
cessful resistance to future Soviet policing actions in Eastern Europe. 

Soviet concern over the reliability of its Warsaw Pact allies is 
also reflected in the alliance's military-technical policy, which is 
controlled by the Soviets. The Soviet Union has given the East 
European allies less modern, though still effective, weapons and 
equipment to keep their armies several steps behind the Soviet 
Army. The Soviets cannot modernize the East European armies 
without concomitantly improving their capability to resist Soviet 
intervention. 



374 



Appendix C 




East Germany: A Country Study 

Military Technology and the Warsaw Pact 

As a result of its preponderance in the alliance, the Soviet Union 
has imposed a level of standardization in the Warsaw Pact that 
NATO cannot match. Standardization in NATO focuses primarily 
on the compatibility of ammunition and communications equip- 
ment among national armies. By contrast, the Soviet concept of 
standardization involves a broad complex of measures aimed at 
achieving "unified strategic views on the general character of a 
future war and the capabilities for conducting it." The Soviet Union 
uses the Warsaw Pact framework to bring its allies into line with 
its view of strategy, operations, tactics, organizational structure, 
service regulations, field manuals, documents, staff procedures, and 
maintenance and supply activities. 

The Weapons and Equipment of the Non-Soviet Warsaw 
Pact Armies 

By the 1980s, the Soviet Union had achieved a degree of tech- 
nical interoperability among the allied armies that some observers 
would consider to be a significant military advantage over NATO. 
However, the Soviet allies had weapons and equipment that were 
both outdated and insufficient in number. As one Western analyst 
has pointed out, the NSWP armies remain fully one generation 
behind the Soviet Union in their inventories of modern equipment 
and weapons systems and well below Soviet norms in force struc- 
ture quantities. Although T-64 and T-72 tanks had become stan- 
dard and modern infantry combat vehicles, including the BMP-1, 
comprised two-thirds of the armored infantry vehicles in Soviet 
Army units deployed in Eastern Europe, the NSWP armies still 
relied primarily on older T-54 and T-55 tanks and domestically 
produced versions of Soviet BTR-50 and BTR-60 armored per- 
sonnel carriers. The East European air forces did not receive the 
MiG-23, first built in 1971, until the late 1970s, and they still did 
not have the most modern Soviet ground attack fighter-bombers, 
like the MiG-27 and Su-24, in the mid- to late 1980s. These defi- 
ciencies called into question NSWP capabilities for joining in Soviet 
offensive operations against NATO and indicated primarily a rear- 
area role for the NSWP armies in Soviet strategy. 

Within the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union decides which of the 
allies receive the most up-to-date weapons. Beginning in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the Soviet Union provided the strategically 
located Northern Tier countries, East Germany and Poland espe- 
cially, with greater quantities of advanced armaments. By contrast, 
the less important Southern Tier, consisting of Hungary, Bulgaria, 



376 



The major Warsaw Pact maneuvers of 1980, called 
"Brotherhood-in-Arms 80, " took place in East Germany 
Courtesy United Press International 



377 



East Germany: A Country Study 

and Romania, received used equipment that was being replaced 
in Soviet or Northern Tier forces. In the mid-1970s, overall NSWP 
force development slowed suddenly as the Soviet Union became 
more interested in selling arms to earn hard currency and gain 
greater influence in the Third World, particularly in the oil-rich 
Arab states of the Middle East. At the same time, growing eco- 
nomic problems in Eastern Europe made many Third World coun- 
tries look like better customers for Soviet arms sales. Between 1974 
and 1978, the Soviet Union sent the equivalent of US$18.5 mil- 
lion of a total US$27 million in arms transfers outside the Warsaw 
Pact. Moreover, massive Soviet efforts to replace heavy Arab equip- 
ment losses in the 1973 war against Israel and the 1982 Syrian- 
Israeli air war over Lebanon came largely at the expense of modern- 
ization for the East European allies. In the late 1980s, the NSWP 
countries clearly resented the fact that some Soviet Third World 
allies, including Algeria, Libya, and Syria, had taken delivery of 
the newest Soviet weapons systems, such as the MiG-25, not yet 
in their own inventories. The Soviet Union probably looked at a 
complete modernization program for the NSWP armies as unneces- 
sary and prohibitively costly for either it or its allies to undertake. 

Coordination of Arms Production 

The Soviet Union claims the right to play the leading role in 
the Warsaw Pact on the basis of its scientific, technical, and eco- 
nomic preponderance in the alliance. The Soviet Union also 
acknowledges its duty to cooperate with the NSWP countries by 
sharing military-technical information and developing their local 
defense industries. This cooperation, however, amounts to Soviet 
control over the supply of major weapons systems and is an 
important aspect of Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact allies. 
Warsaw Pact military-technical cooperation prevents the NSWP 
countries from adopting autonomous policies or otherwise defy- 
ing Soviet interests through a national defense capability based on 
domestic arms production. In discussions of the United States and 
NATO, the Soviets acknowledge that standardization and control 
of arms purchases are effective in increasing the influence of the 
leading member of an alliance over its smaller partners. In the same 
way, Soviet arms supplies to Eastern Europe have made the NSWP 
military establishments more dependent on the Soviet Union. To 
deny its allies the military capability to successfully resist a Soviet 
invasion, the Soviet Union does not allow the NSWP countries to 
produce sufficient quantities or more than a few kinds of weapons 
for their national armies. 



378 



Appendix C 



Romania is the only Warsaw Pact country that has escaped Soviet 
military-technical domination. In the late 1960s, Romania recog- 
nized the danger of depending on the Soviet Union as its sole source 
of military equipment and weapons. As a result, Romania initiated 
heavy domestic production of relatively low-technology infantry 
weapons and began to seek non-Soviet sources for more advanced 
armaments. Romania has produced British transport aircraft, 
Chinese fast-attack boats, and French helicopters under various 
coproduction and licensing arrangements. Romania has also pro- 
duced a fighter-bomber jointly with Yugoslavia. However, Romania 
still remains backward in its military technology because both the 
Soviet Union and Western countries are reluctant to transfer their 
most modern weapons to it. Each side must assume that any tech- 
nology given to Romania could end up in enemy hands. 

Apart from Romania, the Soviet Union benefits from the limited 
military production of its East European allies. It has organized 
an efficient division of labor among the NSWP countries in this 
area. Czechoslovakia and East Germany, in particular, are heavily 
industrialized and probably surpass the Soviet Union in their high- 
technology capabilities. The Northern Tier countries produce some 
Soviet heavy weapons, including older tanks, artillery, and infan- 
try combat vehicles on license. However, the Soviet Union gener- 
ally restricts its allies to the production of a relatively narrow range 
of military equipment, including small arms, munitions, communi- 
cations, radar, optical, and other precision instruments and vari- 
ous components and parts for larger Soviet-designed weapons 
systems. 

The 1980s have witnessed a dramatic increase in the amount of 
secondary source material published about the Warsaw Pact. The 
works of Alex Alexiev, Andrzej Korbonski, and Condoleezza Rice, 
as well as various Soviet writers, provide a complete picture of the 
Soviet alliance system and the East European military establishments 
before the formation of the Warsaw Pact. William J. Lewis's The 
Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy is a very useful reference 
work with considerable information on the establishment of the 
Warsaw Pact and the armies of its member states. The works of 
Malcolm Mackintosh, a long-time observer of the Warsaw Pact, 
cover the changes in the Warsaw Pact's organizational structure 
and functions through the years. Christopher D. Jones's Soviet 
Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact and 
subsequent articles provide a coherent interpretation of the Soviet 



379 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Union's use of the Warsaw Pact to control its East European allies. 
In "The Warsaw Pact at 25," Dale R. Herspring examines intra- 
alliance politics in the PCC and East European attempts to reduce 
Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact. Soviet military journals 
are the best source for insights into the East European role in Soviet 
military strategy. Daniel N. Nelson and Ivan Volgyes analyze East 
European reliability in the Warsaw Pact. Nelson takes a quantita- 
tive approach to this ephemeral topic. By contrast, Volgyes uses 
a historical and political framework to draw his conclusions on the 
reliability issue. The works of Richard C. Martin and Daniel S. 
Papp present thorough discussions of Soviet policies on arming and 
equipping the NSWP allies. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



380 



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Hutchings, Robert L. Foreign and Security Policy Coordination in the 
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Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1985. 

Joint Publications Research Services — JPRS (Washington). The 
following items are from the JPRS series: 
USSR Report Military Affairs: 

"From Experience in Coordinating Troop Operations of the 
Anti-Hitler Coalition," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, Moscow, 
December 1985. QPRS-UMA-86-032, 34-40). 

"The Increased Role of the Communist Parties in Strengthen- 
ing the Combat Association of Fraternal Armies," Voenno- 
istoricheskii zhurnal, Moscow, May 1983. (JPRS-UMA-84-106, 
44-71). 

"Military Cooperation and Coordination of Efforts by Coun- 
tries of the Anti-Hitler Coalition, Part 1," Voenno-istoricheskii 
zhurnal, Moscow, May 1982. (JPRS-UMA-82-628, 60-68). 

"Military Cooperation and Coordination of Efforts by Coun- 
tries of the Anti-Hitler Coalition, Part 2," Voenno-istoricheskii 
zhurnal, Moscow, June 1982. (JPRS-UMA-82-303, 19-47). 

"On the Command and Control of Coalition Troop Groupings," 
Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, Moscow, March 1984. (JPRS- 
UMA-84-042, 1-9). 



407 



East Germany: A Country Study 

"On the Establishing of Armies in Socialist Countries," Voenno- 

istoricheskii zhurnal, Moscow, February 1986. (JPRS- 

UMA-86-014, 57-62). 
"Thirty Years of Guarding Peace and Socialism," Voenno- 

istoricheskii zhurnal, Moscow, May 1985. (JPRS-UMA-85-051, 

30-40). 

Jones, Christopher D. "Agencies of the Alliance: Multinational 
in Form, Bilateral in Content." Pages 127-72 in Jeffrey Simon 
and Trond Gilberg (eds.), Security Implications of Nationalism in 
Eastern Europe. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986. 

. Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the 

Warsaw Pact. (Studies of Influence in International Relations.) 
New York: Praeger, 1981. 

"The USSR, the Warsaw Pact, and NATO." Pages 

15-36 in Ingmar Oldberg (ed.), Proceedings of a Symposium on Unity 
and Conflict in the Warsaw Pact. Stockholm: The Swedish National 
Defence Research Institute, 1984. 

. "Warsaw Pact Exercises: The Genesis of a Greater Social- 
ist Army?" Pages 429-50 in David R. Jones (ed.), Soviet Armed 
Forces Review Annual (SAFRA), 7, 1982-83. Gulf Breeze, Florida: 
Academic International Press, 1984. 

Korbonski, Andrzej. "Eastern Europe." Pages 290-344 in Robert 
F. Byrnes (ed.), After Brezhnev : Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980s. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983. 

. "The Polish Army." Pages 103-28 in Jonathan R. Adel- 

man (ed.), Communist Armies in Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, 
1982. 

Korbonski, Andrzej, and Lubov Fajfer. "The Soviet Union and 
Two Crises in Poland." Pages 241-65 in Jonathan R. Adelman 
(ed.), Superpowers and Revolution. New York: Praeger, 1986. 

Krisch, Henry. "German Democratic Republic." Pages 143-83 
in Daniel N. Nelson (ed.), Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the 
Issue of Reliability. Boulder: Westview Press, 1984. 

Kulikov, V. G. Kollektivnaia zashchita sotsializma. Moscow: Voeniz- 
dat, 1982. 

Kulish, V. M. "Na strazhe mira i bezopasnosti narodov," Voprosy 
istorii [Moscow], No. 2, February 1986, 41-57. 

Lebow, Richard Ned. "The Soviet Response to Poland and the 
Future of the Warsaw Pact." Pages 185-236 in Arlene Idol 
Broadhurst (ed.), The Future of European Alliance Systems: NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact. Boulder: Westview Press, 1982. 

Lewis, William J. The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy. Cam- 
bridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1982. 



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Bibliography 



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Mackintosh, Malcolm. "Developments in Alliance Politics: The 
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Maltsev, V. F., et al. (eds.). Organizatsiia varshavskogo dogovora 
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409 



East Germany: A Country Study 



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411 



Glossary 



Abgrenzung — Demarcation or separation. Policy adopted by the East 
German regime in the early 1970s to emphasize differences in 
culture, language, history, and world view between East Ger- 
many and West Germany. 

Abitur — End-of-school examination. Taken by individuals who com- 
plete a three-year program following the compulsory ten-year 
course of study. Passing this examination permits the student 
to apply to a technical institute or university. 

army — In Soviet military usage, an army has at least two divisions. 
A Soviet or non-Soviet Warsaw Pact motorized rifle division 
has between 10,000 and 14,000 troops. 

Cominform — The Communist Information Bureau, made up of 
the communist parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czecho- 
slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia (expelled in 
1948), France, and Italy. It was formed on Soviet initiative 
in 1947 and dissolved on Soviet initiative in 1956. The Comin- 
form' s primary function was to publish propaganda touting 
international communist solidarity. It was regarded primarily 
. as a tool of Soviet foreign policy. 

D-mark or Deutsche mark (DM) — Basic unit of currency in West 
Germany. Hard currency, highly sought after in East Germany. 
In December 1986 its value was approximately DM1.99 to 
US$1. 

extensive economic development — Expanding production by adding 
resources rather than by improving the efficiency by which these 
resources are exploited. 

front — In Soviet military usage, a front consists of at least two 
armies and usually more than that number. Two or more fronts 
constitute a theater of military operations. 

GDP — Gross domestic product. The total value of goods and ser- 
vices produced within a country's borders during a fixed period 
of time, usually one year. Obtained by adding the value con- 
tributed by each sector of the economy in the form of profits, 
compensation to employees, and depreciation (consumption of 
capital). 

GDR mark — Basic unit of currency in East Germany. The East 
German regime has set an artificial rate that equates the GDR 
mark to the West German D-mark, making its value in March 
1987 about 2.05 GDR marks per US$1. GDR marks are not 
exchanged on world markets for hard currencies. 



413 



East Germany: A Country Study 

GNP — Gross national product. Obtained by adding GDP (q.v.) 
and the income received from abroad by residents less pay- 
ments remitted abroad to nonresidents. 

liquidity shortage — The lack of assets that can be readily converted 
to cash. 

Main Political Administration (Directorate) — The organ of com- 
munist party control over the armed forces of the Soviet Union 
and the other Warsaw Pact countries. An agency of both the 
communist party and the Ministry of Defense, it is responsi- 
ble for conducting ideological indoctrination and propaganda 
activities to prepare the armed forces for war. 

Marshall Plan — A plan announced in June 1947 by the United 
States secretary of state George C. Marshall, for the reconstruc- 
tion of Europe after World War II. The plan involved a con- 
siderable amount of United States aid. 

Nomenklatur — From the Latin nomenclatura. Concept derives from 
the Russian word nomenklatura, which denotes an enumeration 
of important positions and the candidates who are examined, 
recommended, and assigned to fill them by communist party 
committees at various levels. 

opportunity cost — The value of a good or service in terms of what 
had to be sacrificed in order to obtain that item. 

Ostpolitik — Eastern policy. The West German foreign policy 
introduced by Chancellor Willy Brandt that resulted in treaties 
with the Soviet Union, Poland, and East Germany recogniz- 
ing de facto post- World War II borders. Ostpolitik brought closer 
relations between the two Germanies. 

Spetsnaz — Soviet special forces. From Russian voiska spetsiaVnogo 
naznacheniia, meaning "special-purpose forces." 

Treaty of Rome 1957 — Established the European Economic Com- 
munity (EEC — also known as the Common Market). 

valuta mark — Statistical accounting unit used by East Germans 
in foreign trade transactions. Rate of exchange depends on value 
of transfer ruble used by Soviet Union. Statistical deviations 
cause difficulties in determining value of valuta mark vis-a-vis 
United States dollar and West German D-mark. 



414 



Index 



Abgrenzung (demarcation), xxix, 4, 52, 53, 
74, 76, 167; inconsistency with cul- 
tural/economic contacts, 213 

Abteilungsparteiorganization (APO), 
186-87 

Academy of Social Sciences, 180, 185, 
193, 202 

Adamek, Heinrich, 198 

Administration for Security of Heavy 
Industry and Research, 273 

Afghanistan, invasion of, xxxi, 55, 246 

Africa {see also Third World), 215; Come- 
con support in, 325-26; military aid to, 
244-46; military presence, 216 

Agricultural Cooperatives (Landwirt- 
schaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaf- 
ten— LPGs), 48 

agriculture, xxiii, 120, 131; Borderland, 
65, 69; collectivization of, 48, 84, 130, 
131, 138-40, 196; and Comecon, 313; 
labor force, 84, 121, 138; land reform, 
44, 130, 195; landownership and pri- 
vate plots, 139-40; livestock produc- 
tion, 140; organizational relationships, 
125; socialist sector production, 48 

Air Defense Command, 258 

air force, xxiv, 256-58; Air Defense Com- 
mand, 258; creation of, 36, 229; equip- 
ment, 257, 258; and the Group of 
Soviet Forces in Germany, 257; man- 
power, 257, 258; Russian language 
requirement, 257; training, 229, 257; 
and the Warsaw Pact, 257-58, 358, 373 

airports and aviation, xxiii, 144; suspen- 
sion of domestic air traffic, 144 

Albania, 334, 344-45; and Comecon, 
299; and Warsaw Pact, 343, 350-51 

Algeria, 216 

Alliance Policy {Bixndnispolitik), 163, 193- 
94 

Allied Control Commission, 334 
Allied Control Council, 42, 44 
Allied Reparations Commission, 24-25 
Alsace-Lorraine, 17, 20; ceding of, 24 
Die Alternative (Bahro), 54, 114 
Andrei, Stefan, 368 
Anglo-German Naval Pact of June 1935, 
37 



Angola, 153, 216; military assistance to, 
244-45 

Annaherung (rapprochement), 167 

APOs. See Abteilungsparteiorganization 
(APO) 

Arab countries, 216 

armed forces {see also air force; military 
education; National People's Army; 
People's Navy), xxiv, 246-49; alliance 
with the Soviet Army, 246; banners, 
266; budget, 249; conditions of service, 
267-69; conscientious objectors, 239, 
242-43; conscription, 36, 246; and the 
constitution, 165, 249-50; construction 
soldiers, 243; defections, 261; disci- 
pline, 247, 270, 280; equipment, xxiv, 
251-53, 376; ground forces, 229, 
251-53; Grundorganizationen (GOs), 
186-87; and inculcation of regime 
values, 202; mandatory premilitary 
training, 249; manpower problems, 
248-49; military districts, 246-48; mili- 
tary strategy, 14; military technology, 
379; mission and roles, 249-50; na- 
tional service obligations, 235; paramil- 
itary, xxiv, 101, 272-77; rank insignia 
and decorations, 263-65; reserves, 238, 
269-70; Russian language require- 
ments, 268; Soviet military administra- 
tion, 224-25, 231; Soviet model, 229; 
suppression of 1953 uprising, 46; tra- 
ditions and ceremonies, 266-67; train- 
ing, 229, 231, 268; uniforms, 229, 
231-32, 262-63; and the Warsaw Pact, 
366; women, 238, 249 

Arminius, 4 

Army High Command, 23, 24 
Aryan Paragraph of 1933, 40 
Asia {see also Third World), 325-26 
Associations of Publicly Owned Enter- 
prises (Vereinigungen Volkseigener 
Betriebe— VYB^), 49, 124; manage- 
ment of, 50 
Austria, 7, 14, 16, 17; annexation of, 37; 
economic accord (1984), 218; economic 
relationship, 152, 218 
Austro-Hungarian empire, 17 
Auxiliary Service Bill of 1917, 23 



415 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Bach, Johann Sebastian, 77 
Baden, 17 

Baden, Max von, 25 
Bahro, Rudolf, 54, 113, 114 
Balkan Wars, 22 
Baltic coast, 63 

Bank of International Settlement, 29 
banks and banking, 18, 29, 144-46; 

Comecon banks, 305, 309, 312, 317, 

318; role in the planned economy, 145; 

State Bank, 145 
Basic Treaty, xxvii, 4, 52, 62, 74, 76, 203, 

212 

Battle of Britain, 38 

Battle of Stalingrad, 39 

Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, 4 

Battle of the White Mountain, 11 

Baumgarten, Klaus-Dieter, 250 

Bautzen, 59, 82, 257 

Bavaria, 17 

Bavarian German Workers' Party, 31 
Bebel, August, 18, 266 
Belgium, occupation of Ruhr district, 28, 
29 

Belikov, Valerii Aleksandrovich, 270 

Berlichingen, Gotz von, 266 

Berlin (see also East Berlin); allied occu- 
pation, 42; and the Border Command 
Center, 260; Four Power Agreement 
on, xxvii, 52, 67, 74, 203, 212; Soviet 
Union blockade of, 44 

Berlin-Karlshorst, 224 

Berlin-Rome Axis, 37, 39 

Berlin Wall, xxviii, 3, 48, 67, 74, 201; 
construction of, 234 

Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von, 21, 
22, 23, 24 

Bohme, Hans-Joachim, 169, 184 

Biermann, Wolf, 54, 113, 190 

Bismarck, Otto von, xxix, 16-20, 54, 77; 
Ltickentheorie, 17; Machtpoliiik, 17, 19 

Blucher, Gebhard von, 77 

Blek, Martin, 234 

Biilow, Bernhard von, 21-22 

Bohemia, 7, 38 

Border Police (see also Border Troops), 
234, 235 

Border Troops, 250, 258-61; boat com- 
panies, 255; conditions of service, 261, 
268; defections, 261; manpower, 258; 
and military obligations, 260; and 
National People's Army, 235, 258, 260; 
organization of, 259, 260-61; training 



and indoctrination, 261; uniforms, 263; 

women in the, 260 
Boundary Commission, 62 
Brandenburg, 11, 42; population, 69 
Braun, Eva, 40 
Braunau am Inn, 31 
Borderland, 65, 69 
Brezhnev Doctrine, 350, 364 
Britain, 21, 37, 152; cultural agreement, 

218; and division of Germany, xxvii; 

and World War I, 22; and World War 

II, 39 
Briining, Heinrich, 33 
Brunner, Horst, 251 
Brocken, 65 

Brotherhood-in-Arms, 272, 371, 377 
Bulgaria, 19; and Berlin-Rome Axis, 39; 
bilateral mutual assistance treaties, 51; 
and Comecon, 298; invasion of Czecho- 
slovakia, xxx, 349; Red Army occupa- 
tion of, 333, 334; and the Third World, 
362; trade relationship, 151 
Bundesrat (Federal Council), 18, 27 

Calvinism, 11 

Canada, 39 

Caprivi, Leo von, 21 

Carolingian Empire, 5-7 

Catholic League, 11 

CDU. See Christian Democratic Union 

(Christlich-Demokratische Union — 

CDU) 

Ceausescu, Nicolae, 346, 350, 369 
Center Party, 18, 19, 23, 27, 28 
Central Civil Defense Staff, 237 
Central Committee of the Socialist Unity 
Party of Germany (SED), 185-86; and 
economic planning, 186; education pro- 
file of members, 91; formation, 44; 
membership, 50; and Politburo reports, 
183; reduction of functions, 55 
Central Group of Forces (CGF), 349 
Central Party Control Commission, 184 
Central Institute for Socioeconomic Man- 
agement, 185 
centrally planned economy (CPE). See 
economy 

CGF (Central Group of Forces), 349 
Chamber of Deputies, 16 
Chamberlain, Neville, 38-39 
Charles IV, 9 

Charles the Great (Charlemagne), 5 



416 



Index 



Charles V, 10 

Chemnitz. See Karl-Marx-Stadt 

China, 153, 211; and Comecon, 300; and 
the Warsaw Pact, 343 

Christian Democratic Union (Christlich- 
Demokratische Union — CDU), xxviii, 
43, 194-95; and Council of Ministers, 
169; membership, 194 

Churchill, Winston, 38 

civil bureaucracy: and the economy, 125; 
under Hitler, 34; origins of, 7,14; tech- 
nocratic elite, 50 

civil defense (see also national security), 
250, 275, 277; Alert Units, 238; 
Central Civil Defense Staff, 237; com- 
pulsory training exercises, 237; con- 
struction of shelters, 237; personnel, 
238, 275, 277; socializing function, 238; 
training, 277 

Civil Defense Law of 1978, 237 

Clausewitz, Carl von, xxix, 14, 77, 266 

climate, xxii, 63, 65 

Clovis, 5 

CMD (Committee of Ministers of 
Defense), 356 

CMEA. ^Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (Comecon, CMEA) 

CMFA (Committee of Ministers of For- 
eign Affairs), 351 

Coastal Border Brigade, 253, 255, 256 

Cold War, 44 

Comecon. See Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance (Comecon, CMEA) 
Cominform, 299 

Committee of Ministers of Defense 

(CMD), 356 
Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 

(CMFA), 351 
communications, xxiii, 144; Intersputnik, 

144; mass media, 144; with West 

Germany, 53, 144; Western media, 79, 

81 

Communist Party of Germany (Kom- 
munistische Partei Deutschlands — 
KPD), 28, 33, 43-44; assumption of 
civil authority, 225; merger with Social 
Democratic Party of Germany, 178; 
Nazi resistance, 41 

Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU), xxvii, 185, 340; and Gor- 
bachev, 369-70; repudiation of 
Stalinism, 47; and Socialist Unity Party 
of Germany (SED), 180 



Community Constitution (Gemeindeverfqs- 

sung), 175 
concentration camps, 36, 40-41 
Concordat of Worms, 8 
Confederation of the Rhine (Rheinbund), 

14 

Conference of Governing Bodies of the 
Evangelical Churches in the GDR, 112 

Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe (CSCE). See Helsinki 
Accords 

Congress of Vienna, 14 

conscription. See armed forces — con- 
scription 

Conservative Party, 18, 19, 23 

Constitution of 1968, xxiv, 75, 166-67; 
amendments, 53, 76, 166-67; and 
armed forces, 165, 249-50; and equal- 
ity of the sexes, 102; focus on Soviet 
Union, 166, 167; and foreign policy, 
203-4, 213-14; rights of citizens, 85, 
167; and social stratification, 84; 
socialist internationalism, 166; and 
West Germany, 50 

constitutional developments (see also Con- 
stitution of 1968), xxiv, 75; and Council 
of Ministers, 168; 1871, 18; elimina- 
tion of state parliaments, 165; Holy 
Roman Empire, 9; human rights, 165; 
Law Toward the Completion of the 
Constitution, 165; 1949 constitution, 
45, 164-65; 1919 constitution, 25, 27; 
Weimar constitution, 25, 27 

consumerism (see also standard of living), 
60, 85, 154-57; luxury items, 89-90, 
155, 156; Main Task, 52-53; 1986-90 
plan, 158-59; and the private sector, 
127; service industry, 156; subsidiza- 
tion of basic goods, 155; and West Ger- 
many, 53 

Cooperative Departments of Crop Pro- 
duction (Kooperative Abteilungen der 
Pflanzenproduktion— KAP), 140 
Cottbus, 59, 63, 82, 137; population, 69 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon, CMEA), xxiv, xxix, xxix- 
xxx, 46, 119, 202, 297-329; affiliated 
agencies, 304-5; Basic Principles of the 
International Socialist Division of 
Labor, 310; "Bucharest formula," 317, 
328; Bureau for Integrated Planning, 
310; Comprehensive Program for 
Scientific and Technical Progress up to 



417 



East Germany: A Country Study 



the Year 2000, 298, 314-15, 322; Com- 
prehensive Program of 1971 , 133, 297, 
298, 311-13, 328; coordination of 
investment strategies, 310; Council 
Committee for Cooperation in Plan- 
ning, 302, 304, 319; council com- 
mittees, 302; differences from the 
European Common Market, 306-8; 
and East Germany, 170, 299; economic 
planning, 313, 318-20; and EEC coop- 
eration, 210; evolution, 297, 308-9; 
exchange rates and currencies, 317-18; 
Executive Committee, 302, 320; extra- 
regional economic relations, 312, 313- 
14, 324, 328; financing of joint projects, 
312; interstate conferences, 304; Joint 
Commission on Cooperation, 301; 
labor resources, 322-23, 325; member- 
ship, 298-301; Military-Industrial 
Commission, 358; and non-European 
members, 308, 324-25; oil pricing sys- 
tem, 140; opposition to Soviet political 
domination, 298, 310; political and 
ideological basis, 299; pricing system, 
312, 316-17, 328; production speciali- 
zation, 318-19; projects and programs, 
309-10, 313, 320-21, 329; representa- 
tion and voting rights, 305-6; and 
Romania, 310; science and technology 
cooperation, 321-22; scientific insti- 
tutes, 304; Secretariat, 304, 319; and 
"socialist economic integration," 311- 
13; and sovereign equality, 306, 310, 
311, 328; Soviet domination of, 297- 
98, 308, 323-24, 328; and Soviet for- 
eign policy interests, 325; Special 
Council Committee for Scientific and 
Technical Cooperation, 321; standing 
commissions, 304, 319; structure, 
301-5; support for developing coun- 
tries, 325-26; and supranational 
authority, 298, 322; trade, 315-18, 
328; Western relations, 313-14 
Council of Ministers (Ministerrat), xxiv, 
xxviii; constitutional changes, 167; and 
the economy, 124, 126, 170; and Free 
German Trade Union Federation, 170; 
functions, 169-70; membership, 
168-69; political party representation, 
169; Presidium, 168; relationship with 
People's Chamber, 169; selection of 
members, 169; Socialist Unity Party of 
Germany (SED) control, 45 



Council of State (Staatsrat), xxiii, xxiv, 
170-71; creation, 165 

coups. See dissent 

courts. See judicial system 

CPSU. See Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) 

crime, ^judicial system 

CSCE (Helsinki Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe) {See Hel- 
sinki Accords) 

Cuba, 299, 315, 324 

cultural developments {see also language; 
society); censorship of literature, 55; 
development of a "socialist nationalist 
culture," 190; expressionism, 30-31; 
facilities, 93; medieval period, 8; state 
control of arts, xxxii; Weimar Repub- 
lic, 29-31 

currency, 18, 145-46; black market, 146; 
Comecon, 317-18; foreign, 146; prob- 
lems of the "two-currency" system, 
191; purchasing power, 156-57; valuta 
mark, 146; West German mark (DM), 
146, 156-57, 206 

Czechoslovakia: air force assistance from, 
257; bilateral mutual assistance treaties, 
51; and the Central Group of Forces 
(CGF), 349; East German political 
opposition to, 51, 211; invasion of, xxx, 
235-36, 310, 347-51; Klement Gott- 
wald Military Academy, 348, 349; mili- 
tary technology, 379; Sudetenland 
annexation, 37-38; trade relationship, 
137, 149, 151; and the Warsaw Pact, 
333, 343, 347-51, 362 



Danzig, 38 

Dawes, Charles G., 29 
Dawes Plan, 29 

DBD. See Democratic Peasants' Party of 

Germany (Demokratische Bauernpar- 

tei Deutschlands— DBD) 
DDP. See German Democratic Party 

(Deutsche Demokratische Partei — DDP) 
democracy, 3, 164-65; disillusionment 

with, 28 

democratic centralism, xxviii, 55, 181-82; 
and the 1968 Constitution, 166; at the 
local level, 175; role of Council of 
Ministers, 170; and the Socialist Unity 
Party of Germany (SED), 44-45 



418 



Index 



Democratic Peasants' Party of Germany 
(Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutsch- 
lands — DBD), xxviii, 45, 195-96; and 
Council of Ministers, 169; member- 
ship, 194 

Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(North Korea), 300 

Democratic Women's League of Ger- 
many (Demokratischer Frauenbund 
Deutschlands— DFD), 60, 103; and 
People's Chamber, 172 

demography. See population 

Denmark, 38 

depression years, 32-33 

Dessau, 69 

Deutschlandpolitik (German policy), 213-14 

development plans, 48, 55-56; 1986-90 
plan, 86, 157-59; 1981-85 plan, 134-35; 
1976-80 plan, 134; 1959-65 plan, 48; 
1956-60 plan, 47-48; 1951-55 plan, 46 

DFD. See Democratic Women's League 
of Germany (Demokratischer Frauen- 
bund Deutschlands — DFD) 

Dialektik ohne Dogma (Havemann), 114 

Dickel, Friedrich, 272 

dissent, xxx-xxxi, 112-14; against the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, 236; for 
democratization and reunification, 54- 
55; expulsion of dissidents, 61 ; against 
Honecker regime, 54-55; intellectuals, 
113, 114; Marxist opposition, 114; 
against Nazis, 41-42; 1953 workers' 
uprising, xxx, 85, 199, 230-31; peace 
movement, xxxi, 61, 112, 113-14; use 
of repression, 4, 113 

DNVP. See German National People's 
Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei — 
DNVP) 

Dresden, xxiii, 63, 65, 137, 143, 243; 

Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, 

270; population, 69 
Dubcek, Alexander, 211, 347, 349 
Dunkirk, 38 

DVP. See German People's Party 
(Deutsche Volkspartei— DVP) 

DWK. See German Economic Commis- 
sion (Deutsche Wirtschaftskomission — 
DWK) 

East Berlin, xxi, 143, 234, 243; Allied 
position on, 46; population, 69; port, 
xxiii 



East Berlin-Schonefeld, xxiii 

East German Academy of Sciences, 180 

East German Cultural League (Kultur- 
band der DDR), 172 

Eastern Europe {see also under names of 
individual countries): and Comecon, 
323-24; communist parties and the 
military, 335; and detente, 360-61; 
development of socialist armies, 334- 
37; and Gorbachev, 369-70; intra- 
regional trade, 315-18; military tech- 
nology, 376-79; recognition of West 
Germany, 360; and Soviet military 
strategy, 372-75; Soviet Union rela- 
tionship, 323-24; and the Third World, 
325-26, 361-63; Vietnamese guest 
workers in, 325; and the Warsaw Pact, 
342 

Eberlein, Werner, 184 

Eberswalde, 272 

Ebert, Friedrich, 25, 28, 29 

Eckart, Dietrich, 31 

Economic System of Socialism (ESS), 51 

economy {see also Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance (Comecon, CMEA)), 
xxiii, xxix, xxxii, 119-59; banks' role, 
145; centrally planned economy (CPE), 
51, 122-23; consumption-oriented poli- 
cies, 52-53, 131; control mechanisms, 
126-27; and Council of Ministers, 126; 
credit status, 135, 159; Dawes Plan, 29; 
decentralization of authority, 49, 132; 
development plans, 46-48, 55-56, 
134-35, 157-59; Economic System of 
Socialism (ESS), 51; and efficiency 
measures, 135; foreign debt, 136; and 
government, 124; gross national prod- 
uct (GNP), xxii, 131; Honecker 
regime, 134, 154; informal and illegal 
activities, 128-29; investments, 131, 
144, 158; key technology areas, 158; 
Kombinate, 124-25, 133, 158; migra- 
tion effects, 131; Nazi policy, 35-36; 
New Course, 131; New Economic Sys- 
tem (NES), 48-50, 75, 132; policies, 
xxiii, 129-36; post-World War II, 
129-30; pricing policies, 88-89, 
126-27, 134-35, 145; private consump- 
tion rate, 134; private sector, 127; 
producing units, 125; and promotion 
of national consciousness, 80-81; real 
per capita income, 131 ; and reparations 
costs, 129-30; resource base, 120; and 



419 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
(SED), 123-24, 187; State Planning 
Commission, 124, 126; structure, 
122-29; System of Material Balances, 
123, 126; trade deficit, 134; and the 
West, 134 

education {see also military education), 
xxii, 80, 103-8; for attainment of politi- 
cal passivity, 202; English language, 
105; and the Free German Youth 
(FDJ), 99; political-ideological content, 
45, 104, 105; polytechnical, 106; reli- 
gious instruction, 111; Russian lan- 
guage, 104; secularization of, 18; and 
the "socialist personality," 104; and 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
(SED), 55, 182; and socialization, 60; 
universities and colleges, 93, 106-8; 
vocational training, 60, 105-6; women, 
102-3; working class, 106 

Ehm, Wilhelm, 251 

Eighth Party Congress, 52, 167, 190 

Einstein, Albert, 78 

Eisenhiittenstadt, xxiii, 55, 70 

EKU. See Evangelical Church of the Union 
(Evangelische Kirche der Union — 
EKU) 

Eleventh Party Congress, 157, 184, 
192-93 

El Salvador, military assistance to, 246 

Elbe basin, 65 

Elbe River, 65, 143 

emigration: and Berlin Wall, 48, 201, 
234; and Helsinki Final Act, 53-54; 
illegal, 201, 234, 261; and labor short- 
age, 48; refugees, 67; rejection of appli- 
cations, 54; to West Germany, 3, 46 

Emperor Frederick II (Kantorowicz), 30 

employment. See labor force 

Ems Dispatch, 17 

Enabling Act of 1933, 34 

energy {see also mining), xxii; consump- 
tion, 136, 158; crude oil, xxii; hydro- 
electricity, 20; lignite, 120; natural gas, 

xxii, xxiii; nuclear, 137, 158; pipelines, 

xxiii, 144; Soviet imports, 150-51, 
207-8 

Engels, Friedrich, xxix, 266 
environmental protection, xxxiii, 120 
Erfurt, xxiii, 65, 236, 260; population, 70 
Ernst Thalmann Pioneers Organization. 



See Young Pioneers (Junge Pioniere — 
JP) 

Erzgebirge, 62, 65 

Ethiopia, 153, 216; invasion of, 37; mili- 
tary assistance to, 244-45 

European Economic Community (EEC), 
xxix; and Comecon cooperation, 210; 
and "intra-German" trade, 152 

Evangelical Church of the Union (Evan- 
gelische Kirche der Union — EKU), 
108, 109 

Evangelical Lutheran Church, 113 
exchange rates, xxiii, 146; Comecon, 
317-18 

exports, xxiii, 148; to Comecon partners, 
151; military, 245; to Soviet Union, 
149; to West Germany, 152 

Fabius, Laurent, 218 

Falkenhayn, Erich von, 23 

Family Code of 1965, 95 

family life, 60, 95-97; abortion law, 96; 
and education of children, 96-97; mar- 
riage and divorce, 96; women, 95 

I.G. Farben, 36 

farms and farming. See agriculture 
FDGB. See Free German Trade Union 
Federation (Freier Deutscher Gewerk- 
schaftsbund— FDGB) 
FDJ. See Free German Youth (Freie 

Deutsche Jugend — FDJ) 
Federal Council (Bundesrat), 18, 27 
Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- 
many), xxvii; agreements with, xxxiii; 
banking credit arrangement, 214; Basic 
Law {Grundgesetz), 164; Basic Treaty, 
212; currency, 146, 156-57, 206; 
deployment of IBRMs, 204, 205; 
Deutschlandpolitik (German policy), 
213-14; Eastern European recognition 
of, 360; financial aid, 142; Hallstein 
Doctrine, 203, 244; and North Atlan- 
tic Treaty Organization (NATO), 337, 
338; Ostpolitik, 76, 213; relationship 
with, xxxi, 52, 53-54, 55, 74-75, 76; 
and reunification, xxix, 151; and sepa- 
rate citizenship, 191, 212; as supplier 
of consumer goods, 53; tourists, 67; 
trade, xxix-xxx, 149, 151-52, 212; 
Transit Agreement, 212; travel agree- 
ments, 212-13; and United States 



420 



Index 



Strategic Defense Initiative, 193; and 
Warsaw Pact, 366-67 

Federation of Evangelical Churches in the 
German Democratic Republic (Bund 
der Evangelischen Kirchen in der 
DDR), 109, 110 

Feliks Dzierzynski Guard Regiment, 
xxiv, 230, 273; equipment, 273; mili- 
tary obligations, 260; and the Third 
World, 245 

Ferdinand II, 11 

feudalism, 8 

First Reich, 5 

Fischer, Oskar, 219 

Five-Year Plans. See development plans 

Flegel, Manfred, 169 

foreign aid: "solidarity aid" to Africa and 
Vietnam, 245; Third World, xxx, 361- 
63; and Warsaw Pact, 361-63 

foreign policy, xxiv, xxix-xxxiii, 202-19; 
Africa, 200, 202; colonization, 19, 21; 
constitutional basis, 203-4; effect of 
superpower relationship on, 325; 
France, 218; under Hitler, 36-38; 
under Honecker, 52; inter-German 
detente, 191; international agreements, 
xxiv; post-World War I, 28; principles, 
203-4; promotion of Soviet interests, 

210- 11; Soviet Union, xxiv, xxv, xxxii- 
xxxiii, 55, 191, 204-11; Third World, 
215-17; under Ulbricht, 50-52; United 
States, xxiv, 209, 218-19; and the War- 
saw Pact, 351; and the West, 208-10, 
217-19; West Germany, 192-93, 

211- 15 

foreign trade, xxiii, 136, 147-54; Asian 
countries, 153; China, 153; Comecon 
countries, 134, 151; Czechoslovakia, 
149, 151; Hungary, 149, 151; Poland, 
149, 151; and protectionism, 19; re- 
porting system, 148; Soviet fuel 
exports, 150-51, 207-8; Soviet Union, 
133-34, 149, 150-51; Third World, 
153; trade deficits, 154; United States, 
152-53; use of foreign currency, 146; 
and valuta marks, 147; West Germany, 
149, 151-52 

Four Power Agreement on Berlin (Ber- 
lin Agreement), xxvii, 52, 74, 203, 212; 
and visit restrictions, 67 

Four Power Foreign Ministers Confer- 
ence (1954), xxvii, 338 

Four-Year Plan. See development plans 



Fragen, Antworten, Fragen (Havemann), 114 

France, 14, 37, 152; and division of Ger- 
many, xxvii; "Friendship Group, 
France-GDR," 218; occupation of 
Ruhr district, 28, 29; and World War 
I, 22; and World War II, 38 

Francis II, 14 

Franco, Francisco, 37 

Franco-Prussian War, 17 

Frankfurt, 63 

Frankfurt am Oder, 143, 260; population, 

69 

Frankfurt Assembly, 16 
Franks, 5, 7 

Franz Mehring Officer School, 257 
Frederick I (Frederick Barbarossa), 8 
Frederick II (Frederick the Great), 14, 30, 

54 

Frederick qf the Palatinate, 11 

Frederick William IV, 16 

Frederick William the Great Elector, 11 

Free Conservative Party, 18 

Free German Trade Union Federation 
(Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund — 
FDGB), 45, 87, 97-99; cadre system, 
188; and Council of Ministers, 170; and 
People's Chamber, 172; structure, 98 

Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche 
Jugend— FDJ), 60, 92, 99-100; cadre 
system, 188; Ernst Thalmann Pioneer 
Organization, 240; Hans Beimler Con- 
test, 240; and People's Chamber, 100, 
172; premilitary training, 239-41; 
teaching of political reliability, 240, 
241; and the Third World, 241 

French Revolution (1789), 14 

Friendship (Druzhba) oil pipeline, 144, 
309 

Friendship Group, France — GDR, 218 
Fiirstenberg, 270 
Fiirstenwalde, 144 



Garrisoned People's Police (Kasernierte 
Volkspolizei— KVP): Alert Units, 229; 
creation, 225; and military obligations, 
260; transformation under the Warsaw 
Pact, 340 

General German Workers' Association, 
18 

Gentz, Frederick von, 15 
geography, xxi-xxii, 59; Borderland, 65; 
boundaries, 61-63; central lowlands, 63; 



421 



East Germany: A Country Study 



northern plain, 63; regions, 63-65; 

restricted zone, 62; uplands, 65 
George, Stefan, 30 
George Circle, 30 
Gera, 65, 70 
Gerlach, Manfred, 195 
German Academy for Politics, 30 
German Administration of the Interior 

(see also Ministry of the Interior), 225, 

226 

German Confederation (Deutscher 

Bund), 14-17, 16; dissolution of, 17 
German Democratic Party (Deutsche 

Demokratische Partei — DDP), 27 
German Economic Commission (Deutsche 

Wirtschaftskomission — DWK), xxvii, 

45 

German Free Thought Party, 19 
German Gymnastics and Sports Federa- 
tion, 101 

German National People's Party (Deutsch- 
nationale Volkspartei— DNVP), 27, 28, 
33 

German People's Party (Deutsche 

Volkspartei— DVP), 27, 28 
Germanic tribes, 4, 71 
Gestapo (Secret State Police), 34 
Gleichschaltung, 34, 35; resistance to, 41-42 
Gneisenau, August, 77 
Goebbels, Joseph, 35 
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 29, 72, 77 
Goetting, Gerald, 195 
Goldbach, Joachim, 251 
Goldbaum, Ernst, 196 
Golden Bull, 9 
Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 341 
Gorbachev, Mikhail S., xxxii, 192, 193, 

298; endorsement of Honecker, 184; 

and the Warsaw Pact, 368-70 
Gotha, 18 

government (see also civil bureaucracy; 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutsch- 
lands — SED)), xxiv, 167-77; authoritar- 
ian rule, 3, 33; cessation of political/ 
administrative ties with the West, 228; 
citizen participation, 175; Community 
Constitution (Gemeindeverfassung), 175; 
Council of Ministers, xxiv, xxviii, 124, 
126, 168-70; Council of State, xxiii, 
xxiv, 165, 170-71; and democratic cen- 
tralism, 44-45, 55, 166, 170, 175, 
181-82; district and local, 174-75; 



establishment of the GDR, 45; histori- 
cal developments, xxvii; and interna- 
tional legitimacy, xxvii-xxviii, xxxii, 
203; judicial system, 171, 175-77, 277- 
81; legislature, xxiv, 164, 171-74; over- 
lap with party apparatus, 168; 
parliamentary-democratic model, 164; 
People's Chamber (Volkskammer), 164; 
post-World War II, 42-45; president, 
27, 164, 165; public recognition of, 75, 
231; and religion, 61; role of political 
parties, 164-65; and the Socialist Unity 
Party of Germany (SED), 163, 168, 180; 
sovereignty, 46-47; under Soviet con- 
trol, 45-47; stability of, 199-202; States 
Chamber (Landerkammer), 45, 164, 
165; Weimar Republic, 25, 27; and 
women, 103 

Graetz, Manfred, 251 

Great Interregnum, 8, 10 

Great Peasant War of 1525, 10, 54, 266 

Grechko, Andrei, 344 

Gribkov, A.I., 372 

Goring, Hermann, 35; "guns versus but- 
ter" slogan, 36 
Grosse Organisation, 42 
Grosz, George, 31 

Group of Soviet Forces in Germany 
(GSFG), xxiv, xxxi, 234, 270-72, 334; 
and the 1953 workers' uprising, 337; 
border security, 261; and East German 
air force, 257; force locations, 270, 272; 
organization, 270, 272; and the Warsaw 
Pact, 272 

Gr under zeit, 19 

Grundorganisationen (GOs), 186-87 
GSFG. See Group of Soviet Forces in Ger- 
many (GSFG) 
Guard Detachment (Schutzstaffel — SS), 
35, 36 



Haber, Herbert, 183, 184 
Habsburg Dynasty, 8-9 
Haldex, 305 

Halle, 63, 65, 137, 143; population, 69 
Hallstein Doctrine, 203, 244 
Hardenberg, Karl August von, 54, 77 
Harich, Wolfgang, 47 
Harz, 62, 65 

Harzburg Front coalition, 33 
Havemann, Robert, 54, 114 
health care, xxii, 60, 87-88; cancer rate, 87 



422 



Index 



Hegel, Georg, 73 

Helsinki Accords, xxiv, 53, 191, 208, 360 
Helsinki Final Act, 53 
Henry II, 7 
Henry IV, 7 
Henry VI, 8 
Heringsdorf, xxiii 
Hermann, Joachim, 200 
Heusinger, Hans-Joachim, 169, 176 
Heym, Georg, 30 
Hiller, Kurt, 30 
Himmler, Heinrich, 35, 41 
Hindenburg, Paul von, 3, 4, 23, 24, 29, 
33, 34 

Hitler, Adolf, 3, 4, 31-42, 82; and anti- 
Semitism, 31; assassination plot, 41- 
42; beer hall putsch, 32; chancellor of 
the republic, 34; as fiihrer, 35; and 
lebensraum, 36 
Hitler Youth (Hitlerjugend— HJ), 32 
Hoffmann, Heinz, 227, 231, 243, 250 
Hohenlohe, Chlodwig zu, 21 
Hohenstaufen Dynasty, 8 
Hohenzollern Dynasty, 11, 17 
Holocaust. See concentration camps 
Holy Roman Empire, 7, 8, 11 
Honecker, Erich, xxiii, xxviii, 51, 74; as 
chairman of the Council of State, 200; 
and China, 211; and the church, 112; 
and East-West rapprochement, 52; and 
the economy, 134, 154; and national 
consciousness, 76-77; and propaganda, 
200; and the Socialist Unity Party of 
Germany (SED), xxviii-xxix, 179; 
Soviet endorsement of, 163; and Soviet 
Union, 179; visit to West Germany, 
xxxii, xxxiii, 206, 214; and West Ger- 
many, 3, 367 
housing, 60, 155-56, 159; construction, 
135; preferential treatment, 86; private 
ownership, 156; subsidized rentals, 53; 
working class, 85-86 
Hoyerswerda, 59, 82 
Hugenberg, Alfred, 32 
human rights, 52, 191; Lutheran Church 
activities, 112; monitoring station in 
Salzgitter, 215 
Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 54 
Hungary, 17; and Berlin-Rome Axis, 39; 
bilateral mutual assistance treaties, 51 ; 
and Comecon, 298; currency converti- 
bility, 318; foreign relations with, xxxii, 
206; intraregional trade, 315; invasion 



of Czechoslovakia, xxx; 1956 revolu- 
tion, xxx, 342-43; Red Army occupa- 
tion of, 333, 334; and the Southern 
Group of Forces, 342; and the Third 
World, 362; trade relationship, 149, 
151 

Husak, Gustav, 370 

Iakubovskii, Ivan, 347 

immigration, post-World War II, 66 

Imperial Germany, 3, 18-25 

imports, xxiii, 120, 148-49; from Algeria, 
216; from Comecon partners, 151; 
crude oil, xxii; food products, xxiii; 
hard coal, 137; natural gas, xxii; from 
Soviet Union, 149; from West Ger- 
many, 152 

Indemnity Bill, 17 

Independent Social Democratic Party, 27, 
28 

industry, xxii, 19, 20, 136-38; artisans, 
48; chemicals, xxix, 20, 35, 138; elec- 
trical equipment, 20; gross industrial 
production, 138; labor force, 138; 
machinery, xxix, 138; nationalization, 
44, 46, 48, 84, 130; and the Nazis, 36; 
New Course policy, 46; price subsidies, 
51; production rates and quotas, 48, 
132, 135, 136, 158; under Soviet 
administration, 44 
Institute for Marxism-Leninism, 185 
Institute for Marxist-Leninist Sociology, 
202 

Institute for Nuclear Research, 310 
Institute for Opinion Research, 202 
intellectuals: creative intelligensia, 92-93; 
and dissent, 61, 113, 114; emigration, 
67; political elite, 90-92; privileges, 92, 
94; Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
(SED) attitude towards, 190; technical 
intelligensia, 93-95 
Interatominstrument, 305 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
(IRBMs), 209; deployment in West 
Germany, xxxii; public attitudes to- 
wards, 81-82; Soviet-American agree- 
ment, xxxiii 
Intermetal, 305 

internal security. See civil defense; national 
security 

International Bank for Economic Cooper- 
ation, 305, 317; establishment, 309 



423 



East Germany: A Country Study 



International Investment Bank. 305. 318; 
foundation. 312: interest rates and 
Comecon members. 324 

Intershops. 146. 198 

Intertekstilmash. 305 

Investiture Controversy. 7-8 

investments, 131. 144. 158: and Come- 
con coordination. 310 

Italy. 55: and Anti-Comintern Pact. 37; 
economic cooperation. 218: and World 
War I. 22: and World War II. 39 

JAF. See Joint Armed Forces (JAF) 
Japan: economic cooperation. 218; and 

World War II. 39 
Jarowinsky, Werner. 183 
Jaruzelski. Wojciech. 364 
Jena, 70 

Jews. 82-83. 110: anti-Semitism. 31. 40; 

extermination camps. 41: population. 

59: and the Socialist Unity Party of 

Germany (SED) purge, 228 
Joint Armed Forces (JAF). 344. 356. 372 
JP. See Young Pioneers (Junge Pioniere — 

JP) 

Judeo-Christian tradition. 73 

judicial system: abolition of death penalty. 
281: courts. 171. 176-77. 278-79: elec- 
tion of personnel. 176: under Hitler, 
34; military system, 176. 247. 249; 
Ministry of Justice. 176; Ministry of 
State Security, 275; Napoleonic code. 
278-79; Office of the General Prosecut- 
ing Attorney. 171. 176: Penal Code. 
280-81: penal institutions. 275. 280: 
perception of crime. 277-78: and the 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
(SED). 175-76; and young people. 281 

Jugendweihe (youth dedication). Ill 

Junkers. 11, 44, 54 

Kadar. Janos. 370 

Kamenz. 257 

Kant. Immanuel. 73 

Kantorowicz. Ernst. 30 

KAP. See Cooperative Departments of 
Crop Production (Kooperative Abteil- 
ungen der Pflanzenproduktion — KAP) 

Kapp Putsch. 28 

Karl, Freiherr vora Stein. 54. 77 

Karl Marx Party College. 185 



Karl-Marx-Stadt. 65. 114: population. 

68, 69 
Kehr. Eckart. 30 
Kessin. 114 

Kessler. Heinz. 184. 250 
Kiihlungsborn. 229 

Khrushchev. Xikita. 47. 310. 339, 340 
Kleiber. Gunther. 169. 183 
Kohl. Helmut, xxxiii. 213 
Konev. Ivan. 234 

KPD. See Communist Party of Germany 
(Kommunistische Partei Deutsch- 
lands— KPD) 

Kreisauer Circle. 42 

Krenz. Egon. 171. 183 

Kreuznach. 24 

Kriegszielmehrheit . 23 

Kristallnacht (Crystal Night), 40 

Krolikowski, Werner. 169. 200 

Krupp. 36 

Kulikov, Viktor, 363 
Kulturkampf (struggle for civilization), 18, 
19 

Kutzschebauch, Gunther. 241 
KYP. See Garrisoned People's Police 
( Kasernierte Yolkspolizei — KYP) 

labor force (see also trade unions), 120-22; 
agriculture and forestry. 84. 138: 
emigration. 48. 121: Hungarian work- 
ers. 322: Imperial Germany, 20: indus- 
trial sector. 138: and the Nazis. 36: 
1950's. 131: 1960's. 131; opportunities. 
80: payroll tax. 135; post-World War 
I. 28; productivity, 46. 48. 99. 121. 
134: religious discrimination. 108; ser- 
vice sector. 131. 156: shortage, 121; 
socialist sector. 121; under Soviet con- 
trol. 46: standard workweek, 122: 
strikes (1917), 23-24; unemployment. 
1930's. 32-33: use of robots. 121: 
women, 53. 60. 96, 121. 131 

Lake Constance. 10 

lakes. 63 

Lamberz. Werner. 200 

Lange. Ingeborg. 184 

language, xxii. 72: contributions to civili- 
zation. 72: development of linguistic 
differences. 77; dialects. 72-73; 
influence of foreign languages, 73; 
Middle Kingdom. 7; and national con- 
sciousness. 78-79: official jargon. 79; 



424 



Index 



purification programs, 73; Slavic, 82; 
spoken, 72-73; written, 72 

Lassalle, Ferdinand, 18 

Latin America, Comecon support in, 
325-26 

Lausitz, 229 

Lubeck Bay, 62, 260 

Law Toward the Completion of the Con- 
stitution, 165 

League for Friendship Among Peoples 
(Liga fur Volker Freundschaft), 195 

League of Democratic Communists of 
Germany, 54-55 

League of Nations (see also United Nations 
(UN)), 29; withdrawal from, 36 

legislative system. See government 

Leipzig, xxiii, 63, 65, 137, 247; popula- 
tion, 69 

Lessing, Gotthold, 72 

Leuna, 144 

Liberal Democratic Party of Germany 
(Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutsch- 
lands— LDPD), xxviii, 43, 45, 195; and 
Council of Ministers, 169; membership, 
194 

liberal reform movement (liberalism), 

15-16, 19 
Liberman, Evsei, 48, 132 
Libya, 362-63 
Liebknecht, Karl, xxix, 54 
Liebknecht, Wilhelm, 18 
Liechtenstein, 152 
literature. See cultural developments 
Locarno treaties, 29, 37 
Lorenz, Siegfried, 184 
Louis I (Louis the Pious), 5-6 
LPGs. See Agricultural Cooperatives 

(Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenos- 

senschaften — LPGs) 
Lubmin, 137 

Liickentheorie (Bismarck), 17 

Ludendorff, Erich, 23, 24, 32 

Luther, Martin, xxix, 9, 54, 72, 77; On 

the Freedom of a Christian Man, 10 
Lutheran Church: and education, 239; 
formal recognition of, 10; and govern- 
ment, 61; independent peace move- 
ment, xxxi, 61, 113, 114, 243; influence 
on social values, 73; and military ser- 
vice, 243; opposition to Socialist Unity 
Party of Germany (SED) policies, 55; 
organization, 60-61, 108-10 
Luxembourg, 38 



Luxemburg, House of, 8 
Luxemburg, Rosa, 54, 266 

Machtpolitik (Bismarck), 17, 19 
Magdeburg, xxiii, 63, 65, 143; Group of 

Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), 

272; population, 69 
Maginot Line, 38 

Main Administration for Air Police, 229 
Main Administration for Reconnaissance, 
273 

Main Administration for Sea Police, 229 
Main Administration for Security of the 

Economy, 273 
Main Administration for Struggle Against 

Suspicious Persons, 273 
Main Administration of the Border Police 

and Alert Units, 226 
Main Administration of the People's 

Police, 229 
Main Administration of Training, 227, 

229 

Main Coordinating Administration, 273 
Main Department for Communications 

Security and Personnel Protection, 273 
Main Department for Military Courts, 

279 

Main Task, 52-53 

Malenkov, Georgi, 46 

Mann, Heinrich, 30 

Mann, Thomas, 31 

Marc, Franz, 30 

Marne River, 24 

Marshall Plan, 299 

Marx, Karl, xxix, 73 

Marxism-Leninism, xxvii, xxxi, 52; criti- 
cism principle, 182; democratic cen- 
tralism principle, 181; and national 
consciousness, 79; party-mindedness 
principle, 181-82; and perception of 
crime, 277; and proletarian internation- 
alism, 246; and the Socialist Unity 
Party of Germany (SED), 45, 178-79 

Marxist Institute for Social Research, 30 

mass organizations (see also under names 
of organizations), 60, 97-103, 172 

Matthias, Emperor, 1 1 

Miickenberger, Erich, 184 

Mecklenburg, 42; and peace movement, 
114 

Mecklenburg, Ernst, 196 



425 



East Germany: A Country Study 



media: Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachricht- 
endienst (ADN), 197; censorship, 199; 
Junge Welt, 197, 198; Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, 45; Neues Deutschland, 197; 
newspapers, 197-98; radio, 198; Socia- 
list Unity Party of Germany (SED) con- 
trol of, 196-99; television, 198-99; 
Tribune, 197, 198 
medieval Germany, 5-9 
Mein Kampf (Hitler), 32, 35 
Meissen, 114 
Merovingian Dynasty, 5 
Metternich, Klemens von, 14-15 
Middle East {see also under names of 
individual countries); military presence 
in, 216 
Middle Kingdom, 6-7, 10 
Mielke, Erich, xxviii, 169, 273 
migration (Volkerwanderung) (see also 
emigration); ancient period, 4-5; rural- 
urban, 20 

military education (see also armed forces), 
238-42; as basis for career advance- 
ment, 239; Franz Mehring Officer 
School of the Air Force/Air Defense 
Force, 249; Lutheran Church protest, 
239; and mass organizations, 239-42; 
Military Service Law of 1982, 238, 239, 
241, 269; Red Cross, 242; and school 
curriculum, 238; women, 242, 249 

military service (see also armed forces); 
church objections, 243; and conscien- 
tious objectors, 242-43; employment 
discrimination, 243; and engineer/con- 
struction companies, 242-43; penalties 
for refusal, 242 

Military Service Law of 1982: and com- 
pulsory premilitary education, 238, 
239, 241-42, 269; and conscientious 
objectors, 242-43 

mining, xxii; coal, 20; iron and steel, 20; 
lignite, 134, 136-37, 158; mineral 
resources, 65, 69, 120, 136-37 

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Foodstuffs, 125 

Ministry of Defense, 230, 250-51; crea- 
tion of, 231-32; organization of, 251; 
Soviet staff, 251 

Ministry of Finance, 145 

Ministry of Foreign Trade, 124 

Ministry of Justice, 176 

Ministry of State Security, xxiv, xxxi, 45, 
223; armed agencies, 273-75; comman- 



do units, 273; creation of, 229-30; 
penal system, 275, 280; uniformed 
units, 230 

Ministry of the Interior (see also German 
Administration of the Interior), xxv, 
xxxi, 223, 228; Alert Units, 232; armed 
agencies, 272-73; penal institutions, 
280; and Working-Class Combat 
Groups, 275 

Mittag, Giinter, 183, 200 

Muller, Gerhard, 184 

Miiller, Margaret, 184 

Miintzer, Thomas, 54 

Molotov, Viacheslav, xxvii, 338 

Moltke, Helmuth von (the Younger), 22, 
23 

Mongolia: and Comecon, 299, 300, 324, 

325; intraregional trade, 315 
Moravia, 38 
Morocco, 21, 22 
Moscow Treaty, 51 

Mozambique, 153, 216; military assis- 
tance to, 244-45 

Munich Conference (September 1938), 38 

Mussolini, Benito, 37 

Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction 
Agreement, xxiv 

Nagy, Imre, 342 

Nakasone, Yasuhiro, 218 

Napoleonic era, 14, 15 

Napoleonic Code, 278-79 

National Assembly, 25 

national consciousness: and language 
development, 78-79; national heroes, 
77; public attitudes, 80-82; selective 
interpretation of history, 77-78 

National Defense Council, 171; and 
declaration of mobilization, 269 

National Democratic Party of Ger- 
many (National-Demokratische Partei 
Deutschlands— NDPD), xxviii, 45, 
196; and Council of Ministers, 169; 
membership, 194 

National Economic Council, 49 

National Front, 45, 165; establishment of, 
228 

National Liberal Party, 18, 19, 23 
National People's Army (Nationale Volks- 
armee — NVA), (see also armed forces), 
xxiv, xxxi, 227; administration of, 250- 
51; air force/air defense force, 256-58; 



426 



Index 



assertion of Prussian heritage, 54; and 
Berlin Wall construction, 234; career 
service, 267; conscription, 267; creation 
of, 47, 229, 231-32; and invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, 236; discipline, 268- 
69; ground forces, 251-53; and internal 
security, 250; mission of, 250; pay 
scales, 268; People's Navy, 253-56; 
ration scales, 268; and Warsaw Pact, 
272 

national security, xxiv-xxv, 223-81; civil 
defense system, 237-38; effect of 1953 
uprising, 230-31; emigration problems, 
233, 234; external threats, 223; Group 
of Soviet Forces in Germany, 270-72; 
historical development of, 223-27; 
intelligence operations, 273; internal 
threats, 223; international recognition 
issue, 234; military treaties, xxv; mobi- 
lization, 269-70; paramilitary forces, 
272-77; sabotage and espionage protec- 
tion, 283; during Soviet occupation, 
223-27; surveillance of foreigners, 273, 
274; and the Third World, 244-46; and 
the Warsaw Pact, 232 

National Service Act of 1962, 235 

National Socialist German Workers' 
Party (National-Sozialistische Deutsche 
Arbeiterpartei — NSDAP), 3-4, 31, 
196; alliance with German National 
People's Party, 32; and Aryan superi- 
ority, 33; and the depression, 33; 
lebensraum, 33; membership, 32; and 
propaganda, 32, 35 

nationalism {see also national conscious- 
ness), xxix, 22 

nationalization of industry. See industry 

natural gas. See energy 

Naumann, Konrad, 183, 184 

Naval Bill, 21 

navy, xxiv, 253-56; amphibious forces, 
256; aviation forces, 253, 256; Coastal 
Border Brigade, 253, 255, 256; coor- 
dination with Combined Baltic Fleet, 
253; coordination with Soviet Baltic 
Fleet, 250, 373; creation, 229; equip- 
ment, 255-56; locations, 255; 1918 
mutiny, 25; policy, 30; and the Polish 
navy, 250; structure of, 255; under 
Tirpitz, 21 ; training, 229; and the War- 
saw Pact, 358, 373 

Nazi-Soviet Nonagression Pact (1939), 
333 



Nazis. See National Socialist German 
Workers' Party (National-Sozialistische 
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei — NSDAP) 

NDPD. See National Democratic Party of 
Germany (National-Demokratische 
Partei Deutschlands— NDPD) 

Neisse River, 42 

NES. See New Economic System (NES) 
Netherlands, 38 

Neubrandenburg, 63, 248; population, 68 
Neumann, Alfred, 169 
Neuruppin, 272 
New Course, 46 

New Economic System (NES), 48-50, 75, 
132 

Nicaragua, military assistance to, 246 

Nietzsche, Friedrich, 73 

Ninth Party Congress, 54, 77, 179, 180, 

190-91 
Nolde, Emil, 30 
Nomenklatur system, 188 
Norden, Albert, 191 
Nordhausen, 260 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), xxxi, 75, 204; admission of 
West Germany, 337, 338; IRBM 
deployments by, xxxii, 365; and the 
Warsaw Pact, xxxi, 365-67, 370-72 

North German Confederation, 17 

North Korea, 300 

Northern Group of Forces (NGF), 334 
Norway, 38 

November Revolution, 25 
nuclear energy, 47-48, 112; safety agree- 
ments with West Germany, xxxiii 
Nuremberg Laws of 1935, 40 



Oder River, 42, 144 
Office of Sorbic Culture, 82 
Office of the General Prosecuting Attor- 
ney, 171, 176 
Olteanu, Constantin, 368 
Opitz, Otto, 226 
opposition groups. See dissent 
Orthodox Christians, 110 
Ostergeschenk, 24 
Ostpolitik, 71, 213 
Otto I (Otto the Great), 7 



Pact of Steel, 38 
Pankow, 245 



427 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Papen, Franz von, 33 

Parow, 229 

Pavlovskii, I.G., 350 

PCC. See Political Consultative Commit- 
tee (PCC) 

peace movement. See dissent 

Peace of Augsburg of 1555, 10 

Peace of Prague, 11 

Peace of Westphalia, 11 

Peenewerft shipyard, 256 

Penal Code, 280-81 

People's Chamber, xxiv, xxviii, 163; 
creation, 45; functions, 172, 173-74; 
membership, 171, 172; Presidium, 171, 
172; and Socialist Unity Party of Ger- 
many (SED), 173, 174; standing com- 
mittees, 172-73, 174 

People's Navy. See navy 

People's Police (Volkspolizei) {see also 
police), xxiv, xxv, 229; and 1953 up- 
rising, 46; Alert Units, 273; foundation 
of the, 225-27; suppression of anti- 
regime incidents, 236 

People's Tribunal, 34 

Peter, Fritz, 251, 275 

petroleum. See energy 

PGs. See Production Cooperatives (Pro- 
duktionsgenossenschaften — PGs) 

Pieck, Wilhelm, 45, 165 

pipelines, xxiii, 144 

Pima, 260 

Poland, xxxii, 7; 1956 workers' riots, 
341-42; acquisition of German lands, 
62; bilateral mutual assistance treaties, 
51; British and French defense of, 38; 
and Comecon, 298, 313; and invasion 
of Czechoslovakia, xxx; East German- 
Soviet collaboration in, 211; foreign 
debt, 314; invasion of, 38; martial law, 
xxxii; post-war settlement, xxvii; Red 
Army occupation of, 334; reform move- 
ment, xxx; Solidarity movement, xxx, 
55; Soviet control of the military, 333, 
336-37; Third World assistance, 362; 
trade relationship, 137, 149, 151; and 
the Warsaw Pact, 363-65 

police, xxv (see also Garrisoned People's 
Police (Kasernierte Volkspolizei — 
KVP); People's Police (Volkspolizei)); 
Border Police, 226, 229, 234; and 
Ministry of the Interior, 232; 1949 
purge, 227; and political reliability, 
227; repression of dissent, xxxi; 



training, 227; Transport Police, xxiv, 
xxv, 226, 229, 273; Water Police, 260 

Polish Corridor, 24 

Polish United Workers Party, xxx 

Politburo, xxviii, 55, 163, 182-84; and 
Central Party Control Commission, 
184; and the economy, 124; educational 
profile, 91; formation, 44; membership, 
50, 183-84 

Political Consultative Committee (PCC), 
339, 349-50, 351 

political developments, xxiii-xxiv; federal 
republic, 25, 27; international recogni- 
tion, 52, 190-91; resistance to detente, 
49-52; socialism, 75; two-nation policy, 
59 

political ideologies. See liberal reform 
movement (liberalism); Marxism- 
Leninism 

political parties (see also under names of 
parties); "Alliance Policy" (Bundnispoli- 
tik), 163, 193-94; under Hitler, 35; 
membership of People's Chamber, 172; 
and National Front coalition, 45; and 
newspapers, 197; post- World War II, 
42-44 

Pope Gregory VII, 7 

population, xxii, 20, 59, 65-66; birthrate, 
67; death rate, 68; density, 68-70; effect 
of historical trends, 66-68; female sur- 
plus, 66; internal migration, 70; mar- 
riage and divorce rates, 67-68; urban, 
70 

ports and shipping, xxiii, 69, 143-44; 
merchant fleet, 143 

Potsdam, 63, 143, 247; population, 69 

Potsdam Conference, 42, 224 

Potsdam-Elstal, 272 

Potsdam Protocol of 1945, 62 

Prchlik, Vaclav, 348 

premilitary training. See military edu- 
cation 

president. See government 
press. See media 

Production Cooperatives (Produktions- 

genossenschaften — PGs), 48 
Progressive Party, 18 
Progressives, 19 

Protestant League of Schmalkalden, 10 

Protestant Reformation, 9-11 

Prussia, 3, 8, 11, 14, 16; GDR rejection 

of, 54; military reform, 16-17 
Psychoanalytic Institute, 30 



428 



Index 



Patz, 260 

Publicly Owned Enterprises (Volkseigene 

Betriebe— VEBs), 46, 48 
railroads, xxiii, 18, 20, 141, 142; effect 

of war reparations, 142 
rainfall, 63, 65 

Red Army and allied national units, 
333-34 

Red Band {Rote Kapelle), 41, 54 
Red Cross, 242 
Reformation, 9-11 
Regensburg, 39 
Reich Cultural Chamber, 35 
Reichelt, Hans, 169 
Reichsbank, 29 
Reichsrat, 25, 27 

Reichstag (Imperial Parliament), 18, 19, 
21, 25; during depression years, 33-34 

Reinhold, Wolfgang, 251 

religion {see also Jews; Lutheran Church; 
Roman Catholic Church), xxii, 60-61, 
108-12; adoption of Christianity, 5; 
discrimination, 108; financing, 110; 
Orthodox Christians, 110; relationship 
with government, 110-12; and the 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutsch- 
lands — SED), 55; ties with the West, 
110, 111-12 

Reservist Regulation of 1982, 269 

"revolution of the intellectuals," 16 

Rhineland, 20, 37; Allied occupation of, 
24, 28 

Rohm, Ernst, 31 

Riesa, xxiii 

roads, xxiii, 141, 142; West German 
assistance, 142 

Roman Catholic Church, 5, 110; and 
military service, 243; and the Reforma- 
tion, 9 

Roman Empire, 4-5 

Romania, 55; and Berlin-Rome Axis, 39; 
and civilian defense, 346; and Come- 
con, 298, 310; intraregional trade, 315; 
military budget, 366; military technol- 
ogy, 379; Red Army occupation of, 
333, 334; trade relationship, 151; and 
the Warsaw Pact, 345-47, 367-68 

Rommel, Erwin, 42 

Rosenberg, Alfred, 31, 32 

Rostock, xxiii, 63, 143-44; and peace 
movement, 114; population, 69 

Rostock-Gehlsdorf, 253 



Rothenburg, 257 
Rudolf of Habsburg, 9 
Ruhr, 20; French and Belgian occupa- 
tion, 28, 29 
Russia. See Soviet Union 



SA. See Stormtroopers (Sturmabteilung — 
SA) 

Saale River, 65 
Saar, 20 

SAGs. See Soviet joint stock compa- 
nies (Sowjetische Aktiengesellschaf- 
ten— SAGs) 

Salian Dynasty, 7 

Salzgitter, 215 

Sassnitz, xxiii 

Saxon Dynasty, 7 

Saxony, 20, 42, 234 

Saxony-Anhalt, 42 

Schabowski, Gamer, 183, 184, 185 

Schacht, Hjalmar, 36 

Scharnhorst, Gerhard von, 14, 54, 77, 
266 

Schiller, Johann von, 72, 77 
Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik (Kehr), 30 
Schleicher, Kurt von, 34 
Schleswig-Holstein, 17, 24 
Schlieffen, Alfred von, 22 
Schlieffen Plan, 22-23 
Schurer, Gerhard, 169 
Schulze, Rudolf, 169 
Schuschnigg, Kurt von, 37 
Schwedt, 144 
Schwein district, 63 
Schweinfurt, 39 
Schwerin, 63, 243 

SD. See Special Duty Section (Sonder- 

dienst— SD) 
Second Reich, 18 

Secret State Police (Geheime Staats- 
polizei — Gestapo), 34 

Secretariat of the Socialist Unity Party of 
Germany (SED), 55, 163, 184-85; and 
Central Committee responsibilities, 
185; and Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, 185; formation, 44; 
membership, 185 

September Program of 1914, 23, 24 

Seventh Party Congress, 166 

Seven Weeks' War, 17 

Seven-Year Plan (1959-65). See develop- 
ment plans 



429 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Seven Years' War, 14 
Seyss-Inquart, Arthur von, 37 
Shevardnadze, Eduard, 206 
Shultz, George, 219 
Siemens, 36 

Sindermann, Horst, xxviii, 170, 171, 195, 
200 

Sixth Party Congress, 132 
Slovakia, 38; and Berlin-Rome Axis, 39 
SMAD. See Soviet Military Administra- 
tion in Germany (Sowjetische Militar- 
administration in Deutschland — 
SMAD) 

Social Democratic Labor Party, 18 

Social Democratic Party of Germany 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch- 
lands— SPD), xxix, 18, 19, 20, 21, 27, 
28, 43-44; merger with Communist 
Party of Germany, 178; Nazi resis- 
tance, 41; opposition to World War I 
annexationist goals, 23, 24 

Social Democrats, 3; and control of 
government, 25 

Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozi- 
alistische Einheitspartei Deutsch- 
lands — SED), xxiii, xxvii, 3, 177-93; 
Abteilungsparteiorganization (APO), 
186-87; and alliance parties, 193-96; 
cadres, 187-89; and career advance- 
ment, 90; Central Committee, 44, 50, 
55, 91, 185-86; and coercion, xxx- 
xxxi, 181, 201; and Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, 191-92; and crime 
control, 278; cultural policy, xxviii- 
xxix; and democratic centralism, xxviii, 
181-82; district and local party organi- 
zation, 186-87; and the economy, 123- 
24; education and professionalization, 
50, 91, 182, 189; Eighth Party Con- 
gress, 52, 167, 190; Eleventh Party 
Congress, 157, 184, 192-93; formation 
of, 44; and the Free German Trade 
Union Federation, 98; and govern- 
ment, xxviii, 163, 168, 180; Grundor- 
ganisationen (GOs), 186-87; ideology 
and politics, 178-81; legitimation of, 
179, 199-202; and Marxism-Leninism, 
44-45, 178-79; mass participation, 
201; and the media, 196-99; member- 
ship, 49-50, 90-91, 182; membership 
benefits, 92; Neues Deutschland, 183; 
1950 purge, 228; 1953 purge, 231; 1957 
purge, 179, 199; Ninth Party Congress, 



54, 77, 179, 180, 190-91; Nomenklatur 
system, 188; "old-boy" network, 
91-92; organization and structure, 
181-82; party congresses, 189-93; 
Politburo, 182-84; political and eco- 
nomic factions, 50; and propaganda, 
52; research on public opinion, 201-2; 
and science and technology, 180; 
Secretariat, 184-85; selection and 
training, 187-89; Seventh Party Con- 
gress, 166; Sixth Party Congress, 132; 
Tenth Party Congress, 55-56, 167, 
179, 187, 191-92; Third Party Con- 
gress, 46 

society (see also standard of living; welfare 
programs), xxii, 59-115; citizenship, 
75; contributions to civilization, 72; 
creative intelligentsia, 92-93; cultural 
life, 71-73, 93, 190; "de-Nazification," 
83-84; emphasis on young people, 
99-102; establishment of separate iden- 
tity, 54; family life, 60, 95-97; and Ger- 
man unification, 73-76; identification 
with West Germany, 59; influence of 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
(SED), xxx-xxxi; minority groups, 82- 
83; national consciousness, 70-71, 72, 
202; national identity, 76-82; personal- 
ity characteristics, 71, 73, 79-80, 92; 
political elite, 90-92; religious and 
philosophical influences, 73; role of 
trade unions, 98-99; social stratifica- 
tion, 83-84; social values, 73; "socialist 
personality," 77, 79-80, 95; under 
Soviet control, 45-46; technical intel- 
ligentsia, 93-95; travel restrictions, 81; 
upward mobility, 84; visits to the West, 
67; working class, 85-90 
Society for Sport and Technology (Gesell- 
schaft fur Sport und Technik — GST), 
101; career training, 241-42; flight 
training, 257; premilitary training, 239, 
241; role of reservists, 270; and social- 
ism education, 242 
Solidarity. See Poland 
Sorbs, xxii, 82; population, 59 
Sorge, Richard, 266 
Southern Group of Forces (SGF), 342 
Soviet Control Commission, 46, 224, 228 
Soviet joint stock companies (Sowjetische 
Aktiengesellschaften — SAGs), 44, 46 
Soviet Military Administration in Ger- 
many (Sowjetische Militaradministration 



430 



Index 



in Deutschland — SMAD), 42, 224-25; 
economic reform program, 44 

Soviet Union, xxiv; Afghanistan invasion, 
55; alliance system, 1943-55, 333-37; 
bilateral defense treaty, xxv; bilateral 
economic relations, 308; changing atti- 
tudes towards, 178, 204-5; and Come- 
con, 297-329 passim; commitment to 
East Germany survival, 231-32; and 
East German government, 45-47; and 
East German military structure, 
224-25, 229, 231, 246, 251, 257; East 
Germany dependence on, xxvii-xxviii; 
and East Germany society, 45-46; eco- 
nomic relationship, xxix, 207-8, 308; 
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany 
(GSFG), xxiv, xxxi, 270-72, 334, 337; 
ideological and political collaboration, 
210-11; and inter-German relations, 
51, 206, 360, 367; intraregional trade, 
315; military equipment, 251-53, 378; 
and occupation of Germany, 223-27; 
political relationship, xxix-xxxiii, 55, 
364-65; reduction of oil deliveries, 135; 
strategic arms control policy, 209; 
Supreme High Command, 334; trade 
agreements, 150-51, 207; trade rela- 
tionship, 133-34, 137, 149, 207-8; 
troops in Germany, xxiv, 81, 210; war 
reparations, xxvii, 44, 46, 129-30, 309; 
and the Warsaw Pact, 331-79 passim; 
and West Germany, xxxiii, 75, 193; 
and World War I, 22, 24; and World 
War II, 38, 39 

Sozialdemokrat, 20 

Spanish Civil War, 37 

Spartacus League, 25, 54 

SPD. See Social Democratic Party of Ger- 
many (Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands— SPD) 

Special Duty Section (Sonderdienst— 
SD), 41 

SS. See Guard Detachment (Schutzstaf- 
fel— SS) 

SSD. See State Security Service (Staats- 
sicherheitsdienst — SSD) 

Stalin, Joseph, 44, 46; and creation of a 
military force in East Germany, 224; 
and Soviet domination strategy, 297 

standard of living (see also health care), 
xxii, xxix, 80, 85, 154; constitutional 
goal towards, 167; discrepancies 
between social groups, 180, 191; under 



New Economic System (NES), 50; 
post- World War I, 29; and price- 
support policies, 89-90; Socialist Unity 
Party of Germany (SED) program, 190 

State Planning Commission, 48, 49 

State Security Service (Staatssicherheits- 
dienst— SSD), 45, 201 

States Chamber (Landerkammer), 164, 
165; creation, 45 

Stauffenberg, Claus von, 42 

Stendal, 260 

Stoph, Willi, xxviii, 168, 170-71, 200, 
231, 232 

Stormtroopers (Sturmabteilung — SA), 

31, 32, 34 
Stralsund, xxiii, 143-44, 229; population, 

69 

Strausberg, 247 

Streit, Josef, 176 

Streletz, Fritz, 251 

Stresa Front, 37 

Stresemann, Gustav, 28 

Stresemann Era, 28^29 

strikes, 23-24; 1953 uprising, 46 

Sudan, 215 

Sudetenland, annexation of, 37-38 
Suhl district, 65 

Supreme Court, 171, 176-77, 279 
Suslov, Mikhail, 192 
Switzerland, 152 

System of Material Balance, 123, 126 



telecommunications. See communications 

Tenth Party Congress, 55-56, 167, 179, 
187, 191-92 

terrorism training, 245-46 

Third Party Congress, 46 

Third Reich, 34-40; defeat of, 4; dissen- 
sion, 41-42; institutionalization of sys- 
tem of terror, 36; surrender of, 40 

Third World: aid programs, xxx; East 
German military presence, 216; East 
German-Soviet cooperation in, 207-8; 
education assistance to, 192; military 
assistance to, 244-46, 362; policy 
towards, 215; role of non-Soviet War- 
saw Pact countries, 361-63; trade with, 
153; training of terrorists, 245-46; 
transportation assistance, 217 

Thirty Years' War, 10-11 

Thuringer Wald, 62, 65 

Thuringia, 42, 234 



431 



East Germany: A Country Study 



Tilly, Johann von, 11 

Tirpitz, Alfred von, 21 

Toeplitz, Heinrich, 176 

trade. See foreign trade 

trade unions {see also labor force), 97-99; 

dissolution of, 35; women participation, 

103 

Transit Agreement, 212 
transportation, xxiii, 68, 140-44; freight, 

143; under Hitler, 35; inter-German, 

212 

Treaty of Berlin, 29 

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 24 

Treaty of Olmutz, 16 

Treaty of Verdun, 6 

Treaty of Versailles, 24-25, 28, 29; Third 
Reich's violation, 36, 37; "war guilt 
clause," 25 

Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and 
Mutual Assistance. See Warsaw Pact 

Treaty on Mutual Assistance and Cooper- 
ation, 232 

Triple Entente, 21, 23 

Tschacher, Gunther, 193 

Teutonic pagan cosmology and social 
values, 73 

Ulbricht, Walter, xxviii, xxx, 3, 44, 45, 
199, 225; foreign policy, 51-52^ and the 
Lutheran Church, 111; removal of, 
200; and reunification, 74; and the 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
(SED), 179; and West Germany, 74, 
76, 360 

Ulbricht Doctrine, 51 

UN. See United Nations (UN) 

unification, 73-76; abandonment of, 179, 
213; constitutional abrogation of, 167; 
official policy, 74-76 

Union of Jewish Communities in the 
GDR (Verband der Judischen Gemein- 
den in der DDR), 83 

United Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
the German Democratic Republic, 108 

United Nations (UN), xxiv, 52, 202; 
admission, 76 

United States, xxiv, xxx, 218-19; and 
division of Germany, xxvii; trade rela- 
tionship, 152-53; and World War I, 24; 
and World War II, 39 

Unruh, Fritz von, 30 



urbanization: rural-urban migration, 20; 
socialist pattern, 70 

Varus, 4 

VEBs. See Publicly Owned Enterprises 
(Volkseigene Betriebe — VEBs) 

Vernunftrepublikaner , 28 

Vietnam: and Comecon, 299, 300, 324; 
guest workers in East Europe, 325 

Vblkischer Beobachter, 32 

Vormarz, 15 

VVBs. See Associations of Publicly Owned 
Enterprises (Vereinigungen Volkseige- 
ner Betriebe — VVBs) 

wages, 29, 154-55; armed forces, 268; 
Border Troops, 268; collective farms, 
140; under Honecker, 52; income 
differentials, 88; increases, 50; material 
incentives, 88; during World War II, 
36 

Wagner, Richard, 78 

Walde, Werner, 184 

Waldheim, 114 

Wallenstein, Albrecht von, 11 

War of Liberation, 14 

Warburg Library, 30 

Warsaw Pact, xxiv, xxv, xxxi, 202, 
331-79; admission of East Germany, 
340; and Albania, 343; and allied 
armies/security organizations, 237, 
344, 345, 356, 359; Committee of 
Ministers of Defense (CMD), 356; 
Committee of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs (CM FA), 351 ; and conflict over 
national/international interests, 367; 
and Czechoslovakia, 347-51; and 
detente, 360-61; duration of, 339; and 
East Germany, xxx, 232, 366; effects 
of de-Stalinization, 340-41; formal 
meetings of, 352-55; and the Hungar- 
ian revolution, 342-43; Joint Armed 
Forces QAF), 344, 356, 372; Joint 
Command, 339, 356, 358; joint mili- 
tary exercises, 344, 345, 371; Joint 
Staff, 339, 356, 358; legitimization of 
presence of Soviet troops, 338; link with 
Comecon, 299; membership of, 47; 
Military Council, 356, 358; mili- 
tary organization, 351-59; Military 
Scientific-Technical Council, 358, 368; 



432 



Index 



military technology, 376-79; and non- 
Soviet members, 332, 342, 372-75; and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), xxxi, 365-67, 370-72; oppo- 
sition to Soviet Union, 345-47, 359-60, 
364; organization of, 339-40, 351-59; 
and Poland, 349, 363-65; and "Polish 
October," 341-42; Political Consul- 
tative Committee (PCC), 339, 349-50, 
351; political organization, 351; and 
renewal of East- West conflict, 365; and 
Romania, 345-47; security organi- 
zation obligations, 237; Soviet alliance 
system as foundation for, 333-37; and 
the Soviet-Chinese dispute, 343; Soviet 
domination, 331, 339-40, 358; and 
Soviet military strategy, 370-72; Tech- 
nical Committee, 358, 368; and 
the Third World, 361-63; and 
Ulbricht, 51 

Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Coopera- 
tion, and Mutual Assistance. See War- 
saw Pact 

water supply, 120 

waterway system, xxiii, 141, 142, 143 

Weimar-Nohra, 272 

Weimar Republic, 3, 25-31; constitution, 

25, 27; cultural developments, 29-31; 

political parties, 178; as predecessor of 

East Germany, 77 
welfare programs (see also health care; 

housing), 60, 80; maternity benefits, 

53, 67, 96; pensions, 87-88; retirement, 

53; social insurance, 87 
Weltpolitik, 21 

the West: communications, 79, 81; de- 
ployment of IRBMs in Europe, 209; 
and East German economy, 134; 
foreign relations, 308-10; religious affil- 
iations, 110, 111-12; territorial invio- 
lability of Europe, 208; and Warsaw 
Pact, 365-67 

West Germany. See Federal Republic of 
Germany (West Germany) 

Westphalia, 20 

Wilhelm I, 16 



Wilhelm II, 20, 21, 23, 24 
Wilhelmine Era, 20-22 
Wismar, xxiii, 143-44; population, 69 
Wittelsbach, House of, 8 
Wittenberg University, 9 
Wiinsdorf, 272 

women: and the armed forces, 249; and 
education, 102-3, 106-8; in govern- 
ment, 103, 171, 184; maternity leave 
provisions, 53; position in marriage, 
95; and trade unions, 103; in the work 
force, 53, 60, 96, 102 
Workers' and Peasants' Faculty, 106 
Working-Class Combat Groups, xxiv; aid 
to Africa, 275; and Berlin Wall con- 
struction, 234; equipment, 275; person- 
nel, 275 

World Federation of Democratic Youth, 
100 

World Federation of Trade Unions, 97 
World War I {see also Treaty of Versailles), 
21, 22-25; allied occupations, 29; 
casualties, 24; reparations, 28, 29; sub- 
marine warfare, 23, 24; war aims, 23 
World War II, 38-42; allied occupation, 
42-45; casualties, 40; concentration 
camps, 40-41; effect on urbanization, 
70 

Wiirttemberg, 17 

Yalta Conference, 42, 224 

Young Pioneers (Junge Pioniere — JP), 
100-101, 240; military training, 239 

Young Plan of 1929, 29 

Yugoslavia, 55, 299; and Comecon, 300; 
occupation of, 39; post- World War II, 
334; territorial defense strategy, 344-45 

Zaisser, Wilhelm, 227, 231 
Der Zauberberg (Mann), 31 
Zhivkov, Todor, 370 
Zittau, 114 

Zossen-Wiinsdorf, 270 
Zwickau, 69 



433 



Published Country Studies 



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550-167 Finland 550-94 

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